Explaining the Romanian
Revolution of 1989
Culture, Structure, and Contingency
Dragog Petrescu
Editura Enciclopedicg
2010
Explaining the Romanian Revolution of 1989
Culture, Structure, and Contingency
DRAGOŞ PETRESCU
Descrierea CIP a Bibliotecii Naţionale a României
Petrescu, Dragoş
Explaning the Romanian Revolution of 1989: culture, structure
and contingency / Dragoş Petrescu – Bucureşti: Editura Enciclopedică,
2010
ISBN 978-973-45-0626-3
94(498)’’1989.12’’
ISBN 978-973-45-0626-3
Explaining the Romanian
Revolution of 1989
Culture, Structure, and Contingency
DRAGOŞ PETRESCU
Editura Enciclopedică
2010
EDItURA ENCICloPEDICĂ
Str. Luigi Cazzavillan nr. 17, sector 1, Bucureşti
Tel.: 021.317.90.35; Fax: 021.317.88.42
e-mail: difuzare@universenciclopedic.ro
enciclopedica2006@yahoo.com
www.universenciclopedic.ro
Tiparul executat la Regia Autonomă „Monitorul Oficial”
For Cristina
Contents
Introduction
9
Chapter 1
Conceptual Framework and Methodological Approach 27
Chapter 2
73
The December 1989 Events in Romania
Chapter 3
109
Structural Factors
Chapter 4
193
Conjunctural Factors
Chapter 5
246
Nation-Specific Factors
Concluding Remarks
The Revolution Explained
403
Selected Bibliography
417
Index
447
IntroduCtIon
The 1989 demise of communist regimes in East-Central Europe
(ECE) still poses difficult problems of interpretation, all the more
that a series of simple questions have not received yet a convincing
answer. For instance: Can one characterize the 1989 events in ECE
as revolutions? Is violence an essential element of a revolution? Six
countries, i.e. Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia,
Bulgaria and Romania witnessed a regime change in 1989. Although
only the 1989 events in Romania were violent, the revolutionary
character of those events was widely contested. When addressing the
regime changes of 1989, one of the most difficult tasks is to put
forward a viable explanation for an event of historic significance: the
final demise of the six communist dictatorships in the above
mentioned countries during the same year 1989. This book provides
an explanatory model for the collapse of the communist regimes in
ECE, applies it consistently to the case of Romania, and answers
some crucial questions concerning the causes, nature and outcome
of the 1989 events in that country such as: What happened in
December 1989 in Romania? Was it a revolution or a more or less
concealed coup d’état? If it was a true revolution – inasmuch as the
1989 events in ECE can be characterized as revolutions – why it
started in Timişoara, and why precisely in December 1989? Why
violence and bloodshed instead of a “negotiated revolution”? The
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IntroductIon
purpose of the present analysis is to focus on the specificity of the
1989 Romanian revolution and to identify the causes of the sudden
demise of the regime on 22 December 1989 at noon. The Romanian
communist regime ceased to exist at the very moment when the
helicopter that transported the Ceauşescu couple took off from the
upper platform of the building of the Central Committee of the
Romanian Communist Party at 1208 hours on 22 December 1989.
Even more blood was spilled however after 22 December and
therefore what happened after that moment represents an equally sad
and intriguing story. Simply put, the communist regime in Romania
collapsed on 22 December 1989 after protests by the population in
several major urban centers, which the regime tried in vain to
suppress. How and especially why this happened precisely in
December 1989 constitutes a complex problem to which no facile
solution exists. It is the purpose of the present book to address such
an intricate issue and shed some light on a topic that still needs
thorough investigation. The analysis is structured on five chapters.
Chapter 1 provides a comparative analysis of the most significant
similarities and differences between the 1989 events and the “classic”
revolutions of the modern age. This comparative analysis concludes
that the 1989 events in ECE can be termed as revolutions, but a
special kind of revolutions because they were non-utopian, nonviolent – with the conspicuous exception of Romania, and were not
carried out in the name of a particular class. Furthermore, in order
to explain the crucial issues of timing, sequence of events, and nature
of revolution (negotiated or non-negotiated, violent or non-violent)
this author puts forward an explanatory model that takes into
consideration both the domestic developments and the entangled
histories of the Soviet Bloc countries over the period 1945–1989.
This explanatory model combines a culturalist approach with
structural analysis, and takes into consideration the issue of
contingency. In other words, this book is based on the key concepts
of culture, structure, and contingency. The main argument put forward
IntroductIon
11
in Chapter 1 is that the collapse of communist rule in ECE was
provoked by an intricate interplay of nation-specific, structural, and
conjunctural factors, which ultimately determined the timing,
sequence, and nature of those events. Drawing on S. N. Eisenstadt’s
analysis of the 1989 phenomenon, this work proposes the generic
term “postmodern” revolutions when referring to the 1989
breakdown of communist rule in ECE. Two issues have been
considered in order to devise a working definition for the 1989
revolutions. First, mass mobilization and protest are regarded as an
important precondition of this kind of revolutions. Second, the 1989
revolutionary situation in ECE is seen as different from the classic
revolutionary situations in the sense that although an immediate
potential for open and fatal violence did exist, violence was rather
the exception and not the norm. From these, this author has devised
the following working definition of a revolution, which is utilized
throughout this work: A revolution is a rapid and fundamental domestic
change in the dominant values and myths of a society, in its political
institutions, social structure, leadership, and government activity and
policies, following violent or non-violent mass protests. Having reached
a working definition for the 1989 revolutions, the next step is to
provide a theoretical model able to explain the demise of the
communist regimes in six countries with different cultural-historical
and socio-economic backgrounds and characterized by distinct
political cultures. Hence, this author introduces the 1989 sequence
of collapse of communist dictatorships in ECE and argues that in
1989 the communist rule in the above-mentioned six countries in
ECE collapsed in the following order: Poland, Hungary, East
Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania.
To paraphrase Timothy Garton Ash, the six communist
dictatorships that collapsed throughout the year 1989 need qualifying
as much as the revolutions that brought them down. Since variations
among the Soviet bloc countries did exist, one has to specify what
kind of “modern dictatorships” were the communist dictatorships in
12
IntroductIon
the six countries under discussion. Thus, this author contends that
the 1989 sequence of collapse, i.e. Poland – Hungary – East
Germany – Czechoslovakia – Bulgaria – Romania, consisted in fact
of the demise of three types of communist dictatorships: (1) “nationalaccommodative” (Poland and Hungary); (2) “welfare” (East Germany
and Czechoslovakia); and (3) modernizing-nationalizing (Bulgaria
and Romania). The term “national-accommodative” communist
dictatorship employed by this author for Poland and Hungary has
been coined by Herbert Kitschelt, Zdenka Mansfeldova, Radoslaw
Markowski and Gábor Tóka, who have distinguished between
“bureaucratic-authoritarian,” “national-accommodative” and
“patrimonial” communist regimes. One can easily observe that the
initiation of the 1989 sequence of collapse originated in the camp of
“national-accommodative” communist dictatorships, where the 1989
revolutions took the form of “negotiated revolutions” based on the
roundtable principle. To characterize the communist dictatorships
in East Germany and Czechoslovakia – although the term applies
more to the Czech lands than to Slovakia, this author follows Konrad
H. Jarausch who has coined the concept of “welfare dictatorship.”
As Jarausch has aptly shown in his analysis of former German
Democratic Republic (GDR), such regimes were characterized by a
fundamental contradiction between “care and coercion.” The demise
of the “welfare dictatorships” in East Germany and Czechoslovakia
occurred through non-negotiated non-violent revolutions, under the
influence of the “negotiated revolutions” in neighboring Poland and
Hungary. With regard to Romania and Bulgaria, this author has
coined the term modernizing-nationalizing dictatorships in order to
characterize the communist regimes in those countries. The emphasis
on the “dynamic political stance” in this respect is crucial since the
communist power elites in both countries perceived their party-states
in the making as not completely modern and national, and therefore
devised policies aimed at spurring industrial development and creating
ethnically homogenous “socialist” nations.
IntroductIon
13
Having defined the 1989 sequence of collapse of state socialism
in ECE, the discussion further concentrates on the theoretical model
meant to provide a causal explanation for the inception, unfolding,
and outcome of the 1989 revolutions. This model is based on the
three categories mentioned above, i.e. structure, culture, and
contingency. According to the said model, the 1989 revolutions were
determined by a complicated and, sometimes, perplexing aggregation
of structural, nation-specific and conjunctural factors. These factors
operated and interacted in various ways in each of the countries
analyzed, but they were nevertheless present in each case. Such a
model is able to accommodate issues of path-dependency, patterns
of compliance and contestation under communist rule and questions
of interdependence at both international and Soviet Bloc level. The
particular way in which the above-mentioned factors aggregated
determined eventually the nature of the revolution in each of the
cases discussed, i.e. negotiated or non-negotiated, peaceful or violent,
as well as the order in which the six communist dictatorships were
overthrown. Ole Nørgaard and Steven L. Sampson have inspired this
kind of analysis focusing on three types of factors, namely, structural,
nation-specific, and conjunctural. Thus, in their study “Poland’s
Crisis and East European Socialism,” published in 1984, Nørgaard
and Sampson have explained the birth of the Polish Solidarity as an
outcome of social and cultural factors.
Chapter 2 addresses the peculiarities of the Romanian case and
discusses the conflicting representations of the Romanian revolution
in post-communism and the importance of a thorough event-centered
reconstruction of the rapidly unfolding events in December 1989.
Conflicting perceptions and recollections by direct participants, as
well as by simple bystanders, led to the appearance of an enduring
“Rashomon effect” in terms of public representations of the 1989
violent regime change in post-communism. The Romanian
revolution of 1989 was probably the most contested of all the 1989
revolutions in ECE, although it was the only one that possessed the
14
IntroductIon
main ingredients of a true, classic revolution, i.e. “violence, bloodshed
and tyrannicide” – as J. F. Brown wonderfully put it. Thus, Chapter
2 is structured on two parts. The first part addresses the main
interpretations of the 1989 regime change in Romania, including a
brief episode of ego-histoire, in order to illustrate the enduring
“Rashomon effect” that characterizes the general process of reflecting
on the December 1989 events in this country. To paraphrase the
title of a Romanian feature film directed by Corneliu Porumboiu
and released in 2006, the disarmingly simple question “Was it or not
a true revolution?” epitomizes the controversial nature of the
Romanian revolution of 1989. The second part of this chapter
provides a concise event-centered historical reconstruction of the
December 1989 events in Timişoara and Bucharest based primarily
on the recollections of the participants to those events. The historical
reconstruction provided here, which does not pretend to be
comprehensive, is meant to illustrate the fact that people in the street
perceived the 1989 events as revolutionary. Numerous protesters
were convinced that a revolution was sparked under their eyes and
wanted to take part to it. It is also true that “what happened
afterwards,” i.e. the coming to power of the second- and third- rank
apparatchiks in the immediate aftermath of the regime change,
changed the view of large segments of the population of “what went
before,” i.e. in December 1989.
The explanatory model presented above is applied consistently to
the Romanian case beginning with Chapter 3. This chapter discusses
the “structural” factors, i.e. those factors characteristic to all Soviettype societies: economic decline and ideological decay. In terms of
economic decline, this work addresses the economic performance of
the communist regime in Romania over the period 1945–1989 in
order to illustrate the relationship between the severe economic crisis
in the 1980s and the growing potential for social protest. Although
Romania faced the most severe crisis among the six countries that
experienced a regime change in 1989, it was the last to exit from
IntroductIon
15
communism that year. One can explain such a paradoxical situation
by considering the mechanism of rising expectations and setbacks
that characterized the Ceauşescu period. Apart from the
industrialization process initiated by the regime, a civilizing process
did take place under state socialism in Romania, which resulted in
some improvements with regard to urbanization and housing, spread
of education and sanitation, transportation and increased mobility
by the population during the 1960s and 1970s. The severe crisis of
the 1980s however paved in many respects the way for the bloody
revolution of 1989. Due to the miseries of everyday life, the potential
for protest of a majority of the population was particularly high in
the late 1980s. Major policy decisions regarding the economic
development and implicitly the “socialist modernization” of the
country under communist rule were made in accordance with the
external constrains and the political goals of the local power elite.
Thus, the period 1945–1989 has been divided into four distinct
periods that represent different stages in the complicated relationship
between politics and economics under communist rule in Romania.
These four periods are defined as follows: (1) humble imitation of
the Soviet model, 1945–1956; (2) development and emancipation,
1956–1964; (3) closely-watched relaxation, 1964–1977; and (4) crisis
and decline, 1977–1989. Chapter 3 also addresses two issues that
illustrate the relationship between the economic decline and the final
demise of the Romanian communism.
A first issue is that of the achievements of the so-called “golden
epoch” of Romanian communism. That epoch determined a sharp
rise in the expectations of an overwhelming majority of the population
with regard to their personal development, as well as to that of the
Romanian society in general. Many authors conventionally place that
period between 1964 and 1971, i.e. from the issuance of the
Declaration of April 1964 to the issuance of the Theses of July 1971.
Nevertheless, this work argues that one should consider the period
1964–1977, i.e. the period spanning from the issuance of the
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IntroductIon
Declaration of April 1964 to the sparking of the strike organized on
2–3 August 1977 by the miners in the Jiu Valley basin. In 1964, the
bold strategy of political survival, based on independence from
Moscow and extensive industrialization, devised by Gheorghiu-Dej
and his men took a definite form. The year 1977 is important because
two major events that took place that year signaled that the “tacit
deal” between the Ceauşescu regime and the Romanian society ended.
Chronologically, the first event was the initiation of the Goma
Human Rights Movement. Initiated by writer Paul Goma, and
known since as the Goma Movement, it lasted three months
(February-April 1977) and was the most articulated large-scale
dissident action in communist Romania. The second major event
was the above-mentioned strike organized by the Jiu Valley miners,
which due to its characteristics – it was a round-the-clock, nonviolent, occupation strike – constituted the first mature working class
protest in communist Romania. Another event, both tragic and
unexpected, is usually neglected by conventional analyses of
Romanian communism: the terrible earthquake of 4 March 1977.
Nevertheless, that particular earthquake had a great impact on
Romania’s economic performance and contributed decisively to the
economic downturn of the late 1970s and the early 1980s.
A second issue is that of the severe economic crisis of the period
1981–1989. The food shortages and the power cuts of the 1980s
were by no means the only causes of the bloody revolution in
Romania. However, the everyday miseries were among the causes of
the popular revolt that sparked the 1989 revolution in this country.
In a command economy, the central planner decides upon the
separation of national income into accumulation and consumption.
Therefore, the crucial decision about the size of accumulation is
political. During the 1980s, the developmental pattern imposed by
the Ceauşescu regime continued to favor primary and secondary
sectors with a strong emphasis on coal mining as well as on steel,
heavy machinery and petrochemical industries. These sectors however
were unable to produce competitive goods for export, especially for
IntroductIon
17
the Western markets. While these sectors were unable to compete
on the international markets, their functioning required a high level
of energy consumption that led to an endemic energy crisis in
industry. On top of this, Ceauşescu became obsessed with paying
back the external debt of the country and consequently imposed a
heavy burden on agriculture, as one of the few producers of exportable
goods. The erroneous economic strategy devised by the regime in
the late 1960s was pursued unabatedly, in spite of unfavorable
international and domestic conjunctures. Throughout the 1980s,
instead of introducing economic reforms the regime imposed harsh
rationing measures that affected primarily the population. These
measures concentrated on the rationing of energy consumption (e.g.
power supply for household use, gasoline for private cars etc.), of
food supplies (food rationing was introduced in the early 1980s), and
of basic consumer goods (e.g. soap, toothpaste, detergents etc.). Thus,
by the late 1980s the mistaken economic policy of the Ceauşescu
regime forced a large majority of the population to think in terms of
sheer biological survival. Such an economic strategy led to both
absolute and relative deprivation, which affected a great majority of
the population and contributed significantly to the final demise of
the Romanian communist regime.
Ideological decay or the erosion of ideology was a phenomenon
that other communist regimes in ECE experienced after Nikita
Khrushchev presented his “secret report” to the Twentieth Congress
of the CPSU on the night of 24–25 February 1956. According to
Kołakowski, Khrushchev’s exposure of the abuses committed by
Stalin represented a true ideological shock: “De-Stalinization proved
to be a virus from which Communism never recovered.” The “secret
speech” in which the Soviet communist leader attacked Stalin’s
personality cult did have a major impact on the communist regimes
in Poland and Hungary. Actually, the utopian goal of building
radically new societies throughout Sovietized Europe received a
definitive blow with the sparking of the Hungarian Revolution in
October 1956. In the case of Romania, an ideology that never
18
IntroductIon
appealed to the Romanian society – as Mihai Botez aptly observed –
simply could not enter a process of decay. Although MarxismLeninism never truly appealed to the Romanian society, the regime
was able to make use of nationalism as an ideological substitute,
which, especially from 1968 onwards, served as ideological “cement”
for the Romanian ethnic majority and legitimized the rule of the
Romanian Communist Party (RCP).
Ceauşescu turned Gheorghiu-Dej’s incipient nationalism into a
comprehensive nation-building process aimed at creating an ethnically
homogenous “socialist nation” in Romania. The invasion of
Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) troops on
the night of 20 to 21 August 1968 gave the RCP the opportunity to
evaluate the force of the nationalistic argument. When Ceauşescu
publicly condemned the crushing of the Prague Spring by the Sovietled troops of the WTO, the RCP gained widespread popular support
almost overnight. Afterwards, Ceauşescu’s nationalism acted as
ideological “cement” on the background of an obvious popular
distrust for Marxism-Leninism. It was only in the conditions of the
deep economic crisis of the 1980s and, even more importantly, in
the conditions of the radical change of policy in Moscow after the
coming to power of Mikhail Gorbachev that “Ceauşescuism,” as an
ideological substitute for Marxism-Leninism, entered in a terminal
crisis. After 1985, when large segments of the Romanian society began
to look to Moscow in the hope of persuading the Ceauşescu regime
to improve their living standards, independence from Moscow – the
cornerstone of the RCP legitimacy in the post-1968 period – ceased
to appeal to a majority of the people. After the launch of Gorbachev’s
program of reforms, emancipation from the Soviet Union meant
nothing for the Romanian population as long as Moscow became
suddenly synonymous with restructuring and openness, and
independent Romania was heading towards disaster. In this sense,
ideological decay, understood as the demise of Ceauşescu’s nationalcommunism as an ersatz ideology, contributed significantly to the
collapse of the communist rule in Romania.
IntroductIon
19
Chapter 4 discusses the issue of contingency and argues that
conjunctural factors played an important role in the final demise of
the communist rule in Romania. The present analysis concentrates
on two kinds of conjunctural factors, i.e. external and internal. Given
the nature of the power relations between Moscow and its European
satellites, an external factor – which might be called the “Kremlin
factor” – always influenced the decisions made by the power elites
in Sovietized Europe. Until the mid-1980s, the “Kremlin factor” was
synonymous with the involvement of Moscow in the domestic affairs
of the “fraternal” countries in ECE, as it was the case in Hungary in
1956 or in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Once Mikhail Gorbachev came
to power and engaged in a bold program of reforms, the “Kremlin
factor” evolved into the “Gorbachev factor” and became synonymous
with restructuring and openness. At the same time, unexpected events
of historic significance or crucial decisions made by the Western
powers contributed considerably to the demise of communist
dictatorships in ECE. For instance, the election of a Polish Pope in
1978 was a major external factor that contributed to the collapse of
communism in Poland. Furthermore, the Polish Roundtable
Agreements concluded on 5 April 1989 initiated the “snowball
effect,” which lasted until 22 December 1989 when the Romanian
communism was brought down by a violent revolution. In the same
vein, the determination of the American President Ronald Reagan
to establish a high-tech spatial weapon system forced the Soviet Union
to invest more in weaponry, which weakened it economically and
thus contributed indirectly to the breakdown of the communist
regimes in Sovietized Europe.
The communist dictatorships in ECE proved to be particularly
vulnerable to external conjunctural factors. Obviously, one has to
assess the influence of such factors on the six countries that
experienced a regime change in 1989 on a case-by-case basis. For
instance, the Polish “negotiated revolution” initiated the “snowball
effect” that had a considerable influence on the final demise of the
communist regimes in Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia,
20
IntroductIon
Bulgaria, and Romania. Thus, the Polish case poses difficult problems
of interpretation with regard to the set of external conjunctural factors
that contributed to the demise of the communist regime exactly
because a most powerful one, i.e. the “snowball effect” was not
present. As for the case of Romania, this work contends that two
external conjunctural factors were of paramount importance in the
collapse of communism in this country: (1) the “Gorbachev factor;”
and (2) the “snowball effect.” Considering the reaction by the
overwhelming majority of the population in December 1989, the
present analysis has examined the role played by the international
media in keeping alive, or even developing, a spirit of opposition
towards the regime in communist Romania. It was about an intricate
historical process that by the end of the 1980s led a large majority of
the population listen to the information broadcast in Romanian by
international radio stations. The Romanian communist regime also
proved to be vulnerable in terms of domestic conjuncture. The
internal conjunctural factors, however, contributed to a lesser extent
to the final demise of the regime. A major internal conjunctural factor
was the coming of age of the 1967–1969 generation that originated
in the policy of forced natality launched by Ceauşescu after his
coming to power in 1965.
Chapter 5 concentrates on the nation-specific factors. The
examination of this set of factors entails a discussion on political
cultures at both regime and community level. In the end, this chapter
argues, these factors were responsible for the position Romania
occupied within the 1989 sequence of collapse as well as for the
violent nature of the revolution in this country. The analysis addresses
the attitudinal and behavioral patterns that characterize the
relationship between regime and society, which emerged as result of
the successive transformations of the Stalinist model imposed on the
Romanian society in the immediate aftermath of World War II.
These transformations took place under certain constraints imposed
by the Soviet policy towards the “fraternal” countries in ECE in the
general Cold War context, of which the Brezhnev Doctrine was
IntroductIon
21
perhaps the most significant for the purpose of this analysis. This
author identifies five main periods that characterize the relationship
between the communist regime and the Romanian society in general
over the period 1945–1989: (1) “revolution from above,” 1945–
1956; (2) “community-building,” 1956–1964; (3) transition from
“community-building” to nation-building, 1964–1968; (4) fullyfledged nation-building, 1968–1985; and (5) disenchantment and
de-legitimation, 1985–1989. Throughout these five periods, two
processes interacted permanently. On the one hand, the regime
applied consistent policies meant to tame and subsequently co-opt
the population. On the other hand, the population reacted to these
policies in various ways ranging from collaboration to open conflict
with the regime. The attitudinal and behavioral patterns that resulted
from the complex interaction of these processes determined ultimately
both the nature and timing of the Romanian revolution of 1989.
The Stalinist mindset of the Romanian power elite went gradually
through a series of transformations after 1956, in the aftermath of
Khrushchev’s condemnation of Stalin’s personality cult. Threatened
by de-Stalinization, Gheorghiu-Dej and his men devised the strategy
of political survival that was not centered from the very beginning
on a skillful instrumentalization of nationalism. Once Khrushchev
inaugurated his de-Stalinization campaign, Romanian communists
had to look elsewhere for legitimacy and thus initiated a process of
“selective community-building.” In other words, they engaged in a
process of creating new political meanings, shared by the communist
ruling elite and the population, concerning the relationship between
the Party and the society. The 1956 political developments at the
Soviet bloc level imposed the devising of a new political strategy by
the power elite in Bucharest. The selective nature of the community
building process launched in the aftermath of the 1956 events needs
to be stressed once more. Not all the segments of Romanian society
were allowed to take part in the process. Up to the year 1964,
numerous Romanian citizens were imprisoned on political grounds
while their offspring were denied basic civil rights. Obviously, they
22
IntroductIon
were considered “enemies of the people” and the community building
process was not aimed at them. De-Stalinization was a threat to
Gheorghiu-Dej and his men, and a return to the people as the
ultimate source of legitimacy was the only solution at hand. This is
how a worldview developed within the ranks of the illegal RCP during
the interwar years and subsequently in Greater Romania’s prisons
was subsequently extended to the Party-State level. Marginalization,
humiliation, external control, reliance only on the inner circle of power,
made of monolithism and emancipation fundamental values shared by
Gheorghiu-Dej and his inner circle of power. Gheorghiu-Dej’s recourse
to Party-State building in the guise of “selective community building”
created the basis for Ceauşescu’s program of Party-State building in
the form of an all-embracing nation-building project.
Monolithism of the Party and emancipation from Moscow, as
key features of the regime political culture, are largely responsible for
the violent nature of the Romanian revolution of 1989. The most
notable protest from within the nomenklatura occurred very late, i.e. only
on 14 March 1989, when the open letter signed by six former highrank officials of the Party – Gheorghe Apostol, Alexandru Bârlădeanu,
Silviu Brucan, Corneliu Mănescu, Constantin Pârvulescu and Grigore
Răceanu – was broadcast by Radio Free Europe. The letter, addressed
to Ceauşescu, began with an indictment of his mistaken policies. It
was for the first time in communist Romania that former top Party
officials were publicly criticizing Ceauşescu’s policies. Among the
signatories were Pârvulescu and Brucan, who had already criticized
the Ceauşescu regime. The others were communist personalities such
as Alexandru Bârlădeanu and Corneliu Mănescu, who proved
themselves in international politics during the 1960s and 1970s, as
well as Gheorghe Apostol, who had been Gheorghiu-Dej’s oldest
collaborator. Less known was Grigore Răceanu, an old-timer purged
by Gheorghiu-Dej in 1958. The “letter of the six” marked a watershed
in the history of the RCP. On the one hand, the letter of the six
represented the first major split at the level of the RCP elite. For the
first time since the 1957 split at the top – the Constantinescu-
IntroductIon
23
Chişinevschi episode, the monolithism of the RCP was broken and
a major faction of the nomenklatura openly protested against
Ceauşescu’s lead. On the other hand, the signatories of the letter were
already retired when RFE broadcast the text and their links with the
Party were practically severed. In this respect, the letter came too late
and therefore had an insignificant impact on RCP’s domestic policies.
In other words, the “mortal sin” of factionalism was committed too
late to avoid a bloody revolution in 1989.
In what concerns the legitimating power of nationalism, after the
coming to power of Gorbachev in 1985 the Ceauşescu regime was
left with a sole target: the Hungarian minority in Romania. Thus,
on 20 December 1989 Ceauşescu affirmed that the revolt in
Timişoara, which sparked the Romanian revolution, was the result
of the activity of “hooligan elements, working together with
reactionary, imperialistic, irredentist, chauvinistic circles … aiming
at the territorial dismemberment of Romania.” Ceauşescu was
hinting, among others, at neighboring Hungary and the Soviet
Union. Nevertheless, the new image of the Soviet Union among
Romania’s population deeply undermined the propagandistic efforts
of the regime. In the late 1980s, independence from Moscow ceased
to be a major source of legitimacy for the communist regime in
Romania. By 1989, the Romanian polity was definitely split into us
and them. As for them – the inner circle of power around the
Ceauşescu couple – they displayed a high level of cohesion, the highest
among the six countries that compose the 1989 sequence of collapse,
up to the very end of the regime. This explains in many respects why
Romania occupies the last position, the sixth, in the said sequence.
At the same time, to paraphrase the statement of a Romanian top
communist official, independence ceased to be their legitimacy and
this permitted popular protest to grow and spread across Romania
in December 1989. It was because the RCP discourse centered on
independence from Moscow lost its legitimating power in the eyes
of a majority of the population that Romania was eventually able to
exit from communism in 1989.
24
IntroductIon
With regard to community political culture, which has been
termed as the political culture(s) of resistance, Chapter 5 analyzes
patterns of intellectual dissent and working-class protest. Some
authors have argued that the failure of the Goma movement for
human rights epitomizes the entire story of Romanian dissent.
Speaking about the Romanian dissidence in the 1970s, a Western
specialist in East European affairs affirmed in the early 1980s that:
“Romanian dissent lives in Paris and his name is Paul Goma.” This
seems to be true since after Goma the other radical dissidents of the
1980s, such as Doina Cornea, Dorin Tudoran, Radu Filipescu,
Gabriel Andreescu or Dan Petrescu, experienced a similar loneliness
of radical dissidence. Group protests developed only slowly towards
the end of the 1980s and replaced timidly the isolated dissident acts
by courageous individuals. In November 1989, dissident Dan
Petrescu initiated a campaign of collecting signatures against the
reelection of Ceauşescu at the Fourteenth Congress of the RCP.
Petrescu, who was living in the Moldavian city of Iaşi, contacted
Doina Cornea, who was living in the Transylvanian city of Cluj. It
was for the first time when prominent dissidents were trying to
organize a joint action against the regime. Another story, which is
telling of the efforts and vacillations of the intellectuals who felt that
they should do something to protest against the communist rule, is
that of the “letter of the eighteen.” According to writer Stelian Tănase,
the idea of writing a letter of protest against the cultural policies of
the regime emerged during a discussion he had with Alexandru
Paleologu, an intellectual from an older generation imprisoned on
political grounds in the late 1950s. It took until mid-December to
collect the signatures and transmit the letter abroad. Nevertheless,
the fact that eighteen intellectuals eventually managed to become
solidary in their protest in the autumn of 1989 indicates that
something had changed by that time: a timid but shared feeling of
solidarity was gradually replacing the “egoism of small groups.” It
was, however, too late for a dissident movement to take shape and
give birth to a political opposition able to fill the power vacuum in
IntroductIon
25
the afternoon of 22 December 1989. What some intellectuals
managed to do that day was to speak to the large crowds gathered in
the Palace Square in downtown Bucharest and argue forcefully and
convincingly that the monopoly of the RCP was over. In other words,
they told the people that it was not about an anti-Ceauşescu uprising,
but about an anti-Communist revolution. Although short-lived, that
was an important moment of the 1989 Romanian revolution.
A key issue concerning the political cultures of resistance refers to
the working-class revolts and the process of establishing a cross-class
alliance against the communist regime. This work distinguishes
between “genuine” workers and peasant-workers and takes into
consideration the development of distinct subcultures of resistance
against the regime due to the particular situation in which each of
these categories of workers found itself throughout the 1970s and
1980s. “Genuine” workers represented a category of workers that
severed their roots with countryside, moved to towns where they
were employed mostly in industry, and thus were dependent on the
salary they received. By the end of 1980s, in the conditions of the
severe crisis faced by the Ceauşescu regime, this category of workers
was increasingly forced to think in terms of biological survival and
thus was more prone to engage in open protests. Peasant-workers
were less affected by the economic crisis. During the period of food
shortages, i.e. 1981–1989, such people were able to obtain the
necessary foodstuffs for survival and thus their potential for protest
was lower. The peasant-worker is a good example of a strategy of the
individual to survive in the conditions of a severe crisis: a job in
industry in the nearby town, and food supplies from the little farm
he or she owned in the village. However, such a strategy became less
successful after the introduction of a strict system of quotas and
increased control by the authorities of the output of the small
individual farms.
“Genuine” workers represented the first and most affected segment
of society in the conditions of economic crisis. Beginning in the mid1970s four large and highly industrialized areas of communist
26
IntroductIon
Romania – the counties of Constanţa, Braşov, Hunedoara, and Timiş
– attracted the largest number of internal migrants in the country,
many of whom came from remote and less developed regions of
Moldavia. In these areas, as the interregional long distance migration
figures show, came into being a relatively numerous class of workers
relying only on the salary they received in industry – a class of
“genuine” workers. Again, the term “genuine” has to be understood
in the sense of a category of workers almost entirely dependent on
the salary received in industry and not in the sense of worker-father
origins. Until the late 1970s, the category of “genuine” workers
benefited from the policy of industrialization and urbanization
enforced by the communist regime. Beginning in the late 1970s,
however, the same category of workers proved to be the most
vulnerable in face of the deep economic crisis. Between 1977 and
1989, the most important protests from below occurred in workplaces
where “genuine” workers constituted a majority: in the Jiu Valley
(Hunedoara County) in 1977 and in Braşov (the capital of the Braşov
County) in 1987. In the late 1980s there were in Romania four highly
industrialized urban areas – the counties of Constanţa, Braşov,
Hunedoara, and Timiş – where the number of workers coming from
other regions of the country was particularly high. When the
structural crisis deepened, the “genuine” workers in those areas were
severely affected by food shortages, strict rationing, and non-payment
of wages, and were thus forced to think in terms of biological survival.
It was in one of these areas, i.e. the city of Timişoara, the capital of
the Timiş County, that the Romanian revolution of 1989 was
sparked. This happened also because Timişoara was one of the very
few urban centers where the conditions for the appearance of a broad,
though short-lived, cross-class alliance were present.
Chapter 1
ConCeptual Framework
and methodologICal approaCh
the 1989 events
revolutions or mere “revolutions”?
Much has been written on the significance of the 1989 regime
changes in East-Central Europe (ECE). Their unexpected inception,
convoluted unfolding and ambiguous outcome have been heavily
discussed and debated. Theories and pseudo-theories have been put
forward, and a variety of hypotheses and concepts supported one
another or clashed vigorously. Scholars and laypeople alike attempted
at making sense of those events and assessing their regional and global
significance, and eventually proclaimed their revolutionary character.
One might argue that those events took almost everybody by surprise,
and this is why there were so numerous those who believed they were
“true” revolutions. Many accepted that in 1989 the countries of
“actually existing socialism” in ECE experienced a revolutionary
situation. At the same time, it was exactly the revolutionary nature
of the 1989 events that has been often contested, if not utterly denied.
Some maintained that the 1989 events do not qualify as a genuine
revolution on the model of the great modern revolutions such as the
French or the Russian. Violence, it was argued, is the fundamental
characteristic of a revolution and therefore the 1989 regime changes
in ECE were not “true” revolutions for the very simple reason that
violence was almost non-existent, with the obvious exception of
Romania. This chapter puts forward a frame of analysis for explaining
28
conceptual Framework and methodologIcal approach
the 1989 events in ECE. When analyzing the revolutions of 1989,
one is compelled to address three fundamental issues related to their
inception, unfolding and outcome, which can be summarized as
follows: (1) timing; (2) sequence of events; and (3) nature of regime
changes. In other words, one has to provide a convincing answer to
the following questions: (1) Why those revolutions occurred precisely
in 1989? (2) Why the communist regimes in ECE collapsed in that
particular order? and (3) Why some of the 1989 regime changes were
negotiated, others were non-negotiated but non-violent, and only
one of them was violent? This chapter opens with a discussion on
the problems of definition one faces when examining the 1989 events
in ECE and addresses the most significant similarities and differences
between those events and the “classic” revolutions of the modern age.
The argument put forward is that the 1989 events in ECE can be
termed as revolutions, but a particular kind of revolutions, i.e.
“postmodern” revolutions, because they were non-utopian,
non-violent – with the conspicuous exception of Romania, and were
not carried out in the name of a particular class. Furthermore, this
chapter provides an explanatory model that takes into consideration
both the domestic developments and the entangled histories of the
Soviet Bloc countries over the period 1945–1989 in order to discuss
the crucial issues of timing, sequence of events and nature of
revolution (negotiated or non-negotiated, violent or non-violent).
The general model proposed for explaining such issues is based on
path-dependency, agency and contingency, and the main assumption is
that the collapse of communist rule in ECE was provoked by an
intricate and sometimes unexpected interplay of structural,
conjunctural and nation-specific factors, which ultimately determined
the timing, sequence, and nature of those events.
conceptual Framework and methodologIcal approach
29
understanding 1989 by analogy
A simple and direct way of making sense of the nature of the 1989
events in ECE would be to compare them with the classic revolutions.
As Krishan Kumar has suggested, a way of understanding 1989 is
“by analogy.”1 Therefore, this section concentrates on the debates
over the revolutionary nature of the year 1989 in ECE focusing
primarily on three major elements that were generally considered key
issues when comparing the “great,” “classic” revolutions of the
modern age – such as the French or the Russian revolutions, with
the 1989 events in ECE: revolutionary ideology, class character and
violent nature. Therefore, a first issue that deserves further
examination is related to the idea of a “new beginning” that
characterized the classic revolutions. Thus, in her classic study of
revolutions, Hannah Arendt has argued that the modern concept of
revolution is “inextricably bound up with the notion that the course
of history suddenly begins anew, that an entirely new story, a story
never known or told before is about to unfold.”2 Furthermore, Arendt
argues that a crucial element in understanding modern revolutions
is that “the idea of freedom and the experience of a new beginning
should coincide.”3 If one examines the claims by 1989 revolutionaries
throughout ECE, one finds out that in terms of revolutionary
ideology the 1989 events proved to be rather restorative, in the sense
that the forces that stayed behind the regime changes did not want
to engage in new utopian experiments. Many of the participants in
the 1989 events simply envisaged a return to normality, a “normality”
that was generally perceived as that of the affluent “capitalistic”
Krishan Kumar, 1989: Revolutionary Ideas and Ideals (Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press, 2001), 39.
2
Hannah Arendt, On Revolutions (London: Penguin Books, 1990), 28; orig.
publ. 1963.
3
Arendt, On Revolutions, 29.
1
30
conceptual Framework and methodologIcal approach
societies, and certainly not that of “actually existing socialism.” As
Gale Stokes aptly put it, what happened in 1989 was “not a revolution
of total innovation, like the great classic revolutions, but rather the
shucking off of a failed experiment in favor of an already existing
model, pluralist democracy.”4 One can go even further and argue
that many of the ordinary people that poured into the streets of the
major cities of Sovietized Europe in 1989 were fascinated by the
image – amply idealized, to be sure – of the prosperous West. People
simply wanted to live better, and it was quite clear that the communist
regimes were not able to provide for their populations in this respect.
Robert Darnton, who witnessed the fall of state socialism in East
Germany while spending the academic year 1989–90 at the
Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin, remembers the discussion he had with
an East German intellectual in Halle immediately after the Wende:
“Colleague D leaned over and looked hard into my face: ‘Two systems
have competed for almost a half a century,’ he said. ‘Which has won?’
He gave the answer in English: ‘The American way of life [emphasis
added].’”5
Thus, the year 1989 in ECE was marked by a clear tendency of
rejecting grand, utopian projects. As Kumar noted: “The ‘pathos of
novelty’ that Hannah Arendt saw as the hallmark of modern
revolution has been conspicuously absent. Far from it, the revolution
of 1989 has displayed something like nostalgia for the achievements
of past revolutions. It did not wish to go forward; it wished to go back
[emphasis added].”6 In a similar vein, Samuel N. Eisenstadt observed:
“There was no totalistic, utopian vision rooted in eschatological
expectations of a new type of society. The vision or visions
Gale Stokes, The Walls Came Tumbling Down: The Collapse of Communism
in Eastern Europe (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 260.
5
Robert Darnton, Berlin Journal, 1989–1990 (New York: W. W. Norton &
Co., 1991), 192.
6
Kumar, 1989, 40.
4
conceptual Framework and methodologIcal approach
31
promulgated in Central and Eastern Europe, calling for freedom from
repressive totalitarian or authoritarian regimes, relied on various
pragmatic adjustments.”7 Such a rejection of utopian ideas made a
prominent theorist of the French revolution, François Furet, to assert
that “not a single new idea has come out of Eastern Europe in 1989.”8
The backward-looking aspect of 1989 has not escaped to an astute
thinker like Jürgen Habermas, who coined the term “rectifying
revolution” when referring to the 1989 events in ECE. According to
Habermas, what happened in 1989 was a “revolution that is to some
degree flowing backwards, one that clears the ground in order to
catch up with developments previously missed out.”9
A second issue that needs clarification concerns the class character
of the 1989 events. Turning back to the modern revolutions and
comparing the 1989 events in ECE with the “classic,” “bourgeois”
French Revolution of 1789, one should ask oneself to what extent
the events in 1989 constituted a social revolution. The concept of
social revolution has been employed by Theda Skocpol in her
comparative analysis of the French, Russian and Chinese revolutions.
According to Skocpol, social revolutions are “rapid, basic
transformations of a society’s state and class structures; and they are
accompanied and in part carried through by class-based revolts from
below.”10 Mass mobilization has been a fundamental pre-condition
for the 1989 regime changes in ECE. As Habermas observed: “The
presence of large masses gathering in squares and mobilizing on the
See S. N. Eisenstadt, “The Breakdown of Communist Regimes,” in Vladimir
Tismăneanu, ed., The Revolutions of 1989 (London: Routledge, 1999), 93; orig.
publ. 1992.
8
Quoted in Christian Joppke, East German Dissidents and the Revolution of
1989: Social Movement in a Leninist Regime (Houndmills, UK: Macmillan, 1995),
133.
9
Quoted in Kumar, 1989, 40.
10
Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France,
Russia and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 4.
7
32
conceptual Framework and methodologIcal approach
streets managed, astoundingly, to disempower a regime that was
armed to the teeth.”11 Nevertheless, in the case of the 1989 events in
ECE, the class character of the revolts from below is seriously
questionable. In this respect, Eisenstadt noted: “It would be difficult
to say whether these were bourgeois or proletarian revolutions. Even
in respect to the classical revolutions, these definitions are not always
helpful or enlightening; in respect to the events in Eastern Europe
they are meaningless.”12 The same author further asserted: “If there
were specific social sectors predominant in bringing down [the
communist regimes], they included some intellectuals, certain potential
professionals, sometimes abetted by workers, who did not appear to
be the bearers of any very strong class consciousness.”13 To sum up,
one can speak of determined crowds that poured into the streets of
the major cities in ECE and thus contributed significantly to the
breakdown of communist rule in the respective countries, but not of
a particular, self-conscious class that carried out the 1989 transformations.
Third, revolutionary violence represents a crucial aspect that
deserves further discussion when comparing the “classic” revolutions
with the events in 1989. Charles Tilly, a prominent theorist of social
change, stresses the use of force as intrinsically linked with the idea
of revolution. According to Tilly, a revolution is: “A forcible transfer
of power over a state in the course of which at least two distinct blocs
of contenders make incompatible claims to control the state, and
some significant portion of the population subject to the state’s
jurisdiction acquiesces in the claims of each bloc [emphasis added].”14
Nonetheless, if violence represents an indispensable ingredient of a
“true” revolution, then none of the 1989 regime changes that took
place in Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia or Bulgaria
Quoted in Kumar, 1989, 41.
Eisenstadt, “The Breakdown of Communist Regimes,” 91.
13
Ibid.
14
Charles Tilly, European Revolutions, 1492–1992 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 8.
11
12
conceptual Framework and methodologIcal approach
33
could be termed as revolutions. Ironically enough, if one employs
such a perspective, then only the events in Romania could be
described as a “genuine” revolution. It is worth mentioning that there
were quite numerous those who were initially impressed by the
December 1989 situation in Romania. Timothy Garton Ash, for
instance, wrote at the time: “Nobody hesitated to call what happened
in Romania a revolution. After all, it really looked like one: angry
crowds on the streets, tanks, government buildings in flames, the
dictator put up against a wall and shot.”15 However, what happens
after a certain event could change dramatically our perspective on
that event, and this is exactly what happened with regard to the 1989
events in Romania. Consequently, in his concluding remarks to a
major international conference dedicated to the celebration of ten
years from the “miraculous year” 1989, Garton Ash stated bluntly:
“Curiously enough the moment when people in the West finally
thought there was a revolution was when they saw television pictures
of Romania: crowds, tanks, shooting, blood in the streets. They said:
‘That – we know that is a revolution,’ and of course the joke is that
it was the only one that wasn’t [original emphasis].”16
True, the Romanian case remains the most controversial since the
events in that country contradicted the non-violent, peaceful character
of the 1989 revolutions in ECE. However, it was exactly the
Romanian revolution “that wasn’t” which added to the revolutionary
year 1989 the missing elements of “classic” revolutions. These
elements, as J. F. Brown has perceptively argued, were: violence,
bloodshed and tyrannicide.17 At the same time, Garton Ash was not
Timothy Garton Ash, The Magic Lantern: The Revolution of ’89 Witnessed
in Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin and Prague (New York: Vintage Books, 1993), 20;
orig. publ. 1990.
16
See Timothy Garton Ash, “Conclusions” to Sorin Antohi and Vladimir
Tismăneanu, eds., Between Past and Future: The Revolutions of 1989 and Their
Aftermath (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2000), 395.
17
J. F. Brown, Surge to Freedom: The End of Communist Rule in Eastern Europe
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1991), 1.
15
34
conceptual Framework and methodologIcal approach
alone in denying the revolutionary nature of the 1989 events in
Romania. Numerous foreign and Romanian authors, disillusioned
with the slow pace of the post-1989 transition to democracy, have
expressed the idea of a questionable 1989 revolution in Romania by
using the word revolution in quotation marks.18 To conclude this
part, it may be argued that a majority of the authors who addressed
the 1989 regime changes in ECE agreed more or less to the idea that
those events constituted revolutions, but a special kind of revolutions.
The next section discusses the unusual nature of the 1989 revolutions
and argues in favor of defining them as “postmodern” revolutions.
the revolutions of 1989: “postmodern” revolutions?
As shown above, when talking of the revolutions of 1989, a major
problem of definition arises when one attempts at comparing them
with the “classic” revolutions. Thus, there are at least three main
differences between the 1989 events in ECE and the “great”
revolutions in the sense that the revolutions of 1989 were neither
utopian, nor violent, and did not have a class character. These
substantial differences notwithstanding, would it be still possible to
speak of the “revolutions of 1989”? As an astute witness and critic of
the 1989 phenomenon, Garton Ash confessed that there is indeed a
problem of assessing “in what sense this was a revolution” and aptly
observed: “In fact we always have to qualify it; we call it ‘velvet,’ we
call it ‘peaceful,’ we call it ‘evolutionary,’ someone … calls it ‘rebirth’
not revolution, I call it ‘refolution’ [emphasis added].”19 The term
See, for instance, Adrian Marino, “Triptic” (Triptych), in Iordan Chimet,
ed., Momentul adevărului (The moment of truth) (Cluj: Editura Dacia, 1996),
312; and Olivier Gillet, Religion et nationalisme: L’Ideologie de l’Eglise othodoxe
roumaine sous le regime communiste (Brussels: Editions de l’Universite de Bruxelles,
1997), 132.
19
Garton Ash, “Conclusions” to Antohi and Tismăneanu, eds., Between Past
and Future, 395.
18
conceptual Framework and methodologIcal approach
35
refolution was able to grasp the intricate mixture of revolution and
reform, as well as the gradual and negotiated nature of the
fundamental changes that took place in Poland and Hungary and
initiated the changes of 1989 throughout ECE. As Garton Ash puts
it: “It was in fact, a mixture of reform and revolution. At the time, I
called it ‘refolution.’ There was a strong and essential element of
change ‘from above,’ led by an enlightened minority in the still ruling
communist parties. But there was also a vital element of popular
pressure ‘from below.’”20 The blend of reform and revolution, he
further points out, differed from one country to another: “In
Hungary, there was rather more of the former, in Poland of the latter,
yet in both countries the story was that of an interaction between the
two. The interaction was, however, largely mediated by negotiations
between ruling and opposition elites.”21
The first phase of the 1989 revolutions consisted of the “peaceful
revolutions” in Poland in Hungary. It should be stressed from the
outset that the crucial element of the Polish inception and the
subsequent Hungarian ensuing of the 1989 wave of political changes
in ECE was the roundtable principle observed in both countries by
the communist power elites and the opposition groups. The Polish
Roundtable Talks, which lasted from February to April, concluded
with an agreement that recognized the legal right of Solidarity to
exist and thus inaugurated the revolutionary year 1989. As Adam
Michnik noted: “The Round Table signified a willingness to
transform what had been a policeman’s monologue into a political
dialogue.”22 The term “negotiated revolutions” is perhaps the most
appropriate to characterize the 1989 regime changes in Poland and
Hungary. As Rudolf L. Tökés pointed out in his path-breaking
Garton Ash, The Magic Lantern, 14.
Ibid.
22
Adam Michnik, “A Specter Is Haunting Europe,” in idem, Letters from
Freedom: Post-Cold War Realities and Perspectives, ed. by Irena Grudzinska Gross
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 117; orig. publ. in Gazeta
Wyborcza, 9 May 1989.
20
21
36
conceptual Framework and methodologIcal approach
analysis of the Hungarian case, the term “negotiated” characterizes
best the process of political bargaining that led to a regime change
in that country.23 According to Tökés, the term “negotiated
revolution” has a twofold meaning: “Is both a descriptive label and
a metaphor to call attention to the political ambiguity of the
outcome.”24 The idea of political bargaining within the constitutional
framework of the Hungarian state was also emphasized by Béla K.
Király, who argued that in 1989 Hungary experienced a “lawful
revolution” that occurred peacefully “within the constitutional
framework of the state.”25 Former dissident János Kis has proposed
the term “regime change,” understood as a “peculiar type of rapid
social transformation.” According to Kis, the particularity of such a
social transformation resides in the fact that has elements pertaining
to both revolution and reform.26
Tökés also stresses the Hungarian political traditions of reaching such
agreements in complicated times: “Negotiation as an instrument of choice for the
reconciliation of seemingly intractable differences in political beliefs and interests
has well-established historic and contemporary precedents in Hungary.” Rudolf L.
Tökés, Hungary’s Negotiated Revolution: Economic Reform, Social Change, and Political
Succession, 1957–1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 7–8.
24
Tökés, Hungary’s Negotiated Revolution, 439.
25
Béla K. Király, “Soft Dictatorship, Lawful Revolution, and the Socialists’ Return
to Power,” in idem, ed., Lawful Revolution in Hungary, 1989–94 (Boulder, CO:
Social Science Monographs, 1995), 5. Király draws on historian István Deák’s term
of “lawful revolution” employed in his masterful account of the 1848–49 revolution
in Hungary. As Deák noted: “As the Hungarian liberals saw it, theirs had not been
a revolution at all, but a peaceful adjustment to the times and the legal reconquest
of Hungary’s historical freedoms. Their actions had been forceful, dignified, and
magnanimous: his Majesty’s ancient rights had not been curtailed, only the dual
sovereignty of king and nation under the Crown of Saint Stephen had now been
reconstituted.” István Deák, The Lawful Revolution: Louis Kossuth and the Hungarians
1848–1849 (London: Phoenix Press, 2001), 99; orig. publ. 1979.
26
“The regime change is a peculiar type of rapid social transformation. It resembles
revolution inasmuch as the legitimacy of the previous regime is broken during its course,
and thus an unstable, unpredictable political situation comes about. It resembles reforms
23
conceptual Framework and methodologIcal approach
37
The second phase of the 1989 revolutions was characterized by
the non-negotiated, i.e. not based on the roundtable principle, but
non-violent breakdown of communist rule in East Germany and
Czechoslovakia, as well as by the palace coup in Bulgaria. The major
feature of these non-negotiated non-violent revolutions was that
political bargaining regarding the transition to a new political order
occurred only after massive mobilization from below. The respective
regimes, although did not open roundtable talks with the political
opposition previous to the wave of mass mobilization, refrained
themselves from ordering a bloodbath in order to suppress the street
protests. Kitschelt et al. have put forward the term “regime change
by implosion,” which can be applied to the regime changes in East
Germany and Czechoslovakia: “Where implosions take place, the
former elites have the least bargaining power in the transition and
are shunted aside by opposition forces that quickly gain organizational
and ideological predominance.”27 For the particular case of East
Germany, the scholarly literature has retained the term “spontaneous
revolution.” As Karl-Dieter Opp observed: “The revolution in the
GDR is so fascinating because it both occurred spontaneously and
ensued nonviolently…. A revolution is spontaneous if the protests are
not organized [original emphasis].”28 As for the case of former
Czechoslovakia, the most utilized term was that of “velvet
in that the vacuum of legitimacy is not correlated with the dispersion of power, the
continuity of legality is not interrupted. What makes the situation manageable is that
the political actors endeavor to set up mutually acceptable rules of the game.” See János
Kis, “Between Reform and Revolution: Three Hypotheses About the Nature of the
Regime Change,” in Király, ed., Lawful Revolution in Hungary, 53.
27
See Herbert Kitschelt, Zdenka Mansfeldova, Radoslaw Markowski and Gábor
Tóka, Post-Communist Party Systems: Competition, Representation, and Inter-Party
Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 31.
28
Karl-Dieter Opp, “Some Conditions for the Emergence of Spontaneous,
Nonviolent Revolutions,” in Karl-Dieter Opp, Peter Voss and Christiane Gern,
Origins of a Spontaneous Revolution: East Germany, 1989 (Ann Arbor: The
University of Michigan Press, 1995), 225.
38
conceptual Framework and methodologIcal approach
revolution.”29 With regard to the exit from “Balkan communism,”
the cases of Bulgaria and Romania differed in the sense that the regime
change in Bulgaria was non-violent while Romania witnessed a bloody
revolution. In Bulgaria, the day after the fall of the Berlin Wall a
coup was initiated from within the inner circle of power and resulted
in the replacement of the supreme leader of the Bulgarian communists
with a younger apparatchik. The Bulgarian palace coup was aimed
at initiating a “preemptive reform” meant to ensure the survival of
the communist power elite into the new political order.30 However,
the coup initiated the non-violent revolution: the change at the top
of the communist party triggered a massive and unprecedented mass
mobilization under the lead of the united opposition, which opened
the way towards a real change of system in that country.
The communist regime in Romania was the last in a row to collapse
during the revolutionary year 1989, and its collapse was marked by
bloodshed and violence. The Romanian revolution was non-negotiated
and violent and contradicted therefore the non-violent character of
the rest of the 1989 revolutions in ECE. Since the opponents of the
regime could not organize themselves politically under communism
and thus pave the way for the systemic changes of the year 1989, there
was no organized dissident group that could fill the power vacuum
generated by the sudden demise of the regime. Instead, there were
ultimately those who learned politics by doing it, that is, the secondand third-rank communist bureaucrats, who, in those moments of
John F. N. Bradley, Czechoslovakia’s Velvet Revolution: A Political Analysis
(Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1992), 105.
30
With regard to the emergence of a “preemptive reform,” Kitschelt et al.
observe: “Once changes in the international situation made it uncertain whether
communist rule could survive anywhere, factions of the incumbent elites had strong
incentives to seize the initiative, displace the discredited top communist leadership,
and engineer regime change via preemptive reform with only minimal input from
the emerging democratic opposition forces.” See Kitschelt et al., Post-Communist
Party Systems, 30.
29
conceptual Framework and methodologIcal approach
39
general confusion, took over the provisional government. Although
violent, Romania’s exit from communism was perceived as being the
least radical from among the former Soviet bloc countries because of
the obvious continuity between the communist regime and the
successor regime in terms of political elite recruitment. As Linz and
Stepan aptly put it, Romania was “the only country where a former
high Communist official was not only elected to the presidency in the
first free election, but re-elected.”31 Consequently, the Romanian
revolution was characterized as “doubtful,” “entangled,” “diverted,”
“unfinished,” “stolen” or “gunned down.” Some pointed towards the
blend of revolution and restoration that was characteristic to the
Romanian situation and advanced the term “restolution.”32 Others
went further and stated openly that in December 1989 a coup d’état
hindered the popular uprising in becoming a revolution.33
There were also attempts at finding a term that would be able to
characterize the overall exit from communism of the six countries in
ECE discussed here. For instance, Leslie Holmes has coined the term
“double rejective revolutions:” the first rejection was that of the
external domination of the Soviet Union upon the respective countries,
while the second rejection was that of communism as a system of
power.34 An iconoclastic definition of the revolutionary year 1989 has
been put forward by Karol Soltan, who characterized it as a rebirth:
“The events of 1989 were not a revolution (neither liberal, nor selflimiting, nor velvet, nor anti-revolutionary). They were not simply
See Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and
Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 344.
32
Sorin Antohi, “Higher Education and the Post-Communist generation of
Students,” in Henry F. Carey, ed., Romania since 1989: Politics, Economics, and
Society (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2004), 335.
33
Dorin Tudoran, Kakistocraţia (Kakistocracy) (Chişinău: Editura Arc, 1998), 519.
34
Leslie Holmes, Post-Communism: An Introduction (Cambridge: Polity Press,
1997), 14.
31
40
conceptual Framework and methodologIcal approach
reforms or restoration. They were a rebirth, and rebirths (not
revolutions, as Marxists would have it) are the locomotives of history
[original emphasis].”35 For his part, Soltan argues that the true
meaning of the year 1989 could be found in what he perceives as
an attempt of modern civilization at returning to its “symbolic
origins” in the Renaissance. As he further points out: “In a modernity
that re-establishes continuity with its symbolic origins in the
Renaissance, the events of 1989 can be celebrated as exemplary: in
them more than anywhere else we see revolution replaced by
rebirth.”36 When looking for a definition of 1989, one could also
start from the very fact that the 1989 events in ECE took power
elites and populations by surprise. True, revolutions are generally
unexpected and perhaps this is why they represent a fascinating
research topic. Still, in the case of the 1989 events in ECE one could
also employ a term that was originally used by Paul Kecskemeti to
characterize the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, and call them the
“unexpected revolutions.”37
The revolutions of 1989 did not initiate a “new beginning” because
they did not seek for one. What was at stake was the departure from a
project that aimed at solving a crisis of modernity by serving the cause
of freedom and equality which proved to be an utter failure.
Consequently, violence, utopian dreams and class struggle were not on
the agenda of a majority of the revolutionaries of 1989 and thus one
may advance the idea that the revolutions of 1989 were the first
revolutions of the postmodern age. As Jürgen Kocka perceptively argued,
the communist regimes, like the fascist ones, were “modern dictatorships”
because the causes they served, as well as their scopes and means, were
intrinsically modern: “For the communist and fascist dictatorships of
Karol Soltan, “1989 as Rebirth,” in Antohi and Tismăneanu, eds., Between
Past and Future, 25.
36
Soltan, “1989 as Rebirth,” 37.
37
Paul Kecskemeti, The Unexpected Revolution: Social Forces in the Hungarian
Uprising (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961).
35
conceptual Framework and methodologIcal approach
41
the twentieth century the rule was: the modernity of their methods and
goals corresponded to the modernity of their causes.”38
Nonetheless, there was something new that made the 1989
revolutions in ECE – that brought down the communist
dictatorships in the six countries addressed by the present work –
not only different from the “classic” revolutions, but also unique.
In this respect, Eisenstadt’s discussion on the “postmodern” features
of 1989, seen as an upheaval against the failed project of modernity
in Sovietized Europe is perhaps the most appropriate to characterize
those events. In Eisenstadt’s view, one could identify similarities
between 1989 and the “classic” revolutions with regard to: “The
close relations among popular protests, struggles in the center, and
the intellectual groups that developed; the place of principled protest;
[and] the emphasis on the legitimacy of such protest, central in all
of them.”39 Nevertheless, the same author identifies a series of
elements present in the revolutions of 1989 that could be compared
with certain developments in Western societies that have been
described as “postmodern.” As Roger Scruton points out: “The
metanarratives of modernity … confer legitimacy directly on the
present moment, by showing how it might be seized for the benefit
of all. Their legitimizing power stems from their universality – the
good that is promised (freedom, enlightenment, socialism,
prosperity, progress, etc.) is promised to all mankind, and the project
of modernity is cosmopolitan, involving the dissolution of traditional
communities and their release into the collective future.” In
contradistinction, the same author further argues, the postmodern
condition is characterized by the fact that: “Those metanarratives
have lost their justifying force – the paths of emancipation have all
been explored, the promises have been fulfilled, and we find ourselves
See Jürgen Kocka, “The GDR: A Special Kind of Modern Dictatorship,” in
Konrad H. Jarausch, ed., Dictatorship as Experience: Towards a Socio-Cultural
History of the GDR, transl. by Eve Duffy (New York: Berghahn Books, 1999), 22.
39
Eisenstadt, “The Breakdown of Communist Regimes,” 100.
38
42
conceptual Framework and methodologIcal approach
released from tradition, free and equal members of a world
community in which every lifestyle and every value becomes openly
available.”40 With regard to the revolutions of 1989, Eisenstadt
points towards some elements that might be defined as
“postmodern,” such as: “The decharismatization of the centers, the
weakening of the overall societywide utopian political vision and of
the missionary-ideological components.” As he further states: “Even
when the belief in democracy and the free market sometimes evince
such elements, there is a concomitant disposition of many utopian
orientations to disperse; ‘daily’ and semi-private spheres of life
become central.”41 Thus, drawing on the argument put forward by
Eisenstadt, it might be argued that the revolutions of 1989 were
simply “postmodern” because they were non-utopian, non-violent
– the Romanian exception notwithstanding, and were not carried
out in the name of a particular class.42
See Roger Scruton, The Palgrave Macmillan Dictionary of Political Thought,
3 ed. (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 541.
41
Eisenstadt, “The Breakdown of Communist Regimes,” 101.
42
Although grand utopian dreams were absent in 1989, “small” utopias were
nevertheless present and inspired the revolutionaries of 1989. For instance, large
segments of the populations living under state socialism developed an idealized image
of the West and “the American way of life,” which determined in many respects the
“restorative” character of the 1989 revolutions. For more on the emergence of an
idealized image of the West in communist Romania see Dragoş Petrescu, “Conflicting
Perceptions of (Western) Europe: The Case of Communist Romania, 1958–1989,”
in José M. Faraldo, Paulina Gulinska-Jurgiel and Christian Domnitz, eds., Europa
im Ostblock: Vorstellungen und Diskurse, 1945–1991 (Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 2008),
199–220.
40
rd
conceptual Framework and methodologIcal approach
43
explaining the Collapse
Culture, structure, and Contingency
The changes initiated in 1989 in East-Central Europe involved not
only a transition from communist authoritarian rule to a political
democracy, but also a structural change from a centrally-planned
economy to a functional market economy, with enormous social
costs. After the communist takeovers, the newly installed regimes
engaged in a process of decisive “breaking through.” As Jowitt aptly
demonstrated, such a process meant the elimination of those
structures, values, attitudes and behaviors that were perceived by the
communist revolutionary elite as major obstacles to the fulfillment
of its agenda of political, social and economic change.43 The
revolutions of 1989 undertook the monumental task of restoring the
structures, values, attitudes and behaviors the communist regimes
strove to eliminate for almost fifty years.
As shown above, drawing on Eisenstadt’s analysis, this work
proposes the generic term “postmodern” revolutions when referring
to the 1989 breakdown of communist rule in ECE. Nevertheless, it
appears that a major theoretical challenge is to provide a working
definition of such a revolution. Numerous authors have argued that
violence should be considered an essential ingredient of a genuine
revolution. Ironically enough, according to such a criterion, only the
1989 events in Romania could be characterized as a “true” revolution.
It is this author’s opinion that what characterized the 1989 revolutions
was the immediate potential for open and fatal violence, and not
necessarily the actual recourse to it. Therefore, one should take into
consideration two main issues when attempting at devising such a
working definition. First, mass mobilization and protest should be
Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The
Case of Romania, 1944–1965 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), 7–8.
43
44
conceptual Framework and methodologIcal approach
regarded as an important precondition of this kind of revolutions.
Second, the revolutionary situation in ECE in 1989 differed from
the classic revolutionary situations in the sense that although an
immediate potential for open and fatal violence did exist, violence
was rather the exception and not the norm.
Furthermore, the following three definitions of a revolution have
been considered in order to coin the definition of a revolution
employed by the present work: (1) “A revolution is a rapid, fundamental,
and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a
society, in its political institutions, social structure, leadership, and
government activity and policies” (Samuel P. Huntington); (2) A
revolution is: “A rapid and fundamental change of system” (Leslie
Holmes); and (3) A revolution is: “The replacement of the elite and
the introduction of a new political or economic order after (violent
or nonviolent) protests by the population” (Karl-Dieter Opp).44 From
these, it has been devised the following working definition of a
revolution which is utilized throughout the rest the present work: A
revolution is a rapid and fundamental domestic change in the dominant
values and myths of a society, in its political institutions, social structure,
leadership, and government activity and policies, following violent or
non-violent mass protests.
the 1989 Sequence of collapse of State Socialism in ece
Having reached a working definition for the 1989 revolutions, the
next step is to provide a theoretical model able to explain the demise
of communist regimes in six countries with different culturalSee Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1968), 264; Leslie Holmes, Post-Communism: An Introduction
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997), 131; and Karl-Dieter Opp, “Some Conditions
for the Emergence of Spontaneous, Nonviolent Revolutions,” in Opp, Voss and
Gern, Origins of a Spontaneous Revolution, 225.
44
conceptual Framework and methodologIcal approach
45
historical and socio-economic backgrounds, and characterized by
distinct political cultures. This work introduces the 1989 sequence of
collapse of communist dictatorships in ECE. In other words, it considers
that the communist rule in the six countries under scrutiny collapsed
during the year 1989 in the following order: Poland, Hungary,
German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and
Romania. Further explanation is nevertheless required with regard
to the place occupied by Bulgaria within the 1989 sequence of
collapse. One might ask why Bulgaria is placed after Czechoslovakia
in the aforementioned sequence of collapse since, on 10 November
1989, the Secretary General of the Bulgarian Communist Party,
Todor Zhivkov, was forced to resign and was replaced by the sitting
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Petar Mladenov. This author
acknowledges that a majority of the Bulgarians perceive 10 November
as the date of the regime change in their country. At the same time,
the present analysis considers that the political transformations in
Bulgaria gained momentum from early December 1989 onwards,
especially after the creation of the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF)
on 7 December. The UDF, which came into being as an alliance of
some thirteen opposition groups and emerging political parties and
whose leader became the former dissident philosopher Zhelyu Zhelev,
played a major role in mobilizing public support and organizing
demonstrations against the communist party in power, and contributed
significantly to the revoking of communist party’s power monopoly.45
When addressing the revolutionary year 1989 in ECE, one is
compelled to answer two basic questions: (1) Why the communist
For more on the UDF see Duncan M. Perry, “From Opposition to
Government: Bulgaria’s ‘Union of Democratic Forces’ and its Antecedents,” in
Wolfgang Höpken, ed., Revolution auf Raten: Bulgariens Weg zur Demokratie
(Munich: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, 1996), 34. See also R. J. Crampton,
A Concise History of Bulgaria, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2005), 212–13; and Ivan Ilchev, The Rose of the Balkans: A Short History of Bulgaria,
transl. from Bulgarian by Bistra Roushkova (Sofia: Colibri, 1995), 402–403.
45
46
conceptual Framework and methodologIcal approach
rule in the six countries mentioned above ended precisely in 1989;
and (2) Why the demise of those communist regimes occurred in the
aforementioned particular sequence. Although there is by no means
easy to provide a convincing answer to these simple questions, one
can start from a general explanatory model applicable to all societies
in ECE that went through simultaneous processes of modernization
from above and nation-building in their quest for catching-up with
the West. It is this author’s opinion that such an explanatory model
has to take into account three key factors, i.e. path-dependency, agency
and contingency and concentrate on the processes of state- and nationbuilding in ECE over the last two hundred years.
Turning back to the revolutions of 1989, it may be argued that
one can devise an explanatory model by establishing correlations
between a series of factors that could be structured on three main
categories, as follows: (1) structure; (2) culture; and (3) contingency.
A comprehensive analysis of the 1989 phenomenon in ECE has to
address therefore issues related to historical legacies, levels of economic
development and social structures, as well as cultural and political
traditions Moreover, one should also address the issue of political
cultures, which would entail a discussion on: subjective approaches
to “national” histories; competing visions of modernity; trust or
distrust of government and politics; religious faith and treatment of
minorities. Although a single model, the Stalinist one, was imposed
almost simultaneously on the six countries under scrutiny in the
aftermath of World War II, the model imposed from “abroad and
above” was gradually transformed in the countries discussed in this
book and gave birth to national-communisms that eventually
collapsed following various patterns ranging from negotiated to
bloody revolutions. In other words, the Stalinist dictatorships
established in ECE evolved into different kinds of dictatorships and
thus a major question arises: How many types of communist dictatorships can one discern among the six ones that collapsed in 1989?
conceptual Framework and methodologIcal approach
47
To paraphrase Garton Ash, the six communist dictatorships that
collapsed throughout the year 1989 need qualifying as much as the
revolutions that brought them down. Since variations among the
Soviet bloc countries did exist, one has to specify what kind of
“modern dictatorships” were the communist dictatorships in the six
countries under discussion. It is this author’s opinion that the 1989
sequence of collapse, i.e. Poland – Hungary – East Germany –
Czechoslovakia – Bulgaria – Romania, consisted in fact of the demise
of three types of communist dictatorships: (1) “nationalaccommodative” (Poland and Hungary); “welfare” (East Germany
and Czechoslovakia); and (3) modernizing-nationalizing (Bulgaria
and Romania). The term “national-accommodative” communist
dictatorship employed by this author for Poland and Hungary has
been coined by Herbert Kitschelt, Zdenka Mansfeldova, Radoslaw
Markowski and Gábor Tóka who have distinguished between
“bureaucratic-authoritarian,” “national-accommodative” and
“patrimonial” communist regimes.46 One can easily observe that the
initiation of the 1989 sequence of collapse originated in the camp of
“national-accommodative” communist dictatorships, where the 1989
revolutions took the form of “negotiated revolutions” based on the
roundtable principle. To characterize the communist dictatorships
in East Germany and Czechoslovakia – although the term applies
more to the Czech lands than to Slovakia, this author follows Konrad
H. Jarausch who has coined the concept of “welfare dictatorship.”
As Jarausch has aptly shown in his analysis of former GDR, such
According to Kitschelt et al., the communist regimes in ECE can be defined
as follows: (1) bureaucratic-authoritarian communism – East Germany and Czech
Republic; (2) mix of bureaucratic-authoritarian and national-accommodative
communism – Poland; (3) national-accommodative communism – Hungary; (4)
mix of national-accommodative and patrimonial communism – Slovakia; and (5)
patrimonial communism – Bulgaria and Romania. See Table 1.2. – Communist
rule, mode of transition, and post-communist regime form, in Kitschelt et al., PostCommunist Party Systems, 39.
46
48
conceptual Framework and methodologIcal approach
regimes were characterized by a fundamental contradiction between
“care and coercion.”47 The demise of the “welfare dictatorships” in
East Germany and Czechoslovakia occurred through non-negotiated
non-violent revolutions, and was influenced by the “negotiated
revolutions” in neighboring Poland and Hungary. As far as Romania
and Bulgaria are concerned, it is this author’s opinion that the
communist dictatorships established in those countries can be termed
as modernizing-nationalizing dictatorships. The emphasis on the
“dynamic political stance” in this respect is crucial: the communist
regimes in both countries perceived their party-states in the making
as not completely modern and national, and therefore devised policies
aimed at spurring industrial development and creating ethnically
homogenous “socialist” nations.48 Having defined the 1989 sequence
of collapse of state socialism in ECE, let us turn now towards
presenting a theoretical model aimed at providing a causal explanation
for the inception, unfolding and outcome of the 1989 revolutions
in ECE, which will be applied consistently for explaining the 1989
revolution in Romania.
See Jarausch, “Care and Coercion: The GDR as Welfare Dictatorship,” in
idem, ed., Dictatorship as Experience, 59–60.
48
The establishment of a modernizing-nationalizing dictatorship presupposes
that the respective communist regime is characterized by a “nationalizing
nationalism,” apart from its propensity towards “socialist” modernization. In such
situations, the party-state in the making perceives itself as “unrealized” in national
terms, which in turn imposes the adoption of a “dynamic political stance:” the
communist state is not yet national in its entirety and therefore it is imperative to
be “nationalizing.” As Rogers Brubaker puts it: “Nationalizing nationalisms involve
claims made in the name of a ‘core nation’ or nationality, defined in ethnocultural
terms…. The core nation is understood as the legitimate ‘owner’ of the state, which
is conceived as the state of and for the core nation [original emphasis].” See Rogers
Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New
Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 5, 63.
47
conceptual Framework and methodologIcal approach
49
the key Factors: Structural, conjunctural and nation-Specific
In order to explain the collapse of Romanian communism, the present
work employs a model-building approach based on the three
categories mentioned above, i.e. structure, culture and contingency.
The main assumption that stays at the basis of the model presented
below is that the 1989 revolutions were determined by a complicated
and, sometimes, perplexing aggregation of structural, nation-specific
and conjunctural factors. To be sure, these factors operated and
interacted in various ways in each of the countries analyzed, but they
were nevertheless present in each case. Such a model is able to
accommodate issues of path-dependency, patterns of compliance and
contestation under communist rule and questions of interdependence
at both international and Soviet Bloc level. The particular way in
which the above-mentioned factors aggregated determined eventually
the nature of the revolution in each of the cases discussed, i.e.
negotiated or non-negotiated, peaceful or violent, as well as the order
in which the six communist dictatorships were overthrown. Such an
analysis concentrating on the three groups of factors mentioned above
has been inspired by Ole Nørgaard and Steven L. Sampson who, in
their 1984 study “Poland’s Crisis and East European Socialism,” have
explained the birth of the Polish Solidarity as an outcome of social
and cultural factors.49 Let us examine the way Nørgaard and Sampson
have defined the three categories of factors, i.e. “structural,”
“conjunctural” and “specific” in their pioneering work.
See Ole Nørgaard and Steven L. Sampson, “Poland’s Crisis and East
European Socialism,” in Theory and Society, Vol. 13, No. 6 (November 1984),
773–801. For a critical analysis of the model proposed by Nørgaard and Sampson
see Michael D. Kennedy, Professionals, Power and Solidarity in Poland: A Critical
Sociology of Soviet-Type Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991),
60–62.
49
50
conceptual Framework and methodologIcal approach
Structural factors refer to “the relations between society’s economic
and political organization on the one hand, and the expectations and
demands of key social groups on the other. Structural factors are
relevant to all the socialist countries [emphasis added].” As for the
conjunctural factors, their examination aims at explaining: “Why the
structural crisis appears at a certain point in time.” Furthermore, as
the two authors point out, “conjunctural factors are neither
intrinsically socialist nor particularly Polish in origin.” Finally,
Nørgaard and Sampson introduce the nation-specific factors, whose
role is “to explain why contradictions are expressed differently from
one country to another.” As the aforementioned authors note: “These
nation-specific factors (not to be confused with nationalism) determine
the precise nature of the social response to the structural and
conjunctural factors [original emphasis].”50 The following section
discusses the factors whose aggregation determined the nature of the
1989 events in the six countries in ECE.
Structural factors were common to all societies in which “state
socialism” came into being by the imposition of the Soviet model
from “above and abroad,” and whose exit from communism occurred
during the same year 1989. In the terms of the present analysis, two
structural factors are of prime importance: (1.1) economic failure;
and (1.2) ideological decay. Economic failure refers primarily to the
perceived failure of state socialism to offer a living standard similar
to that of the more advanced Western, capitalistic societies, and not
necessarily to the absolute failure of those regimes to achieve a certain
level of economic development. Nevertheless, in the countries of
“actually existing socialism” economic performance was an essential
source of legitimacy for the regime. At the same time, the economies
of the Sovietized countries in ECE were transformed in accordance
with the Stalinist model of “command economy,” which meant that
the party-state in the making was both proprietor and conductor of
50
See Nørgaard and Sampson, “Poland’s Crisis,” 773–74.
conceptual Framework and methodologIcal approach
51
the economy.51 The slogan “Heavy industry at all costs” epitomized
the developmental pattern imposed by the communist parties in
power through central planning.52 However, the resources available
did not permit a simultaneous accelerated growth of primary and
secondary sectors. Since the decision regarding which sectors were
to be further developed was primarily political, the central planners
favored, especially until the death of Stalin in 1953, the “producer
goods” sector. Therefore, the “consumer goods” sector was
consistently neglected throughout the entire period of communist
rule in favor of heavy industry. Thus, the policy of sustained
investments in heavy industry resulted in increasing shortages of
consumer goods that affected directly the population.53 As the Polish
economist Jan Rutkowski put it: “The economic potential increases,
but this does not result in the expansion of individual consumption.
This systemic pressure to increase socially unproductive capital assets
hits only one limit – the limit of social resistance.”54 Thus, the
According to Lewin, a “command economy” is characterized by the following
elements: “(1) a high degree of centralization of economic decision making and
planning; (2) comprehensive character of planning; (3) preference for physical
units as instruments in accounting; (4) the use of ‘material balances’ for obtaining
internal consistency of the plans; (5) a centralized administration for material
supplies, which operated as a rationing system; (6) the imperative and detailed
character of plans; (7) a hierarchically organized administration within factories;
(8) the relegation of market categories and mechanisms to a secondary role, mainly
to the sphere, albeit important, of personal consumption and to labor; and (9)
coercion by the state, as direct organizer of the economy with its ubiquitous controls
and etatization not only of the economy but of the other spheres of life as well.”
See Moshe Lewin, Political Undercurrents in Soviet Economic Debates: From
Bukharin to the Modern Reformers (London: Pluto Press, 1975), 113–14.
52
See Derek H. Aldcroft and Steven Morewood, Economic Change in Eastern
Europe since 1918 (Aldershot, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1995), 110.
53
George Kolankiewicz and Paul G. Lewis, Poland: Politics, Economics and
Society (London: Pinter Publishers, 1988), 102.
54
Cited in Bartłomiej Kaminski, The Collapse of State Socialism: The Case of
Poland (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 127.
51
52
conceptual Framework and methodologIcal approach
constant deprivations to which consumers throughout ECE were
subjected to – though to different degrees, depending on the epoch
and country, contributed to the final demise of the communist
regimes in ECE. As Aldcroft and Morewood have observed: “The
consumer was asked to endure innumerable deprivations which would
have been intolerable in the West and which ultimately sparked
revolution in Eastern Europe.”55
Nevertheless, the way economic failure was perceived by the
populations living in each of the six countries discussed deserves
further examination. For instance, in the case of Romania, and to
some extent in that of Poland, the economic situation led to
increasing dissatisfaction with the regime by significant strata of the
population. Communist Romania represents perhaps the most telling
example of the economic failure of state socialism. A timid attempt
to reform the command economy in that country was made in the
late 1960s. Its main proponent, however, did not succeed in face of
the supporters of a centrally planned economy of which the most
prominent was the supreme leader of the party himself, and was
marginalized beginning in 1968. Although the first signs of a deep
economic crisis appeared in the mid-1970s, the party took the
political decision to pursue the pattern of extensive development of
steel and heavy industries. In the early 1980s, another political
decision put a considerable strain on the already declining economy
of the country: Ceauşescu decided to pay back Romania’s external
debt, which in late 1981 rose to over $ 10 billion. In order to achieve
this goal, the regime took the measure of drastically reduce imports.
As a consequence, beginning with 1981–1982 Romania entered a
period of chronic shortages of foodstuffs and other basic things such
soap, toothpaste and detergents. Thus, during the 1980s, that country
witnessed a decline in the standard of living “unmatched since the
famine of the postwar period,” as an informed observer of Romanian
55
Aldcroft and Morewood, Economic Change in Eastern Europe, 106.
conceptual Framework and methodologIcal approach
53
affairs put it.56 As a consequence of regime’s mistaken economic
policies, in 1989 the situation in Romania was significantly different
from that in the rest of the Sovietized Europe, with the possible
exception of Albania: due to the miseries of everyday life, the potential
for protest of a majority of the population was appreciable.
In the Polish case, the relationship between economic performance
and the outbreak of social protest has been addressed by numerous
authors. As Bartłomiej Kaminski has aptly shown, the Polish
communist economy went through four major “investment cycles,”
as follows: (1) 1949–1957; (2) 1958–1971; (3) 1972–1982; and (4)
1983–1988.57 Each of these cycles ended up with a deep political
crisis. The first three cycles concluded with the crises of 1956, 1970
and 1981, which were in turn followed by a “normalization” period
that ensured the survival of the regime. All these crises led to a change
at the top of the hierarchy of the PUWP. The fourth cycle, 1983–
1988, ended up with a crisis that brought down the communist
regime in Poland and initiated the 1989 “snowball effect,” that is,
the chain reaction that led to the demise of communist regimes
throughout ECE.
In other cases, such as that of communist Hungary, where the
attempts at reforming the command economy bore some fruit during
the 1970s, it was rather the relative dissatisfaction felt by major
segments of the population that undermined the regime. In the late
1960s, Hungarian communists engaged in a systemic change of the
command economy and thus in 1968 the Kádár regime introduced
a set of economic reforms, known as the New Economic Mechanism
(NEM). Economist János Kornai argues that the Hungarian reform,
which consisted in the “radical abolition of short-term mandatory
planning,” proved its viability in spite of a partially developed market
Michael Shafir, Romania – Politics, Economics and Society: Political Stagnation
and Simulated Change (London: Frances Pinter Publishers, 1985), 117.
57
Kaminski, The Collapse of State Socialism, 120–21.
56
54
conceptual Framework and methodologIcal approach
mechanism.58 Although some analyses have showed that the NEM
failed in terms of macroeconomic results, it succeeded in initiating a
timid institutional devolution of the regime and developing an
enterprise culture. People engaged in supplementary working hours
in the second economy, in addition to the job they had in the first
economy, in order to increase their income.59 Towards the late 1980s,
the performance of the economy started to diminish. If one applies
the theory of short-term setbacks to the Hungarian case, the situation
in the late 1980s can be explained as follows: after the “golden period”
of high consumption and rising expectations, the period of relative
economic stagnation during the 1980s led to a rise of societal
dissatisfaction with the regime.
In terms of absolute or relative dissatisfaction with the economic
performance of the command economies in ECE, one should be
reminded the words of sociologist Daniel Chirot: “No East European
country, not even Romania, was an Ethiopia or a Burma, with famine
and a reversion to primitive, local subsistence economies.”60 As Chirot
pointed out, Romania and to some extent Poland were experiencing
economic difficulties, but they were still far from being in a situation
that would allow a comparison with the troubled countries of the socalled Third World. In this respect, Chirot further argues: “Other
economies – in Hungary, but even more so in Czechoslovakia and
East Germany – were failures only by the standards of the most
advanced capitalist economies. On a world scale these were rich, welldeveloped economies, not poor ones [emphasis added].61 Thus, one
János Kornai, Evolution of the Hungarian Economy, 1848–1998; Volume II:
Paying the Bill for Goulash-Communism (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs,
2000), 19.
59
Kornai, Paying the Bill for Goulash-Communism, 41–42.
60
Daniel Chirot, “What Happened in Eastern Europe in 1989?” in idem, ed.,
The Crisis of Leninism and the Decline of the Left: The Revolutions of 1989 (Seattle:
University of Washington Press, 1991), 4.
61
Chirot, “What Happened in Eastern Europe in 1989?” 4.
58
conceptual Framework and methodologIcal approach
55
should stress once again that in terms of economic development, the
difference between the developed countries of the First World and
the developing communist countries of the Second World, although
appreciable, proved to be surmountable in the aftermath of 1989 as
compared to the wide gap that separated the Second World from the
underdeveloped countries of the Third World.
Furthermore, since the present work is concerned with the 1989
collapse of communist rule in ECE, the problem of real or perceived
economic failure in each of the six cases under scrutiny is discussed
in the context of the strategies put forward by those regimes in order
to achieve economic legitimacy. Being imposed from without and
thus having a fundamental legitimacy deficit, the issue of increasing
prosperity and raising the living standards of the population as a
means of achieving legitimacy became central for the power elites in
Sovietized ECE. Thus, the analysis of the economic factors that
contributed to the 1989 demise of the communist regimes examined
concentrates on the economic policies adopted by those regimes and
their efforts aimed at reconciling their political goals with the social
and economic realities. Consequently, issues such as planning
mechanisms, organization of production and labor, formation of prices,
financial control, and the like are not the main focus of this work.62
Ideological decay or the overall erosion of the revolutionary
ideology refers to the fading away of the utopian goal of building
a radically new, classless society.63 As far as the present analysis is
In this respect, sophisticated and comprehensive economic analyses of the
economics of “actually existing socialism” have been provided by brilliant
economists from ECE such as Brus or Kornai. See, for instance, Włodzimierz Brus,
Histoire économique de l’Europe de l’Est, 1945–1985 (Paris: Éditions La Découverte,
1986) orig. publ. 1981; and János Kornai, The Socialist System: The Political
Economy of Communism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992).
63
This aspect has been also referred to as “disintegration of ideology.” See,
András Bozóki, “Introduction” to idem, ed., The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The
Genesis of Hungarian Democracy (Budapest: Central European University Press,
Budapest, 2002), xix.
62
56
conceptual Framework and methodologIcal approach
concerned, this is common for the six countries under discussion,
where state socialism was fully institutionalized only through a
“second revolution” or a “revolution from above.” The
“revolutionary struggle” of the local communists did not encompass
either a “first revolution” on the model of the Bolshevik Revolution,
or a mixture of revolution and independence war on the model of
Tito’s partisan war in Yugoslavia. Consequently, the communists
in the six countries under scrutiny were confined to carry out solely
a “revolution from above,” which represented the major guiding
principle for the relationship between the communist parties in
power and the respective societies in the aftermath of the
communist takeovers. The concept of “revolution from above” is
understood in the terms of Robert C. Tucker’s analysis of the
“second” Soviet revolution of 1928–1941. As Tucker puts it: “The
revolution from above was a state-initiated, state-directed, and stateenforced process …. State power was the driving force of economic,
political, social, and cultural change that was revolutionary in
rapidity of accomplishment, forcible methods, and transformative
effect.”64 A series of events that followed Nikita Khrushchev’s “secret
speech” in the front of the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, most
prominently the Hungarian revolution of October-November 1956
indicated that ideology undeniably lost its strength in Sovietized
Europe.
Simply put, ideological decay describes, to use Andrzej Walicki’s
inspired term, the post-1956 situation in which communism
gradually ceased to represent a “unifying Final Goal.”65 Thus, it may
be argued that ideology ceased to be a driving force in regime’s
relationship with the Hungarian society in the aftermath of the 1956
revolution. The same happened in former Czechoslovakia after the
Robert C. Tucker, “Preface” to idem, Stalin in Power: The Revolution from
Above, 1928–1941 (New York: W. W. Norton & Co, 1990), xiv-xv.
65
Andrzej Walicki, Marxism and the Leap to the Kingdom of Freedom: The Rise
and Fall of the Communist Utopia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 517.
64
conceptual Framework and methodologIcal approach
57
suppression of the Prague Spring by the August 1968 Soviet-led
invasion of the country by the Warsaw Treaty Organization troops.
In other cases, anti-fascism or nationalism acted for a while in support
of the respective regimes and thus alleviated the undermining effects
of ideological decay. For instance, in the case of East Germany, antifascism provided a sort of ideological support for the regime.
However, after the suppression of the June 1953 revolt it became
quite clear that the bulk of the population did not pay much attention
to the GDR propaganda machine that demonized the allegedly
“imperialistic” Federal Republic of Germany. On the contrary, the
increased migration to West Germany over the period 1953–1961
forced the regime in East Germany to erect the Berlin Wall in August
1961, which underlined the “moral, political, and economic” failure
of state socialism in that country.66 In the case of Romania, ideological
decay was alleviated to some extent by the communist elite’s post1956 return to traditional values and gradual instrumentalization of
nationalism. After 1968, under the rule of Nicolae Ceauşescu, the
communist regime in Romania engaged in a sustained policy of
assimilating the ethnic minorities, of whom the first target was the
Hungarian one. An outburst of ethnic nationalism also occurred in
neighboring Bulgaria, where the communist regime under Todor
Zhivkov took the decision to accelerate the forced assimilation of the
ethnic Turks – a policy that is known as the “revival” or the
“regenerative” process – in order to mitigate the popular discontent
with regime’s economic performance.67
Conjunctural factors. Contingency also played a role in the
unfolding of the 1989 events in ECE. Consequently, the present
analysis stresses the role of conjunctural factors in the inception and
unfolding of the revolutions of 1989. Conjunctural factors are of two
66
67
Stefan Wolle, DDR (Frankfurt/Main: Fischer Verlag, 2004), 46.
Crampton, A Concise History of Bulgaria, 204–205.
58
conceptual Framework and methodologIcal approach
kinds: (1) internal; and (2) external.68 With regard to the 1989
collapse of communist rule in ECE, one can mention the following
internal conjunctural factors: natural catastrophes (earthquakes,
floods, drought or unusually mild weather), coming of age of a new
generation, etc. Although the internal conjunctural factors
contributed to a lesser extent to the final demise of the regime, they
should not be neglected. For instance, in the case of the bloody demise
of Romanian communist regime, a major internal conjunctural factor
was the coming of age of the 1967–1969 baby boom resulted from
the policy of forced natality launched by Ceauşescu after his coming
to power in 1965. Furthermore, as many participants to the 1989
events in Timişoara and Bucharest pointed out, the exceptionally
mild weather for the month of December also played a role in the
way the 1989 events unfolded in Romania.
As for the external conjuncture, it may be argued that it has a
direct impact on the breakdown of all the six communist regimes in
ECE. International media, Radio Free Europe most prominently,
contributed heavily to the initiation of the chain reaction throughout
ECE. By broadcasting continuously the news about the initiation of
the 1989 changes in Poland, these radio stations prepared the
opposition groups and the populations in neighboring countries for
a possible similar change. Apart from the prominent role played by
the international media, three other external conjunctural factors
have been often invoked in relation with the 1989 revolutions: the
In structuring the conjunctural factors on two categories, internal and
external, this author draws on the analysis of the four conjunctural factors identified
to have contributed to the emergence of the Polish crisis of 1980–81, put forward
by Nørgaard and Sampson: (1) “the world economic crisis and its effect on Eastern
Europe;” (2) “the degree to which economic dependence on the West was linked
to internal regime legitimacy;” (3) “ the demographic shifts that created certain
unresolvable social strains in Polish society;” and (4) “the effect of natural calamities,
poor harvests, and food shortages in creating popular dissatisfaction”. See Nørgaard
and Sampson, “Poland’s Crisis,” 780.
68
conceptual Framework and methodologIcal approach
59
Vatican, Reagan, and Gorbachev factors. For instance, the 1978
election of a Polish Pope had a direct influence on the development
of dissident stances in Poland in the late 1970s and throughout the
1980s. This factor has to be considered especially when discussing
the initiation of the 1989 revolutions in Poland. Similarly, one has
to consider the project of the American President Ronald Reagan
(1981–1989) of establishing a high-tech spatial weapon system that
weakened the Soviet Union both economically and militarily, and
thus influenced the Soviet politics in ECE. Last, but by no means
least, one cannot explain the chain reaction that took place in 1989
in ECE without taking interdependence into consideration and thus
focusing on the “snowball effect.” It is, however, this author’s opinion
that of all these factors, the Gorbachev factor and the “snowball effect”
deserve further discussion.
The coming to power of Mikhail S. Gorbachev, who became
secretary general of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in
March 1985 and the launch of his domestic perestroika were events
that had an immense impact on the communist regimes of Eastern
Europe. Looking for the causes of the breakdown of communist rule
in ECE, Leszek Kołakowski observed: “Among the many factors, the
personal contribution of Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev cannot be
omitted, though it is evident that he both shaped events and was
shaped by them.”69 Nevertheless, Gorbachev’s insistence on the need
for “renewal” and “new thinking” revealed the crisis of the Soviet
system. As Kołakowski further points out: “Still, by repeatedly
insisting that fundamental though ill-defined changes were urgently
needed, he revealed the empire’s lack of self-confidence.”70 Moreover,
it was the Soviet policy of non-intervention during the “miraculous
year 1989” that eased the way towards peaceful, “negotiated”
See Leszek Kołakowski, “Amidst Moving Ruins,” in Tismăneanu, ed., The
Revolutions of 1989, 56; orig. publ. 1992.
70
Kołakowski, “Amidst Moving Ruins,” 56.
69
60
conceptual Framework and methodologIcal approach
revolutions in ECE, with the notable exception of Romania. As
Archie Brown aptly puts it: “The key to change in Eastern Europe
was Gorbachev’s decision in principle to abandon Soviet foreign
military interventions and his refusal to contemplate resort to them,
even when the Soviet Union was faced with an utterly changed
relationship with the area it had controlled since the end of the
Second World War.”71 In a similar vein, Andrew C. Janos has
questioned the analyses that qualified the 1989 events as revolutions
and argued that the international context was the determining factor
in the unfolding of events: “In reality, however, the locus of change
was in the international sphere, where the Soviet empire had
relinquished its erstwhile holdings in order to effect a deal with its
global adversaries.”72
One should be reminded that after 1968 the relations between
the USSR and the Sovietized countries of ECE stayed under the sign
of the Brezhnev Doctrine, which asserted that the USSR had the
right to intervene in any country in which the communist
government was threatened. After Gorbachev’s coming to power,
things changed fundamentally but the leaders of the Sovietized
countries in ECE seemed not to understand that. At least, this was
the impression of Aleksandr Yakovlev, who confessed in a booklength interview with Lilly Marcou: “The former leaders of the East
European countries did not take seriously, did not want to believe
what Mikhail Sergeyevich kept telling them: ‘From now on, the
political choice in these countries belongs to their peoples, everything
is going to be done in accordance with their options.’”73 Thus, under
Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1996), 249.
72
Andrew C. Janos, East Central Europe in the Modern World: The Politics of
the Borderlands from Pre- to Postcommunism (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2000), 343.
73
Alexandre Yakovlev, Ce que nous voulons faire de l’Union Soviétique: Entretien
avec Lilly Marcou (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1991). The passage quoted is from
71
conceptual Framework and methodologIcal approach
61
Gorbachev, the Sinatra Doctrine replaced the Brezhnev Doctrine
and this was made clear by the Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman,
Gennady Gerasimov, on 25 October 1989. Gerasimov defined the
so-called Sinatra Doctrine by stating that every country must decide
for itself the path to be pursued and referring to Frank Sinatra’s song
“I did it my way.”74
The collapse of the communist regimes in ECE cannot be
discussed apart from the events in neighboring countries. The
“snowball effect,” namely the unfolding of events during the year
1989, had a decisive role in creating a special state of mind throughout
the region, at both the level of the communist ruling elites and the
level of the populations. It was, obviously, a regime that did not
collapse because of the snowball effect, and this was that of
communist Poland. In the particular case of Poland, it may be argued
that the election of a Polish Pope in 1978 was a major conjunctural
factor that contributed in the long run to the collapse of communism.
The Polish Roundtable Agreements, concluded on 5 April 1989
initiated the “snowball effect” which lasted until 22 December 1989
when the Romanian communism was brought down by a violent
revolution. For reasons that are explained below, it was Hungary that
followed suit. The “negotiated revolution” in Hungary was influenced
by the Polish Roundtable Talks. As András Bozóki puts it: “The
political use of the phrase ‘Roundtable’ entered the vocabulary of the
Hungarian opposition after the Polish Roundtable talks.”75 The
Hungarian democratic opposition successfully applied the Polish
model of Roundtable talks to their country and thus completed the
the Romanian version, Alexandr Iakovlev, Ce vrem să facem din Uniunea Sovietică:
Convorbire cu Lilly Marcou, transl. from French by Sanda Grigoriu (What we
intend to do of the Soviet Union: A conversation with Lilly Marcou) (Bucharest:
Editura Humanitas, 1991), 114.
74
Timothy Garton Ash, In Europe’s Name: Germany and the Divided Continent
(New York: Vintage Books, 1994), 4.
75
Bozóki, “Introduction” to idem, ed., The Roundtable Talks of 1989, xvii.
62
conceptual Framework and methodologIcal approach
first phase – the “peaceful,” “negotiated” or, pace Garton Ash, the
“refolutionary” one – of the 1989 revolutions. In the Romanian case,
witness accounts from the period show that the breakdown of
communist regimes, from Poland and Hungary to the neighboring
Bulgaria, created a special state of mind among Romania’s population.
Furthermore, the true meaning of the 1989 events in ECE could not
escape to those who served the regime, first and foremost to the secret
police agencies. It was also due to the “snowball effect” that a large
number of the secret police commanders and party activists remained
mostly passive during the revolutionary events of 1989.
Nation-specific factors. As shown above, the 1989 revolutions were
non-violent (the Romanian exception notwithstanding), nonideological and were not carried out in the name of a particular class.
However, the particular aspects related to the inception, unfolding
and outcome of those events need further explanation. For instance:
Why it was exactly in Poland that the 1989 chain reaction was
initiated? Why only Hungary emulated the Polish model of a
“negotiated revolution”? Why it was only in Romania that the
communist regime went down violently? In order to answer such
questions one should identify a set of nation-specific factors that
would enable us ascertain the intricate relationships between regime
and society in ECE, focusing on patterns of compliance or conflict
with authority. Thus, the present analysis considers that the 1989
sequence of collapse came into being due to the particular way in
which regime and society reacted, in each of the six countries under
scrutiny, to the structural and conjunctural factors discussed above.
Therefore, the place each of the six countries eventually occupied in
this sequence was determined by the particular ways in which power
elites and social actors responded to economic failure and ideological
decay and to the external or internal conjuncture. The solutions for
solving the crisis of state socialism conceived by power elites and
social actors in each particular context also determined the occurrence
of a negotiated, non-negotiated, or violent revolution.
conceptual Framework and methodologIcal approach
63
This quest for specific patterns of interaction between regime and
society brings us to the study of cultural values, attitudinal patterns
and behavioral propensities. It may be argued that culture provides
a framework through which incumbents – political leaders or power
elites – tend to understand the claims and actions of their opponents
and react to them, and vice versa. Thus, as Marc Howard Ross puts
it: “Culture offers significant resources that leaders and groups use
as instruments of organization and mobilization.”76 Furthermore,
when attempting at providing a causal explanation for the particular
sequence in which the 1989 revolutions unfolded, one should be also
reminded of the concept of “repertoires of collective action.” The
concept was coined by Tilly, who defines them as: “A limited set of
routines that are learned, shared, and acted out through a relatively
deliberate process of choices. Repertoires are learned cultural creations
[emphasis added].”77
Therefore, the present work employs the concept of political culture
in order to analyze the specific relationships between political
structures and cultures, as well as the particular patterns of interaction
between regime and society. The purpose of such an analysis is to
explain the nature of change, i.e., violent or non-violent, as well as
the reason why each country occupied its particular place in the
aforementioned sequence of collapse, i.e., Poland-Hungary-East
Germany-Czechoslovakia-Bulgaria-Romania. In their 1963 classic
work, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five
Nations, Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba define the concept as
follows: “The term ‘political culture’ thus refers to the specifically
political orientations – attitudes towards the political system and its
See Marc Howard Ross, “Culture and Identity in Comparative Political
Analysis,” in Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman, Comparative Politics:
Rationality, Culture, and Structure (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997),
52, 60.
77
Quoted in Ross, “Culture and Identity in Comparative Political Analysis,” 52.
76
64
conceptual Framework and methodologIcal approach
various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the
system… . It is a set of orientations toward a special set of social
objects and processes.”78 Subsequent definitions did not depart much
from the initial understanding of the concept. For instance, Almond
and Bingham Powell Jr. proposed a brief definition that reads as
follows: “A political culture is a particular distribution of political
attitudes, values, feelings, information and skills. As people’s attitudes
affect what they will do, a nation’s political culture affects the conduct
of its citizens and leaders throughout the political system.”79 Verba
provided an insightful definition of political culture by stating that it
explains how “people respond to what they perceive of politics and
how they interpret what they see.”80 For Larry Diamond, political
culture is: “A people’s dominant beliefs, attitudes, values, sentiments,
and evaluation about the political system of its country, and the role
of the self in that system,”81 while Ben Rosamond defines it as: “The
set of values, beliefs and attitudes within which a political system
operates.”82
A further discussion is nevertheless necessary with regard to the
concept of political culture and its uses in the particular case of
communist studies. Numerous authors have emphasized the
importance of political culture theory for explaining the intricate
relationship between attitudes and behaviour under communist rule.
In this respect, Archie Brown aptly pointed out: “The peculiar
relevance of the study of ‘political culture’ in relation to change and
Gabriel A. Almond and Sydney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes
and Democracy in Five Nations (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1989), 12.
79
Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell Jr., Comparative Politics Today:
A World-View (New York: Harper Collins, 1992), 39.
80
Sidney Verba, “Comparative Political Culture,” in Louis J. Cantori, ed.,
Comparative Political Systems (Boston: Holbrook Press, 1974), 227.
81
Quoted in Jeffrey Haynes, Comparative Politics in a Globalizing World
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), 181.
82
Quoted in Haynes, Comparative Politics in a Globalizing World, 181.
78
conceptual Framework and methodologIcal approach
65
continuity in Communist states lies in the fact that the goals of total
political, economic and cultural transformation have been pursued
by ruling Communist Parties in societies with the most diverse
historical and cultural traditions.”83 In a similar vein, Almond
observed that communist rule might be considered a “natural
experiment” in attitude change and argued in favour of employing
political culture theory for the analysis of communist regimes in order
to test its explanatory power:
The argument would be that however powerful the effort, however
repressive the structure, however monopolistic and persuasive the media,
however tempting the incentive system, political culture would impose
significant constraints on effective behavioral and structural change
because underlying attitudes would tend to persist to a significant degree
and for a significant period of time.84
Archie Brown’s scholarship on political cultures in communist
regimes deserves a particular attention. According to Brown, political
culture is: “The subjective perception of history and politics, the
fundamental beliefs and values, the foci of identification and loyalty,
and the political knowledge and expectations which are the product
of the specific historical experience of nations and groups.”85 At the
same time, Brown insists on making an analytical distinction between
political culture and political behavior. Thus, he argues in favor of
focusing solely on subjective orientations to the political process and
See Archie Brown, “Introduction” to Archie Brown and Jack Gray, eds., Political
Culture and Political Change in Communist States (London: Macmillan, 1977), 1.
84
Gabriel A. Almond, “Communism and Political Culture Theory,” in idem,
A Discipline Divided: Schools and Sects in Political Science (Newbury Park, CA: Sage
Publications, 1990), 158.
85
Brown also put forward an analytical framework for the study of communist
political cultures based on the following main themes: (1) previous political
experience; (2) values and fundamental political beliefs; (3) foci of identification
and loyalty; and (4) political knowledge and expectations. See Brown,
“Introduction,” 16–18.
83
66
conceptual Framework and methodologIcal approach
excluding patterns of political behavior from the political culture
approach when one engages in the study of communist regimes in
general.86
The present work, however, is concerned with both beliefs and
actions. As Jowitt perceptively observed, numerous analyses of
communist regimes “tended to discount or neglect the role of culture,
largely because the relationship between regime and society was
viewed simply as a pattern of domination-subordination.”87 The same
author insists on the necessity to analyze “the visible and systematic
impact society has on the character, quality, and style of political life”
in order to explain the nature of communist political structures and
cultures. According to Jowitt, political culture is: “The set of informal,
adaptative postures – behavioral and attitudinal – that emerge in
response to, and interact with, the set of formal definitions –
ideological, policy and institutional – that characterize a given level
of society [emphasis added].” By focusing on both attitudes and
behavior, as Jowitt suggests, the present work discusses the patterns
of conduct of power elites and social actors throughout the
communist period, thus acknowledging that, in their quest for
creating radically new polities on the Soviet model, the party-states
in ECE engaged in a conscious and sustained effort of imposing from
above new political values. The process of political socialization under
the communist regimes displayed two contrasting facets. New, official
and “sound,” values were inculcated during adolescence and
adulthood through schooling and socialization within official
organizations, as well as by the centrally controlled mass media. At
the same time, old, traditional values proved to be more resilient than
previously thought and were handed down to younger generations
Brown, “Introduction,” 9.
Kenneth Jowitt, New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1992), 51.
86
87
conceptual Framework and methodologIcal approach
67
within the family environment and contributed to the development
of oppositional stances towards the regime.
In order to analyze the process described above, this work draws
on the three types of political culture defined by Jowitt: elite, regime
and community political culture. “Elite political culture” is defined
as: “A set of informal adaptative (behavioral and attitudinal) postures
that emerge as response to and consequence of a given elite’s identityforming experiences.” “Regime political culture” is understood as:
“A set of informal adaptative (behavioral and attitudinal) postures
that emerge in response to the institutional definition of social,
economic, and political life.” Finally, “community political culture”
is defined as: “A set of informal adaptative (behavioral and attitudinal)
postures that emerge in response to the historical relationships
between regime and community.”88 It is this author’s opinion that,
of the three types of political culture discussed above, two – regime
and community political cultures – are essential in explaining the
collapse of communist rule in ECE. Instead of a classless society, in
the Sovietized countries of ECE a dichotomous, adversarial picture
of society gradually emerged. Those societies became increasingly
polarized and divided into us (the population, including those
members of the elite who turned against the regime) and them (the
regime, i.e., the nomenklatura and the secret police, as well as those
members of the elite – be it cultural, technical or military, who chose
to remain faithful to it).
Consequently, the present work addresses the two major political
cultures – regime and community – which became truly adversarial
by the end of the 1980s, and which are understood in the terms of
Jowitt’s frame of analysis. (At the same time, one should mention
that these two political cultures were not fundamentally adversarial
throughout the entire communist period.) It should be stressed once
again that the present work is concerned with both beliefs and actions,
88
Jowitt, The Leninist Extinction, 51–52 and 54–56.
68
conceptual Framework and methodologIcal approach
and thus addresses both the main attitudinal and behavioral patterns
that emerged during the communist period at the regime and
community levels. The interplay of these attitudinal and behavioral
patterns determined the specific nature of the 1989 revolutions in
each of the six countries discussed. In the terms of the present analysis,
the regime political culture is understood as the official political
culture, i.e., the political culture of the respective communist regime
(Polish, Hungarian, East German, Czechoslovak, Bulgarian or
Romanian). As far as the community political culture is concerned,
the most significant for this discussion are its sub-cultures that, in
the terms of the present analysis, are defined as the political cultures
of resistance against the regime. Thus, the two nation-specific factors
that determined the nature (violent or non-violent), as well as the
outcome of the 1989 revolutions in ECE are: (1) the political culture
of the respective communist regime; and (2) the political culture(s) of
resistance against that regime.
a discussion on the nature of the 1989 revolutions
The nature of the 1989 revolutions in ECE, i.e., negotiated or
non-negotiated, violent or non-violent, was primarily determined by
two important aspects of regime and, respectively, community
political cultures: (1) the monolithism of the power elite and the
problem of its subordination to, or emancipation from, the Soviet
Union; and (2) the existence of political alternatives to the ruling
power within society. Where the power elite was compelled to offer
a “tacit deal” to the society at large due to an intricate interplay
between path dependence, agency and contingency, political
bargaining became a major element of both regime and community
political cultures. As already mentioned, the revolutionary changes
of 1989 originated in the camp of “national-accommodative”
communist dictatorships, i.e. in Poland and Hungary. Looking back
conceptual Framework and methodologIcal approach
69
at the moment of the communist takeovers, one can establish a
relationship between the degree of destruction suffered by the
countries under analysis during World War II and the level of violence
applied by the Stalinist elite during the “revolution from above”
carried out in the respective countries. A comparative study of the
capital losses suffered by a series of countries in ECE during the war,
relative to their national incomes in 1938 provides the following
figures: Poland – 350 percent; Yugoslavia – 274 percent; Hungary –
194 percent; Czechoslovakia – 115 percent; Bulgaria – 33 percent;
and Romania – 29 percent.89 Poland and Hungary, which initiated
the 1989 sequence of collapse, were the countries that suffered the
most, alongside former Yugoslavia, during World War II. In these
two countries, the power elite proved to be less monolithic and splits
at the top did take place. Thus, in Poland splits at the top of the
Polish United Workers Party (PWUP) occurred in 1956, 1970 and
1981. In Hungary, a split at the top of Hungarian Socialist Workers’
Party’s (HSWP) permitted the 1956 Revolution to unfold instead
of being brutally repressed immediately. Furthermore, the division
between “softliners” and “hardliners” within the power elite made
possible the “negotiated revolutions” in Poland and Hungary. In
1989, the solution of opening the negotiations with the political
opposition was perceived at the time by the moderates within the
ruling communist elites as the most appropriate way of surviving
politically into the new order. The initiation of the Roundtable Talks
in Poland marked the “strategic compromise” that led to a negotiated
transition in that country and influenced the course of events in
Hungary.
In the former GDR, the task of economic recovery was not only
huge due to the high level of war destruction, but was also
complicated further because of the Soviet dismantling of production
facilities. For its part, Czechoslovakia ranked only the fourth in terms
89
Quoted in Aldcroft and Morevood, Economic Change in Eastern Europe, 92.
70
conceptual Framework and methodologIcal approach
of capital losses relative to its 1938 national income, as shown by the
figures mentioned above. Therefore, when the communist takeovers
occurred a significant discrepancy existed between the two countries
in terms of initial economic conditions. In spite of such discrepancy,
one can note a striking similarity between GDR and Czechoslovakia
in terms of cohesion of the power elite and its subservience to the
Soviet Union. In both countries, the ruling elites displayed a high
degree of unity and when more or less significant splits at the top
nevertheless occurred, emancipation from to the Soviet Union never
became an issue. The Stalinist power elites in Bulgaria and Romania,
which did not face the enormous task of postwar reconstruction,
proceeded to their “revolutions from above” by making extensive use
of random terror. However, the difference between the two
communist dictatorships was that the Romanian communists
gradually emancipated themselves from Moscow after 1956, while
the Bulgarian communists did not. These two countries were the last
in a row to exit from communism during the revolutionary year 1989.
Thus, one should note that in those countries where the power elites
proved to be monolithic, either because of a higher degree of
institutionalization of the ruling communist party (like in East
Germany and Czechoslovakia) or due to a “patrimonial” type of state
socialism (Bulgaria and Romania) the regime change was nonnegotiated and occurred only in the favorable context determined by
the “negotiated revolutions” in Poland in Hungary. The nonnegotiated revolutions in East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria
were also non-violent. It was only in Romania, where the communist
power elite emancipated itself from the Soviet Union, that the
repressive apparatus was given the order to fire at the anti-regime
protesters and provoked a bloodbath in 1989.
Another major factor that determined the nature of regime change
was related to the development of political alternatives to the
communist power within the respective societies. This is not to say
that the communist regimes in ECE collapsed due to dissident actions
conceptual Framework and methodologIcal approach
71
or because of working-class protests. As Pollack and Wielgohs put
it: “It is widely uncontroversial in the academic literature that
dissidence, opposition, and even the mass protests in the fall of 1989
were not the decisive causes for the collapse of the system.”90 As Juan
J. Linz and Alfred Stepan aptly observed, in comparison with
opposition parties in Spain, Uruguay and Chile, which articulated
alternative political programs before the regime change, the
opposition groups in Central Europe did not devise alternative
political programs before 1989.91 At the same time, the dissident
networks that developed in Poland and Hungary prior to the
revolutionary year 1989 did contribute to the negotiated nature of
the regime change due to the fact that the structured opposition
became a major political actor during the roundtable talks in both
cases. In peasant societies that were practically modernized by the
communist regimes, such as Romania and Bulgaria, opposition to
the communist rule developed slowly. Clientelism and cooptation
functioned quite well until the economic crisis made large segments
of the population think in terms of biological survival. Dissident
networks did not appear and cross-class alliances did not emerge in
such societies. As a consequence, communist successor parties
emerged as the most powerful contenders for power in postcommunism both in Bulgaria and Romania.
It is this author’s opinion that two fundamental features of the
regime political culture determined practically the nature of the 1989
revolution in each of the six countries under discussion: (1) the
cohesion of the power elite; and (2) the degree of emancipation of
the respective elite from the Soviet Union. As shown above, the
communist regimes that experienced early, though failed, attempts
See Detlef Pollack and Jan Wielgohs, “Introduction” to idem, eds., Dissent
and Opposition in Communist Eastern Europe: Origins of Civil Society and Democratic
Transition (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2004), xv. Hereafter quoted as Dissent and
Opposition in Communist Eastern Europe.
91
Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 247.
90
72
conceptual Framework and methodologIcal approach
at emancipating themselves from Moscow by establishing a national
“path to socialism” and were confronted with major mass protests
from below, adopted a negotiated solution in 1989. Those communist
regimes whose power elites proved to be monolithic, but did not
emancipate themselves from Moscow, went through non-negotiated
but non-violent revolutions in 1989. In the Bulgarian case, however,
it was a palace coup that preceded the 1989 revolution. Where the
power elite was monolithic, but emancipated itself from Moscow,
and this happened only in the case of communist Romania, the
revolution was not only non-negotiated, but also violent, since the
regime felt confident enough as to order the repression apparatus to
shoot to kill and had its orders obeyed in the first stage of the revolution.
To conclude, there were three configurations linking the
monolithism of the power elite with the degree of structuring of
societal opposition and the level of emancipation from Moscow that
emerged in 1989 and determined the nature of the respective
revolutions, as follows: (1) factionalism of the power elite that
provoked major splits at the top of the communist hierarchy and a
structured societal opposition, in the conditions of a failed
emancipation from Moscow led to “negotiated revolutions” (Poland
and Hungary); (2) monolithism of the power elite and a less
structured societal opposition, in the conditions of a lack of
emancipation from Moscow led to non-negotiated non-violent
revolutions, i.e. regime “implosion” or palace coup followed by
unprecedented popular mobilization in support of the opposition
(former GDR and Czechoslovakia; Bulgaria); and (3) monolithism
of the power elite and a less structured societal opposition, in the
conditions of the emancipation of the power elite from Moscow led
to a non-negotiated and violent revolution (Romania).
Throughout the following chapters, the explanatory model
presented above is consistently applied for explaining the most
contested – though the sole truly violent – of the revolutions of 1989,
i.e. the Romanian one.
Chapter 2
the deCember 1989 events
In
romanIa
“What happened afterwards changes our view of what went before.”
This statement by Garton Ash in the introductory chapter to his
personal account on the revolutions of 1989 he witnessed in Warsaw,
Budapest, Berlin and Prague is even more appropriate for the
Romanian case.1 Conflicting recollections by direct participants, as
well as by simple bystanders, led to the appearance of an enduring
“Rashomon effect” in terms of public representations of the 1989
violent regime change in Romania.2 The Romanian revolution of
1989 was probably the most contested of all the 1989 revolutions in
Garton Ash, The Magic Lantern, 21.
The “Rashomon effect” refers to contrasting, though perfectly plausible,
accounts by observers of contested events, rooted in subjective understandings of
the respective events. This effect is named after the movie Rashomon (1950) directed
by the famous film director Akira Kurosawa, in which the murder of a Japanese
nobleman is described by four witnesses, as well as by the victim itself via a medium,
in mutually contradictory ways. Kurosawa’s movie is based on two short stories
by Ryunosuke Akutagawa (1892–1927), entitled “In a Grove” and “Rashomon.”
On the impact of this effect on the analysis of contested events such as
contemporary school shootings in the United States, see Wendy D. Roth and Jal
D. Mehta, “The Rashomon Effect: Combining Positivist and Interpretivist
Approaches in the Analysis of Contested Events,” Sociological Methods & Research
31, No. 2 (November 2002): 131–173; http://www.politics.ubc.ca/fileadmin/
template/main/images/departments/soci/faculty/roth/RashomonEffect.pdf;
(accessed 1 November 2009).
1
2
74
the december 1989 eventS In romanIa
ECE, although the main ingredients of a true, classic revolution, i.e.
“violence, bloodshed and tyrannicide” – as J. F. Brown wonderfully
put it,3 were present only in the Romanian case. This chapter is
structured on two parts. The first part addresses the main
interpretations of the 1989 regime change in Romania, including a
brief episode of ego-histoire, in order to illustrate the enduring
“Rashomon effect” that characterizes the general process of reflecting
on the December 1989 events in this country. A fost sau n-a fost?
(Was it, or not?) is the title of a Romanian feature film directed by
Corneliu Porumboiu (b. 1975) and released in 2006, which grasps
masterly the highly controversial legacy of the 1989 regime change
in Romania. In fact, the disarmingly simple question “Was it, or
not?” epitomizes the controversial nature of the Romanian revolution
of 1989.4 The second part of this chapter provides a concise eventcentered historical reconstruction of the December 1989 events in
Timişoara and Bucharest based primarily on the recollections of the
participants to those events. The historical reconstruction provided
here, which does not pretend to be comprehensive – such an endeavor
would go much beyond the capabilities of an individual researcher –
is meant to illustrate the fact that people in the street perceived the
1989 events as revolutionary. At the time, many were convinced that
a revolution was sparked under their eyes and wanted to take part to
it. It is also true that “what happened afterwards,” i.e. the coming to
power of the second- and third- rank apparatchiks, changed the view
of large segments of the population of “what went before,” i.e. in
December 1989.
J. F. Brown, The End of Communist Rule in Eastern Europe, 1.
Corneliu Porumboiu, A fost sau n-a fost? (Was it, or not?), 89 min., 2006;
the movie was internationally released as 12:08 East of Bucharest.
3
4
the december 1989 eventS In romanIa
75
“was it, or not?”
Conflicting Interpretations of the romanian 1989
During my doctoral studies at the Central European University in
Budapest I had the chance to meet Dan Ţura, a participant to the
University Square demonstration of 21 December 1989, and listen
to his amazing story about the initiation of the December 1989
revolution in Bucharest. While listening to Dan, I realized that his
vivid recollections of his participation to the open protest that
emerged on 21 December 1989 in the University Square in
downtown Bucharest represented in fact that special kind of account
of an exceptional individual experience, which practitioners of
microstoria use to call l’eccezionale normale. On the one hand, his
story represents a seeming anomaly within the general context of the
bloody 1989 revolution in Romania. On the other hand, such a story
sheds light on the way ordinary people responded when history
suddenly started to accelerate itself in those days of 21–22 December
1989. After the mass rally organized by the regime in the Palace
Square ended in chaos, a relative numerous group of demonstrators
gathered in the University Square, in the very center of Bucharest,
and initiated a public protest. At the time, Ţura was working at an
institute situated nearby the University Square. Thus, when protesters
gathered there and started to shout anti-Ceauşescu and anti-regime
slogans he joined them. He was aware that he was taking part to a
revolution, which was the experience of a lifetime, and therefore he
wanted to take full advantage of that unique opportunity. At the
same time, that particular day of 21 December was payday.
Consequently, Ţura shouted against the regime for a while and then
returned to his workplace to find out if the payment of salaries had
begun. The money did not arrive yet so that he returned to the
University Square and rejoined the revolution. After some time he
returned to the institute and was happy to find out that the money
76
the december 1989 eventS In romanIa
had finally arrived. So, he got his salary. Immediately afterwards, his
first thought was to go back to the University Square, but he recalled
that he had promised to his family that he would buy a fir tree for the
Christmas celebration, which was approaching. Consequently, he
rushed to the closest market, the Amzei Market, bought a fir tree and
returned to the University Square. Holding firmly the fir tree in one
hand, he rejoined the protesters until dark fell and the repression
troops began firing at the demonstrators. At that moment, he thought
that it was too risky to remain in the University Square and
consequently ran home.5 Dan Ţura’s account of the initiation of the
1989 revolution in Bucharest reminds us of the confusion, uncertainty
and ambiguity that characterized the Romanian 1989 due to
superposition of two streams of events. On the one hand, history
began to accelerate itself due to the outbreak of open contestation of
Ceauşescu’s rule and the chain of rapidly unfolding events it generated,
while on the other hand the normal course of everyday life continued
to unfold slowly and prosaically like in any other regular day. At the
same time, the Romanian revolution of 1989 consisted actually of
two revolutions that unfolded almost simultaneously and often crossed
their paths influencing one another: a bloody revolution carried out
in the streets of a few major cities and a thrilling one witnessed by a
majority of the population in front of the TV sets. It may be argued
that the Romanian revolution of 1989 had three major features that
made it so special in the context of the 1989 revolutions in ECE: it
occurred unexpectedly, unfolded violently and had an ambiguous outcome.
Romanian communism was of a “patrimonial” type and gave birth
to a modernizing-nationalizing dictatorship. The communist power
elite proved to be monolithic up to the very end of the regime and
this is why Romania’s exit from communism was violent and nonnegotiated. For its part, the political opposition was too weak to
5
Dan Ţura, interview by the author, August 1999, Budapest.
the december 1989 eventS In romanIa
77
emerge as a strong contender for power during the revolution. Thus,
the first free elections held on 20 May 1990 were won by the secondand third-rank nomenklatura members, who constantly defined
themselves as a “genuine” emanation of the 1989 revolution. Sparked
unexpectedly and ensued violently, the 1989 revolution brought
eventually to power a mixture of communist reformers and
technocrats under the leadership of a former apparatchik, Ion Iliescu.
As a consequence, dissatisfaction with the newly established power
elite and therefore with the outcome of the 1989 revolution in
Romania was particularly high among the educated urban strata.
Somehow unexpectedly, the bulk of the population enthusiastically
supported Ion Iliescu and his party, the National Salvation Front
(NSF). Consequently, the political opposition, supported by public
intellectuals and the emerging civil society, articulated two conflicting
visions of the post-1945 period, in which the interpretation of the
recent past (the communist period March 1945 – December 1989)
differed fundamentally from that of the immediate past (the violent
regime change of 16–22 December 1989).
The vision of the communist period that emerged powerfully
was one centred on prisons, surveillance and shortages, which
became instrumental in stressing the continuities between the
Ceauşescu and Iliescu regimes in an attempt at convincing the
population not to vote anymore in the next general elections for
Iliescu and his NSF. At the same time, the democratic opposition
and the emerging civil society adopted an overcritical approach to
the December 1989 regime change by contesting, if not by utterly
denying, the revolutionary nature of those events. The adoption of
such a stance by the political opposition and civic groups was also
prompted by the fact that the “neo-communists” of Iliescu spoke
of 1989 as a true revolution and presented themselves as authentic
revolutionaries. Foreign scholars were equally critical towards the
Romanian revolution of 1989. For instance, Garton Ash wrote in
1999 that the Romanian revolution of 1989 “was the only one that
78
the december 1989 eventS In romanIa
wasn’t,”6 and he was by no means alone in his sharp criticism of
the nature and outcome of the 1989 events in Romania. Some have
used the word revolution in quotation marks in order to emphasize
its ambiguities, while others went even further and stated openly that
in December 1989 Romania witnessed a sheer coup d’état.
There were the unsolved “mysteries” of the 1989 regime change
in Romania and the protracted transition to a democratic polity that
added to the wave of contestation and even denial of the revolutionary
character of those events. It is important to stress that more blood
was spilled in Romania after the collapse of the communist regime –
placed by a majority of the analysts at precisely 1208 hours on 22
December 1989, when Ceauşescu’s helicopter took off from the upper
platform of the building of the CC of the RCP – than before its
demise. Innocent people were killed by unidentified “terrorists”
during the period 22–25 December 1989, i.e. from the moment the
Ceauşescu couple left the CC building and their hasten execution
after a mock trial. As for the figures, one should note that out of the
total number of victims officially registered in the 1989 events, i.e.
1,104 dead and 3,352 wounded, 942 died and 2,245 were wounded
after 22 December.7 The intricacies of the 1989 Romanian revolution
led to the emergence of various interpretations of those events.
Of these interpretations, the testimonies and witness accounts by
those who participated directly to the events tend to support three
major interpretations, as follows: (1) 1989 – An Authentic Revolution.
Garton Ash, “Conclusions” to Antohi and Tismăneanu, eds., The Revolutions
of 1989, 395.
7
On the official number of victims see Emil Constantinescu, Adevărul despre
România (The truth about Romania) (Bucharest: Editura Universalia, 2004), 113
and Costache Codrescu, ed., Armata Română în revoluţia din decembrie 1989 (The
Romanian army in the December 1989 Revolution) 2nd rev. ed. (Bucharest: Editura
Militară, 1998), 462. See also Stan Stoica, România, 1989–2005: O istorie
cronologică (Romania, 1989–2005: A chronological history) (Bucharest: Editura
Meronia, 2005), 19.
6
the december 1989 eventS In romanIa
79
According to this interpretation, the 1989 events represented a
genuine revolution, initiated by the spontaneous mass revolt of the
population, especially in Timişoara and Bucharest. Such a view of
the events has been shared since December 1989 by numerous
representatives of the newly established NSF and a major part of the
revolutionaries who poured into the streets and confronted the
repressive forces; (2) 1989 – A Confiscated Revolution. This
interpretation emerged during the first half of the year 1990 and was
put forward by disenchanted critical intellectuals and revolutionaries,
and was endorsed by numerous bystanders who watched the 1989
events on TV. This interpretation reads as follows: the popular revolt
was confiscated by second- and third-rank nomenklatura members
who benefited mainly from Soviet support, and thus the 1989
revolution was never completed. This view of the December 1989
events became more structured after the victory of the NSF in the
first post-communist elections of 20 May 1990 and the repression
of the protesters in the University Square in Bucharest on 13–15
June the same year; and (3) 1989 – An International Conspiracy. This
interpretation contends that the events of 1989 were the direct result
of an international conspiracy conducted from abroad by the
intelligence agencies of the two superpowers with the complicity of
some segments of the party, secret police and the military. This
version of the events has been supported mainly by former members
of the communist secret police (the Securitate) and the military, as
well as by journalists.8
A detailed taxonomy of the discourses on the 1989 events, written from the
perspective of literary studies, has been authored by Cesereanu, who classifies the
discourses on the 1989 revolution as follows: (1) The purists: 1.1 Those in power;
1.2 Those outside the power circle; and 1.3 Other voices; (2) The conspiracy
theory: 2.1 The external plot; 2.2 The internal plot; and (3) The thesis of a
revolution hybridized with a coup d’état. See Ruxandra Cesereanu, Decembrie ’89:
Deconstrucţia unei revoluţii (December 1989: The deconstruction of a revolution)
(Iaşi: Editura Polirom, 2004), 63–180.
8
80
the december 1989 eventS In romanIa
1989 – An Authentic Revolution. Major figures of the NSF, as well
as genuine revolutionaries, argued that Romania did experience an
authentic revolution in 1989. For the prominent members of the
NSF who served under the Ceauşescu regime, their participation to
the 1989 regime change on the part of the revolted masses constituted
the only legitimizing element for continuing their careers under the
new political order. For them, what happened in December 1989
was nothing else than a true revolution to which they took part
actively. At the same time, most of the genuine revolutionaries who
demonstrated against the regime and many of whom faced the bloody
repression have been clearly in favor of considering those events a
revolution.
High-ranking members of the first post-communist regime, such
as President Ion Iliescu or Prime Minister Petre Roman wrote in
their memoirs about their involvement in, and the nature of, the
1989 revolution. Iliescu has constantly affirmed that what happened
in 1989 was a revolution sparked by the popular uprising in
Timişoara and completed by the population of Bucharest which
poured into the streets in large numbers on 22 December.9 In his
memoirs, Roman supports the idea of a genuine revolution while
stressing that the population was not prepared for such an event and
this led to much vacillation and guesswork.10 Siviu Brucan, a close
collaborator of Iliescu and a key figure of the NSF in the early 1990s
also supports the revolution thesis.11 Sergiu Nicolaescu, a post-1989
politician close to Iliescu, has provided his own account of the 1989
Ion Iliescu, Revoluţie şi reformă (Revolution and reform) (Bucharest: Editura
Enciclopedică, 1994), 12–13; and idem, Revoluţia trăită (A lived revolution)
(Bucharest: Editura Redacţiei publicaţiilor pentru străinătate, 1995), 13.
10
Petre Roman, Libertatea ca datorie (Freedom as duty) (Cluj-Napoca: Editura
Dacia, 1994), 105.
11
Silviu Brucan, Generaţia irosită: Memorii (The wasted generation: Memoirs)
(Bucharest: Universul & Calistrat Hogaş, 1992), 208–19.
9
the december 1989 eventS In romanIa
81
events. According to Nicolaescu, the “historic moment” of the
Romanian 1989 occurred on 22 December between 1600 and 1730
hours when the anti-Ceauşescu revolt was turned into an anticommunist revolution by the protesters gathered in front of the CC
of the RCP building.12
As for the revolutionaries in the streets, one should mention the
name of Marius Mioc who has been extremely active in researching
and disseminating firsthand information about the 1989 revolution
in Timişoara. Time and again, Mioc has affirmed that in 1989
Romania witnessed an authentic revolution and due to his constant
efforts numerous witness accounts and documents related to the
inception of the revolution were published.13 Writer and journalist
Stelian Tănase wrote about his 1989 revolutionary experience in
Bucharest. Thus, he recalls the moment when he reached the
Magheru Boulevard shortly after the Bucharest protests had started:
Sergiu Nicolaescu, Revoluţia – Începutul adevărului: Un raport personal (The
revolution – The beginning of the truth: A personal report) (Bucharest: Editura
Topaz, 1995), 50.
13
Marius Mioc, Revoluţia din Timişoara şi falsificatorii istoriei (The revolution
in Timişoara and the falsifiers of history) (Timişoara: Editura Sedona, 1999). See
also idem, The Anticommunist Romanian Revolution of 1989 – Written for people
with little knowledge about Romania (Timişoara: Marineasa Publishing House,
2004); idem, Revoluţia din 1989 şi minciunile din Jurnalul Naţional: Mitul
agenturilor străine, Mitul Securităţii atotputernice (The revolution of 1989 and the
lies in [newspaper] Jurnalul Naţional: The myth of foreign agencies and the myth
of the almighty Securitate) (Timişoara: Editura Marineasa, 2005); idem, ed.,
Revoluţia, fără mistere: Cazul László Tökés – Documente din arhiva Judecătoriei
Timişora; Documente din arhiva parohiei reformate Timişoara; Mărturii (The
revolution, void of mysteries: The László Tökés case – Documents from the archive
of the Timişoara Court of Justice; Documents from the archive of the Timişoara
Reformed Parish Church; Testimonies) (Timişoara: Editura “Almanahul
Banatului,” 2002); and idem, ed., Procesele revoluţiei din Timişoara, 1989:
Documente istorice (Trials of the revolution in Timişoara, 1989: Historical
documents) (Timişoara: Editura Artpress, 2004).
12
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the december 1989 eventS In romanIa
“The Magheru Boulevard was blocked by the special brigades
equipped with shields and helmets and, some meters away, were
hundreds of people who shouted, indeed, ‘Ceauşescu,’ but… ‘Down
with!’ My first sensation was that of astonishment.” It was amazing,
Tănase observes, to see how rapidly people in the street became
radicalized and organized themselves.14
1989 – A Confiscated Revolution. Democratic political opposition
to the NSF and the emerging civil society, as well as numerous
disenchanted critical intellectuals and scholars from Romania and
abroad, have been at the origin of the interpretation of the 1989
events as a revolution initiated by the population of Timişoara and
which was subsequently “confiscated” in the capital city Bucharest.
According to this version, the 1989 events unfolded in two phases:
the genuine revolution that originated in Timişoara was followed by
a coup d’état that took place in Bucharest. Such an interpretation
has been also supported by participants to the events, journalists and
by significant strata of the general public. Talk-shows have
concentrated on such scenarios that proved to be extremely popular
with large audiences. In this respect, one can mention the series of
fifteen TV roundtables dedicated by journalist Vartan Arachelian to
the “mysteries” of the 1989 revolution, whose transcripts were subsequently published in a volume. During one of the aforementioned
roundtables, a journalist affirmed bluntly: “A revolution that started
in Timişoara was killed by a coup d’état.”15 In a similar vein, Dumitru
Mazilu, a former second-rank nomenklatura member who became
critical towards Ceauşescu’s rule in the 1980s, has argued in his book
of memoirs that the 1989 revolution was simply “stolen.” Mazilu,
Stelian Tănase, “Solstiţiu însîngerat la Bucureşti” (Bloody solstice in Bucharest),
in Şocuri şi crize (Shocks and crises) (Bucharest: Editura Staff, 1993), 5, 9.
15
Statement by journalist Sorin Roşca Stănescu. See Vartan Arachelian, În faţa
dumneavoastră: Revoluţia şi personajele sale (In front of you: The revolution and its
characters) (Bucharest: Editura Nemira, 1998), 243.
14
the december 1989 eventS In romanIa
83
who was co-opted to the leadership of the NSF on 22 December
1989 after the fall of Ceauşescu, distanced himself from Iliescu in
January 1990.16 The idea of a “stolen” or “diverted” revolution has
been generally expressed by a large number of Romanian, as well as
foreign, authors by using the term revolution in quotation marks.17
1989 – An International Conspiracy. After 1989, conspiracy
theories and absurd scenarios also filled the pages of the newly
established newspapers, journals and magazines. Numerous
publications nurtured the idea that the Ceauşescu regime was brought
down by a conspiracy involving major foreign secret services,
including the KGB and the CIA, with the support of local figures
from the party, military and the secret police. A brief survey of the
conspiracy theories put forward immediately after the fall of the
Ceauşescu regime has been provided in a volume by Perva and
Roman.18 The thesis of an international conspiracy has been
particularly supported by former Securitate agents, as well as by
employees of the post-communist secret services. For instance, Filip
Teodorescu, a former deputy of the head of the counterintelligence
Dumitru Mazilu, Revoluţia furată: De la totalitarism spre libertate – Memoriu
pentru ţara mea (The stolen revolution: From totalitarianism to freedom – A
memorandum for my country) (Bucharest: Editura Cozia, 1991). Former dissident
Dorin Tudoran stated that in December 1989 a coup d’état hindered the popular
uprising in becoming a revolution. Tudoran, Kakistocraţia, 519. A gifted émigré
analyst of the communist power in Romania argued that the second echelon of the
nomenklatura confiscated a revolution carried out mainly by the anticommunist
young generations and consequently coined the term “gunned down revolution”
to characterize the 1989 events in Romania. See Victor Frunză, Revoluţia împuşcată
sau P.C.R. după 22 decembrie 1989 (The gunned down revolution or the RCP after
22 December 1989) (Bucharest: Editura Victor Frunză, 1994), 7–14 and 23–25.
17
To emphasize the ambiguous character of the 1989 events in Romania, some
scholars used the term revolution in quotation marks. See Katherine Verdery and Gail
Kligman, “Romania after Ceauşescu: Post-Communist Communism?” in Ivo Banac,
ed., Eastern Europe in Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), 117.
18
Perva and Roman, The mysteries of the Romanian revolution.
16
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the december 1989 eventS In romanIa
section of the Securitate asserted in his book of memoirs that the
violent events of December 1989 were stirred from outside the
country, following an agreement between “West and East,” i.e.,
between the United States and the Soviet Union.19 Niculae Mavru,
the former head of the Surveillance and Investigation Section of the
Timişoara branch of the Securitate, supports a similar version insisting
on the Soviet involvement,20 while a volume authored by Valentin
Raiha denounces the 1989 events as a coup d’état organized by the
military with the support of the Soviet Union.21 Witness accounts
by participants to the revolution have supported such views. For
instance, Constantin Vasile’s book, which focuses on the unfolding
of events in the city of Sibiu, concludes that Romania witnessed in
1989 a coup d’état organized by the military.22 Alex Mihai Stoenescu
features prominently among the authors who consistently supported
the thesis of an international conspiracy that provoked the demise
of the Ceauşescu regime in 1989. In this respect, one should mention
the book length interview realized by Stoenescu with Virgil
Măgureanu – the first director of the post-communist Romanian
Filip Teodorescu, Un risc asumat: Timişoara, decembrie 1989 (A risk
undertaken: Timişoara, December 1989) (Bucharest: Editura Viitorul Românesc,
1992), 43–51. For the idea that an international conspiracy led by the CIA and
the KGB provoked the fall of Ceauşescu in 1989 see also Cornel Armean, De ce a
fost ucis? Ar fi împlinit 75 de ani (Why was he killed? He would have turned 75)
(n.p.: Editura Alfabetul, 1993), 164–65.
20
Niculae Mavru, Revoluţia din stradă: Amintirile fostului şef al Serviciului de
Filaj şi Investigaţie de la Timişoara (The revolution in the street: Memoirs of the
former head of the Timişoara Surveillance and Investigation section) (Bucharest:
Editura Rao, 2004), 60–64.
21
Valentin Raiha, În decembrie ’89 KGB a aruncat în aer România cu
complicitatea unui grup de militari (In December 1989, the KGB blew Romania
up with the complicity of a group of militaries) (Bucharest: Editura Ziua – Omega
Press Investment, 1995).
22
Constantin Vasile, Noi am fost teroriştii?! (Have we been the terrorists?!)
(Sibiu: Editura Sibguard, 1995).
19
the december 1989 eventS In romanIa
85
Intelligence Service (Serviciul Român de Informaţii – SRI), in which
Măgureanu and Stoenescu agree upon the idea of an implication of
foreign secret services in the initiation of the mass protest in Bucharest
on 21 December 1989.23
From late December 1989 onwards, numerous critical
intellectuals, generally siding with the political opposition, have
seriously questioned or even denied the revolutionary nature of the
1989 events. As shown above, the political opposition, emerging civil
society and public intellectuals were not able to persuade the bulk of
the population to vote for the “democratic opposition” instead of
Iliescu’s “neo-communists.” Up to the year 1996 when the united
opposition came to power, dissatisfaction with the outcome of the
1989 regime change was accompanied by appeals to proceed to a
new revolution, meant to finally oust the “neo-communists” from
power. It was in that particular political context that the general view
of a 1989 Romanian revolution that calls for qualifying in order to
stress its ambiguities, if not its utter failure, was born. It should be
emphasized once again that such a reading of the 1989 events, which
has remained powerful to this day in spite of the power shift of 1996,
was primarily due to the dissatisfaction with the outcome of the 1989
events mostly among the urban educated strata.
A sharp criticism towards such an attitude by a majority of the
Romanian public intellectuals towards the 1989 events came in the
year 2000 from a former dissident philosopher. That year, in the
final round of the presidential elections in Romania Iliescu competed
with the ultra-nationalist leader of the Greater Romania Party,
Corneliu Vadim Tudor. With that occasion, the Hungarian
intellectual and former dissident G. M. Tamás – who was born in
Romania – addressed an open letter to his Romanian friends, which
Virgil Măgureanu with Alex Mihai Stoenescu, De la regimul comunist la
regimul Iliescu: Virgil Măgureanu în dialog cu Alex Mihai Stoenescu (From the
communist regime to the Iliescu regime: Virgil Măgureanu in dialogue with Alex
Mihai Stoenescu) (Bucharest: Editura Rao, 2008), 116–22.
23
86
the december 1989 eventS In romanIa
sparked a heated debate and triggered responses from many Romanian
public intellectuals. The most relevant replies, accompanied by Tamás’
open letter, were subsequently published together in a volume.24 In
his letter, Tamás observed among other things that the Romanian
intellectuals consistently denied the revolutionary character of the
1989 events because the outcome of the regime change was different
from what they expected. In Hungary, Tamás further argued, the
Revolution of 1956 also left numerous questions unanswered even
after so many years but nobody dares to affirm that it was not a true
revolution because of that. Thus, the Romanian intellectuals have
destroyed the memory of a great accomplishment in Romanian
history and with this the founding myth of the new and democratic
Romanian polity. As Tamás puts it:
You, my dear friends, who did not like the political consequences
(unpleasant, indeed) of the revolution, managed to convince an entire
world that the revolution, in fact, did not even take place, that it was about
a trick, a fata morgana, a hallucination, a foul play, a prank and, by
making use of the deceitful poetic means of negative mythologizing,
succeeded in obscuring the biggest historical deed of the Romanian
people only because, like in all revolutions, there was too much
buffoonery, chatty talk, too much chaos [emphasis added].25
The constant denial of the revolutionary character of the regime
change in Romania determined to a great extent the way in which the
1989 revolution is remembered nowadays in this country. One can
go even further and argue that the process of reflecting on the 1989
phenomenon in Romania focuses almost entirely on its ambiguities
See Mircea Vasilescu, ed., Intelectualul român faţă cu inacţiunea: În jurul unei
scrisori a lui G. M. Tamás (The Romanian intellectual face with inaction: Replicas
to a letter by G. M. Tamás) (Bucharest: Editura Curtea Veche, 2002); for Tamás’
open letter see pp. 11–20.
25
G. M. Tamás, “Scrisoare către prietenii mei români” (Letter to my Romanian
friends), in Replicas to a letter by G. M. Tamás, 16.
24
the december 1989 eventS In romanIa
87
and confusions, and leads more often than not to the sheer denial of
its revolutionary character. It is the purpose of the next section to
present a concise event-centered historical reconstruction of the 1989
events in Timişoara and Bucharest, based primarily on witness
accounts, which is meant to illustrate the fact that at the time a
majority of the participants perceived those events as revolutionary.
december 1989
an event-Centered historical reconstruction
The 1989 revolution began in Timişoara during the night of 16/17
December. A peaceful demonstration by a small group of believers,
in their majority of Hungarian ethnicity, gathered around the house
of Reverend László Tökés, preceded the revolution. Tökés, a
rebellious minister of the Protestant church, was supposed to be
forcibly evacuated from the house he occupied – property of the
Protestant Church – due to a decision signed by the Oradea Diocesan,
Bishop László Papp. At the origins of such a decision stayed Tökés’
religious activism and his militant stance concerning the rights of the
Hungarian minority in Romania. Such activities annoyed both the
communist authorities and the leadership of the Protestant Church,
and led to an open conflict between Tökés and Bishop Papp.26
See Diocesan László Papp, “Scurtă caracterizare a preotului Tökés László”
(Short characterization of Reverend Tökés László), dated 14 August 1989, in
Marius Mioc, ed., Revoluţia, fără mistere: Cazul László Tökés – Documente din
arhiva Judecătoriei Timişora; Documente din arhiva parohiei reformate Timişoara;
Mărturii (The revolution, void of mysteries: The László Tökés case – Documents
from the archive of the Timişoara Court of Justice; Documents from the archive
of the Timişoara Reformed Parish Church; Testimonies) (Timişoara: Editura
“Almanahul Banatului,” 2002), 144–45.
26
88
the december 1989 eventS In romanIa
Eventually, Tökés was released from the position he held in
Timişoara and assigned to a new post in Mineu (Sălaj County), a
small locality in Northern Transylvania.27 However, he refused to
leave the apartment he occupied in the parish house located in
Timişoara on the Timotei Cipariu Street at No. 1, near the Maria
Square.28 On 10 December 1989, after the Mass, Reverend Tökés
announced the churchgoers from his parish that he was ordered to
evacuate the parish house on 15 December and asked them to come
and witness the forced evacuation.29 Consequently, on Friday, 15
December 1989, a rather small group of churchgoers gathered
around the three-level (ground floor and two stories) parish house
in the Timotei Cipariu Street.30
As already mentioned, on 15 December, the crowd was initially
composed of members of the Hungarian minority who showed their
support for their spiritual leader. According to a witness account,
there were around one hundred persons in the front of the parish
house: a few Hungarian-Romanian families and some Romanians,
mostly men. In the evening, around 1900 hours, a part of those
gathered there sang “Deşteaptă-te române” (Awake thee, Romanian!),
Republica Socialistă România, Judecătoria Timişoara, Dosar 9001/1989,
Sentinţa civilă nr. 7190 din 20 octombrie 1989 (Socialist Republic of Romania,
the Timişoara Court of Justice, File 9001/1989, Sentence no. 7190 of 20 October
1989); and Republica Socialistă România, Tribunalul Judeţean Timiş, Dosar
2339/1989, Decizia civilă nr. 1474 din 28 noiembrie 1989 (Socialist Republic of
Romania, the Timiş County Court of Justice, File 2339/1989, Judicial decision
no. 1474 of 28 November 1989), in Mioc, ed., The revolution, void of mysteries,
166–74 and 194–97 respectively.
28
For the layout of the quarter where the Mary Square is located see the map
in Marius Mioc, Revoluţia din Timişoara şi falsificatorii istoriei (The revolution in
Timişoara and the falsifiers of history) (Timişoara: Editura Sedona, 1999), 253.
29
Ibid., 19. See also Miodrag Milin, “Azi în Timişoara, mîine-n toată ţara!”
(Today in Timişoara, tomorrow in the whole country!), in Timişoara: 16–22
Decembrie 1989 (Timişoara: Editura Facla, 1990), 46.
30
For a description and a photograph of the house see Ibid., 100–101.
27
the december 1989 eventS In romanIa
89
a song born of the 1848 revolution and considered a dissident song
by the end of the Ceauşescu rule, which would become the anthem
of post-1989 democratic Romania. A witness, Victor Burghelea,
recalls what he felt at that moment: “I could not believe, it was
phenomenal.”31 Many revolutionaries affirm that the moment when
“Awake thee, Romanian!” was first sung in the Mary Square proved
to be crucial.32 Nevertheless, there were not many those who could
foresee the way the events would evolve. Tökés himself has confessed
that his actions were not intended to provoke the downfall of the
regime: “I am ashamed of not having such a bold-spirited idea, all
the more that the minority churches did not envisage such ideas. Our
scope was to survive.”33
On Saturday, 16 December in the morning, things seemed to
calm down. At least this was the impression of physician Dan Ştefan
Opriş, who walked by the Mary Square that morning.34 In the
afternoon, however, people started to come back. A witness recalls
that it was about 1500 hours when the crowd uttered the first “Down
with Ceauşescu!” slogans.35 Around 1700 hours – as Aurelian David
Mihuţ recalls – the square was packed with people and the traffic
through the intersection became difficult. A small group started to
sing “Hora Unirii” (The union round dance), a highly symbolic
Romanian song, the anthem of the 1859 union between Wallachia
and Moldavia which set the foundation of the modern Romanian
state.36 Around 1900 hours, someone performed the first act of
courage by pulling down the pantograph’s rope of a tram that passed
See the account of Victor Burghelea in Mioc, The revolution in Timişoara, 57.
See Daniel Vighi’s comment in Miodrag Milin, Timişoara în revoluţie şi după
(Timişoara in revolution and after) (Timişoara: Editura Marineasa, 1997), 27–28.
33
László Tökés, “A Dialogue with László Tökés,” interview by Marius Mioc
(Timişoara, 2 November 2001), in Ibid., 77.
34
Milin, Timişoara in revolution and after, 18.
35
See the account of Gazda Arpad in Mioc, The revolution in Timişoara, 10.
36
For Mihuţ’s acount, see Milin, Timişoara in revolution and after, 24.
31
32
90
the december 1989 eventS In romanIa
through the intersection, so that the traffic was blocked.37 There were
around 1,000 people in the Mary Square at that moment, as Ştefan
Iordănescu remembers, an evaluation confirmed by sources from the
Ministry of Internal Affairs.38 From that moment on, the events
unfolded rapidly. People from the crowd started to shout slogans
such as: “Libertate!” (Freedom!), “Jos Ceauşescu!” (Down with
Ceauşescu!), “Jos dictatorul!” (Down with the dictator!), and “Acum
ori niciodată!” (Now, or never!). A column of around 1,000 people
started to march towards downtown, while a small group of believers,
approx. 200, remained in the front of Tökés’ house.39 The
demonstration against the forced evacuation of Reverend Tökés had
already turned into a demonstration against the Ceauşescu regime,
increasingly joined by the population of Timişoara. Subsequently,
the anti-Ceauşescu demonstration developed into an anti-Communist
revolution.
In order to have an idea of the sequence and localization of events,
some remarks concerning the layout of Timişoara’s center would be
useful. Furthermore, since the Opera House would become
Timişoara’s landmark as far as the 1989 revolution is concerned, the
location of other buildings, squares, streets and quarters will be given
below in relation to the Opera Square and the Bega Canal. On the
north-south axis, the Bega Canal, an artificial waterway, cuts the city
of Timişoara into two parts. Timişoara’s downtown is north of the
waterway so that the main official and monument buildings – the
According to Miodrag Milin, Tiberiu Kovács, a worker at the 6 Martie (6
March) enterprise and Ion Monoran, a poet, were those who stopped the trams in
the Mary Square. See Miodrag Milin, Timişoara in revolution and after, 24 and
205. For more on this see footnote 12 in Mioc, The revolution, void of mysteries, 52.
38
Quoted in Milin, “Azi în Timişoara, mîine-n toată ţara!” 53. See also General
Ion Pitulescu, ed., Şase zile care au zguduit România: Ministerul de Interne în
decembrie 1989 (Six days that shook Romania: The Ministry of Internal Affairs in
December 1989) (Bucharest: n.p., 1995), 76.
39
Ibid., 54.
37
the december 1989 eventS In romanIa
91
town hall, the RCP County Council, the Opera Hall, and the
Orthodox Cathedral, lie north of the Bega Canal. Mary Square is
located south of the Bega Canal and southwest of the Opera Square,
while the Students’ Complex is located south of the Canal and
southeast of the Opera Square. The access over the Bega Canal on
the north-south axis is realized, from the east to the west, through
four main bridges: the Mary Bridge, the Mihai Viteazul Bridge, the
Michelangelo Bridge, and the Decebal Bridge. Consequently, in order
to reach the main symbols of communist power, i.e., the town hall
and the RCP County Council, the initial protesters gathered in the
Mary Square had to cross the Canal.
In order to suppress the protest, the communist authorities
mobilized progressively the local Militia forces, the Securitate troops,
the Fire Brigades and the Border Guards (since 12 December 1989
the Border Guards were under the direct command of the Ministry
of Internal Affairs).40 Securitate agents in plain clothes infiltrated the
protesters in Mary Square. The first clashes between the protesters
and the repressive forces – supported by fire engines and Militia
troops, took place sporadically between 1900 and 2100 hours on
Saturday 16 December. The protesters threw stones and empty milk
bottles at the riot police. Shop windows were broken and a number
of shops were devastated. The window of the “Mihail Sadoveanu”
bookstore was also broken and Ceauşescu’s works were set on fire.41
Also, protesters managed to climb on some fire engines and set them
on fire.
Meanwhile, the crowds were slowly moving towards the Bega
Canal, in order to reach the town hall and the building of the RCP
County Council. After 2100 hours the efforts to contain the revolt
increased in intensity. At the same time, the revolted crowd was joined
by numerous city dwellers. It may be argued that technically the
40
41
Codrescu, ed., The Romanian army in the 1989 Revolution, 49–50.
Pitulescu, ed., The Ministry of Internal Affairs in December 1989, 79.
92
the december 1989 eventS In romanIa
revolution in Timişoara started on Saturday, 16 December 1989 after
2100 hours, when large groups of demonstrators began their march
towards the city center. As many of the participants recall, it was a
sort of a dangerous ballet, in which protesters and repression troops
were clashing in clouds of tear gas, under the jets of water pouring
from the water canons. Vehicles were set on fire. Cobblestones and
empty bottles were thrown at the riot police. Groups of protesters
dispersed and regrouped in the anemic light.42 All in all, the night of
16/17 December 1989 was hallucinating: angered crowds wandered
through the shadowy streets of Timişoara while riot police troops,
military patrols, militia officers, and Securitate agents in plain clothes
followed and fought them, and operated arrests. The building of the
RCP County Council was attacked. Nevertheless, there was not a
carefully planned operation from the part of the protesters. As a
participant to the events remarked, during the manifestations of 16
December he was haunted by the same old question: “What is to be
done?”43 Vasile Popovici recalls that it was a rather chaotic movement
in semi-darkness. He could not foresee where from the next attack
would come and had a constant fear of being caught at any time.44
According to military sources, that night around 180 people were
arrested.45
Next day, Sunday, 17 December in the morning, the city seemed
calm, although the traces of the last night clashes could be seen all
See for instance, the account of Vasile Popovici in Milin, Timişoara in
revolution and after, 14–15.
43
See the account of Dan Ştefan Opriş in Milin, Timişoara in revolution and
after, 34–43, which is one of the most coherent and perceptive regarding the events
of 16/17 December 1989.
44
Ibid., 15.
45
Codrescu, ed., The Romanian army in the 1989 Revolution, 50. Reverend
Tökés was forcibly evacuated from his house the same night of 16/17 December,
during the interval 0300–0400 hours. Pitulescu, ed., The Ministry of Internal Affairs
in December 1989, 76.
42
the december 1989 eventS In romanIa
93
over the place. Militia and army troops, however, were in control of
the city center. Traian Orban, a revolutionary, remembers that he
crossed the Michelangelo Bridge and was heading towards the Opera
Square when he saw regular army troops guarding the access towards
the city center. The time was about 1330 hours. He also recalls that
he saw a group of 600–800 protesters, mainly young, shouting slogans
such as “Freedom!” and “Down with Ceauşescu!” Around 1500
hours, the military adopted a more aggressive stance and, supported
by armored vehicles, attempted at dispersing the demonstrators. A
few tanks also appeared on the street. With empty hands, young
revolutionaries tried to immobilize them. Others, however, prepared
Molotov cocktails. Apparently, it was a similar cat-and-mouse game
like the one played the previous night, but this time it was much
more dangerous. The events Orban witnessed were taking place in
the Liberty Square, which is located north of city center, behind the
Opera Square. In that area, at approx. 1620 hours, the first shots
were fired at the revolutionaries.46
Information gathered by corroborating different testimonies
indicates that it was after 1600 hours on 17 December 1989 when
the first isolated shots were fired at the Timişoara protesters.47 It
might be argued therefore that the troops in Timişoara fired at the
protesters before the meeting of the Executive Political Committee
of the CC of the RCP, held on 17 December from 1700 hours
onwards. During that meeting, Ceauşescu repeatedly asked that the
troops be given real ammunition and the protest be repressed in the
shortest time: “I told you to shoot…. So, take immediate measures
Traian Orban (b. 1944) is a key witness for the events in Timişoara. After
1989 he became the president of the association “Memorialul revoluţiei” (Memorial
of the revolution) in Timişoara. For his version of the events see, Mioc, The
revolution in Timişoara, 43–46 and Milin, Timişoara in revolution and after, 59–63.
47
See also the account of Nicolae Bădilescu in Milin, Timişoara in revolution
and after, 75–76.
46
94
the december 1989 eventS In romanIa
to liquidate quickly what happens in Timişoara.”48 During the
teleconference with the county Party secretaries Ceauşescu referred
to the events in Timişoara as an “attempt at an anti-socialist coup
d’état.”49 Meanwhile, other revolutionaries, shouting anti-Ceauşescu
slogans and waving flags with a hole in the center – which meant
that the communist coat of arms was removed, confronted the troops
in the Opera Square in Timişoara. Night fell quickly and all of a
sudden a systematic shooting began. Aurelian David Mihuţ was at
that moment in the front of the Orthodox Cathedral, just opposite
to the Opera House. When the first shots were fired – it looked like
they were coming from the Opera House – he moved towards the
Cathedral, then ran to the Cathedral’s Park and crossed the Mihai
Viteazul Bridge. While running he saw a girl lying on the pavement,
shot dead in the head.50 Rapid machine gun fire was heard until
0200–0300 hours during the night of 17/18 December. Then it
started pouring with rain for almost an hour, an unusually heavy rain
for the month of December, and the machine gun fire ceased.
Timişoara’s population was under shock: innocent blood had been
spilled.51
See Codrescu, ed., The Romanian army in the 1989 Revolution, 126. For the
complete transcript of that meeting see “Stenograma şedinţei Comitetului Politic
Executiv al C.C. al P.C.R. din ziua de 17 decembrie 1989” (The minutes of the
meeting of the Executive Political Committee of the CC of the RCP of 17
December 1989), in Pitulescu, ed., The Ministry of Internal Affairs in December
1989, 188–200. After the meeting Ceauşescu convoked a teleconference with
Party’s representatives at county level. For the transcript of the teleconference see
ibid., 202–204.
49
Pitulescu, ed., The Ministry of Internal Affairs in December 1989, 204.
50
See Milin, Timişoara in revolution and after, 66–69.
51
The shooting of civilians during the night of 17/18 December also led to
one of the most controversial operations related to the events in Timişoara: the
decision to transport 40 corpses to Bucharest in order to be cremated. The
authorities wanted to wipe out the traces of the bloody repression and to avoid a
chain reaction by the city dwellers at the sight of 40 funerary corteges. The corpses
48
the december 1989 eventS In romanIa
95
Monday, 18 December 1989, the city was silent. The communist
authorities were doing their best to wipe out the traces of the bloody
repression. During the day, people walked quietly around the city.
Many had relatives, friends or acquaintances shot dead or wounded
the previous night. It was a working day, so that people went to work
but did not effectively work. In fact, a large part of the city was on
strike. A majority of the population could not believe what happened:
they could not believe that the troops shot to kill, that many protesters
were under arrest, that the traces of the bloody repression were quickly
wiped out, and that the city was packed with army, militia and
Securitate troops. Tuesday, 19 December 1989, was also an
apparently normal workday. The city, however, was effectively on
strike. People were scared of random shootings by the repressive
forces. Almost everybody knew what happened during the night of
17/18 December. Relatives and friends were missing. Rumors about
wounded revolutionaries killed in hospitals spread across the city.
Again and again, many were asking themselves what to do next.
Wednesday, 20 December 1989, the workers in the main
enterprises were at their workplaces but did not work. As an army
officer recalls, after 0800 hours on the industrial platform of the city
– located south of the Bega Canal, southeast of the Opera Square –
small groups of workers were gathered in front of their workplaces.52
Slowly, a column was formed and the manifestants started their march
towards the city center. Deliberately, the column took a longer way
towards the Opera Square in order to reach the main enterprises in
of the killed protesters were loaded in Timişoara during the night of 18/19
December and arrived in Bucharest on 19 December at 1700 hours. The cremation
lasted until the next day, 20 December, at 1000 hours. For a detailed account of
the operation see Pitulescu, ed., The Ministry of Internal Affairs in December 1989,
114–20.
52
See the testimony of Gabriel Mitroi in Timişoara: 16–22 Decembrie 1989,
200–201.
96
the december 1989 eventS In romanIa
the city and attract more people. As Nicolae Bădilescu remembers,
the route they followed was: Calea Buziaşului, Heroes’ Boulevard,
Victor Babeş Boulevard, Romulus Street, Gheorghe Doja Street,
Griviţa Roşie (Red Griviţa) Street, Alexandru Odobescu Street, 6
Martie (6th March) Boulevard, and 30 Decembrie (30th December)
Boulevard. Thus, the column first crossed the city from east to west,
south of the Bega Canal up to the Mary Square, and then headed
north over the Canal towards the Orthodox Cathedral and the Opera
Square.53
When the column arrived at the entrance of the Opera Square
the military troops did not fire. Instead, some fraternized with the
demonstrators while others withdrew. As an army officer, Major Paul
Vasile, remembers, the square was literally packed with people: “There
were around 100,000 – 150,000 manifestants. They were making
friendly gestures and were shouting ‘Fără violenţă!’ (No violence!),
and ‘Armata e cu noi!’ (The army is with us!).”54 It was around 1230
hours on 20 December 1989 and the city was virtually in the hands
of the protesters. A major goal of the revolutionaries, Ioan Lorin
Fortuna recalls, was to make their message heard. Nevertheless, even
the revolutionaries that entered in the Opera Square did not truly
believe at that moment that the communist system in Romania would
collapse. For instance, Fortuna recalls: “I was thinking that what we
could hope for was the elimination of the dictator, followed by an
interim government upon which pressures would have to be exercised
to open towards democracy. At the time, I did not envisage and I
did not dare to hope that one could obtain the total elimination of
communism from the domestic political scene.”55 The protesters
occupied the balcony of the Opera House, which overlooks the Opera
Milin, Timişoara in revolution and after, 97–98.
Quoted in Codrescu, ed., The Romanian army in the 1989 Revolution, 53.
55
See the confession of Ioan Lorin Fortuna in Milin, Timişoara in revolution
and after, 106.
53
54
the december 1989 eventS In romanIa
97
Square, and transformed it into a revolutionary tribune.56 For a period
of time, that day two balconies were opened. Apart from the Opera
House’s balcony, another group of revolutionaries occupied
temporarily the balcony of the RCP County Council. Thus, there
were in fact two “revolutionary” balconies: one at the Opera House
and another at the RCP County Council. However, the balcony of
the Opera House is better placed since it overlooks a large square,
the Opera Square, and has a symbolic location in the front of the
Orthodox Cathedral. In many respects, the revolutionary speeches
delivered from that balcony kept alive the spirit of resistance in
Timişoara for two long days, i.e. from 20 to 22 December 1989.
From that balcony it was announced the creation of the Romanian
Democratic Front (Frontul Democrat Român – FDR) shortly after
1300 hours on 20 December, as the first political organization of the
opposition. It was also from that balcony that the names of Ion Iliescu
and Corneliu Mănescu were mentioned in connection to the antiCeauşescu protests. 57 In the afternoon, in the building of the RCP
County Council a meeting was held at about 1700 hours between
the revolutionaries and Prime Minister Constatin Dăscălescu. The
main request from the part of the revolutionaries was brief: Nicolae
Ceauşescu to present his resignation and a new democratic
government to be formed. Dăscălescu was also asked to speak to the
crowd gathered in the Opera Square.58 Dăscălescu, who was not in
the position to offer a positive answer to such a request, refused to
speak to the revolutionaries. Thus, the negotiations with the
communist authorities reached a deadlock. Prime Minister Dăscălescu
and his team of high rank officials flew back to Bucharest the same
See the testimonies of Fortuna and Ioan Covaci in Milin, Timişoara in
revolution and after, 105–107 and 108–109 respectively.
57
See the testimonies of Fortuna and Bădilescu in Milin, Timişoara in revolution
and after, 111–16 and 117–20 respectively.
58
Ibid., 119.
56
98
the december 1989 eventS In romanIa
evening.59 Shortly after the discussions with the RCP representatives
were called off, the group of protesters from the building of the RCP
County Council was evacuated. Consequently, they joined the group
that occupied the Opera House and the Opera Square became
therefore the core of the Timişoara uprising.
The same day, Wednesday 20 December, Ceauşescu, who had
just returned from an official visit to Iran – the presidential airplane
had landed on the Bucharest-Otopeni airport at 1600 hours, delivered
a televised speech at 1900 hours. One should be remembered that
in the middle of such an acute crisis, Ceauşescu had decided to pay
an official visit to Iran during the period 18–20 December, as
scheduled before the events in Timişoara. Sources from the Ministry
of Internal Affairs reveal that while in Teheran Ceauşescu was kept
informed permanently about the unfolding of events at home.60 In
his speech, Ceauşescu stated among others:
On 16 and 17 December, under the pretext of hampering the
completion of a legal judicial decision, some groups of hooligan elements
have organized a series of manifestations and incidents by attacking
official institutions and by looting a series of buildings, stores, public
offices, and on 17 December they have intensified their activity against
state and Party institutions, including some military units … One can
certainly state that those actions of terrorist nature have been organized
and launched in close connection with reactionary, imperialistic,
irredentist, chauvinistic circles and the intelligence services of different
foreign countries … The scope of these anti-national actions was to
provoke disorder in order to destabilize the political and economic
situation, to create the conditions for the territorial dismemberment of
Romania, to destroy the independence and sovereignty of our socialist
motherland … It is not by chance that the radio stations in Budapest
and other countries have launched during the unfolding of these anti-
59
60
Pitulescu, ed., The Ministry of Internal Affairs in December 1989, 127.
Ibid., 164.
the december 1989 eventS In romanIa
99
national, terrorist actions a spurious campaign of discrediting and lies
against our country.61
Ceauşescu also announced that a state of emergency was declared
on the territory of the Timiş county. The radio-televised discourse
of Ceauşescu could not mobilize the population anymore. From the
night of 17/18 December on, the international media had picked
the news of the bloody repression of the Timişoara protesters and
spread it to the international and domestic audiences. People already
knew what was happening in Timişoara and an overwhelming
majority of the population sided with the anti-Ceauşescu protests.
Nevertheless, the situation of the Timişoara protesters was critical
since by that time the uprising did not spread to other major urban
centers. A sole exception existed: the small town of Lugoj, situated
some 60 km east of Timişoara, where protests by the population
started on 20 December at 1800 hours.62
Meanwhile, the group of revolutionaries that occupied the balcony
of the Opera House was working at the political program of the RDF.
Around midnight, the number of revolutionaries in the Opera Square
was probably in the hundreds, as witness accounts indicate. Thursday,
21 December 1989, at approximately 0300 hours, the text of the
FDR’s Proclamation was finalized.63 Nevertheless, some good news
came after 0600 hours, when delegates from different large enterprises
in Timişoara announced that the personnel already started to mobilize
and they would march towards the Opera Square. At 0830 hours the
Reproduced in Aurel Perva and Carol Roman, Misterele revoluţiei române:
Revenire după ani (The mysteries of the Romanian revolution: A come back after
years) (Bucharest: Editura Carro, 1991), 38–39.
62
According to military sources, the protest in Lugoj was organized by persons
coming from Timişoara. See Codrescu, ed., The Romanian army in the 1989
Revolution, 82.
63
For the whole text of the FDR Proclamation see Pitulescu, ed., The Ministry
of Internal Affairs in December 1989, 127–28.
61
100
the december 1989 eventS In romanIa
Opera Square was again packed with people. More importantly, at
that moment protests had already started in another major Romanian
city: Arad, situated 50 km north of Timişoara. It is also highly relevant
for the present reconstruction of events to notice the way in which
the wave of protests traveled from the west to the east of the country.
On 21 December 1989, unrest sparked in major cities (county
capitals) as follows: Arad (0800 hours); Sibiu (0945 hours);64 Tîrgu
Mureş (1130 hours); Reşiţa (1200 hours); Bucharest (1240 hours);
Braşov (1300 hours);65 Cluj (1500 hours); and Alba Iulia (2230
hours).66
Ceauşescu decided to organize a mass rally in Bucharest on 21
December 1989 at 1200 hours. Colonel Dumitru Dumitraşcu, the
head of the Bucharest Municipal Inspectorate of the Ministry of
Internal Affairs has provided some details on the way the mass rally
was prepared. On 20 December, at 2330 hours, Dumitraşcu was
summoned to the prime secretary of the Bucharest Party organization,
Barbu Petrescu. Confidentially, Petrescu told him that Ceauşescu
had just asked if a grand mass rally on the model of the August 1968
meeting could be organized in the Palace Square the next day, 21
December. Dumitraşcu has confessed that his answer was affirmative,
although he knew very well that the population of Bucharest was
exasperated by the miserable living conditions. Then, Petrescu
phoned to Ceauşescu and confirmed that, as far as he was concerned,
the meeting could be organized.67 The mass rally was intended to
On the events in Sibiu see Constantin Vasile, Have we been the terrorists?!,
16–56.
65
For a brief account of the events in Braşov during the 21–22 December 1989
period see Marius Petraşcu et al., Un pas spre libertate: Braşov, decembrie 1989 (A
step towards liberty: Braşov, December 1989) (Braşov: Fundaţia “Sfîntul Ioan,”
n.d.), 80–85.
66
Mioc, ed., The revolution, void of mysteries, 220.
67
For Dumitraşcu’s declaration see Pitulescu, ed., The Ministry of Internal
Affairs in December 1989, 165–66.
64
the december 1989 eventS In romanIa
101
put the blame for the bloody events in Timişoara on the “hooligan
elements” allegedly linked, as he had stated in his radio-televised
address the previous evening, with “reactionary, imperialistic,
irredentist, chauvinistic circles and the intelligence services of different
foreign countries.” Furthermore, the rally was organized in the Palace
Square, in an attempt, perhaps, to repeat the “balcony scene” of 21
August 1968, when Ceauşescu’s discourse electrified the audience.
Thus, the meeting was prepared following the usual procedure. In
the Bucharest enterprises the personnel was mobilized to attend the
rally, the slogans were carefully prepared in advance and the security
men were in place in order to hamper people leave prematurely the
gathering.68 However, some unusual banners were added to the ones
utilized for such gatherings. For instance, on some banners one could
read slogans such as: “Condamnăm cu fermitate trădătorii de ţară”
(We firmly condemn the traitors to our country) and “Să înceteze
manifestările şoviniste, iredentiste ale cercurilor străine” (Stop the
chauvinistic, irredentist acts by foreign circles).69
Ceauşescu tried in many respects to reenact the scene of 21 August
1968. Such an assertion is also supported by the former head of the
“Ştefan Gheorghiu” Party Academy, Dumitru Popescu. In an oral
history interview, Popescu affirmed that on 21 December Ceauşescu
believed that he could recreate the atmosphere of unconditional
support for his person of that August 1968.70 Indeed, in his discourse
of 21 December 1989, Ceauşescu referred to the necessity to
safeguard the national sovereignty and asked for “force and unity in
defending Romania’s independence.”71 What people mobilized to
participate to the meeting experienced, one can grasp from the
Codrescu, ed., The Romanian army in the 1989 Revolution, 111.
Pitulescu, ed., The Ministry of Internal Affairs in December 1989, 165–66.
70
Dumitru Popescu, Un fost lider comunist se destăinuie: Am fost şi cioplitor de
himere (A former communist leader confesses: I was also a carver of chimeras)
(Bucharest: Editura Expres, n.d.), 380.
71
Quoted in Tănase, The miracle of the revolution, 267.
68
69
102
the december 1989 eventS In romanIa
testimony of Hermina Ştirbulescu. She recalls that at the design
institute where she was working the senior employees tried to recuse
themselves on different grounds in order to avoid going in the Palace
Square. Since she was a junior employee, there was no way out: she
had to participate to the mass rally. Usually, at such events people
did their best to stay as little as possible. Therefore, they placed
themselves at strategic points on the sides of the gathering and waited
for a moment of negligence from the part of the watchmen. When
the moment was right, they would leave quietly and go home. This
was exactly what Ştirbulescu was trying to do. She placed herself in
the last row and just behind her was the human chain of security
men and, apathetically, was chewing a bagel waiting for the right
moment to escape and go home. After a while, she looked back and
was surprised to see that the watchmen had vanished. Shortly
afterwards, a sudden noise was heard somewhere in the middle of
the gathering and people started to yell. Then she felt that she could
scarcely breathe: with profound consternation she saw a flock of
people moving in waves towards her. From that moment on, her
only thought was to escape from the square as quickly as she could,
because she had an acute feeling that she was running for her life.72
Military sources confirm that during the Bucharest meeting people
from the crowd started to yell. According to some sources there were
first women voices. (In the early 1990s, Nica Leon, a controversial
character but nevertheless an opponent of the regime, claimed that
it was he who provoked the first skirmish during Ceauşescu’s
speech.73) Shouts of “Timişoara!” were also heard. Then, a small
explosion occurred. Shortly afterwards, a large TV camera, belonging
Hermina Ştirbulescu, interview by author, 28 December 2002, Bucharest.
On Nica Leon’s claims see Popescu, A former communist leader confesses, 382.
On Leon’s anti-Ceauşescu activities see the account of Coen Stork, the former
Dutch ambassador to Romania, in Cel mai iubit dintre ambasadori: Coen Stork în
dialog cu Gabriel Andreescu (The most beloved of the ambassadors: Coen Stork in
dialogue with Gabriel Andreescu) (Bucharest: Editura All), 63–64.
72
73
the december 1989 eventS In romanIa
103
to the state television, fell with a loud noise.74 Sources from the
Ministry of Internal Affairs claim that, in addition to the already
mentioned disturbances, a group of approximately 100 persons,
gathered in the vicinity of the Bucharest Hotel, i.e. close to the north
entrance to the Palace Square, started to sing “Awake thee,
Romanian”!75 The televised program was suspended immediately.
Across Romania, people stared at the television screens. For many,
it was unbelievable. For others, it was the moment they were
dreaming of for so many years. A few minutes later, the televised
transmission was resumed. To Ceauşescu’s stupefaction, the crowd
yelled again and a few minutes later, panicked, the participants were
trying to leave the place. Totally confused, Ceauşescu tried, from the
balcony of the CC of the RCP, to calm down the people: he promised
them a ridiculous raise in salaries, but nobody listened to him. The
mass rally ended in chaos. Intended to support Ceauşescu’s rule, the
meeting turned into an anti-Ceauşescu demonstration. The time was
about 1250 hours on 21 December 1989. While leaving the balcony
of the CC building, Ceauşescu convoked the Ministry of National
Defense, General Vasile Milea; the head of the Securitate, General
Iulian Vlad; and the Minister of Internal Affairs, Tudor Postelnicu.
He told them that he decided to relocate the general headquarters to
the CC building. According to a witness, Ceauşescu concluded: “We
will defend the cause; we will take up arms to defend socialism,
because we are waging a war more difficult than the war against
Hitlerism. We are therefore at war and not in a state of emergency.
The army, the internal affairs, and the Securitate must do their duty
immediately.”76
If one looks at a map of Bucharest, one can observe that the
General Magheru Boulevard, continued by the Nicolae Bălcescu
Codrescu, ed., The Romanian army in the 1989 Revolution, 111.
Pitulescu, ed., The Ministry of Internal Affairs in December 1989, 168.
76
Ibid.
74
75
104
the december 1989 eventS In romanIa
Boulevard, is the major route on the north-south axis of the city. The
two boulevards unite the Roman Square and the University Square,
while the Palace Square is halfway on the route between the two,
slightly to the west but very close. The building of the CC of the
RCP overlooks the Palace Square, and the access from the Palace
Square to the Bălcescu Boulevard is ensured by the Oneşti Street.
That day of 21 December, after evacuating the Palace Square, some
groups moved towards the Bălcescu Boulevard, which lies behind
the building of the CC of the RCP. Once they reached the boulevard,
the protesters regrouped in two main positions: in the Roman Square
(Piaţa Romană) and the University Square (Piaţa Universităţii). It is
also important to mention that, at the time, the major international
hotel in Bucharest was the Intercontinental Hotel, which overlooks
the University Square. This detail is important, because the
Intercontinental Hotel in Bucharest usually hosted foreigners and
therefore many protesters thought that by demonstrating in the front
of that particular hotel news about their protest would be easily
transmitted abroad. Also, one should note that the American Embassy
in Bucharest is located on the Batiştei Street, just behind the
Intercontinental Hotel, and consequently many revolutionaries
thought that by demonstrating in the University Square the news
about their protest would immediately reach the outside world. There
were, therefore, important reasons for the part of the revolutionaries
to carry out their protest in the University Square, in the very center
of the capital city Bucharest.
Gathered in the University Square, demonstrators shouted antiCeauşescu slogans. Arrived at 1500 hours at the University Square
metro station, painter Adrian Contici was amazed how crowded the
platform was: lots of people, militia troops and Securitate agents.
Militia troops and the Securitate agents were unusually placid, he
thought. In the University Square, lots of people, many with candles
in their hands, were shouting slogans such as: “Ieri în Timişoara,
mîine în toată ţara!” (Yesterday in Timişoara, tomorrow in the whole
the december 1989 eventS In romanIa
105
country!); “Jos dictatura! (Down with the dictatorship!); “Jos
comunismul!” (Down with communism!); “Libertate!” (Freedom!);
and “Moarte tiranului!” (Death to the tyrant!).77
It is also interesting to analyze the way in which people reacted
when the first groups of protesters entered the University Square.
Some preferred to rush home and barricaded themselves into their
homes. For others, the fact that they shouted anti-Ceauşescu slogans
acted as a sort of safety valve, as a technician from the Romlux
Tîrgovişte enterprise told this author. The man had been sent in an
official business trip to Bucharest that particular day of 21 December
when was caught in the midst of the revolution. He joined the protest
for a while and then, satisfied, rushed to the railway station in order
to catch a convenient train back to Tîrgovişte. There were also people
who joined the protest for a longer period of time. They stayed in
the University Square until the dark fell and the shooting began.
Some were arrested, while others were injured or killed.
As for the communist authorities, the first measure they took was
to block the access towards the building of the CC of the RCP. At
about 1400 hours, army units backed by armored vehicles were called
to reinforce the already existing units in the area.78 Like in Timişoara,
the troops called to repress the manifestants comprised the army, the
militia, the riot police and the Securitate. Also, in the evening, at the
Intercontinental Hotel, six fire engines were brought to back the riot
police. The first incident, however, occurred at 1630 – 1645 hours,
when a military truck hit a group of protesters at the Dalles Hall,
some tens of meters away from the Intercontinental Hotel. According
to the official data 23 civilians and 4 riot police troops were hit: 7
protesters died and 7 were severely injured. A member of the riot
police troops was also injured.79 At 2020 hours the fire engines tried
For Contici’s complete story see Perva and Roman, The mysteries of the
Romanian revolution, 40–45.
78
Pitulescu, ed., The Ministry of Internal Affairs in December 1989, 169.
79
Ibid., 171–73.
77
106
the december 1989 eventS In romanIa
in vain to disperse the demonstrators. Tear gas grenades were also
launched. At about 2230 hours the protesters erected a barricade
across the Bălcescu Boulevard. The barricade was made of tables from
the nearby Dunărea (Danube) Restaurant, garbage bins, tubes
confiscated from the fire engines and, finally, with some trucks
appropriated “through revolutionary methods,” as Tănase puts it.80
An officer recalls that there were two trucks and two vans or Aro
four-wheel drive vehicles.81 The barricade, which was subsequently
set on fire by the revolutionaries, was only dismantled with the help
of the tanks towards 2330 hours on 21 December.82
The shooting lasted until 0300 hours on 22 December. It is,
however, difficult to provide with some precision the hour when the
first shots meant to kill were fired. Tănase, who was at the barricade
nearby the Intercontinental Hotel, recalls that at 2020 on 21
December the troops already fired into the air. Then, after 2300
hours the situation became grave. Corroborating different sources,
it may be argued that a bloody repression started at about 2300 hours
on 21 December and lasted until 0300 hours on 22 December.83
After 0300 hours, the authorities tried to wipe out the traces of the
repression. The pavement was washed, the debris collected. As for
the extent of the repression in Bucharest, sources from the Ministry
of Internal Affairs have provided the following figures: 1,245 persons
were arrested, 462 wounded, and 50 killed on 21 December 1989.84
The early morning of 22 December seemed rather calm. The main
streets of Bucharest however, were blocked by army, militia and
Securitate troops. In spite of the massive presence of the troops,
Tănase, “Bloody solstice in Bucharest,” 10–11.
Testimony of Lieutenant Dorel Nae quoted in Pitulescu, ed., The Ministry
of Internal Affairs in December 1989, 174.
82
Ibid.
83
Tănase, “Bloody solstice in Bucharest,” 14–15. See also Codrescu, ed., The
Romanian army in the 1989 Revolution, 112.
84
Pitulescu, ed., The Ministry of Internal Affairs in December 1989, 175.
80
81
the december 1989 eventS In romanIa
107
beginning with 0900 hours large crowds poured into the streets.
Surprisingly, beginning with 1045 hours the army troops began to
withdraw to their garrisons. Then, at 1059 hours, the national radiotelevision announced that a presidential decree, which instated a state
of emergency on the whole territory of Romania, was issued.
Immediately after the decree was read, the following announcement
was made: “The Minister of National Defense turned traitor to
Romania’s independence and sovereignty and, being aware that his
actions have been revealed, he committed suicide. We appeal to all
those who love their country and people to act most firmly against
any traitor.”85 According to the final report of the senatorial
commission which carried out an inquiry on the death of Generalcolonel Vasile Milea, Minister of National Defense, the general
committed suicide between 0925 and 0935 hours on 22 December.86
Nevertheless, in spite of the post-1989 official statements, rumors
concerning Milea’s death persist.87 Milea’s replacement, Generallieutenant Victor Stănculescu, ordered the withdrawal of the army
units to their barracks at about 1045 hours.88
Meanwhile, large crowds were moving towards downtown.
Columns of workers came from the large industrial platforms of
Bucharest and moved slowly towards the city center. At the Griviţa
Heavy Machinery enterprise, the director ordered that the gates be
welded in order to hamper the workers leave the factory and join the
revolution.89 In some places, the workers stormed the gates. In other
Codrescu, ed., The Romanian army in the 1989 Revolution, 119.
The conclusions of the report were presented in November 1996. For more
on the suicide of minister Milea, see Codrescu, ed., The Romanian army in the
1989 Revolution, 123–30.
87
See the testimony of General Iulian Vlad, the former head of the Securitate
in ibid., 128.
88
Ibid., 113.
89
Personal communication to the author by workers at the Griviţa Heavy
Machinery enterprise.
85
86
108
the december 1989 eventS In romanIa
places, the leadership joined the columns. Nothing hampered the
columns in their march towards downtown: neither riot police
barriers, nor armored vehicles or fire engines. From 1100 hours
onwards, the army units increasingly fraternized with the
revolutionaries. Once arrived in the Palace Square the crowds
assaulted the building of the CC of the RCP. The time was
approximately 1200 hours. Again, not one of the security guards
attempted at stopping the crowds and not a single shot was fired at
the protesters. Confused and frightened, the supreme leader of the
RCP – who had spent the night inside the CC of RCP building
accompanied by his wife and ministers Milea, Vlad and Postelnicu
– flew by helicopter from the upper platform of CC building.90 The
moment when Ceauşescu and his wife, Elena, flew by helicopter from
the upper platform of the building of the CC of the RCP was the
moment when the communist regime collapsed – suddenly,
completely and unbelievably.91 It was 22 December 1989 and the
time was 1208 hours.92
Perva and Roman, The mysteries of the Romanian revolution, 46–49.
The same day, 22 December, the Ceauşescus were arrested. Three days later,
on December 25, after a badly staged trial, Nicolae and Elena Ceauşescu were
executed by a firing squad in the city of Tîrgovişte, 74 km. north of Bucharest.
For an early account of the events, see Dorian Marcu, Moartea Ceauşeştilor: Revelaţii
şi documente istorice (Death of the Ceauşescus: Revelations and historical
documents) (Bucharest: Editura Excelsior, 1991), esp. 92–123. The most
documented work on the capture, trial and execution of the Ceauşescu couple is
Grigore Cartianu, Sfârşitul Ceauşeştilor: Să mori împuşcat ca un animal sălbatic (The
end of the Ceauşescus: To die shot at as a wild animal) (Bucharest: Editura Adevărul
Holding, 2010).
92
Urdăreanu, 1989 – Witness and participant, 115.
90
91
Chapter 3
struCtural FaCtors
This chapter concentrates on the influence of the structural factors,
i.e. economic failure and ideological decay on the collapse of the
communist dictatorship in Romania. As shown in Chapter 1, the
communist dictatorships in Bulgaria and Romania have been termed
as modernizing-nationalizing dictatorships, thus stressing the fact
that the communist power elites in both countries eventually
understood the importance of economic development and nationbuilding as means of legitimizing their power. At the same time,
when addressing the issue of economic failure, the Romanian case
seems to illustrate best the structural flaws of state socialism. Among
the communist countries that experienced a regime change in 1989,
Romania was the one in which the economic conditions were the
most difficult. Nevertheless, in spite of the conspicuous failure of the
regime to provide for its population Romania was the last country
to exit from communism in 1989. Thus, one has to address also the
intricate problem of the popular perceptions of the regime and assess
– in the light of the historical legacies related to fundamental issues
such as economic backwardness and national identity – what factors
delayed the development of social protest in Ceauşescu’s Romania.
110
Structural FactorS
economic Failure
This chapter discusses the economic performance of the communist
regime in Romania over the period 1945–1989 in order to illustrate
the relationship between the severe economic crisis in the 1980s and
the growing potential for social protest. However, it should be stressed
once again that although Romania faced the most severe crisis among
the six countries that experienced a regime change in 1989, it was
the last to exit from communism that year. In order to explain such
a paradoxical situation, one has to address the mechanism of rising
expectations and setbacks that characterized the Ceauşescu period.
Thus, apart from a thorough examination of the industrialization
process initiated by the regime, one has to analyze the main aspects
of the civilizing process under state socialism in Romania such as:
urbanization and housing, spread of education and sanitation,
transportation and increased mobility by the population etc. during
the 1960s and 1970s. The crisis of the 1980s paved in many respects
the way for the bloody revolution of 1989, and therefore the causes
and immediate effects of the economic crisis are critically assessed in
order to explain the relationship between the miseries of everyday
life and the high potential for protest of a majority of the population
in the late 1980s.
Major policy decisions regarding the economic development and
implicitly the “socialist modernization” of the country under
communist rule were made in accordance with the external constrains
and the political goals of the local power elite. Starting from this
assertion, the period 1945–1989 can be divided into four distinct
periods that represent different stages in the complicated relationship
between politics and economics under communist rule in Romania.
These four periods are defined as follows: (1) humble imitation of
the Soviet model, 1945–1956; (2) development and emancipation,
1956–1964; (3) closely watched relaxation, 1964–1977; and (4) crisis
Structural FactorS
111
and decline, 1977–1989. Although it is not the scope of this book
to provide an economic history of communist Romania, there are
some issues that deserve a thorough investigation in order to illustrate
the relationship between the economic decline and the final demise
of Romanian communism. Of these issues, two deserve further
examination due to their direct influence upon the nature, unfolding
and outcome of the 1989 revolution in Romania.
A first issue is that of the achievements of the so-called “golden
epoch” of Romanian communism, an epoch that determined a sharp
rise in the expectations of an overwhelming majority of the population
with regard to their personal development as well as to that of the
Romanian society in general. Many authors conventionally place that
period between 1964 and 1971, i.e. from the issuance of the
Declaration of April 1964 to the issuance of the Theses of July 1971.
Nevertheless, it is this author’s opinion that one should consider the
period 1964–1977, i.e. the period of time spanning from the issuance
of the Declaration of April 1964 to the sparking of the strike
organized on 2–3 August 1977 by the miners in the Jiu Valley basin.
The main reason for adopting a longer time interval is to stress the
importance of two events that have to do with the intricate
relationship between politics and economics in communist Romania.
In 1964, the bold strategy of political survival – based on
independence from Moscow and extensive industrialization – devised
by Gheorghiu-Dej and his men took a definite form. The year 1977
is important because two major events that took place that year
signaled that the “tacit deal” between the Ceauşescu regime and the
Romanian society at large was coming to an end. Chronologically,
the first event was the initiation of the Goma Human Rights
Movement. Initiated by writer Paul Goma, and known since as the
Goma Movement, it lasted three months (February-April 1977) and
was the most articulated large-scale dissident action in communist
Romania. The second major event was the above mentioned strike
organized by the Jiu Valley miners, which due to its characteristics –
it was a round-the-clock, non-violent, occupation strike – constituted
112
Structural FactorS
the first mature working class protest in communist Romania and
was perceived as such by the regime. Another event, both tragic and
unexpected, is usually neglected by conventional analyses of
Romanian communism: the terrible earthquake of 4 March 1977.
Nevertheless, that particular earthquake had a great impact on
Romania’s economic performance and contributed decisively to the
economic downturn of the late 1970s and the early 1980s.
A second issue that deserves thorough examination is that of the
severe economic crisis of the period 1981–1989. The food shortages
and the power cuts of the 1980s were by no means the only causes
of the bloody revolution in Romania. At the same time, the everyday
miseries were among the causes of the popular revolt that sparked
the 1989 revolution in this country. Thus, in order to identify the
causes of the economic downturn in the late 1970s one has to analyze
the economic policy of the Ceauşescu regime. In a command
economy, the central planner decides upon the separation of national
income into accumulation and consumption. Therefore, the crucial
decision about the size of accumulation is political. During the 1980s,
the developmental pattern imposed by the Ceauşescu regime
continued to favor primary and secondary sectors with a strong
emphasis on coal mining as well as on steel, heavy machinery and
petrochemical industries. These sectors however were unable to
produce competitive goods for export, especially for the Western
markets. Apart from the fact that these sectors were unable to compete
on the international markets, their functioning required a high level
of energy consumption that led to an endemic energy crisis in
industry. On top of this, Ceauşescu became obsessed with paying
back the external debt of the country and consequently imposed a
heavy burden on agriculture, as one of the few producers of exportable
goods. Simply put, the erroneous economic strategy devised by the
regime in the late 1960s was pursued unabatedly, in spite of
unfavorable international and domestic conjunctures. Throughout
the 1980s, instead of introducing economic reforms the regime
imposed harsh rationing measures that affected primarily the
Structural FactorS
113
population. These measures concentrated on the rationing of energy
consumption (e.g. power supply for household use, gasoline for
private cars etc.), of food supplies (food rationing was introduced in
the early 1980s), and of basic consumer goods (e.g. soap, toothpaste,
detergents etc.). This chapter is also concerned with the way in which
by the late 1980s the mistaken economic policy of the Ceauşescu
regime forced a large majority of the population to think in terms of
sheer biological survival. As shown below, such an economic strategy
led to both absolute and relative deprivation, which affected a great
majority of the population and contributed significantly to the final
demise of the Romanian communist regime.
A truly controversial issue is that of the modernizing aspects of
the communist dictatorship in Romania. Actually, can one speak of
a “civilizing process” under communism? As Norbert Elias has
brilliantly shown in his path-breaking work, such a process has to do
with the “social quality of people, their housing, their manners, their
speech, their clothing.” At the same time, the concept of “civilization”
– Elias further noted – refers to:
A wide variety of facts: to the level of technology, to the type of manners,
to the development of scientific knowledge, to religious ideas and
customs. It can refer to the type of dwelling or the manner in which
men and women live together, to the form of judicial punishment, or
to the way in which food is prepared. . . . But when one examines what
the general function of the concept of civilization really is, and what
common quality leads all these various human attitudes and activities
to be described as civilized, one starts with a very simple discovery: this
concept expresses the self-consciousness of the West. One could even
say: the national consciousness. It sums up everything in which Western
society of the last two or three centuries believes itself superior to earlier
societies or ‘more primitive’ contemporary ones.1
Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic
Investigations (London: Blackwell Publishers, 2000), 5, 6.
1
114
Structural FactorS
As far as communist Romania is concerned, the scope of this
author is more limited. Thus, this section of the book addresses the
changes in the “social quality of people” – as compared with the
more “civilized” Western Europe – during the four periods under
scrutiny, i.e. 1945–1956; 1956–1964; 1964–1977; and 1977–
1989. In terms of civilizational aspects, at the turn of the 19th
century the comparison between Romania and the West meant a
comparison between different types of society, i.e. between the
quasi-Oriental and the Western type of society. However, from
1848 onwards a small but committed Westernizing elite educated
mainly in Paris devised and carried out a project of nation-building
and modernization from above that in the end proved to be
successful. With regard to the creation of the modern Romanian
state, the main chronological landmarks are the years 1859, 1866
and 1877. All in all, after its creation, the Romanian state went
through a process of modernization through “cognitive dissonance.”
After the creation of Greater Romania in the aftermath of World
War I and throughout the interwar period, the social structure of
the country remained deeply polarized. While the upper strata of
the population living in the few large urban centers enjoyed
Western-style amenities, the large, poverty-stricken and poorly
integrated peasant population lived very much alike their distant
ancestors did. Although economy picked up by the end of the
1930s, the industrialization process – that was conducted mainly
from above, as well as the agrarian reforms changed little the socioeconomic landscape. The country remained predominantly
agrarian, with over three-quarters of the population living in the
rural areas. Thus, according to the 1930 census, 78.2 percent of
Romania’s population was employed in agriculture as compared
with only 7.2 percent employed in industry. As for the rural-urban
distribution of the population, in 1930 78.6 percent of the total
population lived in rural areas, while only 21.4 percent lived in
Structural FactorS
115
urban areas. In 1948, 76.6 percent of the total population still lived
in rural areas, while 23.4 percent lived in urban areas.2
After the communist takeover, the project of sustained
modernization from above – devised by the Romanian political elite
in the second half of the 19th century and continued during the
interwar period – became part and parcel of the “revolution from
above” launched by the newly established regime. Thus, as a result
of the program of extensive industrialization and urbanization carried
out under the communist rule – with terrible social costs though –
by the end of the 1980s the distinction between Romania and the
West operated within one type of society, i.e. the Western one. In
terms of economic development, the difference between the
developed countries of the First World and the communist countries
of the Second World was insignificant compared to the wide gap
that separated the Second World from the underdeveloped countries
of the Third World.
To be sure, the two systems did not truly converge. Analysts of
the Soviet system, such as Bertram Wolfe, provided valuable critical
comments on the convergence theory.3 As far as this author is
concerned, the difference – by no means negligible – between the
two systems that characterized the First and respectively Second world
was primarily civilizational. As compared to their Western
counterparts, the communist societies developed a cultural syndrome
best defined by the Polish sociologist Piotr Sztompka as “civilizational
incompetence.” Thus, Sztompka argues that a developed society
operates on the basis of a “less obvious, underlying cultural resource”
called “civilizational competence,” which can be defined as: “A
See Dinu C. Giurescu, Illustrated History, 499, as well as the data provided
in Table 4 in Shafir, Romania – Politics, Economics and Society, 47.
3
Bertram D. Wolfe, “The Convergence Theory in Historical Perspective,” in
idem, An Ideology in Power: Reflections on the Russian Revolution (New York: Stein
and Day, 1970), 393–94.
2
116
Structural FactorS
complex set of rules, norms, and values, habits and reflexes, codes
and matrixes, blueprints and formats – the skillful and semi-automatic
mastering of which is a prerequisite for participation in a modern
civilization.” The same author identifies four sub-categories of
civilizational competence: (1) enterprise culture; (2) civic culture; (3)
discoursive culture; and (4) everyday culture.4 True, the syndrome
of “civilizational incompetence” proved to be more enduring in
Southeast Europe than in Central Europe, and the tortuous transition
to democracy in post-1989 Romania perfectly illustrates such an
assertion. However, the evolution of the former communist societies
in ECE demonstrated that the syndrome of “civilizational
incompetence“ was curable – although in some cases the convalescence
took more than a decade – exactly because, as mentioned above, the
difference operated within a sole category: the Western-type of
society.
When discussing the “civilizing” trends under communism, an
aspect of prime significance is that of urbanization and spread of
urban culture among the population of the country. Following
Gyorgy Enyedi, urbanization can be defined as:
The spatial reorganization of society by which, first, the geographical
distribution of the population of a given country changes and (at least
in the first stages of modern urbanization) gradually concentrates in
cities and urban agglomerations; and, second, the urban life style, urban
social structure and technology diffuse into the countryside, so that and
urban/rural continuum (or a unified settlement system) replaces the
earlier sharp urban/rural dichotomy.5
Piotr Sztompka, “Civilizational Incompetence: The Trap of Post-Communist
Societies,” Zeitschrift für Soziologie (April 1993), 88–89.
5
Gyorgy Enyedi, “Urbanization under Socialism,” in Gregory Andrusz,
Michael Harloe and Ivan Szelenyi, eds., Cities after Socialism: Urban and Regional
Change and Conflict in Post-Socialist Societies (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers,
1996), 101.
4
Structural FactorS
117
As Per Ronnås argues, there exist three basic approaches to
urbanization, which are not mutually exclusive: (1) habitational,
focusing on the mode of living; (2) industrial, focusing on industrial
structure; and (3) social and cultural, focusing on cultural traits,
habits and social characteristics.6 The present chapter analyzes the
process of urbanization and spread of urban culture in communist
Romania for each of the periods under scrutiny, i.e. 1945–56; 1956–
64; 1964–77 and 1977–89 by taking into consideration the three
approaches mentioned above, i.e. habitational, industrial, and sociocultural. By adopting such a perspective, one can understand better
why the epoch when the communist regime paid more attention to
the habitational and socio-cultural aspects of urban life, i.e. 1964–
1977 is identified by a majority of the population as the “golden
age” of Romanian communism – a period that still has a unique
place in folk memory. The issue of path dependency deserves further
examination especially with regard to the strategies employed by the
Romanian ruling elites in order to overcome backwardness and
catch-up with the West from the mid-19th century onwards.
Consequently, the following section addresses the main
characteristics of the process of modernization carried out by the
Romanian ruling elites during the period 1859–1945, i.e. from the
coming into existence of the Romanian state and up to the moment
of communist takeover.
Per Ronnås, Urbanization in Romania: A Geography of Social and Economic
Change since Independence (Stockholm: The Economic Research Institute,
Stockholm School of Economics, 1984), 5.
6
118
Structural FactorS
background information
economic development in romania, 1859–1945
When the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia united in 1859
the country that emerged, the United Principalities of Romania, was
“eminently agrarian” as the conservative Nicolae Şuţu put it. Still
under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Porte, the country, which would
soon become the Kingdom of Romania, had to struggle for its
independence and modernize rapidly. Liberal intellectuals such as
Petre S. Aurelian and Ion Ghica were staunch supporters of a rapid
industrialization of the country, stating that industrial development
was “a guarantee of independence.” Ion Ghica went even further and
argued that “a nation without industry cannot be considered
civilized.”7 The way in which modernity emerged in the “suburbs of
Europe” however was different from the experience of the West. As
Andrew C. Janos has noted in his path-breaking work on Hungary:
Modern state took shape before the modern economy; it came into being
not as a product, but as a potential instrument of social change… . Attitudes
are not changed by exposure to the factory or the marketplace, but by
distorted images of modern life, disseminated through various networks
of communication, above all through the modern educational system
which, like the modern state, arises not in response to social exigencies,
but in anticipation of them…. What emerges thus is not a western-style
Gesellschaft, but a fusion between the patterns of a Gemeinschaft and a
Gesellschaft, with elements of the former predominating.8
The above statement is all the more appropriate for the case of
Romania. In spite of the considerable efforts of modernizing elites,
Quoted in Vlad Georgescu, The Romanians: A History (London: I. B. Tauris
& Co, 1991), 184.
8
Andrew C. Janos, The Politics of Backwardness in Hungary, 1825–1945
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), 314.
7
Structural FactorS
119
at the beginning of the twentieth century the Balkans remained
“relatively untouched” by the Industrial Revolution and Romania
was no exception.9 Actually, at the outbreak of World War I, as
historian Vlad Georgescu put it, the country still lacked “many of
the structures that define a modern society.”10 Indeed, in the Old
Kingdom industrial progress was insignificant until independence.11
In terms of economic development, between 1859 and 1877 the
most important achievements were made in the petroleum industry
and construction of railways. Actually, 62.2 percent of the big
industry enterprises existing in 1901–1902 were established after
1886, when the Romanian government enforced protectionist
legislation. In absolute numbers, from a total of 625 enterprises active
in 1901, 236 were established before 1886; 167 were established
during the period 1886–1892; and 222 were established between
1893 and 1901.12 Nevertheless, one has to explain what “big industry”
meant in the case of pre-World War I Romania. As defined by the
Industrial Survey of 1901–1902, “big industry” (manufacturing
industry) was characterized by three elements: (1) the use of
mechanical force for running the machines; (2) a minimum amount
of capital of 10,000 lei invested in fixed assets; and (3) a minimum
According to Peter N. Stearns and Herrick Chapman, major changes in terms
of industrialization occurred in Britain between 1780 and 1850, while France and
Belgium began a similar process around 1820. To its part, Germany began to
industrialize in the 1840s, Sweden around 1850, Italy, Austria and northern Spain
about 1870 and Russia in the 1890s. Only the Balkans were “relatively untouched”
by the Industrial Revolution at the beginning of the twentieth century. See Peter
N. Stearns and Herrick Chapman, European Society in Upheaval: Social History
Since 1750 (New York: Macmillan, 1992), 98–99.
10
Georgescu, The Romanians, 188.
11
Ronnås, Urbanization in Romania, 112.
12
Gheorghe Iacob and Luminiţa Iacob, Modernizare – Europenism: România
de la Cuza-Vodă la Carol al II-lea (Modernization – Europeanism: Romania from
Prince Cuza to Carol II) vol. I (Iaşi: Al. I. Cuza University Press, 1995), 88.
9
120
Structural FactorS
number of five employees. Until 1914, big industry utilized 75
percent of the total horsepower used in industry and represented 25
percent of the total number of employees; at the same time, it
represented only 1.0 percent of the industry of Romania. Petroleum
industry was one of the industries that experienced a rapid growth
after 1857. The oil production increased from 200 tons in 1857 to
16,000 tons in 1880, 247,000 tons in 1900 and to 1,848,000 tons
in 1913.13 Furthermore, due to the concentration of the petroleum
industry in the Prahova Valley, this area became the most
industrialized area of the Old Kingdom in the pre-1914 period.
According to the Industrial Survey of 1901–1902, the foodprocessing industry was the most important branch of the
manufacturing industry with 26.2 percent of the total number of
employees. In the second place was the metal working industry, with
19.4 percent of the total number of employees, followed by the wood
industry with 16.6 percent, and the chemical industry, which
employed only 8.5 percent of the total number of personnel. In terms
of number of employees, other relatively important industries were
textiles (5.9 percent of the total umber of employees); printing (4.9
percent of the total); clothing (4.2 percent of the total); and paper
(3.9 percent). To sum up, as Ronnås perceptively puts it, “the
smallness of the manufacturing industry and the branch structure,
with a large share of flour mills, reflects that at the turn of the century
industry in the Old Kingdom was still in an incipient phase.”14 Until
the 1918 unification with the Old Kingdom, industrial development
in Transylvania was linked to the natural resources of the province
(iron ore and coal). The most significant resources of coal were located
in the Jiu Valley region; in 1913, from a total production of 2.5 million
tons of coal 2.3 million were extracted from the Jiu Valley mines.15
Ibid., 91–92, 106.
Ronnås, Urbanization in Romania, 113.
15
Ibid., 114.
13
14
Structural FactorS
121
Metallurgical industry was concentrated in the cities of Reşiţa and
Hunedoara, while Arad, Cluj, and Timişoara were the most relevant
manufacturing centers. As a Western scholar aptly observed, Romania
was a “backward traditional state with a large proportion of her
resources locked up in a primitive and inefficient agrarian system.”16
To sum up, when World War I broke out Romania was still an
agrarian state with a severe peasant problem.
The economic difficulties that immediately followed World War
I were surpassed only in 1923–1924. The total number of workers
employed in industry increased from 133,690 in 1915, to 176,879
in 1929.17 At the same time, the timid economic development of the
1920s was mostly reflected by the petroleum industry, which
advanced at the most rapid pace. Compared to the pre-1914 period,
the textiles, metallurgical and wood industries replaced the food
processing industry in terms of personnel. In 1932, in absolute
numbers the situation was the following: in the textiles industry were
involved 38,074 persons (25 percent of the total number of personnel
employed in industry); in the metallurgical industry were involved
26,083 persons (17 percent of the total); and in the wood industry
were involved 24,056 persons (15.8 percent of the total). The trend
was maintained over the entire period: in 1938, in the textiles industry
were employed 74,077 persons (25.6 percent of the total); in
metallurgy were employed 51,321 persons (17.7 percent of the total);
and in the wood industry were employed 43,326 persons (15 percent
of the total).18
See Derek Aldcroft, “Introduction” to David Turnock, The Romanian
Economy in the Twentieth Century (London: Croom Helm, 1986), viii.
17
See Mircea Muşat and Ion Ardeleanu, România după Marea Unire, 1918–
1933 (Romania after the Great Union, 1918–1933) vol. II (Bucharest: Editura
Ştiinţifică şi Enciclopedică, 1986), 356.
18
Iacob and Iacob, Romania from Prince Cuza to Carol II, 94–95.
16
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Structural FactorS
The most industrialized areas of the country were the Prahova
Valley (petroleum industry) and the Jiu Valley (coal mining), while
Hunedoara and Reşiţa remained the main metallurgical centers. As
for the manufacturing industry, the main centers of Greater Romania
were the cities of Bucharest, Timişoara, Arad, Cluj, Braşov, and Iaşi.
It should be stressed however that the secondary industries
concentrated to cities and towns, to the disadvantage of nonagricultural activities in rural areas, which entered a vicious circle of
underdevelopment.19 Furthermore, the censuses of 1901 and 1930
indicate the concentration of industrial activity mainly to the Ilfov
and Prahova counties. As a whole, a thorough look to the interwar
period indicates that Bucharest and the neighboring areas – primarily
the Ilfov and Prahova counties – became more attractive for the big
industry. Such a situation can be explained by considering the effects
of the world depression of the 1930s, which affected to a greater
extent the coal mining and metallurgical industry than oil industry.
Nevertheless, one should not neglect vested political interests, i.e. the
relationships between industrialists and political decision-makers in
Bucharest, which made such areas more interesting for investors.20
At the same time, the concentration of industry and commerce
in the areas mentioned above illustrates the uneven level of
industrialization of Greater Romania. In fact, in spite of some
undeniable achievements, Romania was by no means a modern
industrial state. As stated in a World Bank analysis of the Romanian
economy published in the late 1970s, by the end of the interwar
period “the Romanian economy remained a peripheral appendage
of industrial Western Europe, supplying agricultural products and
mineral and energy resources.”21 Henry L. Roberts, a keen observer
Ronnås, Urbanization in Romania, 125.
Ibid., 120.
21
Andreas C. Tsantis and Roy Pepper, eds., Romania: The Industrialization of
an Agrarian Economy Under Socialist Planning (Washington D. C.: The World
Bank, 1979), 23–24.
19
20
Structural FactorS
123
of the Romanian society in the 1940s, supports a similar idea. Roberts
emphasizes the lack of integration of the industry with the older
sectors of economy and argues that the slow development of the
tertiary industries (related to marketing, distributing and selling)
made the difference between the Romanian economy and the
advanced economies of Western Europe:
There is an impression of disparateness throughout Rumania. In Bucharest
one is startled by the abrupt transitions from modernity to backwardness.
The oil wells and refineries at Ploieşti spring out of a peasant landscape.
Discussions on Rumanian industry revolve not around branches of industry
but around specific large enterprises Reşiţa, Malaxa, I.A.R.—isolated spots
in the economy. In both Rumanian agriculture and industry there is lacking
a “middle ground,” a diversified, intensive peasant farming and the complex
of intermediate industrial activities.22
Actually, in terms of industrial production the interwar Romanian
economy still relied on pockets of industrialization and significant
industrial branches were still to be fully established. However, a fullscale industrialization strategy based on a free market approach was
not implemented in Romania due to the beginning of World War II.
War once terminated, the communist takeover followed shortly and
led to a complete change in terms of political, economic, social and
cultural policies. The following sections address the issues of economic
development and overall modernization in communist Romania
during the four epochs mentioned above, i.e. 1945–56; 1956–64;
1964–77; and 1977–89.
Henry L. Roberts, Rumania: Political Problems of an Agrarian State (n.p.:
Archon Books, 1969), 336–37.
22
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Structural FactorS
humble imitation of the Soviet model, 1945–1956
One should clarify from the outset the issue of the abbreviations used
in this book to denominate the communist party in Romania. Thus,
during the period 1948–1965, the official name of the communist party
in Romania was Partidul Muncitoresc Român – PMR (Romanian
Workers Party – RWP). From 1965 to 1989, the official name was
Partidul Comunist Român – PCR (Romanian Communist Party – RCP).
Throughout this book, the two terms, i.e. RWP and RCP, are used in
accordance with the period discussed and are not interchangeable. The
term RWP/RCP has been used when patterns of continuity between
the two periods, i.e. 1948–1965 and 1965–1989 needed to be stressed.
Also, the abbreviation RCP is used for the period spanning from the
establishment of the party in 1921 to the year 1948.
Having said this, let us turn to the issue of economic development
and patterns of modernization under communist rule in Romania.
The Romanian communists did not come to power with a precise
economic and social agenda. During the period 1945–1956, the small
group of local communist militants brought to power by the Red
Army managed to maintain its position by displaying total loyalty
towards Moscow and humbly emulating the Soviet model. This should
be kept in mind when examining the strategy of economic
development adopted by the Romanian communists in the aftermath
of their coming to power. In fact, the local communists brought to
power by the Soviets in the aftermath of World War II were rather
unprepared to govern and had an unsophisticated vision of politics.
The only chance of such a power elite to stay in power was to be
subservient to Stalin and follow the Soviet model. To the extent that
Romanian communists thought of an economic strategy of their own
– and they had not much time to do so until the late 1950s – they
linked economic development with the total transformation of the
existing market economy into one following closely the Soviet model.
Structural FactorS
125
During this period, an issue of paramount importance for GheorghiuDej and his men was to legitimize themselves in the eyes of Moscow,
and not in the eyes of the population.23
In terms of economic strategy, the newly established communist
regime acted resolutely for a rapid transformation of the economic
system of the country into a “command economy” on the Soviet
model.24 Nevertheless, one should note that the economic
performance of Romania was deeply affected by the burden of war
reparations, and by two years of severe draught and subsequent
famine, i.e. 1946 and 1947. The amount of war reparations was
officially fixed by the armistice agreement to $ 300 million to be paid
in kind at the 1938 prices. Moreover, $ 508 million were to be paid
additionally as a compensation for the goods appropriated by
Concerning the concept of legitimacy, the present analysis employs James
S. Coleman’s definition: “Legitimacy is simply the right to carry out certain
authoritative actions and have them obeyed. It rests on a consensus of those actors
in a society relevant to the continued exercise of authority – which may be the
population as a whole or only certain parts of it.” See James S. Coleman,
Foundations of Social Theory (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 1990), 470.
24
With regard to economic Stalinism or Stalin’s model of “command
economy,” this author follows Moshe Lewin who identified the following main
features of a “command economy:” “(1) a high degree of centralization of economic
decision making and planning; (2) comprehensive character of planning; (3)
preference for physical units as instruments in accounting; (4) the use of ‘material
balances’ for obtaining internal consistency of the plans; (5) a centralized
administration for material supplies, which operated as a rationing system; (6) the
imperative and detailed character of plans; (7) a hierarchically organized
administration within factories; (8) the relegation of market categories and
mechanisms to a secondary role, mainly to the sphere, albeit important, of personal
consumption and to labor; and (9) coercion by the state, as direct organizer of the
economy with its ubiquitous controls and etatization not only of the economy but
of the other spheres of life as well.” Moshe Lewin, Political Undercurrents in Soviet
Economic Debates: From Bukharin to the Modern Reformers (London: Pluto Press,
1975), 113–14.
23
126
Structural FactorS
Romania during the 1918–1940 period of rule over the territories
of Bessarabia and Bukovina. Apart from this, the Soviet Union
engaged in the exploitation of the natural resources of the country
by the means of sixteen joint Soviet-Romanian companies, established
after 1945, called Sovroms. Sovrompetrol, for instance, exported as
much as two thirds of Romania’s oil production to the Soviet Union.
Other similar joint ventures were: Sovromtransport (transport sector,
established in 1945); Tars (air transport, 1945); Sovrombanc
(banking, 1945); Sovromlemn (timber, 1946); Sovromchim
(chemical industry, 1948); Sovromtractor (tractors, 1948); Sovromgaz
(natural gas, 1949); Sovromconstrucţii (construction sector, 1949);
Sovromasigurări (insurance sector, 1949); Sovromutilaj (oilfield
equipment, 1952); Sovromnaval (ship building, 1952); and
Sovromcuarţ (uranium exploitation, 1952). Of the sixteen Sovroms,
nine were established in industry, two in the transport sector and one
in each of the following sectors: construction, banking, insurance,
uranium exploitation and film production.25
After the forced abdication of King Michael I on 30 December
1947, the Assembly of Deputies passed the very same day a law (No.
363), which proclaimed the founding of the People’s Republic of
Romania. As far as the so-called “socialist transformation of economy”
is concerned, a major event was the passing on 11 June 1948 of the
law on the nationalization of large private businesses. This affected
industrial, mining and transport companies, as well as banks and
insurance companies. Subsequently, during the period November
1948 – April 1950 further steps were taken to nationalize smaller
See Ronnås, Urbanization in Romania, 283 and Turnock, The Romanian
Economy, 157. For a detailed analysis of the Sovrom phenomenon and its
consequences for the Romanian economy see Florian Banu, Asalt asupra economiei
României – de la Solagra la SOVROM, 1936–1956 (Assault on Romania’s economy:
From Solagra to SOVROM, 1936–1956) (Bucharest: Editura Nemira, 2004),
123–79.
25
Structural FactorS
127
businesses and a segment of the urban housing sector.26 Furthermore,
the regime mobilized ample private financial resources through the
monetary reform of 28 January 1952, by which only small amounts
of money were exchanged at a convenient rate of 1 new leu for 20 old
lei. For large amounts of cash it was offered a much lower exchange
rate, which could reach the extreme of 1 new leu for 400 old lei.27
The transition from a market economy to a centrally planned
economy was initiated by two annual plans, i.e. 1949 and 1950,
followed in 1951 by the launch of the First Five-Year Plan. As Ghita
Ionescu perceptively observed, the First Five-Year Plan of 1951–1955
“essentially reproduced the pre-war Soviet plans of industrialization
and development on a Romanian scale.”28 The largest share of
investment, however, was channeled towards the already developed
regions, with an emphasis on producer goods.29 Equally important,
Health institutions and movie production companies were nationalized on
3 November 1948; pharmacies, drugstores, chemical and pharmaceutical
companies, and medical labs were nationalized on 2 April 1949. On 20 April 1950
a considerable part of the urban housing sector was also nationalized. See Dinu C.
Giurescu, Illustrated History of the Romanian People (Bucharest: Editura SportTurism, 1981), 595 and Ghita Ionescu, Communism in Romania, 1944 – 1962
(Westport, CT: Grenwood Press, 1976), 161–67; orig. publ. 1964.
27
Ionescu, Communism in Romania, 203–204. See also Turnock, The Romanian
Economy, 160.
28
The First Romanian Five-Year Plan was devised by Miron Constantinescu.
According to Ghita Ionescu, Constantinescu was “a rigid doctrinaire in economic
planning, following faithfully the Stalinist line of absolute control and centralization”
while he tended “to oppose the tremendous Soviet economic demands on Romania.”
Ionescu, Communism in Romania, 193. Alexandru Bârlădeanu, a moderate marketsocialist reformer, is critical towards Constantinescu’s handling of Romanian
economy during the First Five-Year Plan. See Lavinia Betea, Alexandru Bârlădeanu
despre Dej, Ceauşescu şi Iliescu (Alexandru Bârlădeanu on Dej, Ceauşescu, and Iliescu)
(Bucharest: Editura Evenimentul Românesc, 1998), 152.
29
Lion’s share of the new investments went to traditional industrial centres
such as Bucharest and Braşov (engineering), and Hunedoara and Reşiţa
(metallurgy). See Turnock, The Romanian Economy, 162.
26
128
Structural FactorS
the communist regime launched in 1951 the Ten-Year Plan of
Electrification and Water Management (1951–1960), a daring
enterprise with long-terms implications on the future development
of the country.30 In agriculture, the process of collectivization was
launched by the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RWP of
3–5 March 1949. The first five collective farms were established on
24 July 1949, and by the end of 1949 their number reached 56.31
Nevertheless, the collectivization of Romanian agriculture proved to
be more difficult than previously thought, not only because of a
mistaken approach, but also because of a steady opposition from a
major part of the peasant population.32 Started in 1949, by 1959 the
process was by no means finished and only 27.3 percent of the total
arable land belonged to collective farms, while private farms still
accounted for 26 percent.33 All in all, the provisions of the First FiveYear Plan were not fulfilled in their entirety. In his report to the
Second Congress of the RWP, held on 23–28 December 1955,
Gheorghiu-Dej announced that the plan was fulfilled in terms of
gross industrial production. Nevertheless, he had to admit that the
plan targets were not met in some industrial branches such as steel
and laminated steel, coal, coke and coking coal, cement, cellulose,
A monumental work – both insightful and documented – on the
electrification program under communism in Romania is Ioan Ganea, Marcel
Croitoru and Filomenos Savin, eds., Electrificarea în România, 1951–1992
(Electrification in Romania, 1951–1992) (Bucharest: Editura Tehnică, 1996). On
the electrification drive in the early 1950s, see pp. 158–62.
31
The first five collective farms were established at Laslea (Sibiu County), Luna
de Jos (Cluj County), Răşcani (Vaslui County), Turnişor (Sibiu County) and
Zăbani (Arad County). See Dinu C. Giurescu, Illustrated History, 602.
32
For more on the collectivization process during the period 1949–1953, see
Dan Cătănuş and Octavian Roske, eds., Colectivizarea agriculturii în România:
Dimensiunea politică, 1949–1953 (Collectivization of agriculture in Romania: The
political dimension, 1949–1953) (Bucharest: Institutul Naţional pentru Studiul
Totalitarismului, 2000), 33–48.
33
Tsantis and Pepper, Romania, 229.
30
Structural FactorS
129
textiles, footwear, sugar, as well as dairy and fish.34 At the same time,
investments in the consumer goods sector remained, as GheorghiuDej put it, “seriously behind the schedule.”35
With regard to the main elements of “civilization,” that is,
education, increased mobility of the population, access to
information, housing, medical care and supply of consumer goods,
some timid improvements were actually made. The Ten-Year Plan
of Electrification and Water Management stipulated a rapid pace of
rural electrification so that by the end of the period 2,000 villages
were to be connected to the national grid. To have an idea about the
scale of the project, it suffices to mention that in 1945 only 535
villages from a total number of 15,000 were connected to the national
grid. Rural electrification was accompanied by the spread of cheap
radiophonic equipment that brought out rural Romania of its autarky.
In his report to the Congress, Gheorghiu-Dej announced that during
the First Five-Year Plan nine new local radio broadcasting stations
were established. Also, he announced that the number of loudspeakers
connected to such local radio stations around the country in both
urban and rural areas had reached half a million. Moreover,
Gheorghiu-Dej stated that the production of radio sets reached
90,000 units per year.36 One should be reminded that interwar
Romania had a deplorable network of paved roads. During the period
1948–1955 – Gheorghiu-Dej stated in the front of the Congress –
over 1,200 kilometers of roads were modernized and 15.5 kilometers
of bridges were built. He had to admit, however, that by the end of
See Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, “Raportul de activitate al Comitetului Central
al Partidului Muncitoresc Romîn la Congresul al II-lea al Partidului – 23 decembrie
1955” (Activity Report of the Central Committee of the Romanian Workers’ Party
to the Second Congress of the Party – 23 December 1955), in idem, Articole şi
cuvîntări: decembrie 1955 – iulie 1959 (Articles and speeches: December 1955 –
July 1959) (Bucharest: Editura Politică, 1960), 38.
35
Ibid., 39.
36
Dej, Activity Report to the Second Congress of the Party, 52.
34
130
Structural FactorS
1955 modernized roads represented only 15 percent of the total road
network.37 In 1956, paved roads still made up only 4.8 percent of
the total road network of 76,000 km. The regime also engaged in a
sustained educational program. It is true that in interwar Romania,
the rate of illiteracy substantially declined between 1918 and 1948.
However, the vast majority of the population did not have more than
four years of primary school. The law of 1948 stated that out of seven
years of free education, four were compulsory; in 1955/1956 seven
years of school became compulsory in urban areas, followed by a
similar provision in 1959/1960 for rural areas.
During the First Five-Year Plan (1951–1955), urban growth
averaged some 2.5 percent per year, while the investment in housing
represented 10.1 percent of the total investment in the national
economy. At the same time, the rate of urban growth and the share
of the investment in housing do not say much about the functions
performed by the urban centers in Romania. In this respect, the first
thing to say about the approach to urbanization adopted by the
Gheorghiu-Dej regime is that it focused overwhelmingly on the
industrial aspect, i.e. the industrial structure of towns. With regard
to this issue, there are two major aspects to be discussed. The first
relates to a change in terms of employment. For instance, in 1956,
in the city of Hunedoara 84.4 percent of the total population active
in industries was employed in the secondary sector. For comparison,
in 1930 in the city of Hunedoara 38.8 per cent of the population
was employed in manufacturing, mining and construction. Similarly,
in 1956 in the city of Braşov out of the total population active in
industries, 60.7 percent was employed in the secondary sector, while
36.2 was employed in the tertiary sector. For comparison, in 1930
39.1 percent of the population in Braşov was employed in the
secondary sector, while 38.6 percent was employed in the tertiary
sector. As far as urban employment is concerned, the tertiary sector,
37
Ibid., 51.
Structural FactorS
131
which was dominant during the 1930s, suffered a strong decline after
World War II and by 1956 lost its first position to manufacturing.38
Second, many of the newly declared towns were mining and heavy
manufacturing centers where employment in the secondary sector
was, or became, dominant. During the period 1948–1956, the
approach of the Gheorghiu-Dej regime to urbanization was also made
clear by the provisions of the two administrative reforms, carried out
in 1950 and 1952. The most interesting aspect is that fourteen towns
– mainly market towns – were deprived of their urban status while
twelve of the thirty-two newly declared towns were economically onesided, as overwhelmingly mining or heavy manufacturing centers.39
It may be argued that of prime importance for the regime was the
industrial function of urban centers, while their social and cultural
functions were discarded. Furthermore, in habitational terms no
progress was actually made: the housing sector was underdeveloped
and remained so until the mid-1970s.40 In fact, during the period
1951–1955 the regime tried to cope with the high demand for
dwellings in terms of quantity with no concern for quality. Even the
workers, the alleged basis of the new regime, were faced with difficult
Ronnås, Urbanization in Romania, 156.
Baia de Aramă, Dărăbani, Fălciu, Filipeşti Tîrg, Hîrlău, Huedin, Mihăileni,
Ostrov, Pleniţa, Răcari, Săveni, Ştefăneşti Tîrg, Tîrgu Frumos and Vama lost their
urban status. Of the newly declared towns, economically one-sided were notably
Anina, Băicoi, Comăneşti, Doctor Petru Groza, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, Lupeni,
Moldova Nouă, Nucet, Petrila and Vulcan. In 1956, in the mining centres of Jiu
Valley as Lupeni, Petrila and Vulcan, of the total population active in industries,
in the secondary sector were employed: 81.4 percent in Lupeni, 80.5 percent in
Petrila and 82.0 percent in Vulcan. See Ronnås, Urbanization in Romania, 190,
195, 289.
40
In 1975, the housing stock provided an average of 0.978 dwelling per family,
which meant a deficit of 150,000 dwellings. At the same time, in 1976, in rural areas
there were 1,019 dwellings for each 1,000 families, which meant that the housing
deficit was felt in the urban areas. See Tsantis and Pepper, Romania, 290.
38
39
132
Structural FactorS
housing problems. For instance, on March 1954, Gheorghe Apostol,
the vice-president of the Romanian Council of Ministers, visited the
Metallurgical Combine Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej in Hunedoara to
inaugurate of a new blast furnace. On that occasion, a delegation came
forward and submitted a list of requests in the name of their fellow
workers. Housing was one of the four most pressing problems the
workers of the Hunedoara combine faced at that moment.41
Prospects for the future were bright, the official propaganda
maintained, but accounts from the period tell a totally different story
with regard to the realities of everyday life. Rationing of basic
foodstuffs, footwear and textiles lasted until 1954.42 There were hard
times even for the working class, supposed to be the first and foremost
beneficiary of the “socialist transformation” of the society. For
instance, an account of December 1955 provides valuable information
on the living conditions of the railway workers in the Griviţa district
of Bucharest, considered a communist “bastion.” The railway
workers, especially those who worked on trains, i.e. locomotive
conductors, used to buy foodstuffs such as cheese, eggs and meat in
the province at lower prices and sell them to relatives and friends in
Bucharest in order to earn some extra money.43 In fact, for a
significant part of the population in communist Romania the benefits
of the “socialist way of life” were actually not coming true.
In his report to the Second Congress of the Party, Gheorghiu-Dej
also discussed at length the directives for the Second Five-Year Plan
(1956–1960). According to the directives, the Second Five-Year Plan
The workers demanded: (1) a raise in wages; (2) the supply of the protective
equipment by the factory; (3) the timely supply of the firewood in winter; and (4)
the speedy solution of the housing problems, as many workers still lived in barracks.
Romanian Fond, Unit No. 300/60/1/837, Item 11095/54: 3, OSA/RFE Archives.
42
On the 1954 renunciation to the rationing system for basic consumer goods
see Gheorghiu-Dej, Activity Report to the Second Congress of the Party, 50.
43
Romanian Fond, Unit No. 300/60/1/837, Item 4019/56: 4, OSA/RFE
Archives.
41
Structural FactorS
133
continued to put a strong emphasis on industrial development,
predominantly on: oil and petrochemical industries; steel; electric
power production; coal and nonferrous metallurgy. Of the total
investment in industry, 20.5 percent was to be allotted to petroleum;
13 percent to chemical, paper and cellulose; 12 percent to ferrous
metallurgy; 11 percent to electric power production; 8 percent to
coal; 6.5 percent to nonferrous metallurgy; 5 percent to natural gas;
5 percent to textiles, clothing and footwear; 4.5 percent to food
processing; 4.5 percent to construction materials; 4.5 percent to
machinery and electric equipment; 4 percent to lumber and wood
processing; and 1.5 percent to other branches.44 During the 1956–
1960 Five-Year Plan, the regime envisaged the same policy of
sustained economic development following the Stalinist pattern.
Consequently, the directives for the Second Five-Year Plan provided
a projection of the growth of industrial output in 1960, as compared
with the year 1955, for the major industries.45
The year 1956, however, would bring major changes to the overall
political, as well as economic, strategy of Gheorghiu-Dej. The “secret
speech” of Nikita Khrushchev in front of the Twentieth Congress of
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), delivered on the
night of 24–25 February 1956, shook deeply the leadership of the
Romanian communists. The “secret speech,” in which the Soviet
leader exposed Stalin’s personality cult opened a new chapter in the
history of communist regimes. In Poland and Hungary, the “secret
speech” contributed to the emergence of the Polish October of 1956
and, respectively, the 1956 Hungarian Revolution.46 In Romania,
Gheorghiu-Dej, Activity Report to the Second Congress of the Party, 73–74.
For instance, the production of electric power was planned to grow by 80–
85 percent in 1960 as compared with 1955, the oil production with 28 percent,
coal with 80–90 percent, etc. See the complete set of data in Gheorghiu-Dej,
Activity Report to the Second Congress of the Party, 76.
46
The way in which Gheorghiu-Dej and his group reacted to these events is
discussed separately in the section dedicated to the political culture of the Romanian
communist regime.
44
45
134
Structural FactorS
the power elite felt directly threatened by the campaign of deStalinization launched by Khrushchev and, more than ever, afraid of
losing the total control over party and society. An unexpected chain
of events that culminated with the Hungarian revolution of 23
October – 4 November 1956 offered a much needed support for
Gheorghiu-Dej and his men that were desperately looking for a
solution to avoid de-Stalinization. The power elite in Bucharest
reacted swiftly and not only that condemned the Hungarian
revolution, but also displayed absolute loyalty towards the Soviets.
This permitted the Romanian communist leadership to buy some
time and devise a strategy of political survival based on a cautious
return to the Romanian traditional values combined with a program
of extensive industrialization. Thus, it turned out that the 1956 events
in Poland and Hungary favored the strategy of Gheorghiu-Dej to
preserve his personal power and ultimately avoid de-Stalinization.
The Romanian population, however, sympathized with the 1956
insurgents in Budapest. As post-1989 analyses show, numerous
individuals expressed their solidarity with the Hungarian revolution
in those days and it was in the city of Timişoara where the
manifestations of sympathy towards the Hungarian revolution were
the most significant.
Again, the importance of the 1956 events resides in the fact that
the ruling elite in Bucharest became concerned with legitimating itself
in the eyes of the population. A first measure taken by the regime was
to modify its short-term economic strategy in the sense of allotting a
larger share to consumption and boosting the production of consumer
goods. Gheorghiu-Dej announced this shift in economic policy in his
speech delivered to the Plenum of 27–29 December 1956, by stating
that the Party decided to allot a larger share of the national income to
consumption. “We must orient our efforts – Gheorghiu-Dej
proclaimed – towards a massive development of the agricultural
production, towards the development of the light and food processing
Structural FactorS
135
industries, as well as the housing sector, which are closely linked to
the raising of the living standard of the working population.”47
Nevertheless, in terms of economic strategy the Second Five-Year
Plan presented many inconsistencies. At the time, Gheorghiu-Dej
was engaged in a dangerous political game and the stakes were high,
since the leader of the Romanian communists was shrewdly
maneuvering to preserve his supreme power. Therefore, the economic
issues were pushed to the background while the political struggle
within the Party came to the foreground. That something was
happening and the economic policy of the regime had changed one
could also apprehend from Gheorghiu-Dej’s exposé to the national
meeting of peasants and laborers in the socialist sector of agriculture,
held on 3 April 1958. On that occasion, the leader of Romanian
communists spoke of the increased output over the previous year
1957 of some major industries such as steel, electric power, oil, natural
gas, construction materials, machinery, as well as consumer goods.
However, Gheorghiu-Dej compared the production of 1957 with
the production of the year 1938 and not with that of the year 1955.48
Such a strategy to obscure difficulties in meeting the plan targets by
comparing the actual production with the peak year of industrial
development in prewar Romania, i.e. the year 1938 would be widely
used by both Gheorghiu-Dej and Ceauşescu regimes until the very
end of the communist rule in Romania.
Gheorghiu-Dej, “Raport prezentat la plenara C.C. al P.M.R. din 27–29
decembrie 1956” (Report presented to the Plenum of the CC of RWP of 27–29
December 1956), in idem, Articole şi cuvîntări: decembrie 1955 – iulie 1959 (Articles
and speeches: December 1955 – July 1959) (Bucharest: Editura Politică, 1960), 209.
48
Gheorghiu-Dej, “Expunere făcută la consfătuirea pe ţară a ţăranilor şi
lucrătorilor din sectorul socialist al agriculturii, Constanţa, 3 aprilie 1958” (Exposé
to the national meeting of peasants and laborers in the socialist sector of agriculture,
Constanţa, 3 April 1958), in idem, Articles and speeches: December 1955 – July
1959, 369–70.
47
136
Structural FactorS
A particularly important event, that validated the success of
Gheorghiu-Dej’s strategy of political survival, took place on 25 July
1958 when the last echelon of the Soviet troops stationed in Romania
left the country. From that moment until his untimely death,
Gheorghiu-Dej was the undisputed leader of the party and the state.
Turning back to the economic achievements of the Second Five-Year
Plan, it seems that the Party was not pleased with its outcome. As a
consequence, in June 1960 the Third Congress of the RWP approved
the launch of a Six-Year Plan (1960–1966), which was the only sixyear plan enforced under communist rule in Romania. The next
period, i.e. 1956–64, which is discussed below, was of major
significance due to the reorientation of the Romanian economy
towards the West.
development and emancipation, 1956–1964
The period 1958–1964 represents a key period due to the gradual
reorientation of the Romanian economy towards the West as a result
of the political strategy based on emancipation from Moscow and
extensive industrial development devised by the power elite in
Bucharest. As already mentioned, the Hungarian revolution of 1956
offered the Romanian communist elite a wonderful opportunity to
display a total subservience to the Kremlin and thus avoid the
replacement of Gheorghiu-Dej and his men with a Khrushchevite
faction. Such a stance by the Romanian communists led ultimately
to the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Romania in July 1958.
It may be argued that July 1958 was a watershed in the history of
communist Romania. As far as the RWP leadership was concerned,
it signaled that the period of learning by doing came to an end for
both Gheorghiu-Dej – once a humble railway worker but by now
Structural FactorS
137
the uncontested leader of RWP,49 and his followers. The small “group
from prisons” led by Gheorghiu-Dej, became a confident and
experienced power elite with an increased room to maneuver after
the Soviets withdrew their troops from Romania.
At the same time, one could identify a major shift with regard to
the legitimating discourse of the RWP supreme leader. From July
1958 on, both the Party and its supreme leader had to legitimate
themselves in the eyes of the population and this implied a return to
traditional values in parallel with some economic improvement. For
instance, Gheorghiu-Dej’s report to the enlarged plenum of the CC
of the RWP, held on 13–14 July 1959, is almost entirely dedicated
to the strategy of the Party for improving the standard of living of
the population.50 Actually, in the immediate aftermath of the
Hungarian revolution the Romanian communists did make some
efforts to improve the situation of the population in order to avoid
the spreading of unrest to Romania. Thus, during the 1956–1960
period 82.9 percent of the national income went to consumption
and only 17.1 percent was allotted to accumulation.51
One of the major economic achievements of the 1950s was
undoubtedly the completion of the 1951–1960 Electrification Plan.
Corneliu Coposu was the most representative political figure of the reborn
National Peasant Party in the post-1989 period and a survivor of the Romanian Gulag.
In his recollections, he emphasized the astonishing transformation of Gheorghiu-Dej
from a humble worker animated by communist ideas, rather intimidated by Ana
Pauker and Vasile Luca, into a tough and cynical communist leader who ordered the
assassination of Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu. See Corneliu Coposu, Dialoguri cu Vartan
Arachelian (Dialogues with Vartan Arachelian) (Bucharest: Editura Anastasia, 1991),
76–77, as well as idem, Confesiuni: Dialoguri cu Doina Alexandru (Confessions:
Dialogues with Doina Alexandru) (Bucharest: Editura Anastasia, 1996).
50
Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, “Raport prezentat la Plenara lărgită a C.C. al
P.M.R. din 13–14 iulie 1959” (Report presented to the enlarged Plenum of the
C.C. of the RWP), in idem, Articles and speeches: December 1955 – July 1959, 643–76.
51
Maria Mureşan, Evoluţii economice, 1945–1990 (Economic evolutions, 1945–
1990) (Bucharest: Editura Economică, 1995), 87.
49
138
Structural FactorS
A thorough post-1989 analysis of the plan indicates that between
1951 and 1960 Romania increased tremendously the domestic energy
production and developed a wide infrastructure in terms of personnel,
research and training. Also, between 1951 and 1960 large investments
were undertaken and new power plants, whose installed capacity
amounted to 1,039 MW, were built. Compared to 1950, when the
overall installed capacity was only 740 MW, in 1960 the overall
installed capacity reached 1,779 MW. The overall installed capacity,
however, did not meet the provisions of the Electrification Plan that
envisaged an installed capacity of 2,000 MW by 1960. Nevertheless,
in terms of annual production of electric power the plan targets were
exceeded due to an extended period of utilization of the existing
capacities: from 2.1 TWh in 1950, it reached 7.65 TWh in 1960.
As for the power plants built during the period 1951–1960, the most
important were the Doiceşti, Fîntînele (Sîngeorgiu de Pădure),
Paroşeni and Borzeşti thermoelectric power plants and the Bicaz
(Stejaru) hydroelectric power plant.52 It should be emphasized that
during the period under scrutiny only one major hydroelectric power
plant was built, i.e. Bicaz. In spite of their efficiency and capacity to
produce clean energy, hydroelectric power plants require larger
investments and longer construction periods than their thermoelectric
counterparts. At the same time, the policy of rapid industrial
development and extensive rural electrification enforced by the regime
was better served by thermoelectric power plants that could be erected
more rapidly and at lower costs. Nevertheless, what is important for
the present analysis is that the 1951–1960 Electrification Plan was
quite successful and had a decisive contribution in raising the living
standard of the population during the following decade.
On 8 May 1961, in his report to the meeting dedicated to the
celebration of 40 years since the establishment of the Romanian
Communist Party, Gheorghiu-Dej referred to the provisions of the
52
Ganea, Croitoru and Savin, eds., Electrification in Romania, 162.
Structural FactorS
139
Six-Year Plan (1960–1966) and reiterated the determination of the
Party to continue the rapid pace of industrialization. In this respect,
the stance of the Party was crystal clear and Gheorghiu-Dej expressed
it in plain words: “At the center of Party’s activity stays the socialist
industrialization – the preponderant development of heavy industry
with its pivotal sub-sector, the engineering goods (machinery)
industry.”53 Furthermore, Gheorghiu-Dej affirmed that in 1960,
which was the first year of the Six-Year Plan, the gross industrial
production rose about 17 percent compared with the previous year.
Moreover, during the first trimester of 1961 the gross industrial
production grew 18 percent compared with the similar period in
1960. These figures, quite difficult to check today, were meant
primarily to convey a single message: that the Party was determined
to pursue the same policy of sustained industrial development.54
Nevertheless, the issue of the strategy of economic development
adopted by the power elite in Bucharest vigorously surfaced when
Nikita Khrushchev announced his project of the so-called “division
of labor within the socialist camp.” In June 1962, the Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) adopted a document entitled
“Principles for the International Division of Labor,” which stressed
the idea of “socialist economic collaboration” in the sense of a division
of labor within the communist bloc between the industrialized north
and the agrarian south. The project was strongly supported by
Czechoslovakia and East Germany, the most industrialized “fraternal”
countries. Alexandru Bârlădeanu, the representative of Romania to
the CMEA (1955–1966), recalls that during a meeting of the
organization the East German delegation actually proposed that
Romania should grow maize and raise pigs that would be processed
Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, 40 de ani de luptă a Partidului sub steagul
atotbiruitor al Marxism-Leninismului (40 years of struggle under the triumphant
flag of Marxism-Leninism) (Bucharest: Editura Politică, 1961), 24.
54
Ibid., 25–27.
53
140
Structural FactorS
in East Germany. All in all, Bârlădeanu maintains, the Romanian
communists perceived Khrushchev’s plan as an attempt at
transforming their country into a sort of colony of the more
industrialized East Germany and Czechoslovakia, while the Soviet
Union would have directed the whole project.55
Obviously, Gheorghiu-Dej fiercely opposed such ideas, all the
more that Romania had already started in 1961 the building of a
large integrated iron and steel works in the town of Galaţi, located
in the southeast of the country, in order to stir economic
development.56 The Galaţi Iron and Steel Complex was finally
inaugurated in 1966. The initial reluctance of the Soviets to support
the Galaţi steel mill project contributed decisively to the economic
opening of communist Romania towards the West. Moreover,
Romania started to produce machinery and equipment under
Western licenses. A witness account speaks of Khrushchev’s irritation
when he was invited during his visit to Romania in June 1962 to the
Electroputere Craiova enterprise to see the Romanian-made 2,100
HP diesel-electric locomotive.57 Romania also engaged in other major
collaborative economic projects. Thus, in order to boost the
hydroelectric power production, on 30 November 1963 Romania
and Yugoslavia signed in Belgrade the convention concerning the
building of a large hydroelectric and navigation complex on the
Danube at Porţile de Fier (Iron Gates) with an installed capacity
of 2,050 MW. The launch of the Yugoslavian-Romanian joint
project was all the more telling of the increasingly independent
policy of Romania since Yugoslavia was not a member of the
See Betea, Bârlădeanu on Dej, Ceauşescu and Iliescu, 149.
For more on the Galaţi iron and steel works project see Turnock, The
Romanian Economy, 199–200.
57
See Silviu Brucan, Generaţia irosită: Memorii (The vanished generation:
Memoirs) (Bucharest: Editurile Universul & Calistrat Hogaş, 1992), 86–87. On
Khrushchev’s 1962 visit to Romania see also Paul Niculescu-Mizil, O istorie trăită
(A lived history) (Bucharest: Editura Enciclopedică, 1997), 164–76.
55
56
Structural FactorS
141
CMEA.58 The Iron Gates worksite was inaugurated on 7 September
1964 in the presence of the communist leaders of Romania and
Yugoslavia, Gheorghiu-Dej and Josip Broz Tito. After completion,
the hydroelectric and navigation complex was inaugurated on 16
May 1972 in the presence of Ceauşescu and Tito.59
Another conflict within the CMEA opened when geographer E. B.
Valev published in February 1964 an article concerning the creation
of an “interstate economic complex” composed of parts of southern
Soviet Union, south-east Romania and northern Bulgaria.60 The project
envisaged the cooperation between the Soviet Union, Romania and
Bulgaria for the creation of a so-called Lower Danube Economic
Complex encompassing a surface of 150,000 square kilometers, of
which Romania would have contributed with 100,000, Bulgaria with
38,000 and the Soviet Union with 12,000. To be sure, GheorghiuDej and his men perceived the idea of a transnational economic region
put forward by Valev as a direct threat to their independence from the
Soviet Union. Consequently, they fiercely criticized the article.61
Nevertheless, the industrialization program devised by the power elite
The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) or Comecon was
established in Moscow in January 1949. Its founding members were the Soviet
Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Romania. GDR joined
the Comecon in 1950; CMEA was officially dismantled in February 1991. See
Aldcroft and Morewood, Economic Change in Eastern Europe since 1918, 133, 204.
59
Matei Ionescu and Z. Ornea, Compendiu românesc (Romanian compendium),
in Almanahul Scînteia 1967 (Bucharest), 45–46, 125. See also Dinu C. Giurescu,
ed., Istoria României în date (History of Romania in data) (Bucharest: Editura
Enciclopedică, 2003), 578, 627–28.
60
Georgescu, The Romanians, 245.
61
An official scholarly rejection of Valev’s article appeared in the form of an
article published in the economic periodical Viaţa economică (Economic life)
(Bucharest) No. 24 (43), 12 June 1964; Internet, http://www.cnsas.ro/documente/
istoria_comunism/documente_PMR_PCR/documente_programatice/1964%20Re
latiile%20economice%20dintre%20tarile%20socialiste.pdf; accessed 16 October
2010. On the debates within the RCP and the rejection of Valev’s article see
Niculescu-Mizil, A lived history, 235–50.
58
142
Structural FactorS
in Bucharest was only one of the elements of an astute policy of
independence from Moscow. Such a policy culminated with the
Declaration of April 1964 – which may be considered the “declaration
of autonomy” of the Romanian communists, and the general amnesty
that led to the liberation of a overwhelming majority of the political
prisoners by the end of 1964.62
A question, however, still needs a convincing answer: How far was
Gheorghiu-Dej prepared to go along the path of economic reforms? It
seems that, in spite of his flexible policies, Gheorghiu-Dej did not
envisage a comprehensive reform of the system. Although the
information on this particular aspect of Gheorghiu-Dej’s vision of
economic development is still scarce and contradictory, some witness
accounts shed some light on the issue. According to his men, the first
communist leader of Romania was determined to pursue a policy of
economic reforms. Bârlădeanu, himself a communist reformer somehow
in the spirit of the Czech Ota Sik, claims that Gheorghiu-Dej intended
to grant autonomy to collective farms, thus allowing them to function
according to the free market mechanism. Gheorghiu-Dej envisaged a
sort of economic liberalization, Bârlădeanu maintains, but he also admits
that Gheorghiu-Dej made no clear statements that would allow one
determine if the supreme leader of the Party was thinking of a global
Economic history of communist Romania was also rewritten in 1964. For
instance, a volume edited by the Romanian Academy and published in the summer
of 1964, i.e. after the Declaration of April, overlooks Romania’s economic
subservience to the Soviet Union during the 1950s. See Vasile Malinschi, Roman
Moldovan and Vasile Rausser, eds., Industria Romîniei, 1944–1964 (Romania’s
Industry, 1944–1964) (Bucharest: Editura Academiei Republicii Populare Române,
1964), 29–61. A work on a similar topic, published in the summer of 1961, places
a greater emphasis on the economic relations between Romania and the Soviet
Union. See Vasile Rausser, “Economia naţională a Republicii Populare Române
în etapa desăvîrşirii construcţiei socialismului” (National economy of Romania
during the period of completing the construction of socialism), in I. Rachmuth,
ed., Studii de economie socialistă (Studies of socialist economy) (Bucharest: Editura
Academiei Republicii Populare Române, 1961), 7–39.
62
Structural FactorS
143
economic reform.63 To his part, Gheorghe Apostol goes as far as to argue
that, after succeeded in gaining independence from Moscow,
Gheorghiu-Dej intended to head Romania towards both economic and
political liberalization. Another prominent former nomenklatura
member, Ion Gheorghe Maurer, claims that the untimely death of
Gheorghiu-Dej stopped the trend towards economic reforms.64
closely watched relaxation, 1964–1977
Apparently, the rise to power of Nicolae Ceauşescu following the
death of Gheorghiu-Dej after a galloping cancer did not represent
the coming of a new era.65 Gheorghiu-Dej died on 19 March 1965
and the Plenum of the CC of the RCP of 22 March sanctioned the
election of Nicolae Ceauşescu as Secretary General of the Party. Not
unexpectedly, the Ceauşescu regime followed until the late 1960s the
developmental pattern established by Gheorghiu-Dej. On 19 July
1965, in his report to the Ninth Party Congress, Ceauşescu stated:
“In the future, the industrialization of the country, especially the
development of the heavy industry with an emphasis on the heavy
machinery industry will remain at the core of our Party’s policy.”66
See Betea, Bârlădeanu on Dej, Ceauşescu, and Iliescu, 156.
Betea, Bârlădeanu on Dej, Ceauşescu, and Iliescu, 112 and 156; Idem, Maurer
and the yesterday world, 151–52 and 265.
65
For more on Gheorghiu-Dej’s illness see Pierre du Bois, “Ultimele zile ale
lui Gheorghiu-Dej” (The last days of Gheorghiu-Dej), Dosarele Istoriei (Dossiers
of History) (Bucharest) Nr.3 (1997), 47–50.
66
Nicolae Ceauşescu, “Raportul Comitetului Central al Partidului Comunist Român
cu privire la activitatea partidului în perioada dintre Congresul al VIII-lea şi Congresul al
IX-lea al P.C.R.” (Report of the CC of RCP concerning the activity of the Party during
the period between the Eighth and the Ninth Congresses of the Party), in idem, România
pe drumul desăvîrşirii construcţiei socialiste – Rapoarte, cuvîntări, articole, iulie 1965 –
septembrie 1966 (Romania on the path of completing the socialist construction: Reports,
speeches, articles, July 1965 – September 1966) (Bucharest: Editura Politică, 1968), 20.
63
64
144
Structural FactorS
Nevertheless, a timid attempt to reform the Romanian command
economy was made in the late 1960s by Alexandru Bârlădeanu. As
already mentioned, Bârlădeanu was a moderate market-socialist reformer
and a supporter of the more flexible policies introduced by GheorghiuDej during his last period in power. Bârlădeanu recalls that he had an
argument with Ceauşescu over the separation of national income into
consumption and accumulation as early as 1965, just before the opening
of the Ninth Congress of RCP, because Ceauşescu wanted a larger share
to be allocated to accumulation.67 By 1968 however it became clear that
the reformist views of some nomenklatura members such as Bârlădeanu
were in sharp contrast with the rigid economic ideas of the supreme
leader of the Party and had therefore no chance to materialize.
In terms of economic development, the Ceauşescu regime imposed a
rapid pace of industrialization. The table presented below reflects the
distribution between the consumption fund and accumulation fund over
the period 1951–1989.68 As one can easily grasp from the data presented
below, over the five five-year periods that make up the interval 1951–1975,
the accumulation fund grew steadily with the exception of the 1956–1960
period, when the Party made hastily some adjustments in the aftermath
of the Hungarian Revolution in order to raise the share of consumption.
Five-year period
1951–1955
1956–1960
1961–1965
1966–1970
1971–1975
1976–1980
1981–1985
1986–1989
Consumption fund
75.7
82.9
74.5
70.5
66.3
64.0
69.3
74.3
Accumulation fund
24.3
17.1
25.5
29.5
33.7
36.0
30.7
25.7
Betea, Bîrlădeanu on Dej, Ceauşescu, and Iliescu, 193–97.
Reproduced after Table 2.2. in Mureşan, Economic evolutions, 1945–1990, 87.
See also Table 5.1. Use of National Income (in Comparable Prices) for Consumption
and Accumulation, 1951–55 to 1971–75, in Tsantis and Pepper, Romania, 82.
67
68
Structural FactorS
145
As already noted, one has to bear in mind that in a command
economy the choice of establishing a high rate of accumulation is
primarily political. Costin Murgescu, one of the prominent
economists of the communist period, argued in this respect:
The fundamental political choice in the national plan – a choice that
influences directly or indirectly all of its other constituents – concerns
the concrete fixing of those parts of the national income which are
allocated to the fund for economic and social development, on the one
hand, and to the consumption fund, on the other…. The general
conclusion was reached that a lower rate of accumulation would allow
present [1974] living standards to rise faster in the short run; but, at the
same time, lowering the rate of accumulation would have negative effects
on overall economic development and this would diminish in the long
run the very material basis of systematically accelerating the improvement
of living conditions for the entire population [original emphasis].69
Data presented above clearly indicate that Ceauşescu intensified
the policy of sustained industrialization and urbanization devised by
his predecessor. As a consequence, between 1960 and 1977 the
percentage of urban population grew from 32.1 to 47.5 percent of
the total population, while the percentage of rural population declined
from 67.9 percent in 1960 to 52.5 percent in 1977. The rapid pace
of industrialization resulted in the growth of population involved in
industry; thus, the labor force employed in industry grew from 19.2
percent in 1960 and 30.6 percent in 1975. At the same time, the
percentage of population involved in agriculture (except for forestry)
declined from 56.5 percent in 1960 to 37.8 percent in 1975. In
absolute numbers, the population employed in agriculture decreased
from 6,233,000 persons in 1960 to 3,837,000 persons in 1975,
whereas the total labor force increased from 9,538,000 persons in
Costin Murgescu, Romania’s Socialist Economy: An Introduction to a
Contemporary Experience of Economic Development, translated from Romanian by
Leon Jaeger (Bucharest: Meridiane Publishing House, 1974), 77–79.
69
146
Structural FactorS
1960 to 10,150,000 persons in 1975. In terms of social composition
of the population, the changes that occurred during the 1956–1977
period are telling. Of the total population, the Romanian working
class – “blue collar workers,” including foremen – evolved as follows:
from 23.7 percent in 1956, to 39.9 percent in 1966 and to and 54.3
percent in 1977.70 Simply put, it was the program of sustained
industrialization enforced by the communist regime that led to the
actual creation of the Romanian working class.
All in all, between 1964 and 1977 Romania experienced a period
of economic achievements. One could feel that something had
changed, in the sense that communism in Romania was trying to
adopt a less ferocious face. One of the best analyses of economic
development under communist rule in Romania ever published in
the West, i.e. Economic Development in Communist Romania by John
Michael Montias, published in 1967, suggests that in terms of social
and economic change the claims of the regime were true in many
respects. As Montias aptly puts it:
Official Rumanian propaganda is so strident and repetitious in
proclaiming the economic accomplishments of the Communist regime
that a Westerner accustomed to more subtle means of persuasion may
become quite obdurate to its claims. Nonetheless, much of what it blares
is true. Industrial output had indeed grown very fast; health conditions
have vastly improved; education has spread; new technical skills have
been developed; and consumption levels have risen since the late 1930’s
not only because the majority of peasants and industrial workers live
somewhat better but also because so many peasant families have moved
to town and acceded to the higher standards of urban living.71
See Table SA1.12, Employment in the State Sector, by Professional Category,
1950, 1955, 1960, 1965, and 1970–76, in Tsantis and Pepper, Romania, 542–43.
71
John Michael Montias, Economic Development in Communist Rumania
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1967), 1.
70
Structural FactorS
147
It is also worth noting that the assessment of the economic
performance of communist Romania provided by Montias was
appreciated rather positively by Costin Murgescu – perhaps the most
prominent economist agreed by the communist regime, who wrote:
No doubt, Montias is looking at the Romanian economy from a
different standpoint than that of Marxist researchers. Nevertheless, his
study has got the merit of being an effort to look at it objectively “from
outside the socialist world.” Although I do not share some of the remarks
or conclusions of the American economist, I admit that Prof. Montias’
analysis is the most penetrating one ever made by a non-Marxist writer
of the national economy of Romania.72
True, the regime could claim that major achievements were made
in the economic realm. However, the claim that that, between 1950
and 1975 the Romanian economy grew at an average compound rate
of over 9 percent is highly questionable. It should be added that
Costin Murgescu even claimed that between 1951 and 1972 the
national income of Romania increased at an annual average rate of
9.6 percent.73 In this respect, economist Peter Bauer raised a simple
question: What was the economic situation of Romania in 1950? To
find a valid answer to such a question, Bauer de-compounded the 9
percent rate of growth advanced by the regime and the result was
perplexing: in 1950 the Romanian economy would have been so
small that it could not sustain human life on the available income.74
It is also important to mention that Ceauşescu lacked the
proverbial ability of Gheorghiu-Dej to evaluate properly the longterm effects of the political decisions made at the level of the power
elite. Especially in the economic realm, Ceauşescu proved to be highly
Costin Murgescu, Romania’s Socialist Economy, 14.
Ibid., 82.
74
Cited in Mark Almond, The Rise and Fall of Nicolae and Elena Ceauşescu
(London: Chapmans Publishers, 1992), 118–19.
72
73
148
Structural FactorS
dogmatic and rigid and this became crystal clear especially after the
Eleventh Congress of the RCP, held in November 1974. In his report
to the Eleventh Congress, delivered on 25 November 1974,
Ceauşescu stated that during the 1976–1980 Five-Year Plan the RCP
would firmly continue the policy of socialist industrialization of the
country.75 In spite of the fact that the world economy had just
experienced the first oil shock in 1973, the RCP pursued adamantly
a policy of massive expansion of the metallurgical, petrochemical and
heavy machinery industries. However, a crucial issue conspicuously
overlooked by the central planners was that beginning in 1972–1973
Romania shifted from an energy surplus to a net energy deficit.76 The
measures taken in the aftermath of the 1973 oil shock were, nevertheless, disappointing. An emergency decree was issued on 18 November
1973, but its effect on the overall energy consumption was limited.
In fact, the measures put forward were rather administrative, like
raising the price of gasoline for private consumption or introducing
controls of space heating, while very little was done in terms of
rethinking the overall strategy of economic development.
The Party continued to develop the industrial branches
characterized by high levels of energy consumption such as heavy
metallurgical industries (primarily iron and steel). As a consequence,
the demand for energy in industry grew steadily and the regime had
to take measures to cope with it. Quite naturally, the central planners
decided to put a stronger emphasis on the development of domestic
energy resources such as hydropower and coal. Hydroelectric power
stations necessitated large investments and took long periods of time
to be built. Thermal electric power is based on coal and Romania
has limited resources of high-quality coal. Consequently, the energy
Nicolae Ceauşescu, Raport la cel de-al XI-lea Congres al Partidului Comunist
Român (Report to the Eleventh Congress of the RCP) (Bucharest: Editura Politică,
1974), 47. On the RCP’s projections concerning the annual rate of growth of the
main industrial branches during the 1976–1980 Five-Year Plan, see pp. 48–53.
76
Tsantis and Pepper, Romania, 331.
75
Structural FactorS
149
sector had to rely on the lignite deposits located mainly in the Gorj
County. The main mining centers of the area were (and still are)
Motru and Rovinari, located near the county capital Tîrgu Jiu.
Furthermore, the calorific value of the Romanian lignite is quite low
(1,600–1,970 kilocalories/kg), which posed major technical problems.
A first problem was the organization of the mining process due to
the large quantities of lignite requested by the thermal power stations,
which had to be fuelled regularly. As a consequence, thermal power
stations using lignite had to be built near the mines.77 A second
problem was related to the process of burning the lignite in thermal
power stations. Due to the poor quality of the lignite, the burning
process was characterized by large variations of temperature that
damaged rapidly the pipes that constituted the boiler, a core element
of a thermal power station. Apart from the energy-related issues, the
supreme leader of the Party was determined to engage in extremely
costly, gigantesque projects of doubtful economic efficiency. Thus,
in 1973 it was decided to resume the construction of the Danube –
Black Sea Canal.78
For instance, a large thermal power station was built nearby the Rovinari
open-cast mining exploitation. The first unit of 330 MW at the Rovinari power
station was inaugurated on 15 December 1975. See Constantin Voican, “Istoria
se scrie sub ochii noştri: Cronologie selectivă extrasă din colecţia Scînteii” (History
is being written under our eyes: Selective chronology from the Scînteia collection),
in Almanah Scînteia 1977 (Scînteia Almanac 1977) (Bucharest), 46.
78
The resuming of the works to the Danube – Black Sea navigation system
was first discussed at the Plenum of CC of the RCP held on 18–19 June 1973.
See Constantin Voican, “Istoria se scrie sub ochii noştri: Cronologie selectivă extrasă
din colecţia Scînteii” (History is being written under our eyes: Selective chronology
from the Scînteia collection), in Almanah Scînteia 1974 (Scînteia Almanac 1974)
(Bucharest), 128–29. However, the general plan for the execution of the canal was
approved at the Meeting of the CC of the RCP on 9 May 1978. See idem, “Istoria
se scrie sub ochii noştri: Cronologie selectivă extrasă din colecţia Scînteii” (History
is being written under our eyes: Selective chronology from the Scînteia collection),
in Almanah Scînteia 1979 (Scînteia Almanac 1979) (Bucharest), 118.
77
150
Structural FactorS
Having said this, let us turn back to the economic achievements
of the period 1964–1977. During this period the regime paid a special
attention to the housing sector. Again, the data provided below should
be considered, similar to all official statistics of the communist period,
with a large grain of salt. Nevertheless, the authorities made efforts
to augment the housing stock and improve the quality of housing.
According to the official data, in 1975 new urban housing represented
81.7 percent of total housing; for comparison, in 1965 urban housing
represented only 45.3 percent of the total.79 Similarly, the average
number of persons for each dwelling (urban and rural combined)
decreased over the 1965–1975 period from 3.66 in 1965, to 3.44 in
1970 and to 3.17 in 1975. In urban areas, the average number of
persons per dwelling was 3.27 in 1965; 3.51 in 1970; and 3.17 in
1975.80 Also, improvements were made with regard to the
habitational aspects of urban living. The number of newly built
dwellings with three or more rooms increased, allowing therefore
more living space per person. For instance, in 1965 out of a total of
191,988 dwellings put into occupancy, one-room dwellings
amounted to 57,116 (29.8 percent); two-room dwellings amounted
to 85,080 (44.3 percent), while dwellings with three rooms or more
amounted to 49,792 (25.9 percent). In 1970, there were 159,152
dwellings put into occupancy, of which 26,548 (16.7 percent) with
one room; 83,935 (52.7 percent) with two rooms; and 48,669 (30.6
percent) with three rooms and over. Finally, in 1975 out of a total
of 165,431 dwellings put into occupancy, 14,952 (9.0 percent) had
one room; 83,148 (50.3 percent) had two rooms; and 67,331 (40.7
See Table SA8.7, Housing Turned over to Occupancy, 1965–1976, in Tsantis
and Pepper, Romania, 666–71.
80
See Table 12.9, Average Number of Persons for Each Dwelling, 1965, 1970
and 1975, in Tsantis and Pepper, Romania, 295. The increase in the number of
persons per dwelling during the 1965–1970 period can be explained by the sudden
rise in the birth rate after 1966 due to regime’s policy of forced natality.
79
Structural FactorS
151
percent) had three rooms or more.81 As one can observe from the
data presented above, while in 1965 the number of dwellings with
three or more rooms put into occupancy represented 25.9 percent
of the total, in 1975 the same type of dwellings made up 40.7 percent
of the total.
Although the quality of housing improved appreciably, the
housing stock did not grow in accordance with the growth in
population and therefore demand remained high. In 1975, for
instance, in urban areas the housing deficit amounted to 150,000
dwellings. Nevertheless, visible changes occurred and, especially in
Bucharest, the urban landscape was transformed. In 1959 it was
started the construction of the Drumul Taberei district, with more
than 60,000 apartments in high-rise buildings. The work at another
large district of apartment buildings, the Balta Albă – Titan district,
was initiated in 1966.82 Furthermore, between 1968–1969 it was
erected the new building of the Romanian Television. In 1968 was
started the construction work at the monumental Intercontinental
Hotel, which was inaugurated on 14 May 1971, and the new
National Theatre, both located in the University Square.83 A new
international airport, the Bucharest – Otopeni airport, was
inaugurated on 8 April 1970.
It must be stressed once again that a thorough examination of this
period is essential in analyzing the “civilizing” trends under Romanian
communism and therefore the popular perceptions of the regime. It
was exactly that period of economic improvement and relative
ideological relaxation that led to a rise of the expectations of a majority
See Table 12.12, Housing Put into Occupancy, by Number of Rooms and Sources
of Funds, 1965–1975, in Tsantis and Pepper, Romania, 298–99.
82
Constantin Olteanu et al., eds., Bucureşti – Omagiu Marelui Erou (Bucharest:
Homage to the great hero) (Bucharest: Editura Meridiane, 1988), 159.
83
Marin Nedelea, Istoria României în date, 1940–1995 (Romania’s history in
data) (Bucharest: Editura Niculescu, 1997), 176.
81
152
Structural FactorS
of the population. In her book of memoirs, Sanda Stolojan, the
official interpreter of the French president Charles de Gaulle during
his official visit to Romania (14–18 May 1968), speaks convincingly
of the sense of hope the population experienced in those days. Her
account, coming from a critical exiled intellectual is all the more
relevant: “In spite of poverty and cramming, the houses, churches,
streets were not yet disfigured or destroyed. The heart of the city
continued to beat. Hope was in the air, I could feel it that month in
1968 beyond the pallid faces and damaged façades.”84
Indeed, compared with the grim 1950s, things had changed for
the better. During the period 1964–1977, numerous families moved
in a new flat, usually rented from the state. Some even bought their
flats with loans from the state through the Savings and Consignment
Bank (Casa de Economii şi Consemnaţiuni – CEC). For such loans,
repayment periods were established at 15, 20 and 25 years;
respectively, the minimum down payment was 30, 25 or 20 percent
of the value of the purchase.85 Loans were also available for buying
durable goods. One can still find in many Romanian homes the
famous Bîlea living room furniture set, a real hit of the late 1960s
and early 1970s and a much-desired sign of modernity – in
communist terms, to be sure. Furthermore, the domestic production
of household appliances gained momentum. Thus, cooking, washing
and sewing machines, vacuum cleaners, as well as TV and radio sets
entered the homes of many Romanians. Radio sets, under different
product names such as Select, Eforie and Traviata, were already a
familiar presence in numerous homes. Equally important, during
that period many Romanians bought their first TV set. In the
beginning, the TV sets were usually imported from the Soviet Union
Sanda Stolojan, Cu de Gaulle în România (With de Gaulle in Romania)
(Bucharest: Editura Albatros, 1994), 36.
85
For a discussion on the terms and conditions of loans for the purchase of
apartments built by the state see Tsantis and Pepper, Romania, 291–92.
84
Structural FactorS
153
and many Romanians still remember the black and white Sovietmade Rubin (Ruby) TV set on which they watched the first cartoons
of their childhood. Subsequently, it was initiated the domestic
production of TV sets and Romanian-made products such as Miraj,
Venus, Opera, Lux or Diana replaced the Soviet-made ones.
Refrigerators represented another sign of progress, and those born in
the 1960s recall the familiar presence of a Fram refrigerator – named
after Fram the polar bear, the main character of a popular novel for
children by writer Cezar Petrescu – in the kitchen of their parents.
In the early 1970s, the more advanced Frigero model – in two
versions, Frigero Super and Frigero Lux – replaced the outdated Fram.
Other common appliances widely available were the Carpaţi
(Carpathians) cooking machines, Alba Lux washing machines, Practic
and Ideal vacuum cleaners, and Ileana and Nicoleta sewing machines.
In 1967, PECO, the sole national distribution company for petrol
and lubricants launched an advertisement that read: “Poate oare un
Trabant remorca un elefant? E neverosimil? Cu benzina PECO totul
e posibil!” (Is it possible for a Trabant to tow an elephant? Is it
unbelievable? With the PECO gasoline everything is possible!). As
one can easily grasp, the advertisement focused on the popular
Trabant car produced in a “fraternal” country: the German
Democratic Republic. Nevertheless, the same advertisement
mentioned, in small print, that PECO also distributed lubricants fit
for Renault and Fiat engines. It should be mentioned that at the time
Romania did not manufacture automobiles, and consequently
passenger vehicles were imported mainly from the Soviet bloc
countries, i.e. Soviet Union (Volga and Moskvitch, later on Lada),
Czechoslovakia (Škoda) and East Germany (Trabant and Wartburg).
At the same time, as the advertisement quoted above shows, in the
second half of the 1960s French (Renault) and Italian (Fiat) cars were
imported as well.
The domestic production of automobiles however was initiated
in 1968. On 20 August 1968 it was inaugurated the Piteşti
154
Structural FactorS
Automobile Plant, which started the production of cars under a
licence purchased from the French manufacturer Renault. Production
started with the Dacia 1100 model – the Romanian version of
Renault 8, and continued from the early 1970s onwards with Dacia
1300 and its subsequent variants – the Romanian version of Renault
12.86 As a consequence, many families managed to buy their first car,
usually a Dacia 1100 or the larger Dacia 1300.87 Gasoline was still
cheap in the late 1960s – early 1970s,88 and numerous families
managed to spend their summer holidays away from home, usually
on the Black Sea Coast or in the Carpathians.
The Party also encouraged a better use of the leisure time by the
population. For instance, the first issue of the Scînteia Almanac –
the offspring of the Party newspaper Scînteia – published in 1967
pays an appreciable attention to tourism, cultural tourism included.
It contains, among others, useful lists of the most relevant museums,
historical monuments and sites, spas and mountain resorts, chalets
in the Carpathians, petrol stations and garages. The same almanac
also contains an article entitled “What are you doing in your leisure
time?”89 In fact, the Scînteia Almanac represents a valuable source
For more on the Piteşti enterprise in its early stages of development see C.
Ştefănescu, C. Moroşan and I. Soare, Monografia Uzinei de Autoturisme Piteşti
(The monograph of the Piteşti Automobile Enterprise) (Piteşti: n.p., 1972).
87
The production of the Piteşti enterprise grew steadily. On 18 June 1975 the
Piteşti Automobile Plant celebrated the manufacturing of the Dacia car with the
number 200,000. See Constantin Voican, “Istoria se scrie sub ochii noştri:
Cronologie selectivă extrasă din colecţia Scînteii” (History is being written under
our eyes: Selective chronology from the Scînteia collection), in Almanah Scînteia
1976 (Scînteia Almanac 1976) (Bucharest), 52.
88
The price of gasoline was raised in 1973 because of the oil crisis. The price
of premium gasoline was raised from 2.50 lei/l to 4.50 lei/l while the price of
regular gasoline was raised from 1.75 lei/l to 4.30 lei/l. Tsantis and Pepper,
Romania, 345.
89
See Almanah Scînteia 1967 (Scînteia Almanac 1967) (Bucharest), 257–68,
305–52 and 380–92.
86
Structural FactorS
155
for the analysis of the Party policy towards leisure time. In this respect,
one can understand that something changed in terms of the Party
policy regarding leisure time and tourism by the end of the period
under scrutiny by analyzing the Scînteia Almanac 1977. In that
almanac, not a single article refers to tourism or leisure.90 Turning
back to the late 1960s and the early 1970s, it should be mentioned
that trips to the communist countries were organized more frequently.
More importantly, common people were allowed to travel outside
the communist bloc, and many took their first trip to the West in
the late 1960s – early 1970s.
However, the period in which Romanian communism showed
for once some decency came to an end in the mid-1970s.
Moreover, a sharp reversal in terms of both economic conditions
and political freedoms occurred in the early 1980s and a large part
of the population became increasingly dissatisfied with the regime.
It is the scope of the next section to analyze the causes of the
structural economic crisis that characterized the period 1977–1989
and contributed significantly to collapse of the regime in December
1989.
crisis and decline, 1977–1989
From the viewpoint of the side effects of the policy of extensive
industrial development enforced by the RCP, the year 1977
represented a turning point.91 Due to the rigid economic beliefs of
the supreme leader of the Party, from 1974 onwards the Romanian
See Almanah Scânteia 1977 (Scînteia Almanac 1977) (Bucharest).
For an official point of view on the economic development of communist
Romania during the 1965–1977 period see România pe calea socialismului şi
comunismului: Cifre şi fapte (Romania on the road towards socialism and
communism: Figures and facts) (Bucharest: Editura Politică, 1977).
90
91
156
Structural FactorS
economy became even more centralized. Furthermore, in spite of the
fact that the size of the country and its natural resources could not
sustain an economic strategy focusing overwhelmingly on heavy
industry, the regime continued to invest heavily in new production
units. The lack of domestic resources and the unfavorable
international economic context did not provoke any serious debate
on the developmental strategy of the country at the power elite level.
On the contrary, in a majority of the cases the top party officials just
echoed the simplistic ideas of the secretary general of the RCP. For
instance, in an article entitled “Romania’s Development Strategy”
and published in 1984, when Romania had already entered a period
of chronic shortages, a prominent nomenklatura member, Manea
Mănescu, wrote:
The necessity to allot an important, rationally determined part of the
national income for accumulation, as a long-standing political and
economic option, has become part and parcel of our Party and State’s
all-embracing concept on the lines of action for solving the fundamental
development problems. The steady scoring of an accumulation rate of
about 33 percent of the national income all along the last three FiveYear Plans enabled the implementation of vast programs of investments.
The Party is firmly guiding the investments activity towards the
achievement of highest efficiency indices corresponding to the strategy
of Romania’s embarking upon a new stage of development; special
attention is paid, at the same time, to the most efficient use of all
productive capacities.92
Let us have another look at the figures concerning the division
between the accumulation fund and consumption fund over the last
three five-year plans of the communist period in Romania, i.e. 1976–
1980; 1981–1985 and 1986–1989 (unfinished). The structure is the
following: (1) Five-Year Plan 1976–1980: 64.0 percent consumption;
See Manea Mănescu, “Romania’s development strategy,” Romania – Pages
of History (Bucharest) No.3–4 (1984), 210, 216.
92
Structural FactorS
157
36.0 percent accumulation; (2) Five-Year Plan 1981–1985: 69.3
percent consumption; 30.7 percent accumulation; and (3) Five-Year
Plan 1986–1989: 74.3 percent consumption; 25.7 percent
accumulation.93 One can observe that over the three five-year plans
considered, the rate of accumulation remained relatively high.
Although the accumulation fund decreased from 36 percent of the
national income over the 1976–1980 five-year plan to 25.7 percent
of the national income over the last five-year plan 1986–1989, it was
still far from the lowest value of 17.1 ever recorded during communist
rule over the 1956–1960 five-year plan. In spite of the clear signs of
social unrest provoked by the deep crisis of the 1980s, the
accumulation fund received a significant share of the national income.
This also supports the argument that Ceauşescu was not able to adopt
more flexible policies in time of crisis as his predecessor, GheorghiuDej, did in the aftermath of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution in order
to avoid popular unrest.
Turning back to the international economic context of the 1970s,
one should mention that the Western economies entered during that
period the fifth industrial age, i.e. the age of electronics and
information technology, while the Soviet-type economies were more
or less confined to the third industrial age, i.e. the age of steel and
organic chemistry.94 As Chirot aptly put it: “By the 1970s, the USSR
had the world’s most advanced late nineteenth-century economy, the
world’s biggest and best, most inflexible rust belt.”95 The fifth
Mureşan, Economic evolutions, 1945–1990, 87.
According to Daniel Chirot, capitalism went through the following five
industrial ages: (1) the cotton-textile age (from the 1780s to the 1830s); (2) the
rail and iron age (from the 1840s to the early 1870s); (3) the steel and organicchemistry age (from the 1870s up to WWI); (4) the age of automobiles and
petrochemicals (from the 1910s to the 1970s); and (5) the age of electronics,
information, and biotechnology (from the 1970s to the present). See Chirot, “What
Happened in Eastern Europe in 1989?” 23.
95
Ibid., 22.
93
94
158
Structural FactorS
industrial age however placed a strong emphasis on the rapid
circulation of capital: in the economic realm, speed became crucial.
In communist Romania decisions were made only slowly since
almost everything had to be approved at the power elite level, usually
by the supreme leader himself. The unusually slow pace of the
decision-making process in Ceauşescu’s Romania was described by
Verdery as follows: “Far from being speeded up, time was being
gradually slowed down, flattened, immobilized, and rendered
nonlinear.”96 Thus, the excessive centralization in an age of increasing
“time-space compression” contributed significantly to the economic
collapse of the communist regime in Romania. The major characteristics
of the economic policy enforced by the Party during the period 1977–
1989 can be summarized as follows: continuation of the massive
investments in heavy industry (steel and iron, heavy machinery); and
launch of a series of gigantesque and extremely costly projects such
as the Danube – Black Sea Canal and the “systematization” of the
capital city Bucharest.
As already mentioned, the power elite in Bucharest pursued in
spite of the unfavorable international economic context – most
notably the 1973 oil crisis – a policy of massive investments in the
heavy industry. Thus, the erection of a new heavy machinery combine
(Combinatul de Utilaj Greu – CUG) located in the city of Iaşi began
on 31 July 1976. A similar heavy machinery combine, i.e. CUG ClujNapoca was erected in the city of Cluj; the first electric furnace at
CUG Cluj was put into operation on 30 September 1982.
Furthermore, the existing production units were expanded. For
instance, the Galaţi Iron and Steel Complex received a huge, brand
new furnace of 2,700 cubic meters which was inaugurated on 7
December 1978. Another furnace, the largest in Romania (3,500
cubic meters), was put into function on 10 February 1981 at the
Katherine Verdery, “What Was Socialism and Why Did It Fall?” in
Tismăneanu, ed., The Revolutions of 1989, 80.
96
Structural FactorS
159
same Galaţi steel combine. Nevertheless, in spite of the massive
investments in industry, Romania produced mainly standard goods
that sold poorly on the international markets. For instance, the
Romanian metallurgical industry produced large quantities of carbon
steel, which was not in great demand for export. At the same time,
Romania started tardily to produce stainless steel for which demand
was high. In this respect, the first experimental batch of stainless steel
was produced at the Galaţi steel combine on 28 April 1982.
Furthermore, in spite of the fact that the crude oil reserves of the
country were diminishing rapidly, the investments in the
petrochemical industry grew steadily and new installations were built.
Thus, a large petrochemical complex was inaugurated in 1979 at
Midia-Năvodari, on the Black Sea coast.97 The Midia-Năvodari
project is particularly telling of the misdirected investment policy of
the regime. The petrochemical complex was projected to process
crude oil imported on the basis of a bilateral trade agreement with
Iran by which Romania was supposed to receive 4 million tons of
crude oil yearly in exchange for Romanian-made machinery and
equipment. However, in 1979, the same year when the Midia
petrochemical complex was inaugurated, an Islamic Revolution took
place in Iran, Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi was deposed and the
trade agreement was revoked.98 Until the end of the communist rule
in Romania the Midia-Năvodari petrochemical complex never
worked at full capacity. In addition to the Midia-Năvodari complex,
new crude oil processing units were erected. For instance, a second
refinery – inaugurated on 25 September 1980 – was built at the
Borzeşti Petrochemical Combine.
Relying increasingly on Western credits, Romania imported
Western licences in order to produce goods that would boost its
exports. For instance, a new French-Romanian joint venture was
97
98
Nedelea, Romania’s history in data, 294.
Aldcroft and Morewood, Economic Change in Eastern Europe since 1918, 169.
160
Structural FactorS
established in the field of car manufacturing in the mid-1970s. The
Oltcit enterprise was located in the city of Craiova, the capital of the
Dolj County, and produced compact cars under a licence from the
French manufacturer Citroën.99 The outcome of such projects was
nevertheless disappointing. Romanian-made industrial consumer
goods did not sell well on the international markets. Moreover, some
of the products were not fit for the domestic market either. For
instance, during the 1980s, the popular demand for the outdated
Dacia 1300 model remained high. After a period of fourteen years
of “socialist development” which separated the Dacia and Oltcit
projects, the Romanian population was not in position to afford a
relative modern “popular car” like the Oltcit. Indeed, the Oltcit car
was closer to the modern European cars of the time: the engine was
compact, equipped with electronic ignition and special transmission
belts. At the same time, the Oltcit was vulnerable to dust and
humidity. Moreover, due to the complexity of its engine, an Oltcit
had to be repaired only in specialized repair shops. In short, the Oltcit
was more advanced but smaller, more difficult to maintain, and
inappropriate for the low quality of the Romanian roads. As for the
Dacia 1300, the “old lady” proved to be all the more fit for everyday
use in the conditions of the structural economic crisis of the 1980s.
The Dacia car was more spacious, could be repaired by its owner
with relative simple means, allowed the use of low quality fuels and
permitted the transport of heavy loads on Romania’s terrible roads.
The Romanian Prime Minister Manea Mănescu held discussions concerning
the creation of a joint venture with the French manufacturer Citroën during his
visit to France on 14–17 December 1976. On 30 December 1976 it was signed
in Bucharest the protocol concerning the creation of the “Oltcit” Romanian-French
joint venture. The erection of the new plant was started on 17 June 1977 in Craiova
and the production of the Oltcit automobiles was inaugurated in November 1982.
Constantin Voican, “Istoria se scrie sub ochii noştri: Cronologie selectivă extrasă
din colecţia Scînteii” (History is being written under our eyes: Selective chronology
from the Scînteia collection), in Almanah Scînteia 1978 (Scînteia Almanac 1978)
(Bucharest), 115 and Nedelea, Romania’s history in data, 321.
99
Structural FactorS
161
Another costly project was the ROMBAC project dedicated to
the production of a Romanian commercial airplane under a British
licence. The first ROMBAC 1–11 jet-propelled aircraft produced in
Romania took off from Bucharest on 28 January 1983 for a domestic
flight to Timişoara. The same year, on 23 March, the ROMBAC 1–11
aircraft performed its first international flight from Bucharest Otopeni
to London Heathrow.100 In his propagandistic article quoted above,
Mănescu claimed that “by mass-producing the ROMBAC 1–11
Romania became a producer of updated air transport means.”101
Nevertheless, no figures concerning the “mass-production” of the
ROMBAC 1–11 commercial airplane were released.
The Romanian case, however, was not singular. In Poland, the
Berliet bus plant manufactured a product that required $ 6,000
imported parts and was not fit for the Polish weather and roads.
Moreover, the enterprise produced in 1980 only 1,000 units instead
of the planned 5,000.102 As for the Yugoslav car manufacturer Zastava,
its exports into hard currency markets were sold at prices lower than
the home prices, which deepened the crisis of state socialism in
Yugoslavia.103 As Włodzimierz Brus observed, a major problem that
the economies of the Soviet bloc countries faced was that the
technologies imported from the West served to produce standard
goods instead of being a ground for innovation. It was the inability
of the state enterprises to assimilate and develop the technologies
imported from the West, Brus argues, that led to their poor
performances in the field of foreign trade.104
Dinu C. Giurescu, ed., History of Romania in data, 701–702.
Mănescu, “Romania’s development strategy,” 195.
102
Aldcroft and Morewood, Economic Change in Eastern Europe since 1918, 164.
103
David F. Good, “The Economic Transformation of Central and Eastern
Europe in Historical Perspective: Main Themes and Issues,” in CEU History
Department Yearbook, 1993 (Budapest: CEU, 1994), 195.
104
Włodzimierz Brus, Histoire économique de l’Europe de l’Est, 1945–1985
(Paris: Éditions La Découverte, 1986), 322–23.
100
101
162
Structural FactorS
In the case of Romania, as already noted, during the period under
scrutiny a series of gigantic projects of questionable economic
efficiency were launched. Of them, the most prominent was the
Danube – Black Sea Canal. Although the project was initiated in
1973, the official decision to build the canal was made on 15 April
1976 during a session of the Grand National Assembly. The official
inauguration of the canal took place on 27 May 1984. A first attempt
at building a canal between the Danube and the Black Sea occurred
in the beginning of the communist rule in Romania. Nevertheless,
the project that was launched in the summer of 1949 served more as
an instrument of repression, i.e. a labor camp for the “enemies of the
people,” than for economic purposes. On top of this, technical
problems and the lack of the promised Soviet support for the project
made impossible its completion. Consequently, the worksite was
closed in the summer of 1953.105
As mentioned above, another gigantic project was the so-called
“systematization” of the capital city Bucharest. Ceauşescu’s
megalomaniacal plan was to build an entirely new politicaladministrative complex in downtown Bucharest by razing to the
ground a large area – one fifth of the township – around the Unirii
Square. As architect Gheorghe Leahu puts it:
The new center, crosswise located on the N-S axis has cut a coarse gap
into the radial-concentric layout of the old city. Some of its main
thoroughfares come from nowhere to head for nowhere…. During the
ten-year period of 1977 through 1987 huge labor and equipment power
The first Danube – Black Sea Canal is remembered primarily as a forced
labor camp for political prisoners. The working conditions were so appalling that
numerous inmates died a terrible death there. For more on this see Doina Jela,
Cazul Nichita Dumitru: Încercare de reconstituire a unui proces comunist, 29 august
– 1 septembrie 1952 (The Nichita Dumitru case: An attempt at re-enacting a
communist trial, 29 August – 1 September 1952) (Bucharest: Editura Humanitas,
1995), 25–55.
105
Structural FactorS
163
was guided to tear down large areas of Bucharest, these years remaining
for ever a “dark,” highly dramatic age of the history of these places.”106
A comprehensive analysis of the systematization of Bucharest
will go much beyond the limits of the present work. Nevertheless,
it should be stressed once again that in terms of the expenditure
of funds and human sufferings incurred the project proved to be
cataclysmic. The buildings of the State Archives, the Central
Military Museum, the “Mina Minovici” Forensic Medicine
Institute, the “Republicii” Stadium, the “Brâncovenesc” Hospital,
the Institute for Physical Education and Sports, the Operetta
Theatre House, as well as hundreds of individual houses were all
razed to the ground.107 Also, between 1977 and 1989 twenty
Orthodox churches were torn down and eight moved, i.e.
translated on a distance ranging from 12 to 289 meters in
Bucharest.108 As for the long-term consequences, it suffices to say
that present day Bucharest still bears the marks of the
systematization plan. Obviously, the official propaganda presented
the situation in a totally different manner. For instance, in 1989
a Party propagandist characterized the project as a “grandiose
oeuvre, fruit of the masterly vision of the general secretary of the
Gheorghe Leahu, Bucureştiul dispărut (Vanished Bucharest) (Bucharest:
Editura Arta Grafică, 1995), 116. See also the map at page 187.
107
The major work on Ceauşescu’s systematization plan, including the project
of rural systematization, remains Dinu C. Giurescu, Distrugerea trecutului României
(The Razing of Romania’s Past) (Bucharest: Editura Museion, 1994). First
published as The Razing of Romania’s Past (Washington DC: The Preservation
Press, 1989).
108
For a detailed presentation of the respective churches and the way in which
they were demolished or translated to a nearby location see Lidia Anania et al.,
Bisericile osîndite de Ceauşescu (The churches doomed by Ceauşescu) (Bucharest:
Editura Anastasia, 1995). A concise description of the respective churches is to be
found in the tables at pp. 202–206 and 206–209.
106
164
Structural FactorS
Party and his love for the capital city in which he grew up as an
astute revolutionary.”109
There was also an unexpected event that, apart from the
misdirected investments and rigid economic policies, put a
supplementary burden on the economy of the country after 1977:
the terrible earthquake of 4 March 1977. Also, one should note that
Ceauşescu’s project to tear down and rebuild the center of Bucharest
was in many respects inspired by the fact that a majority of the blocks
that crumbled during the earthquake had been built during the
interwar period. The consequences of the earthquake have been
disastrous: the number of victims amounted to 1,570 people killed
and 9,300 injured. Moreover, the housing sector was seriously hit:
156,000 flats in urban areas and 21,500 dwellings in rural areas were
destroyed or severely damaged. Another 336,000 flats in urban areas
and 117,000 dwellings in rural areas had to be consolidated.
According to Romanian estimates, the earthquake of 4 March 1977
provoked a total loss of five percent of Romania’s GNP and incurred
overall costs of over 2 billion U.S. dollars.110
Finally, it should be mentioned that it was one ample project
developed after 1977 that deserves a closer attention: the erection of
the Cernavodă nuclear power plant. Ceauşescu wanted to avoid at
all costs Romania’s dependence on Soviet technologies and this made
possible the erection of a CANDU-type nuclear power plant based
on Canadian technology near the town of Cernavodă, in Dobrogea.111
The Romanian-Canadian protocol in the field of nuclear energy was
See Panait I. Panait, “Călătorie în timp prin Bucureşti” (Travel in time
through Bucharest), in Almanah Scînteia 1989 (Scînteia Almanac 1989)
(Bucharest), 44–61. The passage cited is at page 58.
110
Tsantis and Pepper, Romania, 390–91. See also Luminiţa Moroianu,
Catastrofa anunţată (A foreshadowed catastrophe), Ziua (20 January 2003);
available from http://www.ziua.net; Internet; accessed 20 January 2003.
111
It is about a nuclear power plant of Canadian design using deuterium oxide
as moderator and natural uranium as fuel.
109
Structural FactorS
165
signed in Bucharest on 16 December 1978. The CANDU-type
nuclear power plant was not only adapted to the needs of a country
like Romania – in terms of size and level of development, but it was
also much more secure than the Soviet model adopted by other
communist countries such as Bulgaria or former Czechoslovakia.
These characteristics proved to be all the more important in the
aftermath of the Chernobyl – now in Ukraine, northwest of the
capital city Kiev – nuclear catastrophe of 16 April 1986. It is also
worth mentioning that Romania was the only Soviet-bloc country
that decided not to import Soviet nuclear technology for producing
electrical power.
Although the first signs of a deep economic crisis already appeared
in the mid-1970s, it was in 1979 that the regime introduced price
increases for gasoline, electricity, natural gas and heating fuel.
Ceauşescu, who wanted to diminish Romania’s dependence on the
West, engaged in a policy of reducing country’s external debt, which
in late 1981 amounted to some $ 10.2 billion and in 1982 reached
a record amount of approx. $ 13 billion.112 At the Plenum of the CC
of the RCP held on 12–14 April 1989 Ceauşescu would proudly
announce that Romania concluded the payment of its external debt.
Nevertheless, it is still difficult to explain why the regime did not
allot a larger share of the national income to consumption in order
to raise the living standards of the population after April 1989, all
the more that the communist secret police, the infamous Securitate,
provided timely and accurate reports regarding the growing potential
for protests “from below.” Especially in 1989, the power cuts and
food shortages contributed heavily in deepening the frustration felt
by a majority of the population in Romania.
As already noted, in terms of industrial consumer goods Romanian
exports were less competitive. As a consequence, in its quest for hard
currency revenues, the Party decided to augment the exports of
112
Georgescu, The Romanians, 270.
166
Structural FactorS
agricultural products simultaneously with a drastic reduction of
imports. Thus, beginning in 1981–1982 Romania, which used to
import foodstuffs from the West on a regular basis, entered a period
of chronic shortages. Food rationing measures followed shortly: in
1981, bread rationing was introduced in order to limit consumption
and was maintained over the entire 1981–1989 period, except for the
capital city Bucharest. Similar measures of food rationing were
introduced for other basic foodstuffs, such as cooking oil and sugar.
In the face of the alimentary crisis, instead of taking radical measures
in order to increase production the regime issued a so-called “Program
of scientific alimentation of the population” (Programul de alimentaţie
ştiinţifică a populaţiei), which was published on 14 July 1982.113 Such
a program was meant to obscure the real causes of the crisis, i.e. the
mistaken economic policy enforced by the Party, and suggest that the
shortages were due to a tendency of overeating among the population
at large. As a consequence, severe shortages of foodstuffs and other
basic things, such as soap, toothpaste and detergent occurred.
Queuing for food became a daily routine. A person who went
through the experience of queuing for food recalls: “The stores that
had no queue in front of them were empty. The most important
queues started to form at night or at the break of dawn, especially
for ‘chicken’ (claws, neck, head and wings) or cheese and eggs. The
maximum quantity that a buyer could ask for was one kilo of cheese
and thirty eggs.”114 Children could not be spared: they had to stay
in line and buy their share of foodstuff in order to help their families.
A witness account is telling of the situation created:
Although I was just a child, I remember perfectly the horror of the
interminable, awfully suffocating queues, to which we, the children,
Nedelea, Romania’s history in data, 318.
Account by Grigore Olimp Ioan published in Martor (Witness) – The Review
of Anthropology of the Museum of the Romanian Peasant (Bucharest) No.7 (2002),
132. Hereafter quoted as Martor.
113
114
Structural FactorS
167
often participated.… I remember these things with amusement, but our
parents experienced them with pain. They had to torture their children,
watching them squeezed by people, so that they could lay breakfast on
the table for the following week.115
Gasoline was also rationed. In order to reduce traffic, the regime
devised all sorts of administrative measures, such as banning the
circulation of private automobiles during winter. The regime also
imposed a measure meant to reduce traffic: people could drive their
cars only every other Sunday, in accordance with the registration
number – odd or even – of their car. Those who could afford used
to have two cars, one with an even registration number and the other
with an odd one. A majority of the population, however, could not
keep two cars. In spite of rationing and the administrative measures
introduced in order to restrict traffic, people were determined to drive
their cars. Driving your car was also a political gesture. Queuing for
gasoline was another humiliating experience and numerous witness
accounts tell how difficult it was for ordinary people to get some
extra gasoline. Nevertheless, some gasoline-related stories, like the
following one, are tragicomic:
There was a law that forbade car traffic in winter, from the first snowfall
until March. In the provinces they established a fixed quota, 20 liters
of gasoline a month. The town officials managed to get some extra
coupons. In Bucharest we had a right to 4 reservoirs. You were appointed
to a certain gas station where they marked you off every time you filled
your reservoir.… In August or September 1983 I went on a trip to the
monasteries in Moldavia. I took with me 4 cans of gasoline. On the
road between Sf. Gheorghe and Braşov I came upon a funeral convoy
that was blocked on the way. The driver was waving and making signs
that they had run out of fuel, and could not move to take the dead man
to his grave. I gave him 10 liters.116
115
116
Account by Ana-Maria Bucium, Martor, 134.
Account by Puiu Gheorghiu, Martor, 77.
168
Structural FactorS
Apart from gasoline, natural gas became an issue. During the
1980s, for those who lived in blocks of flats the pressure of the natural
gas delivered to the cooking machines was so low during the day that
it was impossible to cook. As a consequence, there were many those
who prepared their food overnight, when the gas pressure was higher.
In general, some preferred to cook early in the morning, from 4 a.m.
to 7 a.m., while others stayed after 11 p.m.117 However, not everybody
was connected to the natural gas pipelines. Thus, many were forced
to rely on gas cylinders to fuel their cooking machines and
consequently queuing for natural gas was another frustrating
experience, as the following account indicates:
There was true wrestling in the lines for gas cylinders. There was a time
when you could practically die in there. I for one was almost in for it
once. When the truck came to unload the goods, all previous priority
lists were ignored and people crowded in, trampling on one’s another
feet for fear someone else might steal their gas cylinder from under their
nose…. That was because there were never enough gas cylinders.118
In 1982 electricity price rose with 30 percent, while the heating
fuel rose almost 300 percent.119 Although the private electricity
consumption represented only 7.0 percent of the total consumption,
during the 1980s, the population had to bear the burden of energy
crisis. This provoked major difficulties in central heating during
wintertime, which had appalling long-term consequences for state
of health of the population. A witness account speaks of the terrible
situation during those winters of mid-1980s:
Heating was a hellish business back then. The majority of the Bucharest
lodgings were connected to thermal power stations. The heating was
extremely weak, there was no gas, and people lived for years beneath 10
Account by Ioana Monj, Martor, 74.
Account by Ilie Filip, Martor, 75.
119
Shafir, Romania – Politics, Economics and Society, 118.
117
118
Structural FactorS
169
degrees Celsius. There was no heating source. No heat at home, no heat
at work, no heat in shops. People suffered from cold, many fell sick.
We kept our long coats on when at work. I kept one permanently at
my work place. I saw people fall ill and die with cold. It was appalling
[emphasis added].120
Such a situation made some Party old-timers such as sociologist
Pavel Câmpeanu to protest publicly against the irrational energyrationing policies of the regime. Câmpeanu’s petition addressed to
Ceauşescu on 11 January 1988 is a severe indictment of the drastic
restrictions imposed on the deliveries of electricity and natural gas
for the population, as well as a sobering analysis of their long-term
effects on the well being of the population.121 Thus, it may be argued
that in the late 1980s for the major part of the Romanian population
the conditions of life were at the lowest level among the communist
countries in East-Central Europe, with the possible exception of
Albania. Furthermore, it is reasonable to affirm that the high potential
for protest of ordinary people was directly linked to the miseries of
everyday life.
It took however some years until the profound dissatisfaction of
the population with the Ceauşescu regime was publicly expressed by
the angered crowds of urban dwellers that joined the revolted workers
in the city of Braşov on 15 November 1987. The confession of a
1987 protester who stormed the Party headquarters in Braşov is also
telling with respect to the quality of life of the ordinary people at the
time: “When I entered an office [located in the Party building] I saw
a pineapple for the first time in my life.”122 Similar testimonies
Account by M.B., Martor, 81.
The complete text of the petition is provided in Câmpeanu, Ceauşescu, the
countdown years, 279–87.
122
See the confession of Marian Ricu in Marius Oprea and Stejărel Olaru, eds.,
Ziua care nu se uită: 15 noiembrie 1987, Braşov (The day one cannot forget: 15
November 1987, Braşov) (Iaşi: Editura Polirom, 2002), 49.
120
121
170
Structural FactorS
abound. One of them, however, expresses in few words the feelings
of those who revolted: “We were working like slaves and had nothing
to eat.”123 A critical intellectual, mathematician Mihai Botez, reached
in 1989 an appalling conclusion with regard to the dire consequences
of the economic policies enforced by the regime:
According to my estimates, between 15,000 and 20,000 people are dying
each year in Romania due to the shortages of food, the lack of heating, bad
transportation, etc. [emphasis added]. The situation is not exactly a joke.
Living in Romania is like living in a concentration camp. The economic
disaster has had major consequences for the social, political and cultural
environment of Romania.124
That the economic situation in Romania in the late 1980s was
disastrous and the agriculture devastated one could also grasp from
the first communiqué of the National Salvation Front (NSF) issued
on 22 December 1989. At point four the NSF proposed: “To
restructure the whole national economy in accordance with the
criteria of profitability and efficiency. To eliminate the administrative,
bureaucratic methods of centralized economic management and to
promote free initiative and competence in management of all
economic sectors.” As for the agriculture, point five of the NSF
communiqué proposed: “To restructure agriculture and to assist the
small scale peasant production. To halt the destruction of villages.”125
If one applies the theory of short-term setbacks to the Romanian
case the situation in the late 1980s can be explained as follows. A
“golden period” of higher consumption and rising expectations
Confession of Aurel Buceanu, ibid., 52.
See “Romania: A Case of ‘Dynastic’ Communism,” in Perspectives on Freedom
No.11 (New York: Freedom House, 1989), 34.
125
For excerpts translated into English from the NSF communiqué of 22
December 1989 see Robert V. Daniels, ed., A Documentary History of Communism
and the World: From Revolution to Collapse (Hanover, NH: University Press of
New England, 1994), 345–46. The passages quoted are at page 345.
123
124
Structural FactorS
171
(1964–1977) was followed by a period of crisis and decline of the
living standards of the population (1977–1989), which led to a rise
of the societal dissatisfaction with the regime and finally to the
December 1989 upheaval. It should be stressed however that this
explains the general explosion of fury after the Ceauşescu couple fled
from the CC building on 22 December 1989 at noon. Nevertheless,
in order to explain the sparking of the 1989 revolution in Romania
one has to examine the conjunctural and nation-specific factors as well.
Turning back to issue of rising expectations, it should be stressed
that in terms of popular perceptions the regime was generally
perceived as having offered something to the Romanian society during
the period 1964–1977, i.e. a reasonable standard of living. By the
late 1980s, however, as a direct result of the mistaken policies enforced
by the regime, a strange phenomenon occurred. As historian Vlad
Georgescu perceptively observed: “Under the guise of austerity, the
regime imposed on the country an almost bizarre process of
demodernization.”126 The same author also provides a shocking
picture of the Romanian society in the late 1980s:
The media constantly appealed to the peasants to replace mechanical
with manual work, and to use carts and horses instead of trucks and
tractors. Commercial firms were advised to transport merchandise on
tricycles. The use of refrigerators and washing machines was officially
discouraged and restricted, and coal irons and oil lamps were
recommended as energy savers, in preference to electrical appliances. In
a state that produced cars but banned driving, built housing
developments but withheld heat and running water, announced that it
had harvested the biggest grain crop in history but put its people on
meager bread rations, this paradoxical turning back of the clock belied
the outward forms of modernization and exposed their lack of content.127
126
127
Georgescu, The Romanians, 272.
Ibid.
172
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Absolute deprivation was a primary source of hatred towards the
regime. Scholars have employed syntagms such as “queuing for food”
(Pavel Câmpeanu) or “etatization of time” (Katherine Verdery),
which capture well the way in which absolute deprivation had a
significant contribution to the collapse of the regime. One should
bear in mind that in the late 1980s a majority of the population was
forced to think in terms of biological survival. Moreover, the
profound sense of powerlessness proved to be one of the most terrible
experiences of the 1980s. As Verdery aptly puts it:
The experience of humiliation, of a destruction of dignity, was common
to those who had waited for hours to accomplish (or fail to accomplish)
some basic task. Being immobilized for some meager return, during
which time one could not do anything else one might find rewarding,
was the ultimate experience of impotence.128
In a similar vein, it may be argued that relative deprivation/
dissatisfaction played an important role in the development of
discontent. In the Romanian case, relative discontent was generated
not only by the sharp division in terms of social identities, i.e., the
division between “us” (population) and “them” (nomenklatura),
but also by the comparison between Romania and the “fraternal”
countries which were better off. Paradoxically, the incipient
Titoism of the late Gheorghiu-Dej period (1962–1965) initiated
the process of rising expectations that his successor, Ceauşescu,
was compelled to pursue during the period of collective leadership
(1965–1968).
Until consolidating his power and gaining control over the party,
Ceauşescu did follow the policies enforced by Gheorghiu-Dej.
Beginning in 1969 and especially after the Eleventh Congress of the
RCP in 1974, Ceauşescu pursued only Gheorghiu-Dej’s policy of
Katherine Verdery, What Was Socialism, and What Comes Next? (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1996), 56.
128
Structural FactorS
173
independence from Moscow but failed to adopt more flexible policies
in the economic realm. Thus, Ceauşescu fatally neglected or
misinterpreted a crucial element characteristic of the political strategy
of his predecessor, which could have saved his life in December 1989.
Although not an economic reformer – as Bârlădeanu rightly asserted
– Gheorghiu-Dej favored towards the end of his rule an economic
policy based on prudent reforms. For his part, Ceauşescu was
inflexible and unimaginative. In 1973, enthroned as the uncontested
leader of the Party, he stated emphatically: “In the next ten to fifteen
years we are called upon to do away completely with the lagging
behind which we have inherited, to raise the Romanian people on
to a high level of economic, scientific and cultural development, to
ensure them a superior standard of living.”129 Within sixteen years
of stating the above, the economy of the country was devastated and
the standard of living of the population plummeted. Also, within
sixteen years of stating the above Ceauşescu himself was dead,
executed by a revolutionary regime. At the same time, the story of
the demise of communism in Romania is much more complicated.
Economic failure alone cannot explain why the communist regime
in Romania survived until the end of 1989 and was only the last in
a row to collapse among the communist regimes in ECE. In other
words, economic failure cannot explain the place Romania occupies
within the 1989 sequence of collapse. In order to explain the issue
of timing, one has to concentrate on the conjunctural and nationspecific factors.
129
Quoted in Costin Murgescu, Romania’s Socialist Economy, 77.
174
Structural FactorS
Ideological decay
Ideological decay or the erosion of ideology was a phenomenon that
other communist regimes in ECE experienced after Nikita
Khrushchev presented his “secret report” to the Twentieth Congress
of the CPSU on the night of 24–25 February 1956.130 Some authors,
such as Leszek Kołakowski, have argued that Khrushchev’s campaign
of de-Stalinization meant the “the moral ruin of communism.”
According to Kołakowski, Khrushchev’s exposure of the abuses
committed by Stalin represented a true ideological shock: “The
Stalinist regime could not exist without the cement of ideology to
legitimize party rule, and the party apparatus at this time was sensitive
to ideological shocks.… De-Stalinization proved to be a virus from
which Communism never recovered.”131 The “secret speech” in which
the Soviet communist leader attacked Stalin’s personality cult did
have a major impact on the communist regimes in Poland and
Hungary. Actually, the utopian goal of building radically new societies
throughout Sovietized Europe received a definitive blow with the
sparking of the Hungarian Revolution in October 1956. As for
Romania, it may be argued that an ideology that never appealed to
the Romanian society simply could not enter a process of decay.
Nevertheless, although Marxism-Leninism never truly appealed to
the Romanian society at large, the regime was able to make use of
nationalism as an ideological substitute which, especially from 1968
onwards, served as ideological “cement” for the Romanian ethnic
majority and legitimized the RCP rule.
For the complete text of Khrushchev’s “secret speech” see Bertram D. Wolfe,
Khrushchev and Stalin’s Ghost: Text, Background and Meaning of Khrushchev’s Secret
Report to the Twentieth Congress on the Night of February 24–25, 1956 (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1957).
131
Lezsek Kołakowski, Main Currents of Marxism, vol. 3, The Breakdown
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978; reprint, 1990), 453.
130
Structural FactorS
175
A brief survey of the history of the communist movement in
Romania is however necessary in order to understand better the
context in which Marxism-Leninism was replaced by nationalism as
an ideological instrument for legitimating the RCP rule. Speaking
of the Romanian political system at the end of World War II, Trond
Gilberg correctly observed: “The communists had no future in
Romania. They could only hope to obtain power through
extraordinary circumstances, and, by the same token, maintain
themselves in power by means of force or by redefining Marxism in
their own image, tradition, and culture. This they did.”132 A detailed
analysis of the development of the socialist ideas in the Old Kingdom
and later on in Greater Romania would go much beyond the scope
of this chapter. What is important for the present discussion is that,
at the moment of the communist takeover, the socialist and
communist parties in Romania virtually lacked popular support as
compared to the traditional (“historical”) political parties.
In fact, the Romanian socialists were campaigning for a “virtually
non-existent class,” as Constantin Stere perceptively argued.133
Socialism was actually an alien ideology with little impact on the
overwhelmingly peasant population of the country. This was made
clear by the “founding father” of the Romanian socialism, Constantin
Dobrogeanu-Gherea, who wrote in 1894 in a letter to Karl Kautsky
that the word “socialism” was not even known in Romania when he
had arrived in the country as a Russian refugee.134 According to Shafir,
the frailty of the Romanian socialist movement was determined by
three major factors: (1) the socio-economic structure of Romanian
economy, i.e. the “eminently agrarian” character of the country; (2)
the “non-Romanian ethnic origin” of many socialist and communist
Trond Gilberg, Nationalism and Communism in Romania: The Rise and Fall
of Ceausescu’s Personal Dictatorship (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), 34.
133
Cited in Shafir, Romania – Politics, Economics and Society, 13.
134
Ibid., 12.
132
176
Structural FactorS
leaders; and (3) the “disregard displayed by the Romanian
Communist Party towards traditional national aspirations.”135 The
lack of audience within society also led to a series of internal conflicts
and ruptures that marked the Romanian socialist movement until its
demise in the aftermath of the communist takeover.136 Founded in
1893, the Romanian Social Democratic Workers Party (RSDWP)
dissolved in 1899, when a large faction of the RSDWP joined the
much stronger Liberal Party, an event known as the “treason of the
Generous.”137 The “treason of the Generous” had a devastating, longlasting effect on the development of Romanian socialism. Due to the
said “treason,” the party was re-organized only in February 1910.
The Bolshevik Revolution represented a watershed in the history
of socialist movement in Romania. Archival sources published after
1989 reveal that the Bolshevik propaganda in Romania gained
momentum well before the October Revolution. The authorities
were concerned with the activity of the Romanian socialists and the
Secret Service (the Siguranţă) closely watched them. For instance, a
report of the Siguranţă dated 13 April 1917 refers to the contacts
between the Romanian Socialists and Russian Bolsheviks camped in
the city of Iaşi and surroundings.138 On 18 April/1 May 1918, the
Shafir, Romania – Politics, Economics and Society, 9.
“The Romanian socialist movement – Shafir argues – was plagued by
constant rifts, schisms and re-alliances.” Shafir, Romania – Politics, Economics and
Society, 28.
137
Nicolae Jurca, Istoria social-democraţiei din România (History of Romanian
Social Democracy) (Bucharest: Editura Ştiinţifică, 1994), 42–47. See also Robert
Levy, Ana Pauker: The Rise and Fall of a Jewish Communist (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 2001), 35.
138
See “Raport al Siguranţei Generale referitor la contacte dintre socialiştii români
şi soldaţi ruşi bolşevizaţi, cantonaţi în Iaşi şi în împrejurimi” (Report of the Siguranţă
concerning the contacts between Romanian and Bolshevized Russian soldiers camped
in the city of Iaşi and surroundings), in Florian Tănăsescu et al., eds, Ideologie şi structuri
comuniste în România, 1917–1918: Documente (Ideology and communist structures
in Romania, 1917–1918: Documents) (Bucharest: INST, 1995), 217–20.
135
136
Structural FactorS
177
Russian soldiers in Iaşi participated to a large demonstration that led
to the release of two radical socialist militants sentenced to house
arrest: Cristian Rakovski (1873–1941) and Mihail Gheorghiu Bujor
(1881–1964).139 One should also note that, between World War I
and World War II, the increased pace of industrialization boosted
the process of “making” the Romanian working class. Although the
exact figures are difficult to calculate, it can be stated that the
Romanian working class numbered around 400,000 persons in 1938.
These circumstances proved to be favorable for the socialist
movement, which experienced a revival. However, the issue of the
affiliation to the Comintern sparked a heated debate, which ultimately
led to a major schism within the socialist movement and opened the
way for the creation of the Romanian Communist Party. An open
conflict among the Romanian socialists erupted already in February
1921, but it was only after the congress of 8–13 May 1921 that the
movement split. Subsequently, a radical faction, the “maximalists,”
who opted for the affiliation to the Comintern, founded the
Romanian Communist Party (RCP).
The congress of 8–13 May 1921 became the First Congress of
the RCP. During the interwar period, the RCP held another four
congresses, as follows: on 3–4 October 1922 (the Second Congress);
August 1924 (the Third Congress, held in Vienna); 28 June – 7 July
1928 (the Fourth Congress, held in Kharkov); and 3 – 24 December
It is still unclear if the release of the two radical socialist militants was part
of a plan to Sovietize Romania beginning in the spring-summer of 1917.
Nevertheless, subsequent to their release, both militants engaged in a sustained
Bolshevik propaganda in the Odessa region. On the release of Rakovski and Bujor
see “Raport al Serviciului Siguranţei din Marele Cartier General privind manifestaţia
soldaţilor ruşi de la Iaşi cu prilejul zilei de 18 aprilie (1 mai), în timpul căreia au
fost eliberaţi C. Rakovski şi M. Gh. Bujor” (Report of the Siguranţă concerning
the demonstration of the Russian soldiers in Iaşi to celebrate 18 April/1 May during
which C. Rakovski and M. Gh. Bujor were released), in Tănăsescu et al., eds.,
Ideology and communist structures in Romania, 1917–1918, 221–24.
139
178
Structural FactorS
1931 (the Fifth Congress, held nearby Moscow).140 The Party’s lack
of adherents during the interwar period was also related to the
acceptance by the RCP of the Cominternist theses stating that
Romania was an “imperialistic state,” created “by occupation of
foreign territories,” which “exploited the oppressed peoples.” Actually,
apart from slogans the RCP had no practical solutions for the
problems Romania was facing at the time. For instance, in the end
of the Fifth RCP Congress (1931), Elena Filipovici stated:
The Fifth Congress of the RCP gives us the just line and five
fundamental slogans: [1] against the fascist dictatorship; [2] the 8–hour
workday; [3] land to the peasants; [4] self-determination up to secession;
[5] the defense of USSR. These slogans must be the lighthouse for our
struggle and teach us that the everyday struggle must be transformed
into a struggle at a higher level, for conquering power and thus
concluding the bourgeois-democratic revolution.141
The identity-shaping experiences of the Romanian communist
militants during the interwar period led to the development of the
two most cherished political values of the communist movement in
Romania, i.e. monolithism and emancipation. Although these aspects
are discussed at length in the chapter on nation-specific factors, it is
important to mention that emancipation proved to be the crucial
element that permitted the use of nationalism as an ideological
substitute for Marxism-Leninism during the late Gheorghiu-Dej and
the entire Ceauşescu periods. Throughout the interwar period, the
Party was compelled to follow unabatedly the orders coming from
the Kremlin and this led to a profound political marginalization of
the communist militants during that period. The RCP propaganda
For more on the interwar policies of the RCP see Mircea Muşat and Ion
Ardeleanu, România după Marea Unire 1918–1933 (Romania after the Great
Unification 1918–1933) vol. II (Bucharest: Editura Ştiinţifică şi Enciclopedică,
1986), 170–206 and 594–641.
141
Quoted in Muşat and Ardeleanu, Romania after the Great Unification, 640.
140
Structural FactorS
179
had little success in reaching the hearts and minds of the
overwhelming majority of the population of Greater Romania since
the Party militated, as far as ethnic minorities were concerned, for
“self-determination up to secession” – as Elena Filipovici put it. In
terms of leadership, the RCP had during the period 1922–1944 only
one general secretary of Romanian ethnic origin, Gheorghe Cristescu
(1922–1924), while all the others were of non-Romanian ethnic
origin: Elek Köblos (1924–1928); Vitali Holostenko (1928–1931);
Aleksandr Danieluk Stefanski (1931–1934); Boris Stefanov (1934–
1940) and Ştefan Foriş (1940–1944). For the purpose of the
argument developed in this section it is worth mentioning the ethnic
origin of those RCP general secretaries: Holostenko was Ukrainian,
Stefanski was Polish, Stefanov was Bulgarian and Foriş was a
Hungarian from Romania.142 Such a situation created a deep
frustration among the ethnic Romanian members of the Party, whose
salience could be grasped from witness accounts, testimonies and
even Party documents long after the local communists took control
over the Party in the postwar period.
The socialist movement in Romania started to grow effectively
beginning in 1937, when the Social-Democratic Party united with
the Unitary Socialist Party.143 However, the events that followed
shortly – the institution of royal dictatorship of King Carol II, the
break out of World War II, the establishment of the military
dictatorship of general Ion Antonescu and finally the communist
takeover – hampered the development of what might be called an
“authentic left” in Romanian politics. As for the communists, in 1944
the RCP emerged from the underground as a group of militants that
amounted to some 1,000 members. Consequently the support of the
Florin Constantiniu, P.C.R., Pătrăşcanu şi Transilvania, 1945–1946 (RCP,
Pătrăşcanu and Transylvania, 1945–46) (Bucharest: Editura Enciclopedică,
2001), 34.
143
Jurca, History of Romanian Social Democracy, 246–47. See also Shafir,
Romania – Politics, Economics and Society, 28–29.
142
180
Structural FactorS
Red Army was of paramount importance in bringing the Romanian
communists to power after the coup of 23 August 1944. This is why
the official propaganda never addressed the issue of the RCP
membership in 1944. Ceauşescu, for instance, spoke of the RCP
membership in 1945, not in 1944, and claimed that the Party had
20,000–25,000 “well versed activists” at the time.144
Simply put, without the catastrophic consequences of World War
II and the subsequent Soviet occupation of the country there would
have been no communist regime in Romania. It is another question
as to how Moscow influenced the coming to power of the local
communists in Romania. As already noted, Gheorghiu-Dej and his
men did not come to power with a precise economic or social agenda.
At stake was the political survival of a small and marginal group of
militants, totally dependent on the Red Army that brought it to
power. Furthermore, what characterized the postwar history of the
RWP/RCP was a ruthless struggle for power and not a debate over
the main tenets of Marxism-Leninism and the way they had to be
put into practice in Romania. Ideology never stayed at the core of
the debates within the inner circle of power. In fact, the Soviet tanks
Quoted in Istoria patriei şi a Partidului Comunist Român în opera Preşedintelui
Nicolae Ceauşescu (History of the Motherland and the Romanian Communist Party
reflected in the work of President Nicolae Ceauşescu) (Bucharest: Editura Militară,
1979), 369. Actually, none of the propagandistic works tackled the problem of
RCP membership in 1944. See, for instance, the collection of excerpts from
Ceauşescu’s speeches concerning the history of the RCP entitled: Partidul Comunist
Român – continuator al luptei revoluţionare şi democratice a poporului român, al
tradiţiilor înaintate ale mişcării muncitoreşti şi socialiste (RCP – continuator of the
revolutionary and democratic struggle of the Romanian people, of the advanced
traditions of the workers’ and socialist movement) (Bucharest: Editura Politică,
1972), 87–125. See also Ilie Ceauşescu, “Partidul Comunist Român – moştenitorul
autentic al tradiţiilor luptei întregului popor pentru apărarea patriei,” in Nicolae
Petreanu and Ştefan Lache, eds., Contribuţii la studierea istoriei contemporane a
României (Contributions to the study of Romania’s contemporary history)
(Bucharest: Editura Politică, 1980), 230–43.
144
Structural FactorS
181
brought to power not an ideology, but a small group composed of
Gheorghiu-Dej and his “group from prisons” that made use of
Stalinist methods – aiming gradually at Stalin’s “terroristic
despotism,” to quote Robert C. Tucker – in order to establish and
perpetuate a dictatorship. As Tucker puts it: “Those communist
parties that acquired power in the aftermath of the Second World
War, in most cases under conditions of Red Army occupation of
their countries, presided over internal revolutionary processes which
involved the forcible transplantation of Soviet Communism in its
highly Russified Stalinist form.”145
Soon after the imposition of the communist rule in Romania it
became clear that to “struggle for communism” was by no means the
ideal of a majority of the population. The elections of 19 November
1946, in which the so-called “historical,” that is, traditional and
democratic parties won a majority of the vote. The vote however was
reversed afterwards in favor of the communists and their allies, but
the fact remains that the major part of the population did not support
the communists and their allies. As historian Dinu C. Giurescu has
demonstrated, democratic parties won a majority of the votes in the
elections of November 1946, but the results were falsified in favor
of the so-called Bloc of Democratic Parties (Blocul Partidelor
Democrate – BPD) led by the RCP. The BPD was established on 17
May 1946 and was composed of the RCP and other five parties that
fully supported its policies. Although numerous irregularities intended
to influence the vote in favor of the BPD were recorded, the BPD
actually received only 33 percent of the votes at the country level.
Moreover, Giurescu suggests that, in the absence of such irregularities
and discrimination against the democratic “historical” parties, the
votes for the BPD would not have exceeded 20 percent of the total.
Robert C. Tucker, “Stalinism and Comparative Communism,” in idem,
ed., Stalinism: Essays in Historical Interpretation (New York: W.W. Norton &
Company, 1977), xviii-xix.
145
182
Structural FactorS
According to the official data, however, BPD got 83.81 percent of
the total vote.146 It is therefore reasonable to suggest that the masses
had little faith in the utopian dream of building a radically new society
in Romania. Again, this does not mean that nobody believed in the
“dream of a utopia where the masses were free and managed
everything on their own initiative,” to use the inspired words of
Wolfe.147 Deep social, economic, and ethnic cleavages did exist in
interwar Romania and many hoped in a change for the better in the
immediate postwar period. A majority of the population, however,
was simply not convinced that the communists would be able to
achieve it.
As for the post-World War II communist elite, the initial utopian
dreams were replaced quickly by a ruthless power struggle. The “true
believers,” antifascists that joined the communist movement during
the “illegality period,” that is, the underground years, were slowly
marginalized after the takeover. Many were marginalized because of
their ethnicity, especially those of Jewish origin.148 Those who fought
in the Spanish Civil War – the “Spaniards,” as well as the French
Resistance veterans were primarily targeted beginning in the autumn
of 1952. With regard to the ethnicity of the Spanish Civil War
veterans, Robert Levy observed that “at least two-thirds of the
Spaniards, and perhaps as many as four-fifths of them, were Jews.”149
The year 1956 proved to be poisonous for the communist
movement. The “secret report” by which Khrushchev denounced the
“excesses” of the late Soviet dictator – the “crimes of the Stalin era”
Dinu C. Giurescu, “Documente privind ‘alegerile’ din 1946” (Documents
concerning the ‘elections’ of 1946), in Centenar Constantin C. Giurescu (Centennial
Constantin C. Giurescu) (Craiova: Editura Universitaria, 2001), 313–24.
147
Wolfe, “Marxism and the Russian Revolution,” in idem, An Ideology in
Power, 30.
148
Câmpeanu, Ceauşescu, the countdown years, 180–195.
149
Levy, Ana Pauker, 160.
146
Structural FactorS
183
– frightened deeply the power elite in Bucharest. Furthermore, the
outbreak of the Hungarian revolution demonstrated that totalitarian
ideology undeniably lost its strength or, to use Andrzej Walicki’s
inspired words, communism ceased to represent a “unifying Final
Goal.”150 In Hungary, in the aftermath of the 1956 revolution, the
traditional symbolism regarding the mission of the communist party
to construct a utopian new society had to be abandoned in favor of
an unwritten social contract. Ideology ceased to be a driving force in
the relationship between the regime and the Hungarian society; it
was, instead, the issue of stability and economic performance that
the regime skillfully utilized in order to avoid a new 1956–like trauma
and to pursue consensus.151
The Hungarian Revolution also influenced the Stalinist regime
in neighboring Romania. For its part, the Romanian Stalinist elite
led by Gheorghiu-Dej saw in the Hungarian Revolution an
unexpected chance to display its apparent support for Khrushchev’s
policies and eventually escape de-Stalinization. Yet, Stalinism was
constrained to evolve in Romania as well, but not in the sense of
returning to the “Leninist norms” of collective decision-making
envisaged by Khrushchev. To survive politically, the Stalinist elite in
Bucharest returned gradually and cautiously to the traditional local
values. Apparently highly ideological, the debates within the
RWP/RCP were actually meant to preserve the unity of the party
around its supreme leader. Monolithism and emancipation – the
Andrzej Walicki, Marxism and the Leap to the Kingdom of Freedom: The Rise and
Fall of the Communist Utopia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 517.
151
Writing about the Hungarian society during the 1980s, Kornai wonderfully
put it: “In Hungary, 20–25 years after a defeated revolution, the attention of the
leading stratum and the millions of ordinary people turned not towards strikes
and political struggles, but calmly towards economy. Ordinary people chased
around after extra earnings, built houses and grew vegetables.” János Kornai,
Evolution of the Hungarian Economy, 1848–1998; Volume II: Paying the Bill for
Goulash-Communism (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 2000), 131.
150
184
Structural FactorS
already traditional values of the communist movement in Romania
– were translated into a policy of independence-cum-industrialization
that eventually legitimized the Party in the eyes of the population.
It is highly questionable that an “old-timers’ dissidence” was about
to emerge within the RCP in the mid-1950s. An episode that has
been invoked as a proof of an incipient factionalism was the June
1958 purge of a group of old-timers, former railway fellow workers
of Gheorghiu-Dej. During a Plenum of the RWP held on 9–13 June
1958 it was “unveiled” the alleged “anti-Party,” “factional” activity
of a group of old-timers composed of: Constatin Doncea, Ovidiu
Şandru, Grigore Răceanu, Eugen Genad, Heinrich Genad, Ion
Drancă, Constantin Moflic, Pavel Ştefan, Vasile Bîgu, Vasile Negoiţă,
and Iacob Coţoveanu. The enumeration of those purged follows the
enumeration in the original report to the Plenum, read by Nicolae
Ceauşescu on 10 June 1958.152 As recent scholarship indicates, the
old-timers were not attempting at organizing on ideological grounds
a dissident faction within the Party: they were rather mumbling
against the new configuration of the Party elite shepherded by
Gheorghiu-Dej in which they had become marginal.153 In any case,
the unsophisticated mindset of many of those purged would have
not recommended them as an “enlightened” alternative to
Gheorghiu-Dej and his men.
Nevertheless, a small group of what might be called true believers
remained within the RWP/RCP. Marginalized and frustrated, their
disillusionment with the policies of Gheorghiu-Dej and Ceauşescu
should not be denied. Some even dared to speak out. For instance,
For the indictment and the measures taken against the “anti-Party” faction
and those who allegedly supported, or failed to inform on, them see Alina Tudor
and Dan Cătănuş, eds., Amurgul ilegaliştilor: Plenara PMR din 9–13 iunie 1958
(The sunset of the old-timers: The RWP Plenum of 9–13 June 1958) (Bucharest:
Editura Vremea, 2000), 14–57.
153
Florin Constantiniu, foreword to The RWP Plenum of 9–13 June 1958,
edited by Alina Tudor and Dan Cătănuş (Bucharest: Editura Vremea, 2000), 7–10.
152
Structural FactorS
185
Constantin Pârvulescu, one of the founders of the RCP, protested
publicly against Ceauşescu’s leadership in the front of the Twelfth
Party Congress in 1979 but nobody supported him. Also, it is worth
mentioning the confession Ileana Răceanu, herself an old-timer, made
to her son Mircea in June 1981, two days before she died. Her
statement is relevant because it goes beyond the usual criticism
towards the personal rule of Ceauşescu and addresses the issue of
disenchantment with the “actually existing” communism:
Myself and the others who, like me, in their youth believed in the
communist ideals, never thought, even in our worst dreams, that we would
get in such a situation! Yes, Mircea, we knew that it would not be easy,
we knew that a perfect, ideal world does not exist, but it never, ever,
occurred to us that the society we believed in would look like this one! I
would like you to know that we did not dream of this, and we did not
want to get here!154
One should also mention that a strain of “rebellious communism”
did not emerge in Romania as compared, for example, with Poland.155
Marxist intellectuals and enlightened apparatchiks barely engaged in
debates that would have led to a more sophisticated Marxist critique
of the regime and thus permit the appearance of a faction of softliners within the Party. Monolithism proved to be a salient value
even for the more sophisticated Party members. The absence of softliners within the RWP/RCP also explains why Romania did not
Quoted in Mircea Răceanu, Infern ’89: Povestea unui condamnat la moarte
(Inferno 1989: The story of a prisoner sentenced to death) (Bucharest: Editura
Silex, 2000), 158.
155
In his conversation with Daniel Cohn-Bendit, held in Warsaw in May 1987,
Adam Michnik confessed: “My political consciousness flows from these two
traditions: that of rebellious communists, represented by [Jacek] Kuron, and that
of independent, secular intellectuals, like [Jan Józef] Lipski.” See “Anti-authoritarian
Revolt: A Conversation with Daniel Cohn-Bendit,” in Adam Michnik, Letters from
Freedom: Post-Cold War Realities and Perspectives (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1998), 31.
154
186
Structural FactorS
experience a peaceful, “negotiated” revolution in December 1989
born of a deal between the opposition elites and a reformist faction
within the Party.
During the 1980s, as a witness recalls, “nobody was taking
communist ideology seriously.”156 Although this might be true, it
should be stressed nevertheless that people did participate to regular
sessions of ideological education and thus continued to live the
everyday lie. Witness accounts confirm that for ordinary Party
members the issue of ideological training was perceived as just routine:
I was a Party member and, as a conscientious person, I was appointed
manager of the political education sessions over a group of operators
at the Accounting Center of the Ministry of Chemistry. On the one
hand, I did not dare evade the painful task. On the other hand, I
organized ludicrous sessions, which would never last more than 15
minutes: I’d babble on some speech that sort of made me sick uttering,
possibly mimicked some discussion afterwards and that was it. For a
whole year, no one reacted, no one complained [emphasis added].157
Other ordinary Party members, more daring, went further and
ridiculed the “political education” sessions when named by the
propagandist in charge to take the floor and read an ideological
paragraph. In this respect, the account of Speranţa Rădulescu, an
ethnomusicologist, is telling: “At the meeting, I sit next to two
trustworthy ladies and told them: ‘Watch this, I’ll read every other
line and you’ll see nobody will tell!’ And so I do. Nobody wonders,
nobody protests, smiles, or ever notices anything.”158 Nobody cared
for what was read as long as it was about ideology. Nevertheless, the
fact that people did participate to “political education” sessions is
Account by Anca Manolescu, Martor, 124.
Ibid.
158
Account by Speranţa Rădulescu, Martor, 125.
156
157
Structural FactorS
187
also telling, and this issue is addressed extensively in the section on
the political cultures of resistance in communist Romania.
Since it was not about a “utopia in power” the erosion of ideology
had little influence on bringing down the regime on 22 December
1989. In this respect, Mihai Botez, a Romanian critical intellectual,
stated: “If utopia did not play an essential role in establishing and
legitimating the communist regimes in Eastern Europe – as it did
in Russia – what significance the crisis of that utopia could have?”
Furthermore, Botez asked rhetorically: “Could the demythologization
of an ideology that never operated as an authentic ideal damage the
stability of the regimes in Eastern Europe?”159 In the Romanian case
it was not the erosion of ideology that brought down the Ceauşescu
regime, but the erosion of its substitute, the Romanian version of
national-communism developed after 1968 that some use to call
“Ceauşescuism.” The case of the last communist leader of Romania
is, however, different: he was thinking primarily in ideological terms.
Ceauşescu, as a genuine true believer, allegedly sang “The
International” in the front of the firing squad when he was executed
by the revolutionary regime on 25 December 1989.160
Mihai Botez, “Declinul marxismului şi criza comunismului” (Decline of
Marxism and the crisis of communism), review of The Crisis of Marxist Ideology in
Eastern Europe: The Poverty of Utopia, by Vladimir Tismăneanu, Agora, Vol.2,
No.2 (July 1989), 84.
160
Witness accounts provided by some of the main actors involved in the trial
and the subsequent execution – General Victor Atanasie Stănculescu (former
Minister of Defense) and Gelu Voican Voiculescu (former Deputy Prime Minister)
– do not clarify this particular issue related to the death of the Ceauşescus. Folk
memory however, has preserved the image of the Ceauşescu couple, hand in hand,
singing “The International” in the front of the firing squad. For the above
mentioned accounts and documents on the Ceauşescu trial, including the death
certificates of the Ceauşescus, see Dorian Marcu, Moartea Ceauşeştilor: Revelaţii şi
documente istorice (The Death of the Ceauşescus: Revelations and historical
documents) (Bucharest: Editura Excelsior, 1991), 11–123.
159
188
Structural FactorS
Communism was rather transplanted to Romania, than
homegrown. At the same time, due to the particular way in which it
evolved in relation to the political traditions of the “host” nation it
gave birth to the local version of national-communism that ultimately
led to the legitimation of the regime. As Wolfe puts it:
Because of the uniqueness of each country’s history, when nations
borrow from each other – and in the age of world wars and world
communications such borrowing has become well-nigh universal – what
is borrowed suffers a change as it is transplanted…. But quite frequently,
a borrowed institution may alter, even profoundly, the course of the life
stream into which it enters. Yet even more profoundly is it transformed by
the life of which it becomes a part. Not institutions alone, but ideas and
doctrines suffer a radical change on transplantation [emphasis added].161
The Stalinist model transplanted to Romania went through a series
of transformations after 1956, in the aftermath of Khrushchev’s
condemnation of Stalin’s personality cult. Threatened by
de-Stalinization, Gheorghiu-Dej and his men devised the strategy of
political survival that was not centered from the very beginning on a
skillful instrumentalization of nationalism. Once Khrushchev
inaugurated his de-Stalinization campaign, Romanian communists
had to look elsewhere for legitimacy and thus were compelled to
initiate a process of “selective community-building,” that is, to strive
to create new political meanings, shared by the communist ruling
elite and the population, concerning the relationship between the
Party and the society.162 The 1956 political developments at the Soviet
bloc level imposed the devising of a new political strategy by the
power elite in Bucharest. The selective nature of the community
building process launched in the aftermath of the 1956 events needs
Wolfe, “Backwardness and Industrialization in Russian History and
Thought,” in idem, An Ideology in Power, 49.
162
Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development, 74.
161
Structural FactorS
189
to be stressed once more. Not all the segments of Romanian society
were allowed to take part in the process. Up to the year 1964,
numerous Romanian citizens were imprisoned on political grounds
while their offspring were denied basic civil rights. Obviously, they
were considered “enemies of the people” and the community building
process was not aimed at them.
However, the de-Stalinization launched by Khrushchev was a
threat to Gheorghiu-Dej and his men, and a return to the people as
the ultimate source of legitimacy was the only solution at hand. This
is how a worldview developed within the ranks of the Party, i.e., the
illegal RCP, during the interwar years and subsequently in Greater
Romania’s prisons, was extended to the Party-State level.
Marginalization, humiliation, external control, reliance only on the
inner circle of power, made of monolithism and emancipation
fundamental values shared by Gheorghiu-Dej and his men. Valued
at the Party level, monolithism and emancipation were nevertheless
synonymous with unity and independence, arguably the most powerful
historical myths (alongside ancient roots and continuity) that were
instrumental in establishing the modern Romanian nation-state in
the mid-19th century. Nonetheless, his recourse to Party-State
building in the guise of “selective community building” created the
basis for Ceauşescu’s program of Party-State building in the form of
an all-embracing nation-building project.163
It took a rather long time until the Party learned the language of
nationalism and fully understood the importance of national ideology.
Thus, the power elite in Bucharest managed to reinvent Marx as a
supporter of the national aspirations of the Romanians. A manuscript
by Marx in which consistent references to the Romanians are made
As Jowitt aptly puts it: “Given the highly concrete, rigid, hence superficial
nature of Gheorghiu-Dej’s Marxist-Leninist beliefs, there was a chance that his
regime could become nationalistic in the style of historic Romanian nationalism.”
Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development, 224.
163
190
Structural FactorS
was discovered in Amsterdam in 1958; however, the manuscript was
published only in 1964, when it became clear that it could serve the
RWP policy of independence from Moscow.164 Testimonies by
former apparatchiks in charge with cultural issues support such an
assertion. For instance, Pavel Ţugui, former head of the Scientific
and Cultural Section of the CC of the RWP affirms in his memoirs
that the publication of Marx’s writings was part of the new “political
strategy and tactics” pursued by the RWP after 1956.165 Nevertheless,
the Gheorghiu-Dej regime launched in 1958 a second wave of
repression meant to tame further the population. The fact that the
regime turned once again to repression – selective though this time,
supports the argument that the Party was not sure of the effects the
emerging nationalistic rhetoric would have on the population.166
Until Gheorghiu-Dej’s death in March 1965, there were two major
domestic political events that deserve a closer look: the Plenum of
the Central Committee held on 28 November – 5 December 1961
and the Declaration of April 1964. The CC Plenum of NovemberDecember 1961 provided a simple but effective description of Party’s
history since the end of World War II seen as a struggle between two
camps: an autochthonous and patriotic one, and ah Soviet-oriented
one. A first group, led by Gheorghiu-Dej himself, put Romania’s
Karl Marx, Însemnări despre români – Manuscrise inedite (Notes about
Romanians – Unedited manuscripts) (Bucharest: Editura Academiei Republicii
Populare Române, 1964).
165
Pavel Ţugui, Istoria şi limba română în vremea lui Gheorghiu-Dej: Memoriile
unui fost şef de Secţie a CC al PMR (History and Romanian language in GheorghiuDej’s times: The memoirs of a former head of Section of CC of the RWP)
(Bucharest: Editura Ion Cristoiu, 1999), 185–86.
166
On the wave of repression launched in 1958 see Romulus Rusan, Cronologia
şi geografia represiunii comuniste din România: Recensămîntul populaţiei
concentraţionare, 1945–1989 (Chronology and geography of communist repression
in Romania: A census of detained population, 1945–1989) (Bucharest: Editura
Fundaţiei Academia Civică, 2007), 31–34.
164
Structural FactorS
191
interests above everything else. That group was fiercely opposed by
a so-called Muscovite group, which served only the interests of the
Soviet Union. Subsequent to Gheorghiu-Dej’s speech, all the
participants to that Plenum were called to reiterate the interpretation
of their leader.
The document that epitomizes Gheorghiu-Dej’s policy of
independence from Moscow was issued in April 1964. Known as the
“Declaration of April 1964,” that document is one of the RWP’s
most important official documents. Simply put, the Declaration
proclaimed that all communist parties were equal within the
international communist movement, and therefore they were free to
choose their own path toward communism: “It is the exclusive right
of each communist party to elaborate independently its political line
and specific objectives, as well as the ways and methods to reach
them, by applying creatively the general truths of Marxism-Leninism
and the conclusions it draws from the thorough study of the
experience of other communist and workers parties.” Moreover, the
Romanian communists argued, it was by no means acceptable to talk
about “‘parent’ party and ‘offspring’ party, ‘superior’ and
‘subordinated’ parties” within the communist movement, which, the
Declaration of April 1964 further stated, was a “large family of
communist and workers parties having equal rights.”167 After claiming
the right of each and every communist party to decide upon its own
strategy of building “socialism,” the RWP elite took the major step
towards a decisive shift from “selective community building” to
nation-building: the liberation of political prisoners. The general
See Declaraţie cu privire la poziţia Partidului Muncitoresc Român în problemele
mişcării comuniste şi muncitoreşti internaţionale, adoptată de Plenara lărgită a C.C.
al P.M.R. din aprilie 1964 (Declaration concerning the position of the Romanian
Workers’ Party with regard to the problems of the international communist and
workers’ movement adopted by the enlarged Plenum of the CC of the RWP of
April 1964) (Bucharest: Editura Politică, 1964), 55.
167
192
Structural FactorS
amnesty led to the liberation of the overwhelming majority of political
convicts by the end of August 1964.168
However, Gheorghiu-Dej did not live long enough to see the
results of this major policy shift. It was his successor, Ceauşescu, who
turned Gheorghiu-Dej’s incipient nationalism into a comprehensive
nation-building process aimed at creating an ethnically homogenous
“socialist nation” in Romania. Another unexpected event that
occurred on the night of 20 to 21 August 1968 gave the RCP the
opportunity to evaluate the force of the nationalistic argument. When
Ceauşescu publicly condemned the invasion of Czechoslovakia by
the Soviet led troops of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, the RCP
gained widespread popular support almost overnight. Therefore, it
might be argued that Ceauşescu’s nationalism acted as ideological
“cement” on the background of an obvious popular distrust for
Marxism-Leninism. It was only in the conditions of the deep
economic crisis of the 1980s and, even more importantly, in the
conditions of the radical change of policy in Moscow after the coming
to power of Mikhail Gorbachev that “Ceauşescuism,” as an
ideological substitute for Marxism-Leninism, entered in a terminal
crisis. After 1985, when large segments of the Romanian society began
to look to Moscow in the hope of persuading the Ceauşescu regime
to improve their living standards, independence from Moscow – the
cornerstone of the RCP legitimacy in the post-1968 period – ceased
to appeal to a majority of the people. After the launch of Gorbachev’s
program of reforms, emancipation from the Soviet Union meant
nothing for the Romanian population as long as Moscow became
suddenly synonymous with restructuring and openness, while the
independent Romania was heading towards disaster. In this sense
ideological decay, understood as the demise of Ceauşescu’s nationalcommunism as an ersatz ideology, did play a role in the final demise
of the communist rule in Romania.
168
Rusan, Chronology and geography of communist repression in Romania, 35.
Chapter 4
ConjunCtural FaCtors
Contingency played an important role in the final demise of the
communist dictatorships in ECE. As mentioned from the outset, the
present analysis concentrates on two kinds of conjunctural factors,
i.e. external and internal. Given the nature of the power relations
between Moscow and its European satellites, it may be argued that
an external factor – which might be called the “Kremlin factor” –
always influenced the decisions made by the power elites in Sovietized
Europe. Until the mid-1980s, the “Kremlin factor” was synonymous
with the involvement of Moscow in the domestic affairs of the
“fraternal” countries in ECE, as it was the case in Hungary in 1956
or in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Once Mikhail Gorbachev came to
power and engaged in a bold program of reforms, the “Kremlin
factor” evolved into the “Gorbachev factor” and became synonymous
with restructuring and openness. At the same time, unexpected events
of historic significance or crucial decisions made by the Western
powers contributed considerably to the demise of communist
dictatorships in ECE. For instance, the election of a Polish Pope in
1978 was a major external factor that contributed in the long run to
the collapse of communism in Poland. Furthermore, the Polish
Roundtable Agreements concluded on 5 April 1989 initiated the
“snowball effect,” which lasted until 22 December 1989 when the
Romanian communism was brought down by a violent revolution.
In the same vein, the determination of the American President Ronald
194
conjunctural FactorS
Reagan to establish a high-tech spatial weapon system forced the
Soviet Union to invest more in weaponry, which weakened it
economically and thus contributed indirectly to the breakdown of
the communist regimes in Sovietized Europe.
It should be stressed though that the communist dictatorships in
ECE proved to be particularly vulnerable to external conjunctural
factors. Obviously, the influence of such factors on the six countries
that experienced a regime change in 1989 should be assessed on a
case-by-case basis. For instance, the Polish “negotiated revolution”
initiated the “snowball effect” that had a considerable influence on
the final demise of the communist regimes in Hungary, East
Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania. Consequently,
the Polish case poses difficult problems of interpretation with regard
to the set of external conjunctural factors that contributed to the
demise of the Jaruzelski regime exactly because a most powerful one,
i.e. “the snowball effect” was not present. As for the case of Romania,
this work contends that two external conjunctural factors were of
paramount importance in the collapse of communism in that country:
(1) the “Gorbachev factor;” and (2) the “snowball effect.” The
Romanian communist regime also proved to be vulnerable in terms
of domestic conjuncture. Although the internal conjunctural factors
contributed to a lesser extent to the final demise of the regime, they
should not be neglected. A major internal conjunctural factor was
the coming of age of the 1967–1969 generation that originated in
the policy of forced natality launched by Ceauşescu after his coming
to power in 1965.
conjunctural FactorS
195
external Conjuncture
The coming to power of Mikhail S. Gorbachev, who became secretary
general of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in March 1985,
and the launch of his domestic perestroika were events that had an
immense impact on the communist regimes in ECE. As many authors
have pointed out, the Soviet policy of non-intervention during the
“miraculous year 1989” contributed enormously to the collapse of
the communist regimes in Eastern Europe.1 In many respects, the
Soviet renunciation to the “Brezhnev Doctrine” was a decision of
crucial importance that paved the way towards the “negotiated”
revolutions in ECE, with the notable exception of Romania. As
Archie Brown aptly put it:
The key to change in Eastern Europe was Gorbachev’s decision in
principle to abandon Soviet foreign military interventions and his refusal
to contemplate resort to them, even when the Soviet Union was faced
with an utterly changed relationship with the area it had controlled since
the end of the Second World War.2
One should be reminded that after August 1968 the relations
between the Soviet Union and the Sovietized countries in ECE stayed
under the sign of the “Brezhnev Doctrine.” Named after the Soviet
leader Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev (1906–1982), the “Brezhnev Doctrine”
stated that the USSR had the right to intervene in any country in
which the communist power was threatened. The Brezhnev Doctrine
was enunciated in 1968, in the aftermath of the Warsaw Treaty
Organization (WTO) invasion of Czechoslovakia during the night
of 20–21 August 1968 that crushed the Czechoslovak communist
Timothy Garton Ash, In Europe’s Name: Germany and the Divided Continent
(New York: Vintage Books, 1994), 4.
2
Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996),
249.
1
196
conjunctural FactorS
reform movement known as the Prague Spring.3 At the time, Ceauşescu
condemned both the invasion of a “fraternal” country by the troops
of five WTO member states and the idea of “limited sovereignty.”
Subsequently, the power elite in Bucharest rejected explicitly the
Brezhnev Doctrine. Today it is generally agreed that an article signed
by S. Kovalev, published in Pravda on 26 September 1968, represented
the first official enunciation of the Brezhnev Doctrine.4 The response
of the Romanian communists was delayed until 16 October when, at
a popular meeting held in the city of Iaşi, the main urban center of
Moldavia, Ceauşescu delivered a speech in which he stated:
One can also hear questions such as: “In the conditions of socialism do
the affirmation and strengthening of national sovereignty and
independence not contradict Marxism-Leninism?” We consider that
such a question deserves the answer: No! On the contrary, only in
socialism the conditions for the complete affirmation of national
independence and sovereignty are achieved…. This is why we do not
see any contradiction between sovereignty and socialism and we do not
consider that, in the conditions of socialism, the problem of
independence and sovereignty should be posed otherwise.5
The literature on the Prague Spring is immense. Nevertheless, a comprehensive
collection of major documents from the beginnings of the Prague Spring to the
Soviet and Warsaw Pact apologies to Czechoslovakia (dated 5 December 1989),
is pivotal for a full understanding of the phenomenon. See Jaromír Navrátil et al.,
eds., The Prague Spring 1968: A National Security Archive Documents Reader
(Budapest: CEU Press, 1998). For a collection of documents issued immediately
after the events see Robin Alison Remington, ed., Winter in Prague: Documents on
Czechoslovak Communism in Crisis (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1969).
4
For the complete text of Kovalev’s article see S. Kovalev, “Sovereignty and the
International Obligations of Socialist States,” in Remington, ed., Winter in Prague,
412–16. See also “Unofficial Enunciation of the ‘Brezhnev Doctrine,’ September
26, 1968” (Excerpts) in Navrátil et al., eds., The Prague Spring 1968, 502–503.
5
Nicolae Ceauşescu, Cuvîntare la adunarea populară din Iaşi – 16 octombrie
1968 (Speech delivered at the popular meeting held in Iaşi – 16 October 1968),
3
conjunctural FactorS
197
In mid-November, however, a major event would give the
supreme leader of the CPSU the opportunity to launch officially the
Brezhnev Doctrine: the Congress of the Polish United Workers’ Party
(PUWP), which opened on 11 November 1968. On 12 November,
the Soviet leader delivered a rather concise speech in which he
practically reiterated the ideas contained by the Pravda article of 26
September. Thus, Brezhnev argued that the sovereignty of a socialist
state could not be understood as solely a domestic problem of the
respective state. In the case that the domestic evolutions in that
country were threatening the “cause of socialism,” then such a
situation was becoming a problem of common concern for all
communist countries:
It is common knowledge that the Soviet Union has really done a good
deal to strengthen the sovereignty and autonomy of the socialist
countries. The CPSU has always advocated that each socialist country
determine the concrete forms of its development along the path of
socialism by taking into account the specific nature of their national
conditions. But it is well known, comrades, that there are common
natural laws of socialist construction, deviation from which could lead
to deviation from socialism as such. And when external and internal
forces hostile to socialism try to turn the development of a given socialist
country in the direction of restoration of the capitalist system, when a
threat arises to the cause of socialism in that country – a threat to the
security of the socialist commonwealth as a whole – this is no longer
merely a problem for the people of that country, but a common
problem, the concern of all socialist countries.6
in idem, România pe drumul desăvîrşirii construcţiei socialiste: Rapoarte, cuvîntări,
articole, ianuarie 1968 – martie 1969 (Romania on the road of completing the
construction of socialism: Reports, speeches, articles, January 1968 – March 1969)
(Bucharest: Editura Politică, 1969), 578–79.
6
See Leonid Brezhnev, “The Brezhnev Doctrine, November 12, 1968,” in
Gale Stokes, ed., From Stalinism to Pluralism: A Documentary History of Eastern
Europe since 1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 132–34.
198
conjunctural FactorS
Communist Romania was not represented at the highest level at
the 1968 PUWP Congress. Instead, Chivu Stoica, the secretary of
the CC of the RCP, led the RCP delegation. On 14 November,
Stoica delivered a speech in the front of the Congress in which he
argued quite anemically for the thesis of non-interference in the
internal affairs as a basis of relations between socialist states.7 That
the Romanian communists deeply disliked the thesis of “limited
sovereignty” one could also grasp from the fact that the Party
newspaper Scînteia did not reproduce Brezhnev’s speech of 12
November 1968. Nevertheless, on 16 November, in his speech at
the Writers’ General Meeting, Ceauşescu stated: “Life demonstrates
that in our time the politics of interference in the affairs of other
states – source of severe dangers as far as peace is concerned, spring
of conflicts and perpetual tensions – is doomed to failure.”8 Ceauşescu
made his refusal of the Brezhnev Doctrine plain on 29 November
1968 in the front of Romanian Grand National Assembly, which
gathered in a special session to celebrate fifty years from the
unification of Transylvania with Romania. In his speech, Ceauşescu
resolutely criticized the concept of “limited sovereignty” applied to
the relations between communist countries:
The thesis that one tries to validate lately, according to which the
common defense of the socialist countries against an imperialistic attack
presupposes the limitation or renunciation to the sovereignty of a state
participating to the [Warsaw] Treaty, does not correspond to the
principles characterizing the relations between socialist states and under
no circumstances may be accepted. The affiliation to the Warsaw Treaty
Organization not only that does not question the sovereignty of the
For Stoica’s speech, see Scînteia (15 November 1968), 5.
Nicolae Ceauşescu, Cuvîntare la adunarea generală a scriitorilor – 16 noiembrie
1968 (Speech delivered at Writers’ General Meeting – 16 November 1968), in
idem, Romania on the road of completing the construction of socialism, January 1968
– March 1969, 685.
7
8
conjunctural FactorS
199
member states, that does not “limit” in a way or another their state
independence, but, on the contrary, as the Treaty stipulates, is a means
of strengthening the national independence and sovereignty of each
participating state.9
The Brezhnev Doctrine governed the relations between Moscow
and the Soviet bloc countries over the period 1968–1985. Under
Gorbachev however things changed fundamentally. For their part,
the leaders of the Sovietized countries in ECE seemed not to
understand that, or at least this was the impression of Aleksandr
Yakovlev who confessed in a book-length interview with Lilly
Marcou: “The former leaders of the East European countries did not
take seriously, did not want to believe what Mikhail Sergeyevich kept
telling them: ‘From now on, the political choice in these countries
belongs to their peoples, everything is going to be done in accordance
with their options.’”10
With regard to the relations between Moscow and Bucharest
towards the end of Ceauşescu’s rule, Yakovlev states that they were
“ridiculous and strained.” Furthermore, according to Yakovlev,
Ceauşescu not only clung on his deeply entrenched ideological stance
– he accused the Soviets of deviating from socialism and of “sinking
the ship of socialism” – but, interestingly enough, blamed them for
Nicolae Ceauşescu, Expunere la şedinţa jubiliară a Marii Adunări Naţionale
consacrată sărbătoririi semicentenarului unirii Transilvaniei cu România – 29
noiembrie 1968 (Speech delivered at the special session of the Grand National
Assembly dedicated to the celebration of fifty years since the unification of
Transylvania with Romania – 29 November 1968), in idem, Romania on the road
of completing the construction of socialism, January 1968 – March 1969, 745–46.
10
Alexandre Yakovlev, Ce que nous voulons faire de l’Union Soviétique: Entretien
avec Lilly Marcou (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1991). Translated into Romanian as
Alexandr Iakovlev, Ce vrem să facem din Uniunea Sovietică: Convorbire cu Lilly
Marcou (What we intend to do of the Soviet Union: A conversation with Lilly
Marcou) (Bucharest: Editura Humanitas, 1991), 114. The page numbers are to
the Romanian edition.
9
200
conjunctural FactorS
“eschewing internationalist assistance.” In 1989, Ceauşescu was faced
with the terrifying image of a new Soviet Union, which was not only
unwilling to provide “internationalist assistance,” but was also
warning him that what was happening in Romania “had nothing to
do with socialism.”11 An experienced diplomat – he was a Minister
of Foreign Affairs under both Gheorghiu-Dej and Ceauşescu (1961–
1972), Corneliu Mănescu has provided insightful comments on
Gorbachev’s visit to Romania in 1987. As Mănescu perceptively
observed, Gorbachev criticized in his speech the Brezhnev regime for
stagnation, corruption and nepotism, a criticism that was perfectly
fit for the Ceauşescu regime.12 In the autumn of 1989, the Sinatra
Doctrine replaced the Brezhnev Doctrine. This was made clear by
the Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman, Gennady Gerasimov, on 25
October 1989. Gerasimov stated that every country must decide for
itself the path to be pursued and referred to Frank Sinatra’s song
“I did it my way.” The Sinatra Doctrine cleared the way for the 1989
events in ECE. In other words, the “Gorbachev factor” made possible
the appearance of the “snowball effect.”
The collapse of the Romanian communist regime cannot be
discussed apart from the 1989 events in the neighboring countries.
The “snowball effect”, namely, the unfolding of events in ECE during
the year 1989 had a decisive role in creating a special state of mind
among the communist ruling elite and the population at large. As we
now know, the events in Poland, i.e. the Polish Roundtable Talks that
took place during the period February-April 1989 initiated the
sequence of collapse of communist regimes in ECE. As already noted,
at the time – as András Bozóki observed – the Polish case was seen as
“the only pattern of peaceful transition” and the Hungarian democratic
opposition followed it closely.13 In the Romanian case, it was not by
Ibid.
Betea, Mănescu: Unfinished conversations, 242.
13
András Bozóki, “Hungary’s Road to Systemic Change: The Opposition
Roundtable,” in Király, ed., Lawful Revolution in Hungary, 65.
11
12
conjunctural FactorS
201
chance that the Ceauşescu regime collapsed only after the breakdown
of all the other communist regimes in ECE, except for Albania and
Yugoslavia, which did not experience revolutions in 1989.
In early December 1989, the Ceauşescu regime was still standing
out as an island of immobility in a sea of changes. In this respect,
Ceauşescu’s last meeting with Gorbachev, which took place in early
December 1989 in Moscow is telling. The encounter between the
two leaders took place with the occasion of the meeting of the
Consultative Political Committee of the WTO held in Moscow on
4 December 1989. It is worth mentioning that the Romanian
delegation left Bucharest in the morning and flew back the same day,
late in the evening.14 The minutes of the Gorbachev-Ceauşescu
meeting reveals that Ceauşescu was not able to realize that the
communist regimes in ECE had already collapsed one by one and
that the peoples in those countries did not want a return to “state
socialism.”15 Ceauşescu tried to convince Gorbachev to organize, on
the initiative of the RCP and the CPSU, a conference of the
communist parties in Eastern Europe. During the meeting, Ceauşescu
stated that he was deeply concerned with what was happening is some
European communist countries. Moreover, he argued that the actions
that were taking place in those countries were seriously threatening
not only socialism, but also the very existence of the communist
parties in the respective countries. In fact, the Ceauşescu-Gorbachev
dialogue is telling of Ceauşescu’s disregard for, or perhaps nescience
of, the real course of events in ECE, as well as of his unwillingness
to adopt a more flexible stand:
For more details regarding the meeting of the Consultative Committee of
the WTO see Constantin Olteanu, România – O voce distinctă în Tratatul de la
Varşovia: Memorii, 1980–1985 (Romania – A distinct voice within the Warsaw Treaty
Organization: Memoirs, 1980–1985 (Bucharest: Editura Aldo, 1999), 212–19.
15
See Stenograma întîlnirii lui Nicolae Ceauşescu cu Mihail Gorbaciov la 4
decembrie 1989, la Moscova (Minutes of the meeting between Nicolae Ceauşescu
and Mikhail Gorbachev held on 4 December 1989 in Moscow), in Olteanu,
Romania – A distinct voice within the Warsaw Treaty Organization, 234–43.
14
202
conjunctural FactorS
Ceauşescu:
Gorbachev:
Ceauşescu:
We have been contacted by some Parties and exactly
because there is a very difficult situation within the
communist movement we have the responsibility to do
something even though only a few Parties would come
[to the proposed conference]. Do you know what Lenin
said in 1903?
I am afraid not!
“No matter how few we are, we have to raise the flag.”
People need to see that one takes action towards increasing
the influence of socialism and strengthening the
revolutionary movement.16
If Ceauşescu was not able, or not willing, to grasp the true meaning
of the events that had taken place in ECE that autumn of 1989, this
could not escape to those who served the regime. Moreover, archival
documents indicate that those who served the regime did their job
properly. The personnel of the Romanian embassies in Warsaw,
Budapest, Berlin, Prague, and Sofia covered timely and
comprehensively the rapidly unfolding events they were witnessing.
The present day reader is really amazed by the accuracy of those
reports, which also specify the names of the recipients of such
information. In a majority of the cases they were: (1) Emil Bobu,
Member of the Permanent Bureau of the Political Executive
Committee of the RCP and Secretary of the CC of the RCP; (2)
Ioan Totu, Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs (26
August 1986 – 4 November 1989); (3) Ion Stoian, Secretary of the
CC of the RCP and Minister of Foreign Affairs (4 November – 22
December 1989); (4) Vasile Milea, Minister of National Defense (17
December 1985 – 22 December 1989); (5) Iulian Vlad, Minister
Secretary of State at the Ministry of Internal Affairs, head of the State
Security Department – the Securitate (5 October 1987 – 22
16
Ibid., 236.
conjunctural FactorS
203
December 1989); (6) Nicolae Giosan, President of the Grand
National Assembly; and (7) Miu Dobrescu, President of the General
Assembly of the Trade Unions in Romania.
As already noted, the “snowball effect” was initiated by the Polish
Roundtable agreement of 5 April 1989. Following that agreement,
distressing telegrams were sent home by the Romanian embassy in
Warsaw. Thus, the Romanian embassy in Warsaw informed
Bucharest in due time on the legalization of Solidarity on 17 April
1989 in conformity with the Roundtable Agreement of 5 April. The
telegram also referred to Lech Wałęsa’s appeal to the members of
Solidarity to prepare for the June general elections.17 On 17 May,
the Romanian ambassador to Poland, Ion Teşu, sent to Bucharest a
report on the visit of the Hungarian Prime Minister Miklós Németh
to Poland. The report also referred to Németh’s press conference in
which the Hungarian Prime Minister stated that the scope of his
visit to Poland was to familiarize himself with the political
transformations in Poland that the Hungarian authorities were
observing with great care. The said report also mentioned that the
Hungarian Prime Minister characterized the Roundtable Agreement
as a “historical event that permitted a normalization of the social
relations and facilitated the implementation of reforms.” At the same
time, Teşu reported on Németh’s answer to a question on the status
of Hungarian-Romanian relations, posed by an Indian journalist.
The answer, which was carefully summarized, stated that the
relations between the two countries worsened and that the
deterioration in terms of human rights observance in Romania was
Informarea Ambasadei României la Varşovia către Ministerul Afacerilor Externe,
19 aprilie 1989, ora 19:00 (Report of the Romanian Embassy in Warsaw to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 19 April 1989, 1900 hours), in Dumitru Preda and
Mihai Retegan, eds., 1989 – Principiul dominoului: Prăbuşirea regimurilor comuniste
europene (1989 – The domino principle: The breakdown of the European
communist regimes) (Bucharest: Editura Fundaţiei Culturale Române, 2000), 51–52.
17
204
conjunctural FactorS
affecting not only the Hungarian and German minorities, but also
the Romanian majority.18
Equally distressing messages were received from the Romanian
embassy in Budapest. The Romanian ambassador in Budapest, Traian
Pop, sent regularly detailed reports on the events in Hungary. On 20
May 1989, he sent to Bucharest a commentary on an important
document issued by the Central commission of revision of the
Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (HSWP). The document, entitled
“The viewpoint of the central commission of revision on the situation
of the [Hungarian Socialist Workers’] Party,” was published on 19
May by the Hungarian press. After summarizing the document, Pop
concluded that HSWP was prepared to acknowledge that in the future
it would not maintain a monopoly on power and would have to adapt
its practices to a multiparty system. According to Pop, the first to blame
for such a situation was the secretary general of the HSWP, Károly
Grósz, who “displayed a lack of determination and firmness of purpose
in defending and promoting the Marxist principles and ideology, in
the theoretical and practical activity of the Hungarian Party.”19
A report on the meeting of the “reform circles” within the
HSWP, held in Szeged on 20–21 May 1989, was promptly sent
to Bucharest on 22 May.20 On 24 May ambassador Pop sent a
Raportul Ambasadei României la Varşovia către Ministerul Afacerilor Externe,
17 mai 1989, ora 12:30 (Report of the Romanian Embassy in Warsaw to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 17 May 1989, 1230 hours), in Preda and Retegan,
eds., The breakdown of the European communist regimes, 60–61.
19
Informarea Ambasadei României la Budapesta către Ministerul Afacerilor
Externe, 20 mai 1989, ora 18:00 (Report of the Romanian Embassy in Budapest
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 20 May 1989, 1800 hours), in Preda and
Retegan, eds., The breakdown of the European communist regimes, 63–66.
20
Raportul Ambasadei României la Budapesta către Ministerul Afacerilor Externe,
22 mai 1989, ora 20:00 (Report of the Romanian Embassy in Budapest to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 22 May 1989, 2200 hours), in Preda and Retegan,
eds., The breakdown of the European communist regimes, 66–68.
18
conjunctural FactorS
205
telegram on the preparations for the reburial of Imre Nagy,21 and
on the following day, 25 May 1989, reported on the main points
of the “platform of the reform circles” within the HSWP. More
importantly, ambassador Pop’s telegram of 25 May comprised a
personal assessment of the situation: for Pop, the HSWP was in
a “deep crisis” and the “reform circles” aimed at “demolishing
the Party from within.” 22 An even more sobering report, which
summarized the main ideas expressed by the secretary general of the
HSWP, Károly Grósz, in a televised interview broadcast on 30 May,
was sent to Bucharest on 1 June 1989. In his telegram, ambassador
Pop emphasized Grósz’s statement that the HSWP “earnestly wishes
a multiparty regime.” At the same time, the Romanian ambassador
accused Grósz of lacking a clear and firm stance towards the crisis
the HSWP was facing and for not taking a clear stand towards the
“fractionist activity” of Imre Pozsgay.23
The snowball was already rolling downhill. From June to
December 1989 the Romanian embassies in the Sovietized countries
in ECE sent home regularly reports that were almost alike: timely,
accurate and detailed. For instance, telegrams sent from Warsaw
spoke of the first (4 June) and, respectively, the second round (18
June) of the general elections and the victory obtained by Solidarity’s
Raportul Ambasadei României la Budapesta către Ministerul Afacerilor Externe,
24 mai 1989, ora 17:00 (Report of the Romanian Embassy in Budapest to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 24 May 1989, 1700 hours), in Preda and Retegan,
eds., The breakdown of the European communist regimes, 75–76.
22
Raportul Ambasadei României la Budapesta către Ministerul Afacerilor Externe,
25 mai 1989, ora 21:00 (Report of the Romanian Embassy in Budapest to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 25 May 1989, 2100 hours), in Preda and Retegan,
eds., The breakdown of the European communist regimes, 76–80.
23
Raportul Ambasadei României la Budapesta către Ministerul Afacerilor Externe,
17 iunie 1989, ora 23:00 (Report of the Romanian Embassy in Budapest to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1 June 1989, 2000 hours), in Preda and Retegan, eds.,
The breakdown of the European communist regimes, 86–88.
21
206
conjunctural FactorS
candidates.24 A report from Budapest informed about the reburial of
Imre Nagy (1896–1958) and four other leaders of the 1956
revolution. This particular message deserves attention due to
ambassador Pop’s gloomy conclusion: “The day of 16 June 1989 can
be considered as a peak moment in the process of dissolution of the
socialist system [in Hungary].”25 On 27 July, in a telegram sent by
ambassador Teşu from Warsaw one could read a similarly depressing
news: “As a result of the dissensions and fractionist currents within
the [Polish United Workers’] Party, the number of Party members
continues to decrease and it is possible that, due to opposition’s
pressures, to withdraw [the Party organizations] from the economic
enterprises.”26 On 12 August, a telegram from Budapest informed
for the first time about groups of citizens from the German
Democratic Republic who were trying to emigrate to the Federal
Informarea Ambasadei României la Varşovia către Ministerul Afacerilor
Externe, 7 iunie 1989, ora 15:00 (Report of the Romanian Embassy in Warsaw
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7 June 1989, 1500 hours); and Raportul
Ambasadei României la Varşovia către Ministerul Afacerilor Externe, 24 iunie
1989, ora 8:00 (Report of the Romanian Embassy in Warsaw to the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, 24 June 1989, 0800 hours), in Preda and Retegan, eds.,
The breakdown of the European communist regimes, 98–99 and 114–18
respectively.
25
Raportul Ambasadei României la Budapesta către Ministerul Afacerilor Externe,
17 iunie 1989, ora 23:00 (Report of the Romanian Embassy in Budapest to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 17 June 1989, 2300 hours), in Preda and Retegan, eds.,
The breakdown of the European communist regimes, 108–112. The other four persons
were Miklós Gimes (1917–1958), Géza Losonczy (1917–1957), Pál Maléter (1917–
1958), and József Szilágyi (1917–1958). Apart from Losonczy, who died in prison,
in 1957, while on hunger strike, all the others were executed in 1958; a sixth coffin
was added, in the memory of the “unknown freedom fighter.”
26
Raportul Ambasadei României la Varşovia către Ministerul Afacerilor Externe,
27 iulie 1989, ora 12:30 (Report of the Romanian Embassy in Warsaw to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 27 July 1989, 1230 hours), in Preda and Retegan,
eds., The breakdown of the European communist regimes, 139–41.
24
conjunctural FactorS
207
Republic of Germany via the West German embassy in Budapest.27
A new report on the situation of the East German citizens who
wanted to cross the Hungarian-Austrian border on their way to West
Germany was sent to Bucharest on 19 August.28
That communist Romania was trying to oppose the
democratization process initiated in Poland became clear by
mid-August 1989. During the night of 19/20 August 1989 Ceauşescu
sent an official letter to the leaderships of the “fraternal” communist
parties. The said letter contained the official point of view of the
RCP and its supreme leader on the situation in Poland. In the evening
of 21 August, the Romanian ambassador to Warsaw, Ion Teşu, was
convoked to the CC of the PUWP where he received the official
Polish answer to the RCP letter. In his report sent to Bucharest on
22 August, ambassador Teşu mentions that during the meeting, the
secretary for international affairs of the CC of the PUWP, W. Natorf,
stated: “We are surprised about certain reproaches contained in the
[RCP] declaration, all the more that this was also sent to other
countries in the [Warsaw] Pact. We were expecting to receive support
in the difficult situation we face and not criticism.”29 Briefly put, the
RCP was worried about the fate of “socialism” in Poland and the
possible effects the situation in that country could have on the
Nota Ambasadei României la Budapesta către Ministerul Afacerilor Externe,
12 august 1989, ora 17:00 (Note of the Romanian Embassy in Budapest to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 12 August 1989, 1700 hours), in Preda and Retegan,
eds., The breakdown of the European communist regimes, 146–47.
28
Informarea Ambasadei României la Budapesta către Ministerul Afacerilor
Externe, 19 august 1989, ora 20:00 (Report of the Romanian Embassy in Budapest
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 19 August 1989, 2000 hours), in Preda and
Retegan, eds., The breakdown of the European communist regimes, 155–56.
29
Raportul ambasadei române la Varşovia către Ministerul Afacerilor Externe, 22
august 1989, ora 01:45 (Report of the Romanian Embassy in Warsaw to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 22 August 1989, 0145 hours), in Preda and Retegan,
eds., The breakdown of the European communist regimes, 164–65.
27
208
conjunctural FactorS
“community of socialist states.” Furthermore, the Romanian
communists considered that the participation of Solidarity’s
representatives to the government was promoting the interests of “the
most reactionary imperialistic circles.” Such a situation, the RCP
letter considered, “was not only a Polish domestic issue, but an issue
of concern for all socialist countries.”30
Twenty-one years before, the Romanian communists had
condemned the WTO intervention in the former Czechoslovakia
and Ceauşescu had delivered his famous “balcony speech” of 21
August 1968. Subsequently, Romania had fiercely opposed the
Brezhnev Doctrine and, as shown above, on 29 November 1968
Ceauşescu himself had proclaimed in the front of the Romanian
Grand National Assembly that: “The thesis … according to which
the common defense of the socialist countries against an imperialistic
attack presupposes the limitation or renunciation to the sovereignty
of a state participating to the [Warsaw] Treaty, does not correspond
to the principles characterizing the relations between socialist states
and under no circumstances may be accepted.” Nevertheless, in his
letter of 19 August 1989, Ceauşescu actually proposed the putting
into practice of the Brezhnev Doctrine, i.e. the same doctrine he
defiantly opposed for some twenty-one years. There is no wonder
therefore that the official answer from the part of the PUWP – dated
21 August 1989 and transmitted to Bucharest by the Romanian
embassy in Warsaw on 22 August – referred exactly to the principle
of “non-interference in the domestic affairs” in the relations between
Quoted in Răspuns la punctul de vedere al Comitetului Politic Executiv al
P.C.R. şi al Preşedintelui Nicolae Ceauşescu în legătură cu aprecierea actualei situaţii
din Polonia, inclusiv cu formarea guvernului Republicii Populare Polone (Reply to
the viewpoint of the Political Executive Committee of the RCP and the President
Nicolae Ceauşescu with regard to the actual situation in Poland, including the
formation of the government of the Popular Republic of Poland), in Preda and
Retegan, eds., The breakdown of the European communist regimes, 165–67.
30
conjunctural FactorS
209
communist states that Romania defended since the WTO
intervention in Czechoslovakia.31
As for the Hungarian official response to the RCP letter of 19 August,
this came on 24 August and began with the following paragraph:
The leadership of the HSWP took notice with stupefaction and without
compliance with the message sent by the RCP and the president Nicolae
Ceauşescu, which suggests an urgent common action “making use of all
available means in order to hamper the liquidation of socialism in Poland.”32
Similar to the Polish answer to the RCP letter, the official
response of the HSWP also referred to Romania’s “systematic call
for the observance of the principles of non-interference in the
domestic affairs and sovereignty in the relations between socialist
states.” Therefore, the HSWP reply continued, the position of the
RCP was “in complete disagreement with the Romanian standpoint
with regard to the mentioned principles on which Romania based
its policy in 1968 in relation to the events in Czechoslovakia.”33
From that moment on, the Romanian embassies continued to
inform Bucharest about the historic events that unfolded rapidly
throughout ECE. Thus, they provided accurate reports on events
such as: the decision made by the Hungarian authorities to permit
the GDR citizens to emigrate to the FRG;34 the inauguration of the
Polish reply to the viewpoint of the Political Executive Committee of the RCP
and the President Nicolae Ceauşescu, 166.
32
Informarea Ambasadei României la Budapesta către Ministerul Afacerilor
Externe, 24 august 1989, ora 14:15 (Report of the Romanian Embassy in Budapest
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 24 August 1989, 1415 hours), in Preda and
Retegan, eds., The breakdown of the European communist regimes, 170–71.
33
Ibid., 171.
34
Nota Ambasadei României la Budapesta către Ministerul Afacerilor Externe,
11 septembrie 1989, ora 14:15 (Note of the Romanian Embassy in Budapest to
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 11 September 1989, 1415 hours), in Preda and
Retegan, eds., The breakdown of the European communist regimes, 192–93.
31
210
conjunctural FactorS
Mazowiecki government in Poland;35 the mass demonstrations in the
East German city of Leipzig;36 the dissolution of the HSWP;37 and
the events in East Germany that culminated with the fall of the Berlin
Wall on 9 November 1989.38 The changes in ECE continued to
proceed at a rapid pace: on 10 November the Romanian embassy in
Sofia reported on the dismissal of Todor Zhivkov from the position
of Secretary General of the CC of the Bulgarian Communist Party.39
Beginning with 20 November, worrisome messages were also sent
by the Romanian embassy in Prague.40
On 20 November 1989, the Fourteenth Congress of the RCP
opened its session in Bucharest. In his report to the Congress, which
lasted five hours and a half, Ceauşescu, totally removed from reality,
spoke about the “active participation of the whole [Romanian] society
for defending the revolutionary achievements.” Obedient and
Raportul Ambasadei României la Varşovia către Ministerul Afacerilor Externe,
17 septembrie 1989, ora 17:00 (Report of the Romanian Embassy in Warsaw to
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 17 September 1989, 1700 hours), in Preda and
Retegan, eds., The breakdown of the European communist regimes, 196–99.
36
Raportul Ambasadei României la Berlin către Ministerul Afacerilor Externe, 3
octombrie 1989, ora 15:00 (Report of the Romanian Embassy in Berlin to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 3 October 1989, 1500 hours), in Preda and Retegan,
eds., The breakdown of the European communist regimes, 208–209.
37
Nota Ambasadei României la Budapesta către Ministerul Afacerilor Externe, 7
octombrie 1989, ora 23:30 (Note of the Romanian Embassy in Budapest to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7 October 1989, 2330 hours), in Preda and Retegan,
eds., The breakdown of the European communist regimes, 217–18.
38
See Documents: 145; 146; 148; 149; and 150, in Preda and Retegan, eds.,
The breakdown of the European communist regimes, 282–89.
39
Nota Ambasadei României la Sofia către Ministerul Afacerilor Externe, 10
noiembrie 1989, ora 18:40 (Note of the Romanian Embassy in Sofia to the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, 10 November 1989, 1840 hours), in Preda and Retegan, eds.,
The breakdown of the European communist regimes, 291.
40
See Documents: 164; 165; 172; 176; 181; 184; 186; and 188, in Preda and
Retegan, eds., The breakdown of the European communist regimes, 306–46.
35
conjunctural FactorS
211
frightened, the RCP elite did nothing to reform the Party from within
at this last congress of the RCP, which was held on 20–24 November
1989. Silviu Curticeanu, a top communist official close to Ceauşescu
during his last period in power, affirmed that the “authentic
antechamber of the end [of communism] was the last ‘great forum of
Romanian communists.’”41 It may be argued that the outcome of the
Fourteenth Congress of the RCP determined the nature of the 1989
revolution. Some ten days before the opening of the RCP Congress,
the Bulgarian communists had ousted Zhivkov, the supreme leader
of their Party. The Romanian communists did not have the courage
to proceed in a similar manner, which also contributed to the violent
nature of the Romanian 1989 revolution. Official information from
abroad however continued to flow towards Bucharest until 23
December 1989. Afterwards, the Romanian embassies started to send
home messages of solidarity with the newly established National
Salvation Front (NSF) and to condemn the “criminal Nicolae
Ceauşescu for his acts through which, for a quarter of a century,
established in Romania a regime of dictatorship and terror.”42
As shown above, the Party, the military and the Securitate were
very well informed about the unfolding of events in the communist
countries of ECE. Therefore, many of those around Ceauşescu were
psychologically prepared for similar events to take place in Romania.
Colonel Filip Teodorescu, a former top Securitate officer, confesses
that in October 1989, while keeping under surveillance a Westerner
allegedly spying on Romania, he overheard that the fall of Ceauşescu
was planned for 25 December 1989. The same Teodorescu maintains
Curticeanu, The testimony of a lived history, 365.
Among the first to do so was the Romanian Embassy in Belgrade. See Nota
Ambasadei României la Belgrad către Ministerul Afacerilor Externe, 23 decembrie
1989, ora 17:30 (Note of the Romanian Embassy in Belgrade to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, 23 December 1989, 1730 hours), in Preda and Retegan, eds., The
breakdown of the European communist regimes, 487.
41
42
212
conjunctural FactorS
that information gathered during the Fourteenth Congress of the
RCP especially via surveillance of foreign delegates to the Congress
allowed him to conclude that “an action was planned outside the
country” in order to put an end to the Ceausescu regime.43 Even
more telling is the way in which the commander in chief of the Timiş
county Militia, colonel Ion Deheleanu, evaluated the situation in
Timişoara on 17 December 1989, one day after the unrest sparked
in the city. That day colonel Deheleanu saluted the group of high
rank officers coming from Bucharest to assess the situation with the
words: “Could the whole General Inspectorate of the Militia come…
Everything is finished, the accounts are settled.”44
Further research is nevertheless necessary in order to reconstruct
the atmosphere of those days at the top and medium levels of the
hierarchy of the army, Party, and the Securitate. At the actual stage
of research it can only be stated that the Party and the major
institutions of the State were accurately informed about the unfolding
of events in the countries of Sovietized ECE. Nevertheless, it is
difficult to assess the quality and nature of information Ceauşescu
received in that period. Many authors blamed Elena Ceauşescu for
censoring the “unpleasant” information received from abroad and
providing his husband only with doctored evidence. A former
Romanian top official, who wished to remain anonymous, stated in
a discussion with this author that the information that reached
Ceauşescu was usually filtered twice: by Emil Bobu and Elena
Ceauşescu. It is therefore reasonable to argue that, apart from his
ideological orthodoxy, Ceauşescu himself was also misinformed on
Filip Teodorescu, Un risc asumat: Timişoara, decembrie 1989 (A risk
undertaken: Timişoara, December 1989) (Bucharest: Editura Viitorul Românesc,
1992), 38–40.
44
Quoted in General Ion Pitulescu, ed., Şase zile care au zguduit România:
Ministerul de interne în decembrie 1989 (Six days that shook Romania: The Ministry
of Internal Affairs in December 1989) (Bucharest: n.p., 1995), 82.
43
conjunctural FactorS
213
the real proportions of the “snowball effect.” At the same time,
numerous secret police and army commanders, as well as many
party activists were rather well informed and consequently remained
passive during the crucial days of 21–22 December 1989. In this
respect, Curticeanu’s assertion has to be taken seriously: “The truth
is only one, that the ending as we know it was so rapid also because
none of us [the CC members] did anything to help him [Ceauşescu],
because each of us wished and waited for his political demise as a
liberation from an existence that had become insupportable [original
emphasis].”45 This assertion is also supported by the fact that
military and Securitate commanders, such as the generals Vasile
Milea, the Ministry of National Defense, and Iulian Vlad, the
commander of the Securitate, repeatedly ordered their troops not
to shoot to kill the protesters.46
domestic Conjuncture
The Romanian communist regime proved to be also vulnerable in
terms of domestic conjuncture. Although the internal conjunctural
factors contributed to a lesser extent to the final demise of the
regime, they should not be neglected. Some factors were indeed of
minor importance. For instance, during the period 16–22
December 1989 the weather was exceptionally mild both in
Timişoara and Bucharest. A revolutionary from Timişoara recalls:
“Since the events started to unfold, the weather was on our side.
The sky was clear and it was unusually warm for the month of
45
46
Curticeanu, The testimony of a lived history, 484.
Pitulescu, ed., The Ministry of Internal Affairs in December 1989, 181–82.
214
conjunctural FactorS
December.”47 This is not to say that had the weather been bad, the
1989 revolution would have not taken place. Nevertheless, the
springlike weather played a role in creating an almost surreal
atmosphere that contributed to the appearance of the short-lived
sense of solidarity by a majority of the population during those days
of December 1989.
Having said this, let us turn to an important internal conjunctural
factor: the coming of age of the 1967–1969 baby boom resulted from
the policy of forced natality launched by Ceauşescu after his coming
to power in 1965. The issue needs a closer examination, so that some
background information would be useful. On 1 October 1966, the
Romanian Council of State issued Decree 770, which practically
banned abortion. The 1966 banning of abortion led to a sudden
increase in population over the period 1967–1969. In 1967, for
instance, the number of births was nearly double in comparison with
the preceding year.48 As Pavel Câmpeanu has shown, before the
banning of abortion there were 250,000 births per year in Romania,
while in 1967 the number of births rose to 500,000.49
The concept of political socialization has a particular relevance
when applied in relation to the 1967–1969 generation in Romania.
According to David Easton, political socialization refers to “those
developmental processes through which persons acquire political
orientations and patterns of behavior.”50 One should note that the
1967–1969 generation was in its majority urbanized – it was also
named the “first generation born in blocks of flats.” Furthermore,
See the account of Dan Ştefan Opriş in Milin, Timişoara in revolution and
after, 102. See also Stelian Tănase, Miracolul revoluţiei (The miracle of the
revolution) (Bucharest: Editura Humanitas, 1999), 268.
48
Gail Kligman, The Politics of Duplicity: Controlling Reproduction in Ceauşescu’s
Romania (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 52–59.
49
Câmpeanu, Ceauşescu, the countdown years, 275–77.
50
David Easton, “The Theoretical Relevance of Political Socialization,” in Louis
J. Cantori, ed., Comparative Political Systems (Boston: Holbrook Press, 1974), 198.
47
conjunctural FactorS
215
that generation was raised in a climate of relative stability and modest
economic improvements during the late 1960s and early 1970s. (As
shown above, in Romania the economic crisis was felt beginning in
the late 1970s.) Consequently, this generation went through a
different process of political socialization and had different
expectations than the generation of their parents. Furthermore, the
1967–1969 generation took advantage of the technological
improvements brought about by communism, such as radio and
television, and was therefore much more exposed to the international
media. This issue, which deserves further elaboration, is addressed
in a separate section below.
As the figures concerning the victims of the revolution show, the
young generation joined immediately the protest and was extremely
active during the December 1989 events. Thus, by looking at the
age groups to which the victims of revolution belong one can get an
overall image regarding the involvement of the young generation in
the Romanian revolution of 1989. According to the calculations of
the Ministry of Internal Affairs concerning the period 17–21
December 1989, the total number of victims of the revolution in
Timişoara amounts to 376. Of them, 73 persons were killed and 303
injured. In terms of age groups, the victims can be arranged into the
following categories: (1) up to 15 years of age: 8; (2) between 15 and
25 years of age: 133; (3) between 25 and 35 years: 120; (4) between
35 and 45 years: 81; (5) over 45 years: 34. As one can easily see, the
most active persons in the 1989 revolution were those aged between
15–25 years (133 victims) and 25–35 years (120 victims).51
Nevertheless, such a calculation tells little about the numbers of
the participants to the revolution. In this respect, there are no reliable
statistics. However, the overwhelming majority of the witness
Pitulescu, ed., The Ministry of Internal Affairs in December 1989, 100–101.
For the names of the victims of the revolution in Timişoara (16–26 December
1989) see Mioc, The revolution in Timişoara, 226–41.
51
216
conjunctural FactorS
accounts, memoirs, and testimonies of those who participated to the
revolution in cities such as Timişoara, Arad, Sibiu, Tîrgu Mureş,
Bucharest, Braşov, and Cluj speak about the massive involvement of
the young generation in the revolution. For instance, a witness recalls
that on 16 December 1989, somewhere after 1800 hours, there were
“numerous youngsters, pupils and students” in the Maria (Mary)
Square in Timişoara staying in the front of the house of reverend
Tökés.52 This piece of information is confirmed by a report by the
Ministry of Internal Affairs, which mentions the presence of
numerous young people in the area on 16 December.53 An interesting
aspect of the revolution in Timişoara is that students did not join
immediately the revolution, while the young workers did.54 A witness
recalls that on Sunday, 17 December, around 2300–2400 hours a
group of around 100 young workers came out of the workers’
dormitories in Calea Buziaşului shouting “Romanians, join us!” and
“Down with Ceauşescu!”55 As already noted, of the total number of
376 victims in Timişoara during the period 17–21 December, 185
were workers.56 Another participant to the 1989 revolution in
Timişoara remembers that many youngsters were shouting antiCeauşescu slogans, while others were imitating Ceauşescu’s manner
of waving his hand.57
The participants to the events in Bucharest during the period 21
– 22 December 1989 tell similar stories about the involvement of
Miodrag Milin, “Azi în Timişoara, mîine-n toată ţara!” (Today in Timişoara,
tomorrow in the whole country!), in Timişoara: 16–22 Decembrie 1989 (Timişoara:
Editura Facla, 1990), 53.
53
Pitulescu, ed., The Ministry of Internal Affairs in December 1989, 71.
54
Ibid., 80.
55
See the account of Gliguţă Avram (injured in the revolution), in Mioc, The
revolution in Timişoara, 40.
56
Pitulescu, ed., The Ministry of Internal Affairs in December 1989, 100.
57
See the account of Dan Ştefan Opriş in Milin, Timişoara in revolution and
after, 34–35.
52
conjunctural FactorS
217
the young generation in the revolution. A participant to the mass
rally of 21 December, Hermina Ştirbulescu, told this author that
when the meeting was disrupted she ran away. However, she recalls
that she felt ashamed of running away while many youngsters, who
were shouting slogans against the Ceauşescu regime, were appealing
to the crowds to remain in the University Square and continue to
protest. Other accounts speak of the courage of the youngsters who
tried to negotiate with the riot police on the day of 21 December.58
Nearby the Dalles Hall, in downtown Bucharest, a memorial plaque
reads: “Mihai Gâtlan, 19 years, fallen on 21 December 1989, 1730
hours. With him, other 12 youngsters died.”59
International media fueled domestic discontent through the
transmission of anti-regime messages and dissemination of images of the
more affluent Western societies, which created an acute sense of frustration
among a majority of the population in Romania. It was through the
mechanism presented below that the external conjuncture played an
important role in the collapse of the Romanian communist regime.
International media and the collapse of romanian
communism
Considering the reaction by the overwhelming majority of the
population in December 1989, one is compelled to address a rather
simple question: What determined the pro-active stances by the
population against the regime during the period 17–22 December
1989? The answer is by no means simple. This section proposes a
historical analysis of the way in which international media contributed
in keeping alive, or in developing, a spirit of opposition towards the
regime in communist Romania. Due to an intricate historical process,
58
59
Perva and Roman, The mysteries of the Romanian revolution, 42–43.
Urdăreanu, 1989 – Witness and participant, 117.
218
conjunctural FactorS
by the end of the 1980s a large majority of the population used to
listen to the information broadcast in Romanian by international
radio stations and trust in general the information transmitted.
In order to investigate the above-mentioned process, the present
chapter concentrates on the international broadcasting in the
languages of ECE and takes into consideration long- and short-term
processes. Furthermore, this analysis is based on the concepts of
communication and propaganda. Communication is understood as
the transmission of factual, straight information that observes the
ethics of the transmission of information. Propaganda refers to mass
persuasion, i.e., to the role of communication during the Cold War
psychological warfare and the battle that opposed pro-democracy
propaganda to communist propaganda. Although the focus of this
chapter is communist Romania, when appropriate, reference is made
to the representative events in other communist countries in ECE.
This section is structured on two parts. The first part discusses the
Western, mainly American, efforts of international persuasion and
anticommunist propaganda during the Cold War period (1949–1989)
and concentrates mainly on the activity of Radio Free Europe (RFE).60
It also analyzes the way in which RFE covered the first major event
that shook the communist bloc, i.e. the 1956 Hungarian Revolution
and how the broadcasting policy of RFE changed after that event.
The second part addresses a more specific issue: the role of the
international media in picturing, on the one hand, an idealized image
of the “capitalistic” West and “the American way of life” and, on the
other hand, in keeping alive the spirit of opposition in communist
ECE. The argument put forward in this part is that, by emphasizing
the great diversity of consumer goods produced by capitalism, this
For a full analysis of the way in which the United States conducted their
Cold War psychological warfare, see Michael J. Sproule, Propaganda and Democracy:
The American Experience of Media and Mass Persuasion (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1997).
60
conjunctural FactorS
219
sort of propaganda constantly undermined the communist
propagandistic efforts. This part also discusses the specific role
international media played in bringing down the Ceauşescu regime
through the continuous flow of information which, after the coming
to power of Gorbachev in March 1985 and especially during the
“miraculous year” 1989, created a special state of mind among the
population. The analysis also focuses on international media’s strategy
of making use of both communication and propaganda, that is, of
combining the transmission of straight information with more
sophisticated methods of influencing public opinion. This kind of
information, broadcast mainly by RFE, had an appreciable impact
on the populations living under communist regimes, and eventually
contributed to the appearance of the chain reaction that led to the
collapse of communism in ECE. Arguably, international media played
an important role in revealing and, by means of sophisticated methods
of mass communication, (over)emphasizing the structural flaws of
the communist system. By doing this, it contributed to the shaping
of the political cultures of resistance in communist countries, and
speeded up the process that culminated with the final demise of
communist regimes. The following analysis demonstrates that, due
to the specificity of the Romanian communism, i.e., the regime and
community political cultures, international media had a strong impact
on the collapse of communism in Romania. At the same time, one
should be aware of the fact that international media had a more
limited impact on the collapse of other communist regimes in ECE.
In Hungary, for instance, due to the legacy of the 1956 revolution
that shaped both the regime and community political cultures,
international media had a less significant influence on the final demise
of the communist regime. At the same time, international media
played, for better or worse, a major role in the 1956 Hungarian
revolution.
220
conjunctural FactorS
the cold war propaganda warfare
Since the present analysis is also concerned with propaganda warfare,
a brief survey of the structure of Western broadcasting in foreign
languages during the Cold War period would contribute to a better
understanding of the argument put forward by this part. According
to George R. Urban, who was the director of Radio Free Europe
between 1983 and 1986, there were two main streams of broadcasting
in the national languages of Sovietized Europe.61 A first category was
represented by the programs of radio stations such as British
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Voice of America (VOA),
Deutsche Welle (DW), Radio Vatican, etc. The main goal of these
radio stations, however, was to promote the political, economic,
cultural etc. interests of their governments. In other words, although
they had an interest in the fate of the populations under Soviet-type
regimes, their main purpose was to pursue their own national
interests. A second type comprised Radio Free Europe (RFE) and
Radio Liberty (RL), sponsored by the United States government.
Both radio stations started their activity in 1951–1952, in Munich,
Germany. Radio Free Europe broadcast in the languages of the “other
Europe” and, more importantly, its scope was to identify itself with
the aspirations, national sentiments, and cultural traditions of the
populations that fell under Soviet occupation in the aftermath of
World War II. Equally important, its role was to keep alive the hope
of liberation and self-determination in those countries. As Urban
aptly put it, the role of RFE was to speak to “Poles as Poles, Czechs
as Czechs.”62 Radio Liberty had a more complicated mission, since
it was destined to speak to the whole population of the Soviet Union.
One should keep in mind that Soviet Union was, in fact, a colonial
George R. Urban, Radio Free Europe and the Pursuit of Democracy: My War
Within the Cold War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), ix-x.
62
Urban, Radio Free Europe, 2.
61
conjunctural FactorS
221
empire, and the radio had to address not only Russians, but also
Ukrainians and other non-Russian populations with different agendas
towards self-determination and national fulfillment, so the
effectiveness of RL was seriously diminished.
There were also the critical events that shook communism in ECE
to which RFE had to react and exploit in order to undermine the
communist power in the respective countries. Events of this kind were
the Hungarian 1956 revolution, the 1968 Prague Spring or the 1981
birth of Polish Solidarity. For instance, one of the most controversial
issues related to the broadcasting policy of RFE in the 1950s was its
involvement in the 1956 Hungarian revolution. Some authors have
argued that RFE, through its Hungarian-language broadcasts,
irresponsibly misled the insurgents and made them believe that a
Western intervention on the side of the revolution was imminent.
Recent analyses have revealed that is was an unfortunate interplay of
misleading passionate comments and analyses from the part of the staff
of the Hungarian Section of RFE, and a great deal of wishful thinking
from the part of the revolutionaries who wanted to believe that the
American administration was going to intervene militarily in order to
support them. A brief survey of the RFE coverage of the 1956
Hungarian revolution would help one understand better why the
broadcasting policy of RFE changed in the aftermath of the 1956
Hungarian Revolution. Equally important, such an analysis would
provide more elements for investigating the way in which the Romanian
desk of RFE responded to the December 1989 events in Romania.
The 1956 Hungarian revolution broke out on 23 October,
sparked by a demonstration of students from different universities
in Budapest. The events in Hungary were also stirred by the
spectacular changes that had taken place in Poland – the June uprising
of the workers at the Stalin Works in Poznan and the return to power
of Gomułka, who was reelected as supreme leader of the party at the
Eighth Plenary Meeting of PUWP, held on 19–21 October 1956 –
which were extensively covered by RFE. As Urban perceptively put it:
222
conjunctural FactorS
Radio management would have done well to recognize without delay
the implications of Gomułka’s rehabilitation and popular acceptance
in Poland, and the enthusiasm with which Hungary’s mushrooming
student circles, schoolchildren’s parliaments, dissident intellectual
associations, and other “assemblies” were adopting and then beginning
to apply the Polish example to Hungarian conditions, the culmination
of the trend being the demand for Imre Nagy’s return to power.63
Nikita Khrushchev’s “secret speech” to the Twentieth Congress
of the CPSU in February 1956 contributed in many respects to the
appearance of the Polish October and the sparking of the Hungarian
Revolution later that year. It was in Hungary where Stalinists were
the first to lose influence after the death of Stalin in March 1953. In
July 1953, the Hungarian Stalinist leadership was forced to resign
and Imre Nagy – who would become the main figure of the
Hungarian Revolution of 1956 – became Prime Minister. However,
the first outburst of social discontent following the historic
condemnation by Khrushchev of the crimes committed by Stalin
against Party members occurred in Poland. The June 1956 revolt of
the Polish workers in Poznan had a significant influence on the
sparking of the revolution in Hungary. Paul Lendvai, for instance,
affirmed that in Hungary “demonstrations of sympathy with Poland
on 23 October 1956 turned out to be a direct prelude to
revolution.”64 A brief survey of the 1956 events in Poland would be
therefore useful. Thus, on 28 June 1956, in the context of a sharp
economic decline, in the town of Poznan the workers from the Stalin
Works went on strike.65 The protesters marched into town demanding
a wage increase, more dwellings for workers, and a revision of the
stiff working norms and high taxation. The crowd marched towards
Ibid., 229.
Paul Lendvai, Hungary: The Art of Survival (London: I.B. Tauris & Co.,
1988), 47.
65
Kennedy, Professionals, Power and Solidarity in Poland, 26.
63
64
conjunctural FactorS
223
the center of the city where the demonstration took a violent form.
The communist authorities intervened swiftly and savagely: the army
fired at the demonstrators and, according to independent Polish
sources, the number of victims amounted to 74 people killed and
400 wounded.66 The bloody repression of the uprising led to a crisis
at the top of the PUWP. In the end, Gomułka, the wartime leader
of the Polish communists who had been ousted in the late 1940s for
his insistence on establishing a “Polish path to socialism” returned
to power on 21 October 1956.
As already mentioned, the revolution in Hungary was initiated by
the student manifestation of 23 October 1956. The demonstrators met
at the statue of General Bem, a Polish general who led the Hungarian
revolutionary forces in the 1849 battles against the Habsburgs. Numerous
inhabitants of Budapest joined the demonstration, so that the crowd
that gathered at the statue numbered tens of thousands.67 The same
night, the crowd removed the statue of Stalin so that only a pair of
boots remained on the pedestal. Almost at the same time, the
protesters stormed the building of the public radio, and shots were
fired by both those who guarded the building and from the part of
the insurgents. Some authors consider that the storming of the public
radio marked the beginning of the armed revolt.68 From that moment
on, the events unfolded rapidly. Imre Nagy, who was named Prime
Minister, made efforts to find a political solution to the crisis while
the revolution spread throughout the country. On 27 October, a
Ibid.
Following the Polish model – the coming back to power of Gomulka – many
shouted slogans such as: “Imre Nagy into the government!” Nagy, who was outside
Budapest, and returned to the city in the morning of 23 October, was asked in the
evening to speak to a crowd of around 200,000 people who waited for him in the
front of the building of Parliament. Nagy spoke indeed to the demonstrators, but
his discourse tried to appease the crowd, and many left frustrated.
68
György Litván, ed., The Hungarian Revolution of 1956: Reform, Revolt and
Repression 1953–1963 (London: Longman, 1996), 58.
66
67
224
conjunctural FactorS
new government composed of less compromised communists was
announced and on 1 November Nagy informed Yurii V. Andropov,
the Soviet ambassador, about Hungary’s decision the step back from
the Warsaw Treaty Organization. In the evening, Nagy announced
on the radio that Hungary proclaimed its neutrality. During the
period 1–4 November, the pace of changes indicated a clear trend
towards the establishment of a democratic political order. On 4
November 1956, the Soviet troops attacked Budapest and put an
end to the Nagy’s government activity. János Kádár, who silently left
the revolutionary camp and sought refuge to the Soviets, returned
with the Soviet tanks and, on 7 November 1956, his new pro-Soviet
government was officially instated.
During the 1950s, no similar events occurred in Romania. As
shown below, crucial events on which RFE had an appreciable
influence occurred much later, i.e. in December 1989. However,
since not many authors have addressed the Romanian reaction to the
1956 Hungarian revolution, some details are necessary. The
Romanian communist elite condemned the Hungarian revolution
and succeeded in convincing the Soviets of their profound loyalty all
the more that the 1956 events in Poland and Hungary favored the
strategy of the Romanian Stalinist leader, Gheorghiu-Dej, to preserve
his personal power and avoid de-Stalinization. The population,
however, sympathized with the insurgents and numerous individuals
expressed their solidarity with the Hungarian revolution in those
days.69 In the city of Timişoara, the manifestations of sympathy
towards the Hungarian revolution were the most virulent. As one of
See especially the reports by the Securitate informers regarding the popular
reactions to the 1956 Hungarian revolution in Corneliu Mihai Lungu and Mihai
Retegan, eds., 1956 – Explozia: Percepţii române, iugoslave şi sovietice asupra
evenimentelor din Polonia şi Ungaria (1956 – The explosion: Romanian, Yugoslav
and Soviet perceptions of the events of Poland and Hungary) (Bucharest: Editura
Univers Enciclopedic, 1996).
69
conjunctural FactorS
225
the participants confessed, students listened avidly to foreign radio
stations, including Radio Budapest, searching for news about the
course of events in the neighboring country. In Timişoara, the unrest
developed slowly among the students from 23 to 30 October, when
a mass meeting was called. The regime reacted swiftly and ruthlessly
to hamper the spreading of the protest and thus, between 30 and 31
October 1956, the army and the secret police occupied the student
campus and around 3,000 students were arrested. From among those
arrested 31 people were eventually put on trial and sentenced to terms
varying from 2 to 8 years in prison.70 Although the protest was
savagely suppressed, the population of Timişoara kept alive the spirit
of anticommunist resistance and it was in Timişoara that the 1989
Romanian revolution was sparked.
As far as the broadcasting policy of RFE is concerned, the 1956
events in Hungary provoked significant changes. During the days of
the Hungarian Revolution, many of the insurgents believed that the
West would support them. Furthermore, many took literally the
American propaganda. True, some rather irresponsible comments
and appeals coming from RFE led many Hungarians to believe that
their sacrifice was not in vain. As far as the broadcasting policy of
RFE is concerned, some argued that the staff of the Hungarian Service
was too right wing, which could explain the nature of comments and
appeals broadcast in those days. Others stated that something was
wrong at the management level of RFE. Whatever the explanation,
a profound misunderstanding did occur. A young Hungarian
revolutionary spoke in bitter words of the tragedy of a majority of
the revolutionaries who thought that their revolt would be supported
by the West: “Words like ‘freedom,’ ‘struggle for national honor,’
‘roll-back,’ and ‘liberation’ have meanings…. If America wants to
With regard to the 1956 events in Timişoara a precious witness account is
Aurel Baghiu, Printre gratii (Through the bars) (Cluj: Editura Zamolxis, 1995),
esp. 7–24.
70
226
conjunctural FactorS
flood Eastern and Central Europe with these words, it must
acknowledge ultimate responsibility for them. Otherwise you are
inciting nations to commit suicide.”71
Nevertheless, one should bear in mind that RFE did not provoke
the 1956 revolution. Indeed, as Urban’s thorough analysis shows,
the Hungarian-language programs of RFE caused profound
misinterpretations during the 23 October–4 November 1956 events.72
What is important for the present analysis, however, is that from
1956 onwards the policy of the Radio changed. Consequently, during
the following crises of world communism – Prague 1968, Gdansk
1980, ECE 1989 – no 1956–like appeals to frontal challenge were
ever made. At the same time, the strategy of RFE relied upon a
sophisticated combination of communication and propaganda meant
to nurture domestic opposition to the communist regimes in ECE.
The way in which such a strategy worked in the case of Romania is
addressed below.
ceauşescu’s romania: From disenchantment to revolution
As already mentioned, the case of Romania is unique because the
international media and especially the Romanian desk of Radio Free
Europe played a major role in the collapse of the communist regime.
One should explain, however, why the international media was so
influential, and why the overwhelming majority of Romania’s
population listened to the programs of the foreign radio stations. The
answer is by no means simple, since it requires a detailed analysis of the
period of decline that started around 1977. Between 1981 and 1989,
Romania experienced a period of deep economic crisis, cultural
autarchy, ethno-national propaganda, and widespread malaise. In
71
72
Quoted in Urban, Radio Free Europe, 220.
See Urban, Radio Free Europe, 239–42.
conjunctural FactorS
227
this context, two major trends converged and made an overwhelming
majority of the population pay a special attention to international
media.
First, it was about the emergence of an idealized image of the
West. This led to a growing interest among the population, especially
among the younger generations, for Western cultural products.
Because of the economic crisis and the policy of cultural autarky
enforced by the regime, indigenous cultural products were prevalent,
from books to music and movies. Therefore, there is no wonder that
audiences deserted and looked elsewhere for something new and
entertaining. However, the quest for Western cultural products led
also to a habit of listening to the programs in Romanian language
broadcast by foreign radio stations. Among these, RFE programs
featured prominently and contributed in many ways to the
development of anti-regime stances among younger audiences.
Second, it was the character of the public life in the 1980s that
determined a total mistrust of a majority of the population towards
the official press, radio, and television. People were simply exasperated
by the official propaganda, which spoke unrelentingly of the allegedly
unparalleled achievements of the communist regime under the “wise
guidance” of Nicolae Ceauşescu, the “Genius of the Carpathians.”
The real situation was very different, and people knew it. Therefore,
when they wanted to find more about recent international and
domestic events they turned to foreign radio stations of which, again,
RFE was usually the first choice.
The idealized image of the West. An idealized, even mythical, image
of the prosperous West emerged among the populations living under
“really existing socialism.” Such an image, continuously nurtured by
the international media, contributed significantly to the breakdown
of communism. A famous scene from the movie Megáll az idő (Time
stands still) by the Hungarian film director Péter Gothár, wonderfully
epitomizes this aspect. In post-1956 communist Hungary, at a party,
someone brings a bottle of Coca-Cola – one of the most desired
228
conjunctural FactorS
beverages among the young generation under communism and one
of the strongest symbols of the West and the “American way of life.”
After sipping from his glass of Coke, one of the participants effectively
gets drunk and has to be carried home by his brother and some
friends.73 This scene is perhaps the best illustration of how powerful
the myth of the capitalistic West was among the young generations
living in the Sovietized countries in ECE. Nevertheless, one should
be reminded that in the late 1980s Hungary was better off than many
of the other communist countries in ECE. To be sure, an idealized
image of the West existed also in Hungary in the late 1980s but
Kádár’s “gulyás communism” elevated the living standard to a certain
extent and reduced accordingly the level of frustration among the
population. An album published by András Gerő and Iván Pető,
which reconstructs the atmosphere in Hungary during the Kádár era
by combining photographs and press reports, conveys a convincing
overall image of that period.74
The case of Romania is perhaps more emblematic in analyzing
the way in which international media contributed in spreading a
mythical image of the affluent, capitalistic West. As shown above,
until the mid-1970s the regime had something to offer to Romania’s
population at large. Industrialization, urbanization, spread of
education, acceptable sanitation, rather fair chances of upward
mobility, all these led to a “tacit deal” between the regime and society.
Beginning in the early 1980s, however, the economic policy of the
Ceauşescu regime plunged the country into a deep economic crisis,
characterized by food rationing measures for bread, sugar, cooking
oil and other basic foodstuffs. Simultaneously, in order to reduce the
external debt of the country, the regime drastically reduced imports,
which deepened further the food crisis. In the conditions of economic
Péter Gothár, Megáll az idő (Time stands still), 99 min., 1981.
See András Gerő and Iván Pető, Unfinished Socialism: Pictures from the Kádár
Era (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1999).
73
74
conjunctural FactorS
229
failure described above, the West, with its affluence and freedom,
became a sort of Paradise on Earth in the minds of the ordinary
Romanians. Such a representation of the West nurtured to some
extent the political cultures of the resistance in communist Romania.
As a Western scholar aptly put it:
It is perhaps a sad but significant fact that the biggest factor in the fall
of East European communism was not the desperate striving for political
freedom so much as a desire for a Western standard of living seen on
Western television which East Europeans could pick up, a standard of
living that communist governments could not deliver.75
This silent, long-term process of imagining the affluent West
undermined significantly the efforts of the regime aimed at a total
control of the society. It is also true that such a widespread, distorted
image of the capitalistic West aggravated the syndrome of
“civilizational incompetence.” People were not used to work hard,
face competition and take risks, which led to difficult problems of
adaptation to a functioning market economy in post-communist
Romania. Turning to the situation in the 1980s, it should be mentioned
that Western consumer goods became for many Romanians a sort
of cult objects. Those who received parcels from the West used to
invite their relatives or friends to the “ceremony” of parcel opening
to admire together the colorful labels and nice packages, and have a
taste of good life. Brand names such as Fa and Lux (toilet soap), Kent
(cigarettes) or Rifle (Italian-made blue jeans) were synonymous with
the affluent West. Western products were so desired that average
Romanians developed strange habits. When they could procure from
the black market a scented soap, say, a Fa soap – the German brand
was particularly desired in communist Romania, they did not use it:
they placed it inside the wardrobe to scent the clothes and the
underwear. Furthermore, chronic shortages of consumer goods led
Ian Adams, Political Ideology Today (Manchester: Manchester University
Press, 2001), 284.
75
230
conjunctural FactorS
to a politicization of consumption and to an increased attraction to
Western goods. As Katherine Verdery put it: “You could spend an
entire month’s salary on a pair of blue jeans, for instance, but it was
worth it: wearing them signified that you could get something the
system said you didn’t need and shouldn’t have.”76
The idealized image of the capitalistic West and the “American
way of life” also spread through informal networks of videocassettes.
In many cases, communist officials or secret police officers brought
such tapes to Romania and fuelled the networks.77 In the late 1980s,
a video player was also seen as a symbol of material affluence that
one should rather conceal. For instance, a joke that circulated in
Bucharest at the time reads as follows:
A kid was playing in the front of the block together with other kids
whose parents and grandparents were sitting nearby. He saw his mom
coming from work and shouted out: ‘Mom, which is the most secret
thing, that papa listens to the Radio Free Europe, or that we’ve bought
ourselves a video player?’78
Verdery, What Was Socialism, and What Comes Next? 29. Actually, in the
1980s, a pair of blue jeans was sold on the black market for 1,400–1,500 lei. To
have an idea of how much that sum meant, it would be useful to mention that in
1987, this author, as a young engineer in his first year of activity, had a monthly
salary of 2,160 lei.
77
It was said that, in the late 1980s, communist Romania had the largest
number of videocassette recorders (VCRs) per capita of all the communist countries
in ECE. Although such an assertion is difficult to prove, if one looks into the
advertising pages of the daily newspaper România liberă of the late 1980s, one can
find numerous announcements for VCRs offered for sale by individuals. One
should also note that the overwhelming majority of the population could not afford
to buy a VCR. At the time, on the black market the cheapest VCR was sold at an
average price of 45,000 lei, which was equivalent to 20 medium monthly salaries.
Considering the prohibitive prices of video players, not to speak of video recorders,
collective viewing was predominant.
78
Reproduced in Martor, 72.
76
conjunctural FactorS
231
Nevertheless, as a Romanian sociologist suggested, the informal
videocassette networks did not constitute dissident networks. At the
same time, they contributed decisively to the spread of a mythical
image of the affluent West. Those videotapes spoke – as an
advertisement for the Kent cigarettes reads – about a “magic
moment.”79 A “magic moment,” it must be added, that could be
experienced only in the capitalistic West, and certainly not under
“really existing socialism.”
For those who could not afford a video recorder or did not have
a friend or relative to own one, radio was a cheap and convenient
means of evading from the everyday miseries of late communism.
The official radio and TV broadcast boring, if not totally
uninteresting programs, dedicated mainly to the “most beloved Man
of the Fatherland” and the “Genius of the Carpathians,” i.e. Comrade
Nicolae Ceauşescu. One should be reminded that Romania was a
special case since, during the 1980s, the national TV station broadcast
only two hours in the evening, and almost the whole program was
dedicated to the Ceauşescu ruling couple. For instance, on 27 January
1987, one day after Nicolae Ceauşescu’s anniversary that was
celebrated on 26 January, the national TV station broadcast from 8
P.M. to 10 P.M. as follows:
8:00 P.M. – News;
8:20 P.M. – “We praise the country’s leader!” (Poetry);
8:40 P.M. – “Brilliant theoretician and founder of communism”
(Documentary dedicated to the theoretical work of
comrade Nicolae Ceauşescu);
9:00 P.M. – “We salute the supreme commander!” (Performance
realized by the artistic brigades of the army);
See Bogdan Vasi, “Fenomenul ‘video’ şi mirajul american’ (The “video”
phenomenon and the American mirage), ICS – Iniţiativa Culturală Studenţească
No.3–4 (Bucharest – Tîrgu Mureş) (April – May 1996): 14.
79
232
conjunctural FactorS
9:50 P.M.. – News;
10:00 P.M. – Closing of the program.80
It is therefore understandable why Romanians attempted to forget
the hardships of the everyday life by shifting to the programs of
foreign radio or TV stations.81 Moreover, one should be reminded
that, as compared with East Germany, Czechoslovakia or Hungary,
Romania does not border Western countries. Until 1989, the
neighbors of communist Romania were Hungary, Yugoslavia,
Bulgaria, and the Soviet Union. Consequently, many Romanians
built special TV antennas to receive programs from neighboring
countries. To be sure, the areas located in western Romania, such as
the Timiş and Arad counties, had the advantage of being able to
receive the more liberal programs of the Hungarian and Yugoslav
TV stations. This aspect should not be neglected when analyzing the
relationship between the exposure to the international media and the
anti-regime attitudes in that part of the country. In Bucharest,
however, the only alternative to the official TV program was the
Bulgarian television. At the time, such a situation was subject of
numerous jokes. For instance:
The schoolmistress: Children, tell me please the actions you take in order
to put into effect the Party directives regarding electricity
saving! Popescu!
Reproduced in Sorin Mitu et al., Istorie (History) (Bucharest: Editura Sigma,
1999), 131.
81
To be sure, the regime was worried by the interest of the population in the
programs of foreign radio and TV stations. Although it was not officially confirmed,
in the late 1980s circulated persistent rumors about the alleged request by Ceauşescu
to the managers of the Romanian consumer electronics factories (radio and TV
sets) to design and produce equipment that could only receive the programs of the
national Radio and Television.
80
conjunctural FactorS
233
Popescu: My mother keeps the food on the balcony so that she does not
have to use the refrigerator.
The schoolmistress: Good! Ionescu!
Ionescu: When I come back from school I do not go out to play. Instead,
I start immediately doing my homework, so that in the
evening we do not have to turn on the lights.
The schoolmistress: Good! Bulă!
Bulă: In the evening, we watch the Bulgarian television so that we
consume their electricity!82
As far as “light” musical novelties were concerned, the foreign
radio stations, such as RFE, Voice of America, BBC, Deutsche Welle
etc. were the most listened to. The younger generations, especially,
listened avidly to the late night rock music programs of RFE –
intelligently placed after the political programs, and the Voice of
America. In the conditions of the structural crisis of the late 1980s,
however, the way from rock to opposition towards the regime proved
to be unexpectedly short. Younger generations were more inclined
to protest against the regime than the generation of their parents.
Such a trend did not pass unobserved by the RCP and its secret police.
Documents from the Securitate files show that during the 1980s the
communist secret police was compelled to acknowledge the
“extraordinary audience” the RFE programs had among adolescents
in Romania. The Party was aware that the young public that listened
to the musical programs of RFE could be transformed into a more
politicized public that would contest soon the RCP policies. Measures
were taken to identify and punish the adolescents who were writing
to RFE to ask for musical dedications. For instance, in a report dated
16 February 1985, the Securitate agents informed that three
Dana Maria Niculescu Grasso, Bancurile politice în ţările socialismului real
(Political jokes in the countries of real existing socialism) (Bucharest: Editura
Fundaţiei Culturale Române, 1999), 200.
82
234
conjunctural FactorS
adolescents from Bucharest who had sent messages to the RFE
musical program were identified. Their names were: Liviu Barbu
(Secondary School no. 108), pseudonym Lie; Liviu Constantinescu
(Industrial High School no. 27), pseudonym Lopez; and Daniela
Toniu (Secondary School no. 160), pseudonym Kim. As a
Romanian researcher aptly put it, the Securitate had a major
problem in this respect: It proved to be quite difficult to identify
and punish the hundreds of youngsters who were writing to RFE
under pseudonyms such as Lord John, Marshal Hendrix, Richard
Right, Zoly the 13th, Heavy Metal 21, The Crab with Eyeglasses
or The Yellow Vampire.83
The triangle of Romanian dissidence (1977–1989). During the
1980s, for a large majority of the Romanians the main source of
information with regard to international politics, East-West relations
and Cold War related issues was RFE. Since there are no surveys on
the size of RFE audience in Romania during the communist period,
the researcher is compelled to rely on scarce and unsystematic
information. It may be argued that an appreciable part of the
population used to listen on a regular basis to the RFE programs long
before the effects of the economic crisis of late communism were felt.
Such a tendency was also due to the increase in the number of radio
sets per capita because of the launching of the domestic production
of such consumer goods. The year 1977 was also a turning point in
terms of the population’s interest in the RFE programs. Episodes of
protest against the regime on which the regime kept a total silence,
such as the Goma dissident movement or the massive strike by the
Jiu Valley miners made many Romanians turn to the RFE programs
for details and comments. An unexpected event, i.e. the terrible
For more on this, see Mihai Pelin, Operaţiunile “Meliţa” şi “Eterul:” Istoria
Europei Libere prin documente de Securitate (The “Grinder” and “Aether” operations:
History of Radio Free Europe through documents of the Securitate) (Bucharest:
Editura Albatros, 1999), 278–80.
83
conjunctural FactorS
235
earthquake of 4 March 1977 also made the RFE programs very
popular in Romania. In the aftermath of the earthquake, many of
those living abroad wanted to find out what happened to their close
relatives and friends and RFE, through its non-stop programs, tried
to cope with such a demand. RFE also provided information on the
international efforts to help Romania and, more importantly, spoke
of things that the regime wanted to avoid, such as the improper way
in which the rescue operations were organized and carried out. This
author, for instance, a schoolchild at that time, became acquainted
with the RFE programs during the nights that followed the
earthquake of 4 March 1977.
During the 1980s, however, RFE voiced a sharp criticism of the
Ceauşescu regime based on both foreign and domestic sources. Again,
although there is little systematic information on this topic it is
generally accepted that RFE was one of the most, perhaps the most,
listened foreign radio station in Romania during the 1980s. The
voices of Noel Bernard, Emil Georgescu, Vlad Georgescu, Monica
Lovinescu, Virgil Ierunca or Neculai Constantin Munteanu, to name
only a few, entered every evening the homes of a majority of the
population. It is also important to mention that after the collapse of
the regime many of the former speakers, analysts, and collaborators
of RFE published their diaries, memoirs, or the analyses written at
the time. Such works are also important because they provide
consistent autobiographical information and reveal that, in the
overwhelming majority of the cases, those who worked for, or
collaborated with, the Romanian desk of RFE opposed communism
in the name of democracy and not because of strong right-wing
convictions.84
See, for instance, Monica Lovinescu, La apa Vavilonului/ 2: 1960–1980 (To
Vavilon’s waters/2: 1960–1980) (Bucharest: Editura Humanitas, 2001); Anneli
Ute Gabanyi, The Ceauşescu Cult (Bucharest: The Romanian Cultural Foundation
Publishing House, 2000); Mircea Carp, “Vocea Americii” în România, 1969–1978
84
236
conjunctural FactorS
The way in which the Romanian desk of RFE contributed to the
final demise of communism in Romania deserves a thorough
investigation. As already noted, widespread dissident networks, not
to speak of a Solidarity-like movement, did not develop in Romania.
However, isolate protests did occur and courageous people did speak
openly against the regime. For such an isolated protest to become
vocal enough as to embarrass the regime, two things were obligatory.
First, that the protesters avoid imprisonment; and second, that his
or her message spread among their fellow citizens. A most effective
way to achieve these goals was to inform the Romanian Service of
RFE about such initiatives. This way, international human rights
organizations could be announced in due time and could provide
support and some protection to dissidents by launching international
media campaigns. At the same time, by making their voices heard
through RFE, the few radical dissidents in Romania could reach a
wider audience in order to disseminate their ideas.
Due to the particular conditions described above, in post-1977
Romania developed a particular relational nexus that might be termed
as the triangle of Romanian dissidence. This can be defined as a
relational nexus composed of: (1) the radical dissidents; (2) the
Romanian desk of RFE; and (3) the silent mass of Romanians, unable
or unwilling to articulate a coherent protest. This way, via the
programs of RFE the Romanian dissidents influenced a major part
of Romania’s population and fuelled the growing discontent with
the regime. Some examples would be useful in order to illustrate the
way in which the triangular relational nexus of Romanian dissent
actually functioned. For instance, writer Paul Goma initiated the
(“Voice of America” in Romania, 1969–1978) (Iaşi: Editura Polirom, 1997);
Nicolae Stroescu-Stînişoară, În zodia exilului: Fragmente de jurnal (Under the sign
of exile: Pieces of a diary) (Bucharest: Editura “Jurnalul Literar,” 1994); Noel
Bernard, Aici e Europa Liberă (This is Radio Free Europe) (Bucharest: Editura
Tinerama, 1991).
conjunctural FactorS
237
movement for human rights that bears his name by sending in
January 1977 a letter of solidarity to Pavel Kohout, one of the leaders
of the Czechoslovak Charter 77. Because of his open dissent, Goma
was jailed on 1 April 1977. When the news concerning his
imprisonment reached the Romanian Section of RFE, an
international campaign was immediately launched and contributed
significantly to his liberation. Similarly, another prominent Romanian
dissident, Dan Petrescu, made his ideas known with the help of
international media. His open criticism towards the regime – he
stated clearly that it was the communist system to be blamed for the
disastrous situation of the country and not solely the person of
Nicolae Ceauşescu – spread among the Romanian population
especially due to the programs of RFE.85
It is also true that the information regarding the opponents of the
regime was not always accurate. In Romania, few foreign press
correspondents were dispatched and when they came their travels
throughout the country were closely supervised. It goes without saying
that such press correspondents were denied access to the opponents
of the regime. There were different ways in which such protests
reached the Romanian desk of RFE in Munich. In general,
information arrived in the West through foreign diplomats,
employees of the international companies, recent emigrants, and
foreign lecturers associated with Romanian universities. In some cases,
foreign reporters who decided to undertake great risks did manage
to meet opponents of the regime. For instance, two reporters from
Gamma News Agency realized, in April 1988, an interview with
dissident Dan Petrescu. Shortly afterwards, the two were arrested,
their equipment confiscated and they were expelled from Romania.
Fortunately, a copy of the filmed interview was left behind in safe
hands in the city of Iaşi, where the interview was taken, and smuggled
to the West one year later. Finally, the interview was broadcast by
85
See Petrescu and Cangeopol, What remains to be said, 231–43.
238
conjunctural FactorS
the French TV channel France 3 on 26 January 1989, and
re-transmitted by RFE on 8 February 1989.86
The acerbic comments and analyses broadcast by RFE
contributed decisively to the changing of the mindset of those who
used to listen to such programs. Such people started to cast serious
doubts towards the social, economic, and cultural policies enforced
by the regime, and to develop a spirit of resistance. As the Securitate
files show, the regime was particularly concerned about the persons
that listened and disseminated information broadcast by RFE.87
Announced by an unforgettable tune by the Romanian composer
George Enescu – the main musical theme of his Second Romanian
Rhapsody in D minor, Op. 11 – Actualitatea românească (Romanian
actualities) was perhaps the most popular of the political programs
broadcast by RFE because of its open criticism and pungent satire
of the Ceauşescu regime. One should also mention the courage,
determination and commitment for democratic values of the major
part of those who worked for the Romanian desk of RFE. In
numerous cases, the Romanian desk of RFE made possible the
transmission of dissident messages that were not usually allowed by
the broadcasting policy of the RFE, as established in the aftermath
of the 1956 Hungarian revolution. Some of the commentators or
collaborators of the Romanian desk of RFE went so far as to risk
dismissal because of their support for the isolated voices of the
Romanian opposition.88
For the complete text of the interview see Petrescu and Cangeopol, What
remains to be said, 268–79.
87
For more on this see Ionuţ Dogaru, “Securitatea în anii ’80: Aspecte ilustrative
de poliţie politică” (The Securitate in the 1980s: Illustrative aspects of political
police), in Totalitarism şi rezistenţă, teroare şi represiune în România comunistă
(Totalitarianism and resistance, terror and repression in communist Romania) ed.
by CNSAS (Bucharest: n.p., 2001), 161–62.
88
See Document 399: Notă informativă (Informative note) dated August 1986,
in The White Book of the Securitate, 352.
86
conjunctural FactorS
239
Such an activity incurred great risks from the part of the staff of
the Romanian Service of RFE. It is also important to emphasize that
under Gheorghiu-Dej the Securitate adopted a rather passive attitude
towards the activity of RFE. This was due, on the one hand, to the
rather small number of radio sets per capita and, on the other hand,
to the limited number of contacts between Romanian citizens and
citizens of Western nations, which limited drastically the amount of
letters smuggled out of the country. Such an attitude was maintained
during the first years of the Ceauşescu regime. Things changed
fundamentally with the expansion of the domestic production of
radio sets and, especially after 1967, with the gradual opening of the
country for Western tourists. Consequently, from the late 1960s
onwards the Party ordered the Securitate to take pro-active and even
offensive steps to combat the activity of RFE.89 One should also note
that between 1981 and 1988 the Romanian desk of RFE lost three
of its directors in a row – Noel Bernard (1981), Mihai Cismărescu –
pen name Radu Gorun (1983), and Vlad Georgescu (1988). As
Urban put it, RFE “had suffered no comparable loss in any of its
other national services.”90 These premature deaths were highly
suspicious and many observers spoke of the active involvement of
the Romanian secret police, although not much could be proved.
According to General Ion Mihai Pacepa, perhaps the most prominent
high rank officer that defected to the West during the communist
years – he left Romania on 23 July 1978 and arrived in the US, via
Frankfurt/Main, on 28 July 1978 – the Securitate was involved in
those suspicious deaths. Pacepa speaks in his memoirs of a radioactive
device, whose code name was “Radu,” utilized by the Securitate to
irradiate regime’s opponents. According to Pacepa, Ceauşescu ordered
See Pelin, foreword to idem, History of Radio Free Europe through documents
of the Securitate, 8–9.
90
Urban, Radio Free Europe, 127–28.
89
240
conjunctural FactorS
a portable version of “Radu” to be manufactured and placed in Noel
Bernard’s office at RFE.91
Nevertheless, Ceauşescu’s determination to silence his most
vehement critics in the Romanian Service of RFE was clear and dates
back to 1977. A first attack against an editor of the Romanian desk of
RFE was carried out on 18 November 1977, in Paris. On that occasion,
two mercenaries allegedly hired by the Securitate on Ceauşescu’s orders
savagely attacked and beat Monica Lovinescu, a reputed literary critic
and RFE editor. (Beginning in 1967, Monica Lovinescu realized for
RFE an important program, “Theses and anti-theses in Paris” which
was widely listened to in Romania.) The attack on Monica Lovinescu
was also linked to her active involvement in launching, in the spring
of 1977, the international campaign in favor of writer Paul Goma.
Fortunately, Monica Lovinescu has left a personal account of the
attack. Unfortunately, her account cannot be corroborated with the
information contained in the Securitate files. However, the
information gathered until now indicates towards an involvement of
the Securitate.92 A similar attack was orchestrated in July 1981, in
Munich, against Emil Georgescu, one of the most caustic
commentators of the Romanian Service of RFE. In the case of Emil
Georgescu, however, the Securitate files suggest that the attack was
actually a Mafia-type operation incurred by some murky financial
arrangements in which Georgescu was involved. In the Georgescu
case, is still unclear if it was indeed an operation of the Securitate or
a revenge of Georgescu’s alleged dubious business partners.93 Both
Ion Mihai Pacepa, Red Horizons (London: Heinemann, 1988), 416. Pacepa
also states that Elena Ceauşescu was particularly angered by Emil Georgescu’s
caustic comments and wanted to silence him.
92
For a personal account of the November 1977 attack, see Monica Lovinescu,
To Vavilon’s waters/2, 247–52. See also Pelin, History of Radio Free Europe through
documents of the Securitate, 119–22.
93
On the attack on Emil Georgescu see Urban, 128. See also Pelin, History of
Radio Free Europe through documents of the Securitate, 161–63 and 239–42.
91
conjunctural FactorS
241
Monica Lovinescu and Emil Georgescu were seriously injured, but
survived the attacks.
In their search for dissident discourses in communist Romania,
the RFE commentators also influenced, consciously or not, the nature
of the post-1989 regime. After 1985, the name of Ion Iliescu was
often associated with the name of Mikhail Gorbachev. Persistent
rumors circulated in Bucharest about the intention of the Kremlin
to replace Nicolae Ceauşescu by Ion Iliescu. In its determination to
nurture opposition and dissent from within and outside the Party,
RFE was equally interested in the person of Ion Iliescu. For instance,
on 19 December 1987, in his program dedicated to reviewing a
recently published book by Silviu Brucan entitled Socialism at
Crossroads, Vlad Georgescu made reference to the views of Iliescu,
which were in many respects similar to those of Gorbachev.94 Such
references contributed in making the name of Iliescu known to wider
audiences, both in Romania and abroad, and contributed significantly
to the widespread acceptance of Iliescu as the leader of the National
Salvation Front in the afternoon of 22 December 1989. Iliescu
himself has acknowledged the role played by RFE in emphasizing
his critical stance towards the huge waterworks projects envisaged by
Ceauşescu during the 1980s.95
The role played by the international media in general, and by RFE
in particular, during the “miraculous year” 1989 deserves further
examination. A first thing to say is that towards the end of the
communist rule in Romania, listening to RFE became customary.
As writer Stelian Tănase noted in his diary on Thursday, 7 September
1989: “When I arrive home, along the doors on the hallway, the
Vlad Georgescu, Editorial No. 42, “Reading Brucan,” Air date: 19 December
1987, Romanian Fond, OSA/RFE Archives, 3–4.
95
Ion Iliescu, Revoluţie şi reformă (Revolution and reform) (Bucharest: Editura
Enciclopedică, 1994), 41. For Iliescu’s own account of his critical stances towards
the Ceauşescu regime see pp. 41–43.
94
242
conjunctural FactorS
buzzing sound of the short waves: people have switched definitively
on Radio Free Europe.”96 The particularity of the 1989 revolution
in Romania resides also in the fact that the Romanian desk of RFE
played a significant role in the collapse of the communist regime. As
the present work demonstrates, a combination of structural,
conjunctural and nation-specific factors made unavoidable a bloody
revolution in Romania, unique in the context of the 1989 revolutions
in ECE. The sparking of the revolution that eventually overthrew
the Ceauşescu regime on 22 December 1989 was also determined
by the news concerning the unfolding of events in the other
communist countries in ECE. A participant to the 1989 revolution
in Timişoara remembers: “For some years I was following daily the
programs of Radio Free Europe and Voice of America waiting for
‘something to happen.’ It was clear for me that the end of Ceauşescu
was close.”97 Another revolutionary from Timişoara, Ioan Savu,
confesses that he was walking by the Maria Square in Timişoara
beginning with 14 December waiting for the moment, i.e., the
revolutionary moment: “I felt that we, Romanians, were also close
to the crucial moment of our existence. Fortunately, in Timişoara,
we are kept informed with sufficient news from the free world by the
Yugoslav and Hungarian TV stations. So far, the downfall of the
socialist system had started in all the countries around us.”98
International media had a considerable influence on the urban
strata of the population during the period 16–22 December 1989,
i.e. the period between the uprising in Timişoara and the revolt in
Bucharest. The news about the Timişoara uprising reached the
Western capitals from the night of 17–18 December onwards.
Immediately, international media picked up the news and broadcast
it widely. The Romanian desk of RFE, especially, re-transmitted the
Tănase, The official wintertime, 143.
See the testimony of Alexandru Corneliu Cuţara in Mioc, The revolution in
Timişoara, 65.
98
Quoted in Timişoara: 16–22 Decembrie 1989, 85.
96
97
conjunctural FactorS
243
news, both to the international and Romanian audiences. From that
moment on, the overwhelming majority of the Romanian population
knew that the inhabitants of Timişoara initiated mass protests against
the regime. In this respect, eyewitness accounts abound. Daniel Vighi
recalls that when the revolution sparked in Timişoara many of those
who took part in the events were concerned with spreading the news
to the outside world and their first thought was to announce RFE.99
According to another participant to the Timişoara revolt, Dan Ştefan
Opriş, in those crucial days of 16–22 December 1989 RFE was the
only link between the Timişoara protesters and the rest of the
country.100 A majority of the Romanian population, including the
present author, who witnessed the 1989 revolution in the city of
Tîrgovişte, hundreds of kilometers away from Timişoara, heard about
the revolt in Timişoara from the programs of RFE. Similarly, Liviu
Antonesei, a critical intellectual from Iaşi, recalls the atmosphere of
great tension he experienced in December 1989: “I shall never forget
the almost non-stop programs of Radio Free Europe.”101 Again, in
those crucial days, it was the continuous flux of information broadcast
by RFE that mobilized the population and kept alive the hope in the
final demise of Romanian communism.102
When Ceauşescu ordered, somehow unexpectedly, for a mass
meeting to be organized in Bucharest on 21 December, those forced
to take part in the event knew perfectly well that by that time the
city of Timişoara was effectively in the hands of the revolutionaries.
Quoted in Miodrag Milin, Timişoara în revoluţie şi după (Timişoara in
revolution and after) (Timişoara: Editura Marineasa, 1997), 29.
100
Milin, Timişoara in revolution and after, 105.
101
Antonesei, Diary from the years of the plague, 1987–1989, 122.
102
For a collection of telegrams, articles, and news of the international news
agencies, newspapers and radio stations during the period 17–20 December 1989,
see Miodrag Milin, ed., Timişoara în arhivele “Europei Libere” – 17–20 Decembrie
1989 (Timişoara in the archives of Radio Free Europe – 17–20 December 1989)
(Bucharest: Fundaţia Academia Civică, 1999).
99
244
conjunctural FactorS
During the Bucharest meeting the crowds started to shout due to a
provocation from within and, a few minutes later, a panic-stricken
crowd was trying to leave the place. Intended to support Ceauşescu’s
rule, the meeting turned into an anti-Ceauşescu demonstration.
Gathered in the University Square in Bucharest, some demonstrators
erected a barricade and continued their protest during the night of
21–22 December. In spite of the bloody repression, the next day, 22
December 1989, large crowds blocked the streets of Bucharest and
occupied the building of the Central Committee (CC) of the RCP,
while other groups occupied the main building of the national
television. When Ceauşescu’s helicopter left the upper platform of
the building of the CC of the RCP on 22 December 1989 at 1208
hours, the communist rule in Romania came abruptly to an end.
In the particular conditions of late communism in Romania –
characterized by economic crisis and cultural autarky – the regime
wanted people not to know what was happening in the rest of
Sovietized Europe. Even more importantly, the regime wanted people
not to realize that the Soviet Union itself had changed dramatically
under the rule of Gorbachev. The international media, especially
RFE, played an important role in revealing the structural flaws of the
communist system and contributed to the shaping of the political
cultures of resistance and in keeping alive the spirit of resistance in
communist countries. Its role in the final demise of communism in
ECE, particularly in Romania, must not be neglected.
This chapter has examined the influence of conjunctural factors,
both external and internal on the collapse of Romanian communism.
The main argument put forward is that Romanian communism
proved to be particularly vulnerable to external factors, of which the
most significant are: (1) the “Gorbachev factor;” and (2) the “snowball
effect.” The renunciation by the Soviet Union to the Brezhnev
Doctrine with the so-called Sinatra Doctrine meant that local agency,
i.e. political action by power elites and opposition groups throughout
Sovietized Europe, determined the nature and outcome of the 1989
revolutions in the respective countries. In the case of Romania
conjunctural FactorS
245
however, because of the independent stance towards Moscow adopted
by the Romanian communists beginning in 1964 and explicitly from
1968 onwards, the “Gorbachev factor” led to the de-legitimating of
the Ceauşescu regime. After Gorbachev came to power in 1985,
independence from Moscow as a crucial ingredient of Romanian
national-communism lost its significance. On the contrary, the
situation in Romania made people turn their eyes to Moscow in the
hope that Ceauşescu would be replaced with a reform communist.
At the same time, the snowball effect contributed significantly to the
changing of the mindset of the population, which saw that from early
January until early December 1989 the communist regimes collapsed,
and democratic transitions were initiated, in five countries of what
used to be the Soviet bloc.
At the same time, this chapter has addressed the issue of domestic
factors that contributed to the final demise of Romanian
communism. Among the domestic factors that contributed to the
demise of communism in Romania, the coming to age of the 1967–
1969 generation featured prominently. Born of the policy of forced
natality implemented by Ceauşescu upon his coming to power, the
1967–1969 generation was particularly active in the 1989 revolution.
This chapter has addressed at length the process of political
socialization that the young generations in Ceauşescu’s Romania
underwent from the late 1960s onwards through exposure to Western
media, primarily to the programs of Radio Free Europe (RFE). Thus,
although dissident networks did not develop in Romania as compared
to other communist countries in ECE, the programs of RFE managed
to create a sort of virtual network of individuals that received similar
messages from the West via radio waves. Such a network lived a short
moment of solidarity on 21–22 December 1989 and brought down
the communist dictatorship in Romania. The lack of common
socialization in an underground movement, however, did not allow
for the transformation of the said network into a coherent political
opposition, which also explains why Romania experienced one of the
most complicated democratic transitions in ECE.
Chapter 5
natIon-speCIFIC FaCtors
regIme vS. communIty
the polItIcal culture approach
The Romanian revolution of 1989 broke out and ensued violently,
and therefore differed fundamentally from the rest of the 1989
revolutions in ECE. The 1989 revolutions in ECE broke out
following a sequence of collapse that, as shown in Chapter 1, has the
following configuration: Poland-Hungary-East GermanyCzechoslovakia-Bulgaria-Romania. Thus, one may argue that two
elements are characteristic for the 1989 revolution in Romania, i.e.
nature and timing. While the issue of nature refers to the fact that
the Romanian revolution of 1989 was the only non-negotiated and
violent, the issue of timing refers to the fact that Romania occupies
the last position within the sequence of collapse presented above. In
order to explain the peculiarities of the Romanian case, this chapter
examines cultural values and attitudinal patterns, taking also in
consideration the intricate relationship between structure and culture.
As Gabriel Almond once noted, the relation between structure and
culture is interactive: “One cannot explain cultural propensities
without reference to historical experience and contemporary structural
constraints and opportunities, and that, in turn, a prior set of
attitudinal patterns will tend to persist in some form and degree and
for a significant period of time, despite efforts to transform it.”1
1
Almond, “Communism and Political Culture Theory,” 157–58.
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
247
Romanian national-communism was born after 1956 from a strategy
based on two core elements, i.e. industrialization and independence,
which also illustrate the relevance of such a framework of analysis for
the particular case of Romania.
Since the conceptual framework of this book has been presented
in detail in Chapter 1, this chapter opens with a brief survey of the
terms and definitions employed. Thus, this author draws on Jowitt’s
distinction between regime and community political cultures, which
are defined as follows. Regime political culture is understood as: “A
set of informal adaptative (behavioral and attitudinal) postures that
emerge in response to the institutional definition of social,
economic, and political life,” while community political culture is
defined as: “A set of informal adaptative (behavioral and attitudinal)
postures that emerge in response to the historical relationships
between regime and community.”2 It is this author’s opinion that
the regime and respectively community political culture are essential
in explaining the nature and timing of the collapse of communism
in Romania. In the terms of the present analysis, regime political
culture is understood as the official political culture and is termed
as the political culture of Romanian communism. As far as the
community political culture is concerned, the most significant for
this discussion are its subcultures that, in the terms of the present
analysis, are defined as the political cultures of resistance against
the regime. Consequently, this chapter concentrates on two
subcultures that in the context of a particular set of structural
constraints determined the nature and timing, as well as the
Jowitt, The Leninist Extinction, 51–52 and 54–56. Some authors have
nevertheless criticized Jowitt’s taxonomy. For instance, Ronald H. Chilcote has
argued that the three types of political culture defined by Jowitt “are described in
jargonistic terms and are not effectively utilized in his analysis.” See Ronald H.
Chilcote, Theories of Comparative Politics: The Search for a Paradigm Reconsidered
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 197.
2
248
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
outcome of the 1989 revolution in Romania: (1) the political culture
of Romanian communism; and (2) the political cultures of resistance
against the regime.
This chapter addresses the attitudinal and behavioral patterns
that characterize the relationship between regime and society, which
emerged as a result of the successive transformations of the Stalinist
model imposed on the Romanian society in the immediate
aftermath of World War II. It should be stressed from the outset
that these transformations took place under certain constraints
imposed by the Soviet policy towards the “fraternal” countries in
ECE in the general Cold War context, of which the Brezhnev
Doctrine was perhaps the most significant for the purpose of this
analysis. One can identify five main periods that characterize the
relationship between the communist regime and the Romanian
society in general over the period 1945–1989: (1) “revolution from
above,” 1945–1956; (2) “community-building,” 1956–1964; (3)
transition from “community-building” to nation-building, 1964–
1968; (4) fully fledged nation-building, 1968–1985; and (5)
disenchantment and de-legitimation, 1985–1989. Over these five
periods two processes interacted permanently. On the one hand,
the regime applied consistent policies meant to tame and
subsequently co-opt the population. On the other hand, the
population reacted to these policies in various ways ranging from
collaboration to open conflict with the regime. The attitudinal and
behavioral patterns that resulted from the complex interaction of
these processes determined ultimately both the nature and timing
of the Romanian revolution of 1989.
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
249
regime political culture
When analyzing the particular features of the political culture of the
Romanian communist regime over the entire period 1945–1989, a
series of elements such as ideology, cohesion of the power elite, as
well as the vision of politics and leadership style of Gheorghiu-Dej
and respectively Nicolae Ceauşescu deserve a closer attention. These
issues are discussed below for the five periods that have already
presented above: (1) “revolution from above,” 1945–1956; (2)
“community-building,” 1956–1964; (3) transition from
“community-building” to nation-building, 1964–1968; (4) fully
fledged nation-building, 1968–1985; and (5) disenchantment and
de-legitimation, 1985–1989.
“revolution from above,” 1945–1956
Following Robert C. Tucker, who has studied the “mental structure”
of Lenin’s Bolshevism as a “party-state political culture” that came
into being after the 1917 October Revolution,3 this section examines
Gheorghiu-Dej’s “socialism” as a heavily context-dependent “partystate political culture” in the making. Let us examine the political
culture of the communist regime in Romania over the period 1945–
1956 with an emphasis on the three elements mentioned above, i.e.
ideology, cohesion, and Gheorghiu-Dej vision of politics and
leadership style.
The small group of Romanian communist militants numbered
some 900–1,000 members in August 1944. This group took power
with the backing of the Red Army and had no other chance of staying
Robert C. Tucker, Political Culture and Leadership in Soviet Russia: From
Lenin to Gorbachev (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1987), 34.
3
250
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
in power than to be completely subservient to Stalin and frantically
emulate the Soviet model. As Kenneth Jowitt perceptively observed:
“On coming to power, the Romanian [communist] elite possessed
and was committed to a Leninist consensual ideology, but it did not
have a set of politically and situationally relevant definitions derived
from that ideology. In short, it lacked a ‘practical ideology’ [emphasis
added].”4 Indeed, the official Party documents from the early
Gheorghiu-Dej period show little, if any, theoretical sophistication.
These documents reveal that the Romanian Workers Party (RWP)
was rigidly and forcefully imposing the Soviet model upon the
Romanian society, with no concern whatsoever for social realities.
As the “Resolution of the plenary meeting of the Central
Committee of the RWP of 3–5 March 1949” explicitly states, in the
aftermath of World War II the Romanian communists had two major
objectives: the seizure of political power and the building of
“socialism.”5 In practice, this meant the institutionalization of the
Party and the industrialization of the country. The Party grew from
the initial figure of some 1,000 members in 1944 to around 257,000
in October 1945 and to over 1,000,000 in February 1948. In 1948,
it was claimed that “unsound” elements entered the Party, which had
Jowitt also argued that a “practical ideology” differs from a pragmatic approach
to politics: “A ‘practical ideology’ is not synonymous with a pragmatic orientation.
Rather, it refers to a set of action-oriented beliefs that are defined in terms which
in significant respects reflect and are congruent with a given social reality and
political situation.”Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development,
76.
5
See Rezoluţia şedinţei plenare a Comitetului central al P.M.R. din 3–5 martie
1949 asupra sarcinilor partidului în lupta pentru întărirea alianţei clasei muncitoare
cu ţărănimea muncitoare şi pentru transformarea socialistă a agriculturii (Resolution
of the plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the RWP of 3–5 March 1949
regarding the Party tasks in the struggle for strengthening the alliance of the working
class with the working peasantry for the socialist transformation of agriculture)
(Bucharest: Editura Partidului Muncitoresc Român, 1949), 7.
4
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
251
to undergo a “verification campaign.” As a result, 192,000 Party
members were purged and until 1952 admissions of new members
were suspended. Consequently, in December 1955 the RWP
numbered approximately 539,000 members.6 Moreover, one could
grasp from the Resolution quoted above that the focus on extensive
industrialization was an axiom: the economic strategy of the RWP
was based on the development of “socialist industry,” with a special
emphasis on heavy industry and the “planned organization of national
economy.” With regard to the “peasantry problem” the same
document read: “Guided by the Marxist-Leninist teaching, our party
sees in the peasantry problem a part of the general problem of the
dictatorship of the proletariat, namely the problem of the main ally
of the working class.”7 The “socialist organization of agriculture”
meant in fact collectivization of agriculture, which was launched in
the aftermath of the above-mentioned plenary meeting of the CC of
the RWP of 3–5 March 1949.
As far as Gheorghiu-Dej was concerned, he did not elaborate on
the building of a classless and stateless communist society or on the
transformation of human nature under “socialism,” but simply
praised the “triumphant ideas” of the official ideological forefathers.
For an analysis of RWP membership over the period 1945–1989 see Nicoleta
Ionescu-Gură, “Introductory Study” to Florica Dobre et al., eds., Membrii C.C.
al P.C.R., 1945–1989 (The members of the Central Committee of the Romanian
Communist Party, 1945–1989) (Bucharest: Editura Enciclopedică, 2004), 20–
22. With regard to the verification campaign of 1948–1950 and the number of
purges see Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, “Raportul de activitate al Comitetului Central
al Partidului Muncitoresc Român la Congresul al II-lea al Partidului – 23 decembrie
1955” (Activity report of the CC of the RWP to the Second Congress of the Party
– 23 December 1955) in Idem, Articole şi cuvîntări, decembrie 1955 – iulie 1959
(Articles and speeches, December 1955 – July 1959) (Bucharest: Editura Politică,
1960), 117.
7
Resolution of the plenary meeting of the CC of the RWP of 3–5 March 1949,
7–8.
6
252
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
A telling statement can be found in his discourse, delivered on 8 May
1951 and occasioned by the 30th anniversary of the Party:
The endless source of our Party’s strength is its unabated fidelity for the
triumphant ideas of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin. Our Party could
face the most difficult challenges and went forward through the storms
of the underground years due to its belief in the triumph of the
proletarian cause instilled to it by the glorious Bolshevik Party and the
brilliant teachings of the leader of world communism – comrade Stalin.8
At the Party apparatus level, the lack of a “practical ideology”
determined a mechanical learning of Lenin’s interpretation of
Marxism, centered on economic determinism and party control over
each and every segment of society. As Vladimir Tismăneanu observed,
the political credo of the Romanian communist elite “derived from
the simplistic, Manichean worldview of the Comintern,” which did
not allow for a Romanian Lukács or Gramsci to appear from within
the ranks of the RWP/RCP.9 In the long term this feature would
hamper the appearance of a faction of softliners within the Party and
thus prevent a negotiated transition to democracy in Romania in
December 1989. The issue of Party cohesion deserves further
elaboration and is discussed below.
As far as the political culture of the Romanian communist elite is
concerned, there were two major elements of continuity between the
Gheorghiu-Dej and Ceauşescu regimes. These elements can be
Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, 30 de ani de luptă a Partidului sub steagul lui Lenin
şi Stalin: Raport prezentat în ziua 8 Mai la adunarea solemnă în cinstea celei de a
30–a aniversări a întemeierii Partidului Comunist Român (30 years of struggle under
the flag of Lenin and Stalin: Report presented to the solemn meeting dedicated to
the celebration of 30 years from the creation of the RCP) (Bucharest: Editura
Partidului Muncitoresc Român, 1951), 6.
9
See Vladimir Tismăneanu, Stalinism for All Seasons: A Political History of
Romanian Communism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 117–18;
page numbers are to the Romanian edition (Iaşi: Editura Polirom, 2005).
8
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
253
identified as two major features of the political culture of Romanian
communism, i.e. Party monolithism and Party emancipation. It is this
author’s opinion that these were most powerful myths of Party
“regeneration” or “rebirth” in the aftermath of World War II, shared
by the group of communists that were imprisoned together in the
interwar and wartime periods. These two Party myths determined
the particular way in which national-communism was born in
Romania: not as a direct return to the interwar conceptualization of
the nation, but as a process that spanned over some eight years (1956–
1964) and was launched as a “selective community-building” process
in the very special political context of the year 1956.
Preserving Party’s unity was a central element of the political
culture of both Gheorghiu-Dej and Ceauşescu regimes. Factions
within the party had to be avoided at all costs. In this respect, one
can grasp from Gheorghiu-Dej’s official speeches what the supreme
leader of the Romanian communists thought of the need to preserve
the unity of the Party. For instance, in his speech delivered at the
“solemn meeting” dedicated to the celebration of 30 years from the
creation of the RCP, Gheorghiu-Dej stated that the most precious
asset of the Party was its unity:
The unity of Party’s ranks is its most precious asset. Without this unity,
characteristic to a new type of Marxist-Leninist Party, we could not
obtain successes in fulfilling the historical tasks that stayed ahead of us.
The preoccupation for the unyielding unity of the Party, for the purity
of its ranks, for the education of the Party members in the spirit of
vigilance against the class enemy from inside and outside the Party and
of intransigence towards deviations from the Party line, is a permanent
duty for every Party organization.10
Similarly, a massive work published in 1960 by the Institute for
Party History affiliated with the CC of the RWP (Institutul de istorie
10
Gheorghiu-Dej, 30 years of struggle under the flag of Lenin and Stalin, 59.
254
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
a partidului de pe lîngă C.C. al P.M.R.) defined one of basic principles
of a Marxist-Leninist party as follows: “The Party represents a unity
of will that is incompatible with the existence of factions [emphasis
added].”11 Under Gheorghiu-Dej’s rule, the observance of this basic
principle led to assassinations, purges, and marginalization of Party
veterans. One can grasp from the post-1989 testimonies of former
nomenklatura members from the Gheorghiu-Dej period that the fear
of factionalism was an essential and distinctive element of the political
culture of the Romanian communist elite. Thus, Gheorghe Apostol,
arguably Gheorghiu-Dej’s most faithful collaborator, has declared
that he had made “a myth” of the idea of Party unity,12 while
Bârlădeanu has confessed that their generation feared factionalism
“more than leprosy.”13 This is why there were only few notable
attempts at creating a split at the top of the RWP hierarchy under
Gheorghiu-Dej. Of them, the most significant was the aborted
attempt by Miron Constantinescu, supported by Iosif Chişinevschi,
to dethrone Gheorghiu-Dej in the aftermath of Khrushchev’s 1956
secret speech, which is discussed below. It was precisely this feature
of Romanian communist regime that permitted to the group from
prisons to control fully the party from 1952 onwards and, as already
mentioned, it was the same feature that made impossible a negotiated
solution involving an “enlightened” faction within the party and the
opposition elites, and determined the sudden, bloody collapse of the
regime in December 1989.
Party emancipation was an equally powerful RCP myth, born of
the interwar years when the Party was compelled to follow
Institutul de istorie a partidului de pe lîngă C.C. al P.M.R. (The institute
for Party’s history affiliated with the CC of the RWP), Lecţii în ajutorul celor care
studiază istoria P.M.R. (Lessons to help those who study the history of the RWP)
(Bucharest: Editura Politică, 1960), 620.
12
Betea, Maurer and the yesterday world, 275.
13
Betea, Bârlădeanu on Dej, Ceauşescu, and Iliescu, 305.
11
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
255
unabatedly the orders coming from Kremlin. This also led to a
profound political marginalization during the said period. This was
due to the fact that the RCP propaganda had little success in reaching
the hearts and minds of the overwhelming majority of the population
of Greater Romania since the Party militated, as far as ethnic
minorities were concerned, for “self-determination up to complete
secession.” As mentioned in the section on ideological decay, in
terms of leadership the RCP had during the period 1922–1944 only
one general secretary of Romanian ethnic origin, Gheorghe Cristescu
(1922–1924), while all the others were of non-Romanian ethnic
origin: Elek Köblos (1924–1928); Vitali Holostenko (1928–1931);
Aleksandr Danieluk Stefanski (1931–1934); Boris Stefanov (1934–
1940) and Ştefan Foriş (1940–1944).14 Such a situation created a
deep frustration among the ethnic Romanian members of the Party,
whose salience could be grasped from witness accounts, testimonies
and even Party documents long after the “group from prisons” took
control over the Party.
When examining the identity-forming experiences of the postwar
RWP elite, a truly significant aspect relates to the period of common
socialization in prisons of those who would compose the future Party
elite. Sociologist Pavel Câmpeanu provided an insightful analysis of
the period spent in prison by the group of communist militants that
included, among others, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, Gheorghe
Apostol, Emil Bodnăraş, Iosif Chişinevschi, Miron Constantinescu,
Chivu Stoica, Nicolae Ceauşescu and Câmpeanu himself.15 From
Câmpeanu’s detailed account, one can grasp how important the
period of common socialization in prisons was in determining the
nature of the political culture of the Romanian communist elite and
thus its cohesion. Marginalization, humiliation and harassment by
. Constantiniu, RCP, Pătrăşcanu and Transylvania, 1945–46, 34.
Pavel Câmpeanu, Ceauşescu, anii numărătorii inverse (Ceauşescu, the
countdown years) (Iaşi: Editura Polirom, 2002).
14
15
256
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
the interwar authorities – Gheorghiu-Dej stayed eleven years in
prison, between 1933 and 1944 – all these explain the determination
of Gheorghiu-Dej and his “group from prisons” to eliminate their
rivals from within the Party and, after the takeover, their former
political opponents (especially the members of the historic political
parties – National Peasant Party, National Liberal Party and SocialDemocratic Party).
Furthermore, the members of the “group from prisons” went
through a process of common socialization that enabled them to
operate sharp distinctions between in-group and out-group
individuals. Jowitt observes that Gheorghiu-Dej had a major
interest in ensuring a high degree of Party cohesion. The same
author refers to the concepts of “peer cohesion” and “hierarchical
cohesion” and argues that Gheorghiu-Dej was primarily oriented
to hierarchical cohesion, which refers to “bonds linking actors of
different ranks.”16 Câmpeanu’s witness account tends to support
such an assertion. As he puts it, the communists learned in prison
a lesson of crucial importance: “It was not the doctrine or the class
relations that really counted, but the relationships based on personal
subordination [emphasis added].”17 However, Câmpeanu also
stresses the dual character of the relationships established between
communists during their prison term, due to the “equality of their
condition:” “While Dej’s infallibility was taken for granted, even
the younger [communist] prisoners were allowed to address him
informally as ‘Ghiţă’”18 Therefore, it may be argued that it was in
fact a complex blend of peer and hierarchical cohesion that
determined the unity of the “group from prisons,” which permitted
it to avoid a major split at the top of the RWP/RCP until the
Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development, 143.
Câmpeanu, Ceauşescu, the countdown years, 101.
18
Ibid., 58.
16
17
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
257
issuance of the “Letter of the six” former nomenklatura members
in March 1989.19
Ironically enough, it was Mihail Haşeganu, one of GheorghiuDej’s ambassadors to former Czechoslovakia and the United Nations
that provided an insightful characterization of a communist supreme
leader. True, the portrait was that of the Albanian supreme leader,
Enver Hoxha, but it is this author’s opinion that such a
characterization could be very well applied to Gheorghiu-Dej himself:
Personally, I perceived in him the specific traits of a Stalinist activist
that was actually not the product of specific Russian abnormal
outgrowths, neither of French left-wingers, nor of Chinese Maoism,
but a synthesis of all these. For this type of activist the central problem
remains the power struggle, and he is able to walk over any creed or principle
in order to fulfill his goals [emphasis added].20
Câmpeanu argues that Gheorghiu-Dej became a natural leader of
the imprisoned communists for at least three reasons. First, it was
due to his long period of internment, which, according to an
unwritten rule, called for respect from the part of the other political
convicts. Second, he was a living proof of the abuses of the interwar
“bourgeois” regime that convicted a communist militant to a tenyear term in prison for organizing a strike. Third, Gheorghiu-Dej
possessed a charismatic personality, doubled by a ruthless
determination to achieve “unlimited power.”21 It should be added
that after Stalin’s death Gheorghiu-Dej managed to impose upon
For more on the context in which the “Letter of the six” was issued and on
its significance, see Cristina Petrescu, “The Letter of the Six: On the Political
(Sub)Culture of the Romanian Communist Elite,” in Studia Politica (Bucharest),
Vol. V, No. 2 (2005), 355–83.
20
Mihail Haşeganu, Din culisele diplomaţiei: Memoriile unui ambasador
(Backstage diplomacy: Memoirs of an ambassador) (Bucharest: Casa de Editură şi
Presă “Viaţa Românească,” n.d.), 35.
21
Câmpeanu, Ceauşescu, the countdown years, 62.
19
258
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
the Party a particular political style that can be defined as follows:
Under Gheorghiu-Dej’s rule, RWP’s immediate political goals were
contextually defined and the strategies devised to pursue them were
context-dependent.22 Such a political style enabled Gheorghiu-Dej
to maintain his personal power in spite of the major challenges he
faced during the year 1956.23
“Selective community-building,” 1956–1964
By the end of 1955, Gheorghiu-Dej was already the undisputed leader
of the RWP. By that time, his major rivals from within the Party,
i.e. Ştefan Foriş, Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu and Ana Pauker, had been either
assassinated or purged. Nonetheless, one cannot predict the
unpredictable. Consequently, Gheorghiu-Dej and his men could not
predict the events that would affect deeply world communism during
the year 1956, i.e. Nikita Khrushchev’s condemnation of Stalin’s
personality cult in the front of the Twentieth Congress of CPSU and
the Hungarian Revolution of 23 October – 4 November. This time,
Gheorghiu-Dej’s unlimited personal power was not threatened
anymore by domestic factors, but by the very source of RWP’s
authority: the Kremlin. Such a new context called for a rapid adoption
of a strategy of political survival, and the Romanian communists
managed to devise one that had at its core a slow and cautious return
to autochthonous values.
Khrushchev’s attack on Stalin’s crimes against Party members
came as a shock for Gheorghiu-Dej. The RWP delegation to the
This approach was inspired by Ross’ reflections on cultural analysis of politics.
See Marc Howard Ross, “Culture and Identity in Comparative Political Analysis,” in
Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman, Comparative Politics: Rationality,
Culture, and Structure (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 44.
23
For more on Gheorghiu-Dej’s political biography see Florica Dobre et al.,
eds., Members of the CC of the RCP, 291–92.
22
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
259
Twentieth Congress of the CPSU was composed of four members:
Gheorghiu-Dej (head of delegation), Miron Constantinescu, Iosif
Chişinevschi and Petre Borilă.24 Paul Sfetcu, who served as
Gheorghiu-Dej secretary from 1952 until the death of the RWP
supreme leader on 19 March 1965, accompanied the delegation and
has provided valuable details on the atmosphere of great tension in
the Romanian delegation during the Congress. True, Sfetcu’s volume
of memoirs is intended to rehabilitate Gheorghiu-Dej and praise his
leadership, but at the same time it provides useful details regarding
the reactions of the members of the Romanian delegation to
Khrushchev’s speech. According to Sfetcu, one could detect a latent
hostility towards Gheorghiu-Dej in the way Constantinescu and
Chişinevschi behaved in those days.25 What is important for the
present analysis is that upon his returning to Romania, GheorghiuDej managed to buy some time in order to devise a political strategy
of opposing de-Stalinization. Miron Constantinescu, supported by
Iosif Chişinevschi, launched an attack on Gheorghiu-Dej’s
“personality cult” at a Politburo meeting in April 1956.26 However,
the two nomenklatura members did not manage to convince other
prominent Party members to support them. Nonetheless, GheorghiuDej’s position was difficult at the time, and therefore it took him
until the next year to oust both Constantinescu and Chişinevschi
On the political biographies of Constantinescu, Chişinevschi and Borilă see
Dobre et al., eds., Members of the CC of the RCP, 175–77, 149–50 and 108–109,
respectively.
25
See Paul Sfetcu, 13 ani în anticamera lui Dej (Thirteen years in Dej’s
antechamber) (Bucharest: Editura Fundaţiei Culturale Române, 2000), 272–83.
26
For details regarding the Constantinescu-Chişinevschi attack on Dej see Elis
Neagoe-Pleşa and Liviu Pleşa, “Introductory Study” to Idem, eds., Dosarul Ana
Pauker: Plenara Comitetului Central al Partidului Muncitoresc Român din 30
noiembrie – 5 decembrie 1961, Vol. 1 (The Ana Pauker file: The Plenum of the
CC of the RWP of 30 November – 5 December 1961) (Bucharest: Editura Nemira
& CNSAS, 2006), 41–49.
24
260
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
from the positions they held at the top of the Party. This happened
on 28 June – 3 July 1957, at a Plenary Meeting of the CC of the
RWP.
Contingency played a major role in saving Gheorghiu-Dej’s
political career: it was the sparking of the Hungarian Revolution of
1956 that contributed decisively to Gheorghiu-Dej’s political survival.
The Romanian communist elite condemned the Hungarian
revolution at once and succeeded in convincing the Soviets of their
profound loyalty. In fact, the 1956 events in Poland and Hungary
provided an unexpected support for Gheorghiu-Dej’s efforts aimed
at preserving his personal power and avoiding de-Stalinization. Thus,
the communist elite in Bucharest took rapid measures to contain the
spread of information about the real meaning of the events in
Hungary. On 24 October 1956, at a meeting of the Politburo of the
CC of RWP, was put forward a plan in 18 points meant to keep the
situation under strict control. Top communist officials were sent to
Transylvania in order to discuss the situation in Hungary with the
population. For instance, Miron Constantinescu was sent to Cluj,
while János Fazekás was sent to the Hungarian Autonomous Region.
Other nomenklatura members were sent to calm down the German
community, which was agitated by rumors that a reunification of
families, i.e. mass emigration to West Germany, would be allowed
by the Romanian communist authorities as a consequence to the
unfolding of events in neighboring Hungary. An important aspect
needs, however, to be stressed here. The Party was facing for the first
time a major problem: it did not really know the state of mind of
the population. Thus, at point 13 it was stated that the situation in
Hungary should be explained through the trade unions to the
workers, but this had to be done gradually, in order to assess the
reaction of the audience and subsequently amend the official approach
in order not to stir unrest. A special attention was to be paid to young
audiences, especially the students. The document also specified that
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
261
it was crucial to ensure that the population was supplied consistently
with basic foodstuffs such as bread, meat and edible oil.27
Gradually, from 26 October onwards, the Romanian communists
started to speak clearly about the events in Hungary as a “counterrevolution.” It was ordered that meetings be organized throughout
Romania, in which workers and clerks, young and old, would
condemn the “reactionary and fascist forces in Hungary and would
express solidarity with the heroic struggle of the Hungarian working
class for crushing the counter-revolution as soon as possible.”28 Thus,
the RWP sided without hesitation with the Soviets and provided
immediate support. Consequently, at the Politburo meeting of 1
December 1956, Gheorghiu-Dej could proudly claim:
We are happy to say that we did not look passively as spectators at the
events in Hungary. We were directly interested that the unfolding of events
be in the interest of the Hungarian people and the future of socialism in
Hungary, as well as in the interest of our camp; thus we did not stay passive
and let the Soviet Union manage as it could, and therefore we had
contributed a lot.29
Nevertheless, one of the most telling documents related to the
reaction of the Romanian communist elite to the Hungarian
revolution is the report of two high rank officials, Aurel Mălnăşan
See “Protocol No. 54 al Şedinţei Biroului Politic al CC al PMR din 24
octombrie 1956” (Minutes of the CC of RWP’s Politburo Meeting of 24 October
1956) in Mircea Stănescu, ed., Organismele politice româneşti, 1948–1965
(Romanian political institutions, 1948–1965) (Bucharest: Editura Vremea, 2003),
396–402.
28
This was expressed clearly on 26 October 1956. See “Protocol No. 55 al
Şedinţei Biroului Politic al CC al PMR din 26 octombrie 1956” (Minutes of the
CC of RWP’s Politburo Meeting of 26 October 1956) in Ibid., 403.
29
See “Stenograma Şedinţei Biroului Politic al CC al PMR din data de 1
decembrie 1956” (Minutes of the CC of RWP’s Politburo Meeting of 1 December
1956) in Ibid., 472.
27
262
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
and Valter Roman, concerning the visit of the RWP delegation to
Hungary in order to assess the course of events in Budapest. On 2
November 1956, in front of the RWP’s Politburo, Valter Roman
emphasized two major elements that, in his opinion, led to “counterrevolution:” (1) under the leadership of Mátyás Rákosi, the
Hungarian Workers’ Party did not manage to be accepted by the
Hungarian people due to its arrogance and disregard for national
traditions, as well as for its total subservience to Stalin and the Soviet
Union; and (2) the leadership of the Hungarian Workers’ Party
displayed an “anti-Romanian spirit” and “never took a just stance
with regard to Transylvania;” in this respect, Valter Roman quoted
the words of János Kádár, whom he met in Budapest during his visit:
“Give autonomy to Transylvania!”30 Arguably, the two conclusions
with regard to the causes of the revolutionary events in Hungary,
presented in front of the RWP Politburo, were, in fact, major
elements of the political culture of Romanian communism: fear of
Moscow and distrust towards Budapest.
As shown above, Party monolithism and Party emancipation are
concepts that enable one understand better the particularities of the
political culture of Romanian communism. Furthermore, two major
features related to Romanian communist elite’s perception of its
enemies from within the communist camp – fear of Moscow and
distrust toward Budapest – were reinforced by the lessons of the year
1956. To be sure, these features were shaped by a long process of
building the Romanian identity in opposition to two strong identities
from neighboring empires – Russian and Hungarian – from the mid19th century onwards. However, the strategy of political survival –
based on a return to the traditional values associated to the Romanian
identity and extensive industrialization – devised by Gheorghiu-Dej
See “Stenograma Şedinţei din data de 2 noiembrie 1956 cu tov. Aurel
Mălnăşan şi Valter Roman” (Minutes of the Meeting of 2 November 1956 with
comrades Aurel Mălnăşan şi Valter Roman) in Ibid., 409–427.
30
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
263
in 1956, in the aftermath of the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU
and the Hungarian Revolution, strongly reinforced these elements.
Gheorghiu-Dej’s political strategy was strictly followed by Ceauşescu
who internalized the crucial elements mentioned above through a
long process of political socialization within Gheorghiu-Dej’s inner
circle of power. Ceauşescu, though, was less imaginative and capable
of adopting flexible policies according to the domestic and
international contexts in comparison to Gheorghiu-Dej.
As an American scholar observed, “Romanian leaders have
successfully capitalized upon the non-Slavic identity of the
population.”31 But this did not happen overnight: things changed in
the direction desired by the Party during the period 1956–1964. It
should be added to this that it was also a slight improvement of the
standard of living that found an echo in the hearts and minds of a
majority of Romania’s population. If one looks attentively at the
shares allotted to accumulation and consumption over the entire
communist period, one observes that it was in the aftermath of the
Hungarian Revolution that the RWP decided to raise significantly
the share of consumption. As shown in the section on economic
decline, during the period 1956–1960, 82.9% of the national income
went to the consumption fund while only 17.1% went to the
accumulation fund. This was the largest share ever allotted to the
consumption fund under communist rule in Romania.32 Thus, due
to a particular conjuncture, fear of Moscow and distrust towards
Budapest were reinforced as major shared understandings of intrabloc politics at the level of the Romanian communist elite. Ironically
enough, these two features also characterized the political culture of
the Romanian elite in the interwar period, as a direct result of the
Soviet and Hungarian claims against Romania.
Ronald H. Linden, “Romanian Foreign Policy in the 1980s,” in Daniel
Nelson, ed., Romania in the 1980s (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981), 229.
32
Mureşan, Economic evolutions, 1945–1990, 87.
31
264
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
Paradoxically, it was also a Soviet political decision that served,
quite unexpectedly, Romanian communists’ efforts of opposing deStalinization: the decision to withdraw their troops from Romania.
A former high-rank official of the RWP/RCP, Gheorghe Apostol,
remembers that the issue was first raised in 1955, after the Soviet
army withdrew from Austria. Although the Romanian communists’
request enraged Khrushchev on the spot, later on he decided to order
the withdrawal of the Soviet troops. No matter how the decision was
made, the 1958 Soviet troops’ withdrawal from Romania represented
the coming of a new era in the history of RWP. Western sources,
such as the US legation in Bucharest, perceived at the time the
withdrawal from Romania as an initiative of the Soviet Union, and
recent scholarship supports such an assertion.33 That Gheorghiu-Dej
was extremely pleased with the withdrawal of the Soviet troops, one
could grasp – as historian Vlad Georgescu noted – from his servile
speech of 25 July 1958, on the occasion of the departure of the last
echelons of Soviet troops from Romania.34 Thus, by the end of 1958
Gheorghiu-Dej had good reasons to congratulate himself for his
political ability. He had managed not only to demote his main critics
from within the Party, but also to survive the first wave of
de-Stalinization. On top of this, the Soviet troops had left the country.
Yet, there was something that he did not manage to achieve: the full
support of his own people.
As already mentioned, the strategy of political survival devised by
Gheorghiu-Dej and his men was not centered from the very
beginning on a skillful instrumentalization of nationalism. There is
See Sergiu Verona, Military Occupation and Diplomacy: Soviet Troops in
Romania, 1944–1958 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1992), 122–40.
34
For documents related to the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from
Romania, see Ioan Scurtu, ed., România: Retragerea trupelor sovietice – 1958
(Romania: The withdrawal of the Soviet troops – 1958) (Bucharest: Editura
Didactică şi Pedagogică, 1996). For Gheorghiu-Dej’s discourse of 25 July 1958,
see pp. 355–61.
33
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
265
little evidence that the Romanian communist elite mastered the main
elements of traditional Romanian nationalism. Nonetheless, after
1956 the Romanian communists had to look elsewhere for legitimacy
and thus were compelled to initiate a process of “selective communitybuilding,” that is, to strive to create new political meanings, shared
by the communist ruling elite and the population, concerning the
relationship between the Party and the society.35 Such a process was
launched as an expansion of the within-group, i.e. within-the-groupfrom-prisons, vision of politics. In other words, it was not a dormant
sense of national identity that was awakened in the political
conjuncture of the year 1956. On the contrary, the context of 1956
imposed the devising of a new political strategy and that strategy was
designed as a selective expansion to a majority – but by no means to
all – segments of the Romanian society of the within-the-group-fromprisons worldview. The selective nature of the community-building
process launched in the aftermath of the 1956 events needs to be
stressed once more. Not all the segments of Romanian society were
allowed to take part in the process. Up to the year 1964, numerous
Romanian citizens were imprisoned on political grounds while their
offspring were denied basic civil rights.36 Obviously, they were
considered “enemies of the people” and the community building
process was not aimed at them.
However, the de-Stalinization launched by Khrushchev was a threat
to Gheorghiu-Dej and his men, and a return to the people – “enemies of
the people” excluded – as the ultimate source of legitimacy was the only
Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development, 74.
The most recent estimate places the number of political prisoners at around
600,000. However, if one adds the persons deported, placed under house arrest,
interned in labor camps in the Soviet Union etc., the total number of the direct
victims of the communist repression raises to approximately 2,000,000 persons.
For more on this issue, see Rusan, Chronology and geography of communist repression
in Romania, 61–62.
35
36
266
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
solution at hand. This is how a worldview developed within the ranks of
the Party, i.e. the illegal RCP, during the interwar years and subsequently
in Greater Romania’s prisons, was extended to the Party-State level.
Again, this is not to say that Gheorghiu-Dej knew perfectly the
language of nationalism. Actually, he did not. Câmpeanu, himself a
member of the group from prisons, speaking of the prison spent in
prison, argues that the said group was not xenophobic or ethnocentric:
“Over the years, I did not observe in that multinational community
the slightest sign of interethnic prejudices.”37 In fact, Gheorghiu-Dej
never referred to the “Romanian nation” in his official speeches. The
RWP first secretary did refer to “people” or “motherland,” but never
to the “nation” as such, although mentions were made to “national
economy”38 or “national independence.”39 Nonetheless, his recourse
to Party-State building in the guise of selective community building
created the basis for Ceauşescu’s program of Party-State building in
the form of an all-embracing nation-building project. As Jowitt aptly
puts it: “Given the highly concrete, rigid, hence superficial nature of
Gheorghiu-Dej’s Marxist-Leninist beliefs, there was a chance that
his regime could become nationalistic in the style of historic
Romanian nationalism.”40
It took however, a rather long time until the Party mastered the
language of nationalism and fully understood the importance of
national ideology. In this respect, the story of Marx’s writings about
Romanians is telling. The manuscript was discovered in Amsterdam
in 1958 but it was published only in 1964, when it became clear that
it could serve the Party’s policy of independence from Moscow.41
Câmpeanu, Ceauşescu, the countdown years, 101.
Resolution of the plenary meeting of the CC of the RWP of 3–5 March 1949, 7.
39
Gheorghiu-Dej, 30 years of struggle under the flag of Lenin and Stalin, 5.
40
Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development, 224.
41
Marx, Însemnări despre români: Manuscrise inedite (Notes on the Romanians:
Unedited manuscripts) (Bucharest : Editura Academiei Republicii Populare
Române, 1964).
37
38
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
267
Pavel Ţugui, a former head of the Scientific and Cultural Section of
the CC of the RWP (1955–1960) states clearly in his memoirs that
the publication of Marx’s writings was part of the new “political
strategy and tactics” pursued “discretely but perseveringly by some
members of the CC of the RWP” after 1956.42 The fact that the
regime launched in 1958 a second wave of repression, during which
the collectivization process was completed (1962) and which was
meant to tame further the population, supports the argument that
the Party was not sure of the effects the emerging nationalistic rhetoric
would have on the population.43 Actually, it was only on 21 August
1968, when Ceauşescu publicly condemned the invasion of former
Czechoslovakia by the troops of five member states of the WTO that
the Party could evaluate the force of the nationalistic argument. The
immediate result of that event was that the RCP gained widespread
popular support almost overnight.
Until Gheorghiu-Dej’s death in March 1965, there were two
major domestic political events that deserve a closer look: the Plenum
of the Central Committee held on 28 November – 5 December 1961
and the Declaration of April 1964. The CC Plenum of NovemberDecember 1961 provided a simple but effective description of Party’s
history since the end of World War II, seen as a struggle between
two camps: an autochthonous and patriotic one, and a Soviet-oriented
one. Thus, Gheorghiu-Dej claimed that the purges of 1952 (the
Ţugui, History and Romanian language in Gheorghiu-Dej’s times, 185–86.
Rusan, Chronology and geography of communist repression in Romania, 31–
34. For more on the forced collectivization process, see Gheorghe Iancu, Virgiliu
Ţârău and Ottmar Traşcă, eds., Colectivizarea agriculturii în România: Aspecte
legislative, 1945–1962 (Collectivization of agriculture in Romania: Legislative
aspects, 1945–1962) (Cluj: Presa Universitară Clujeană, 2000) and Octavian Roske,
Florin Abraham and Dan Cătănuş, eds., Colectivizarea agriculturii în România:
Cadrul legislativ, 1949–1962 (Collectivization of agriculture in Romania: The legal
framework, 1949–1962) (Bucharest: Institutul Naţional pentru Studiul
Totalitarismului, 2007).
42
43
268
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
Pauker-Luca-Teohari group) and 1957 (the ConstantinescuChişinevschi faction) were the result of a struggle between the
proponents of two visions. A first group, led by Gheorghiu-Dej
himself, put Romania’s interests above everything else. That group
was fiercely opposed by a so-called Muscovite group, which served
only the interests of the Soviet Union. Subsequent to GheorghiuDej’s speech, all the participants to that Plenum were called to
reiterate the interpretation of their leader.44
Nonetheless, it is important to stress that at the same plenary
session of November-December 1961 top communist officials made
recurrent references to their “just” stances with regard to Transylvania.
Gheorghiu-Dej himself stated bluntly that immediately after World
War II, “the chief preoccupation of Rákosi and his group was: ‘To
whom would Transylvania belong’.”45 This indicates that the
Romanian communist elite was discovering the main ingredients of
the nationalist discourse and the reference to the contested territory
of Transylvania and the allegedly irredentist stances of Hungarian
Stalinists was meant to stress once more the increasingly national line
adopted by the RWP after 1956. Transylvania was already
conceptualized as an “ethnoscape.” As Anthony D. Smith puts it:
“Historic ‘ethnoscapes’ cover a wider extent of land, present a
tradition of continuity and are held to constitute an ethnic unity,
because the terrain invested with collective significance is felt to be
After the fall of the Ceauşescu regime in December 1989, Paul NiculescuMizil was one the most vocal former nomenklatura members in praising Ceauşescu’s
independent line. Nonetheless, he concedes that the Plenum of 1961 was meant
primarily to praise Gheorghiu-Dej and mentions that Ceauşescu was among those
who excessively glorified Gheorghiu-Dej. See Paul Niculescu-Mizil, De la
Comintern la comunism naţional (From Comintern to national-communism)
(Bucharest: Editura Evenimentul Românesc, 2001), 244–245.
45
Elis Neagoe-Pleşa and Liviu Pleşa, eds., Dosarul Ana Pauker: Plenara
Comitetului Central al Partidului Muncitoresc Român din 30 noiembrie – 5 decembrie
1961 (The Ana Pauker file: The Plenum of the CC of RWP of 30 November – 5
December 1961) Vol. I (Bucharest: Editura Nemira & CNSAS, 2006), 251.
44
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
269
integral to a particular historical culture community or ethnie.”46
Thus, it may be argued that in 1961 the shift from a selective
community building to a nation-building process was only a matter
of inclusion, i.e. of including in the process those citizens who were
previously excluded on ideological grounds.
Equally important, at the same plenary meeting some top officials
took the opportunity to refer to the 1956 Hungarian revolution in
the context of the fierce power struggle within the RWP at that time.
Thus, in his speech held on 4 December 1961 in front of the Plenum,
János Fazekás, member of the Secretariat of CC of RWP, stated that
during the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, Iosif Chişinevschi had an
ambiguous position and was reluctant to define the events in Hungary
as a “counter-revolution.” It was he, János Fazekás, together with
Nicolae Ceauşescu who at the time took the “right” stance and
squarely identified the events as a “counter-revolution.” He also stated
that Miron Constantinescu, who was sent by the Party to Cluj to
speak to the students, did not dare to “unmask” the events in
Hungary as a “counter-revolution.”47 As shown above, in 1956, in
the aftermath of Khrushchev’s “secret speech” Constantinescu, backed
by Chişinevschi, criticized Gheorghiu-Dej’s Stalinism, but they lost
the battle within the Party and were demoted in 1957. What is
important for the present analysis is that in 1961, at the most
important Plenum of RWP under the Gheorghiu-Dej regime, Fazekás
referred to the 1956 events in Hungary in relation to the fierce power
struggle within the RWP. This supports once more the assertion that
the 1956 revolution in Hungary had a major impact on Romanian
communists’ mindset.
See Anthony D. Smith, Myths and Memories of the Nation (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1999), 150.
47
Neagoe-Pleşa and Pleşa, eds., The Plenum of the CC of RWP of 30 November
– 5 December 1961, Vol. II, 187–88.
46
270
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
The document that epitomizes Gheorghiu-Dej’s policy of
independence from Moscow was issued in April 1964. Known as the
“Declaration of April 1964,” that document is one of the RWP’s
most important official documents. Simply put, the Declaration
proclaimed that all communist parties were equal within the
international communist movement, and therefore they were free to
choose their own path toward communism. The following phrase
might be considered the credo of the monolithic and emancipated
RWP: “There is no “parent” party and “offspring” party, “superior”
and “subordinated” parties, but there is the large family of communist
and workers parties having equal rights.”48 After claiming the right
of each and every communist party to decide upon its own strategy
of building “socialism,” the RWP elite took the major step towards
a decisive shift from selective community building to nation-building:
the liberation of political prisoners. The general amnesty led to the
liberation of the overwhelming majority of political convicts by the
end of August 1964.49 However, Gheorghiu-Dej did not live long
enough to see the results of this major shift. It was Nicolae Ceauşescu
who turned Gheorghiu-Dej’s incipient ethnic nationalism into
consistently chauvinistic policies.
transition from “selective community-building”
to nation-building, 1964–1968
The way Ceauşescu managed to be named as Gheorghiu-Dej’s
successor is still a matter of debate. Post-1989 witness accounts by
former nomenklatura members reveal that Ceauşescu skillfully
Declaration concerning the position of the Romanian Workers’ Party with regard
to the problems of the international communist and workers’ movement adopted by the
enlarged Plenum of the CC of the RWP of April 1964, 55.
49
Rusan, Chronology and geography of communist repression in Romania, 35.
48
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
271
managed to convince some of the most influential members of
Gheorghiu-Dej’s inner circle of power to support him. Furthermore,
it seems that the fear of factionalism played an important role in
bringing Ceauşescu to power. At least, this is what one can grasp
from the witness account provided after 1989 by Ion Gheorghe
Maurer, a prominent nomenklatura member and a key player in
Romanian politics under both Gheorghiu-Dej and Ceauşescu. As a
lawyer, Maurer defended the communists in a famous trial that took
place in 1936. After the communist takeover, he rose to prominence
only in 1960 when he was promoted member of the Politburo. From
that moment onwards, Maurer’s influence within the party increased
constantly until he became the most influential person within the
party except for Gheorghiu-Dej himself. On 21 March 1961, Maurer
was appointed President of the Council of Ministers and held this
position without interruption until 27 February 1974, when he was
replaced by Manea Mănescu.50 In his post-1989 testimony, Maurer
claims that Gheorghiu-Dej, already on his deathbed, asked him to
propose Apostol as his successor when the Politburo would meet to
elect a new secretary general of the RWP. Maurer, however, claims
that he decided to support Ceauşescu for two reasons: (1) to avoid a
split at the top of the Party; and (2) because he considered Ceauşescu
pugnacious enough as to continue the “national line” initiated by
Gheorghiu-Dej.51 The argument put forward by Maurer is in line
with the most cherished and shared values at the level of the
Romanian communist elite from the establishment of the Party in
Stelian Neagoe, Istoria guvernelor României: De la începuturi – 1859 pînă în
zilele noastre – 1995 (A history of Romania’s governments: From beginnings –
1859 to the present day – 1995) (Bucharest: Editura Machiavelli, 1995), 181–204.
51
For Maurer’s testimony, see Betea, Maurer and the yesterday world, 172–77.
For more on Maurer’s political biography see Florica Dobre et al., eds., Members
of the CC of the RCP, 385.
50
272
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
May 1921 and until its demise in December 1989, i.e. monolithism
and emancipation.
Let us examine the issues of ideology, cohesion, and leadership
style and vision of politics for the case of Ceauşescu. Like his
predecessor, Ceauşescu was fully convinced that independence and
industrialization were the fundamental elements of Romania’s strategy
of building “socialism.” In terms of foreign policy and relations with
the Soviet bloc countries, Ceauşescu followed unabatedly the line set
forth by the “Declaration of April 1964.” Also, once in power
Ceauşescu followed strictly Gheorghiu-Dej’s policies regarding the
monolithism of the Party. Thus, the statute of the RCP adopted by
the Ninth Congress of the Party, held on 19–24 July 1965,52
stipulates in its section on the Party members: “Each Party member
is obligated to defend firmly the unity and purity of Party’s ranks –
the major conditions for its unshakeable strength. The Party does
not admit the existence of factions within its ranks. Any factional
activity represents a crime against the Party and is incompatible with
the quality of Party member.”53 At the same time, the Ninth Congress
of the RCP decided to change the name of the Party from the
Romanian Workers Party (RWP) into the Romanian Communist
Party (RCP), thus showing that the Romanian party-state in the
making had entered a new period of development.
However, Ceauşescu had first to be recognized as the undisputed
leader of the RCP. In order to achieve this goal, he emulated the
See Congresul al IX-lea al Partidului Comunist Român (The Ninth Congress
of the Romanian Communist Party) (Bucharest: Editura Politică, 1965), 16–17.
53
Statutul Partidului Comunist Român, Partea a II-a: Membrii de Partid;
Secţiunea A: Îndatoriri şi drepturi, punctul 2/b (Statute of the Romanian
Communist Party, Part II: The Party members; Section A: Duties and rights, pt.
2/b) (Bucharest: Editura Politică, 1965), 14–15. See also Culegere de lecţii pentru
cursurile şi cercurile care studiază Statutul Partidului Comunist Român (Collection
of lessons for the courses and circles that study the Statute of the Romanian
Communist Party) (Bucharest: Editura Politică, 1966), 69–70.
52
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
273
Khrushchevite platform – which Jowitt concisely defined as “Don’t
kill the cadres” – of condemning the crimes committed by his
predecessor against Party members in order to consolidate his power.54
Thus, after a period of “collective leadership,” i.e. March 1965 –
April 1968, Ceauşescu thoroughly staged a Plenum of the Central
Committee of the RCP, which was held on 22–25 April 1968. At
the said Plenum, Ceauşescu was unequivocal in his disapproval of
his predecessor’s abuses against a number of Party members. The
Plenum’s agenda was structured on six points: (1) the development
of the education system in Romania; (2) an analysis of the Party
membership and the level of instruction of the Party members; (3)
an appraisal of the Party and state apparatus’ activity in solving
citizens’ claims and requests; (4) an analysis of the training level of
the armed forces and the problems related to their equipping; (5) the
international activity of the RCP; and (6) the rehabilitation of a
number of RCP activists.55 Point six proved to be the key point of
the Plenum, since it was about issuing an official decision of prime
importance with regard to the wrongdoings of the Gheorghiu-Dej
regime: the “Decision of the CC of the RCP regarding the
rehabilitation of a number of Party activists.” This decision deserves
a thorough examination because it represents the essence of Romania’s
belated and short-lived de-Stalinization, which lasted from April 1968
to July 1971. It is clear by now that the same year he acceded to the
supreme position in the Party hierarchy Ceauşescu decided to employ
the Khrushchevite strategy mentioned above. (This also supports the
idea that, from a psycho-historical perspective, Ceauşescu was more
of a planner than an improviser.) Thus, in November 1965 he
established a Party commission composed of four members –
Jowitt, The Leninist Extinction, 233.
Plenara Comitetului Central al Partidului Comunist Român din 22–25 aprilie
1968 (The Plenum of the CC of the RCP of 22–25 April 1968) (Bucharest: Editura
Politică, 1968).
54
55
274
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
Gheorghe Stoica, Vasile Patilineţ, Nicolae Guină and Ion PopescuPuţuri – in charge with examining the “political situation of a number
of Party activists” that were arrested or condemned “many years ago.”
The archival sources that came to light after 1989 show that the
commission organized a series of “hearings,” which looked very much
like interrogatories, with those involved in the purges or executions
of Party militants, especially during the period 1944–1954. The
transcripts that were preserved in the archives reveal not only the
mechanisms of the bloody power struggle that was fought within the
ranks of the RCP during the said period, but also the fact the main
target of the commission was to condemn the misdeeds of the defunct
leader, Gheorghiu-Dej, rather than to establish the facts.56
The Decision of April 1968 comprised six provisions, which were
in fact six indictments of Gheorghiu-Dej’s policies concerning the
Party apparatus: (1) the “post-mortem political rehabilitation” of
Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu; (2) the “post-mortem political rehabilitation”
of Ştefan Foriş; (3) the “post-mortem political rehabilitation” of a
number of nineteen former Party activists, as follows: Ecaterina
Arbore; Imre Aladar; I. Dic-Dicescu; Tudor Diamandescu; Alexandru
Dobrogeanu-Gherea; Elena Filipovici; David Fabian Finkelstein;
Dumitru Grofu; Jacques Konitz; Elek Köblos; Leon Lichtblau; Marcel
Leonin; Gelber Moscovici (Ghiţă Moscu); Alexandru Nicolau; Marcel
Pauker; Eugen Rozvan; Alter Zalic; Petre Zissu; and Timotei Marin;
(4) the revoking of the Party sanctions issued against eight Party
members: Miron Constantinescu; Ion Craiu; Ioan Demeter;
Constantin Doncea; Mihai Levente; Vasile Modoran; Dumitru
For the results of the Party investigation commission, see Section L: Rezultatele
anchetei din 1967–1968 (Results of the investigation of 1967–1968), Docs. 66 to
73, in Gheorghe Buzatu and Mircea Chiriţoiu, eds., Agresiunea comunismului în
România: Documente din arhivele secrete, 1944–1989, Vol. 2 (Communist
aggression in Romania: Documents from the secret archives, 1944–1989)
(Bucharest: Editura Paideia, 1998), 86–120.
56
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
275
Petrescu; and Aurel Vijoli; (5) that similar cases of other old-timers
would be analyzed; and (6) the decision to dismiss Alexandru
Drăghici [former head of the Securitate] from the CC of the RCP
and to establish the responsibility of those involved in “illegal
repressive actions” in order to punish them.57 Although it did not
have a major impact on the Romanian society in general, the Plenum
of April 1968 had a major impact on the Party and the Securitate. It
simply showed that the period of “collective leadership” was coming
to an end and that Ceauşescu was about to become the undisputed
leader of the Party, the one whom the Securitate had to obey
absolutely. Nonetheless, Ceauşescu’s major achievement in terms of
domestic support for his rule was yet to come: the “charismatic”
moment that conferred almost overnight legitimacy to the communist
rule in Romania.
Fully fledged nation-building, 1968–1985
August 1968 was a watershed in the history of communist Romania.
Nicolae Ceauşescu’s public condemnation of the August 1968 invasion
of former Czechoslovakia by the WTO troops under Soviet command
had a major influence on the subsequent development of Romanian
national-communism and therefore deserves thorough examination.
With regard to the relationship between the Romanian Communist
Party (RCP) and the Romanian society the year 1968 had a threefold
significance, which is best described by three concepts, i.e. legitimacy,
nation-building and closure. The political actions taken by the Romanian
communists throughout the year 1968 resulted in positive actions
expressing consent from the part of large segments of society, which
See Hotărîrea C.C. al P.C.R. cu privire la reabilitarea unor activişti de partid
(The decision of the CC of the RCP regarding the rehabilitation of a number of
Party activists), in The Plenum of the CC of the RCP of 22–25 April 1968, 64–76.
57
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natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
ultimately conferred legitimacy on the single party rule. Ceauşescu’s
gesture of defiance brought him a broad popular support and silenced
the domestic critical voices towards the regime for many years.
In terms of ideology, cohesion of the power elite, and Ceauşescu’s
leadership style and vision of politics the August 1968 moment had
a tremendous importance. First, in the aftermath of Ceauşescu’s
condemnation of the WTO invasion of Czechoslovakia ethnic
nationalism was instrumentalized, and served, as an ideological
substitute for the “dying faith” in revolutionary socialism. It may be
argued that in August 1968 the period of transition from a process of
“selective community-building” to a comprehensive nation-building
project aiming at constructing an ethnically homogenous Romanian
“socialist” nation came to an end. Second, the events of 1968
contributed decisively in strengthening the unity of the RCP around
its supreme leader: up to the very end of communist rule in Romania,
no faction would put in danger the unity of the Party. Third, the shift
from “selective community-building” to nation-building had
enormous consequences on the further development of Ceauşescu’s
leadership style. Having gained a “limited legitimacy” through popular
consent for the RCP rule due to his condemnation of the Soviet-led
intervention in Czechoslovakia, Ceauşescu was free to put into practice
his rigid political beliefs, which he did stubbornly and inflexibly until
22 December 1989. Therefore, the year 1968 marked also the
beginning of the end of the period of relative economic liberalization
and closely watched ideological relaxation initiated by Ceauşescu’s
predecessor, Gheorghiu-Dej, in the early 1960s.
Ceauşescu’s official condemnation of the crushing of the Prague
Spring and his subsequent rejection of the Brezhnev Doctrine were
often interpreted as a display of reformist stances. That it was not so,
one can find out only by looking at the way Ceauşescu himself and
the Party propaganda machine presented to the Romanian public
the events that were taking place in Czechoslovakia. Thus, throughout
the period January – August 1968, the reform process that unfolded
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
277
in former Czechoslovakia was presented to the Romanian public as
a version of the independent-path policies communist Romania was
engaged in. Not a single reference was made to the significance of
the reforms introduced by the regime of Alexander Dub•ek.
Furthermore, nothing was said about the way the Czecho-Slovak
society reacted to the reforms initiated from above, i.e., from the top
of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCz). Let us examine
first the unfolding of events.
On 26 January 1968, Ceauşescu turned 50. With the occasion of
the “comradely lunch” offered by the CC of the RCP, Ceauşescu
delivered a speech in which he referred only to the importance of
maintaining the unity of the international working-class movement
and stated that Romania was decided “not to participate to any action
that would endanger such a unity,” but no reference was made to
the changes that had taken place at the top of the CPCz.58 The next
month, however, representatives of the RCP leadership had the
chance to meet in person the new leaders of the CPCz: an official
delegation of the RCP went to Prague and participated to the
festivities occasioned by the 20th anniversary of the February 1948
coup that brought the communists in power in post-World War II
Czechoslovakia. On 22 February, in his speech, Ceauşescu referred
to the “unshakeable alliance” between the two “socialist states.”
Ceauşescu also referred to the need to strengthen the “cohesion of
the international working-class movement.” Interestingly enough, in
his speech Ceauşescu made use of the term normalization when he
spoke about the necessity of “normalizing the relationships between
communist parties on the basis of equality and mutual respect
Ceauşescu’s speech is reproduced in Nicolae Ceauşescu, România pe drumul
desăvîrşirii construcţiei socialiste: Rapoarte, cuvîntări, articole: ianuarie 1968 – martie
1969 (Romania on the road towards completing the building of socialism: Reports,
speeches, articles: January 1968 – March 1969) (Bucharest: Editura Politică, 1969),
37–38.
58
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natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
principles.”59 At the same time, one should assess what stayed behind
the stereotypical phrases rooted in the “wooden language” of the
Romanian supreme leader and find out what the leadership in
Bucharest really thought about the political changes in
Czechoslovakia. In this respect, the witness accounts by former
nomenklatura members could be useful. Officially, Ceauşescu
expressed in Prague his trust in the “Communist Party of
Czechoslovakia, headed by its First Secretary, comrade Alexander
Dubcek.” Unofficially, however, it seems that Ceauşescu had doubts
with regard to the person of Dubcek, whom he considered far too
lenient and “lacking a clear and firm personal stance.” At least, this
is what a top nomenklatura member, Dumitru Popescu, who would
become the RCP chief ideologue, remembers.60
During the spring of 1968 Ceauşescu was extremely busy. After
the carefully staged Plenum of April, which was discussed above, he
received the visit of the French president, Charles de Gaulle (14–18
May 1968). Then, on 27 May-1 June, Ceauşescu paid another visit
to Yugoslavia and held talks with the Yugoslav leader, Josip Broz
Tito. In his official speeches, Ceauşescu referred, time and again, to
the fact that all communist parties were equal within the international
communist movement and that they were free to choose their own
path toward communism, and emphasized the need to observe the
principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of a “fraternal”
Ceauşescu, “Cuvînt de salut la festivităţile de la Praga consacrate celei de-a
20–a aniversări a victoriei oamenilor muncii din Cehoslovacia din februarie 1948”
(Greeting speech at the festivities dedicated to the 20th anniversary of the victory
of the working people of Czechoslovakia of February 1948) in idem, Reports,
speeches, articles: January 1968 – March 1969, 80–84.
60
See Dumitru Popescu, Un fost lider comunist se destăinuie: “Am fost şi cioplitor
de himere” (A former communist leader confesses: “I was also a carver of chimeras”)
(Bucharest: Editura Expres, n.d.), 142. For more on the political biography of
Dumitru Popescu, nicknamed “Dumnezeu,” i.e., “the Almighty,” see Florica Dobre
et al., eds., The members of the CC of the RCP, 480–81.
59
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
279
party. During his visit to Yugoslavia, for instance, Ceauşescu stressed
these ideas in his speeches of 27 and 29 of May.61 Nonetheless, it
was not until mid-July 1968 that he spoke openly about the right of
Czecho-Slovak communists of pursuing their own path towards
“socialism.” For the ordinary Romanians, it was clear that something
was happening in Czechoslovakia and that the Romanian communists
were supportive of CPCz’s initiatives. The Party newspaper Scînteia
wrote constantly about the political changes in Czechoslovakia.
However, no reference was made to official documents of paramount
importance, such as the Action Program of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (10 April 1968), which
indicated to a large extent the direction of the reforms envisaged by
CPCz. Furthermore, nothing was said about the reaction of the
Czechoslovak society in general to the reforms introduced from above.
For instance, the “Two Thousand Words” manifesto of 27 June 1968
was not commented by the Romanian press.62
Documents from the archive of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs indicate that the Romanian embassy in Prague was sending
to Bucharest timely and comprehensive reports on the pace of changes
in Czechoslovakia. Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that Ceauşescu
was aware of the real situation in Prague and of the way some
segments of the Czechoslovak society – most prominently the
students – were responding to the reforms initiated by the CPCz.
For instance, in a telegram sent to Bucharest on 23 March 1968 it
was mentioned that among Czechoslovak students there were signaled
“inappropriate manifestations” such as requests for renouncing to
See Ceauşescu’s speeches delivered at the official dinner offered by President
Tito (27 May 1968) and with the occasion of his visit to the town of Krani (29
May 1968) in Nicolae Ceauşescu, Reports, speeches, articles: January 1968 – March
1969, esp. p. 241 and 249.
62
For a collection of documents related to the Prague Spring and its suppression
by the Soviet-led intervention see Jaromír Navrátil et al., eds., The Prague Spring
1968 (Budapest: CEU Press, 1998).
61
280
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
the leading role of the CPCz, hostile statements concerning the army
or wishes that Czechoslovakia would pursue a policy of neutrality.63
Such critical stances by students and intellectuals in Prague did not
escape to communist leaders like Władysław Gomułka or János
Kádár, who had learned from the lessons of 1956. Thus, at the
Dresden Meeting, held also on 23 March, Gomułka stated: “Why
shouldn’t we draw conclusions from the experience which we
acquired in 1956 in Poland? Why not draw conclusions from what
happened in Hungary? That all began in a similar way, comrades. In
our country and in Hungary everything began with the writers.” For
his part, Kádár warned: “The Czechoslovak comrades know best, I
believe, what is happening in Czechoslovakia today. But the process
we observe, what we see and hear, and what we do not yet see – permit
me to explain – this process is extremely similar to the prologue of
the Hungarian counterrevolution at a time when it had not yet become
a counterrevolution. This means that is the process that took place in
Hungary from February 1956 to the end of October.”64
It should be stressed once again that in his speeches Ceauşescu
presented the situation in Czechoslovakia as mirroring the one in
Romania. Ordinary Romanians were told that the Czechoslovak
communists, largely supported by the population, were determined
to pursue their own, independent path towards “socialism” and that
the communist parties of Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, Poland
and Soviet Union were not happy with that.65 Beginning in mid-July,
Mihai Retegan, 1968 – Din primăvară pînă în toamnă: Schiţă de politică
externă românească (1968 – From spring till autumn: An outline of Romanian
foreign policy) (Bucharest: Editura RAO, 1998), 96–97.
64
See Document No. 14: “Stenographic Account of the Dresden Meeting, March
23, 1968 (Excerpts)” in Navrátil et al., eds., The Prague Spring 1968, 67, 69.
65
For instance, during the month of July 1968, the Party newspaper Scînteia
published news about the situation in Czechoslovakia in its issues of 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,
10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 24 July, which amounts to 18
issues. One has to mention that Scînteia did not appear on Mondays.
63
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
281
however, Ceauşescu referred constantly to the situation in
Czechoslovakia and stressed consistently that the CPCz had the right
to decide by itself upon its way of building “socialism.” Thus, on 15
July, during his visit to the Galaţi Steel Combine, Ceauşescu delivered
a speech in which he stated:
Our people and the RCP do not share the view of those who are worried
by the unfolding of events in Czechoslovakia and who consider that
one should intervene in the processes of perfecting the socialist society
that are taking place in Czechoslovakia. We fully trust the CPCz …
and the Czech and Slovak peoples and we are convinced that under the
lead of their communist party … they know how to build socialism in
Czechoslovakia in accordance with their wishes and aspirations. We
wholeheartedly wish them success.66
During the month of August, Ceauşescu took every opportunity
to display the RCP’s support for the CPCz. Thus, on 11 August, he
delivered a speech to the celebration of Miner’s Day (Ziua minerului)
and the Hundredth Anniversary of the establishment of mining
industry in the Jiu Valley. With that occasion, Ceauşescu stated once
again that the RCP expressed from the very beginning its conviction
that the actions taken by the CPCz were directed towards “building
of socialism” in that country and would “consolidate and develop
the revolutionary achievements of the Czech and Slovak peoples.”67
Then, on 14 August, Ceauşescu took part to the graduation ceremony
at the Military Academy. He took the opportunity to address the
Ceauşescu, “Cuvîntare la mitingul de la Combinatul siderurgic din Galaţi –
15 iulie 1968” (Speech delivered at the meeting at the Galaţi Steel Combine – 15
July 1968) in idem, Reports, speeches, articles: January 1968 – March 1969, 327–28.
67
Ceauşescu, “Cuvîntare la sărbătorirea Zilei minerului şi a Centenarului
industriei carbonifere din Valea Jiului – 11 august 1968” (Speech delivered to the
celebration of Miner’s Day and the Hundredth Anniversary of the establishment
of mining industry in the Jiu Valley) in idem, Reports, speeches, articles: January
1968 – March 1969, 353–55.
66
282
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
graduates and share his views about national armed forces and their
role within the Warsaw Treaty Organization framework:
The command of armed forces cannot be exercised by an institution
from abroad; this is the inalienable right of the leadership of our party
and our state…. There can be no justification to admit, in any way, the
use of armed forces to intervene in the internal affairs of a WTO member
country. The solving of domestic problems belongs exclusively to the
party and people of each country and any kind of interference can only
do harm to the cause of socialism, friendship and collaboration among
the socialist countries.68
In his speech, the supreme leader of the Romanian communists
also announced that in the near future a RCP delegation would pay
an official visit to Czechoslovakia. Indeed, the Romanian delegation,
led by Ceauşescu himself, visited Prague during the period 15–17
August. On 16 August, during a visit to the Avia plant, apart from
praising the collaboration between the Czechoslovak plant and the
Braşov Truck Enterprise, he reiterated that the RCP was fully
supporting the CPCz: “As dear friends and comrades, we wish you
to completely succeed in your efforts towards the multilateral
development of socialist Czechoslovakia and we assure you with this
occasion of the solidarity and the fraternal internationalist support
of Romanian communists and the entire Romanian people.”69 The
Ceauşescu, “Cuvîntare la Adunarea festivă din Capitală cu prilejul absolvirii
promoţiei 1968 a Academiei Militare Generale şi acordării gradului de ofiţer
absolvenţilor şcolilor militare – 14 august 1968” (Speech delivered at the Bucharest
festive meeting occasioned by the graduation of the 1968 contingent of the Military
Academy and conferring the rank of officer to the graduates of military schools –
14 August 1968) in idem, Reports, speeches, articles: January 1968 – March 1969,
365–66.
69
Ceauşescu, “Cuvîntare la mitingul de la uzinele Avia din Praga – 16 august
1968” (Speech delivered to the rally at the Avia plant in Prague – 16 August 1968)
in idem, Reports, speeches, articles: January 1968 – March 1969, 385–86.
68
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
283
same day, 16 August, it was signed the “Treaty of friendship,
cooperation and mutual assistance between the Socialist Republic of
Romania and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic” (Tratatul de
prietenie, colaborare şi asistenţă mutuală dintre Republica Socialistă
România şi Republica Socialistă Cehoslovacă). Ceauşescu took the
opportunity to express once more his support for the course pursued
by the Czech and Slovak communists.70
About his visit to Prague and the alleged wholehearted approval
by RCP of CPCz policies, Ceauşescu spoke in public on 20 August,
when he inaugurated the Piteşti Automobile Plant (Uzina de
Autoturisme Piteşti), which would produce the most popular car in
Romania, Dacia. The following fragment of his speech is telling:
During the visit, with the occasion of the talks we had, we could observe
with complete satisfaction that the CPCz, its leadership, the
Czechoslovak government, the working class, Czechoslovak peasantry,
the intellectuals, the entire people are unabatedly putting into practice
the Party policy of building socialism and of developing Czechoslovakia
on the path of socialism, in order to ensure a bright future for the
working people. We have been profoundly impressed. We have returned
with an even stronger conviction that the destinies of socialism and of
Czechoslovak people are in safe hands, in the hands of the communist
party and of its leadership, and that the Czechoslovak people is a
wonderful friend of ours in our common struggle for socialism.71
Ceauşescu, “Cuvîntare la solemnitatea semnării Tratatului de prietenie,
colaborare şi asistenţă mutuală între Republica Socialistă România şi Republica
Socialistă Cehoslovacă – 16 august 1968” (Speech delivered to the ceremony of
signing the Treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance between the
Socialist Republic of Romania and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic) in idem,
Reports, speeches, articles: January 1968 – March 1969, 391–95.
71
Ceauşescu, “Cuvîntare la mitingul organizat la inaugurarea Uzinei de
Autoturisme Piteşti – 20 august 1968” (Speech delivered at the rally occasioned
by the inauguration of the Piteşti Automobile Plant) in idem, Reports, speeches,
articles: January 1968 – March 1969, 411–12.
70
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natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
The fact that the supreme leader of the RCP was ready to bear
witness of the fact that the “destinies of socialism and the
Czechoslovak people” stayed firmly in safe hands could not change
the decision already taken “from above and abroad.” On the night
of 20 to 21 August 1968, WTO troops under Soviet command
invaded Czechoslovakia and put an end to the Prague Spring.
On 21 August 1968, from the balcony of the building of CC of
the RCP, Nicolae Ceauşescu addressed the crowds gathered in front
of the building. His discourse, highly patriotic and with strong antiSoviet accents, created a particular state of mind among large
segments of the population that seemed to forget about the open
wounds of the past two decades of single party rule in Romania:
The incursion in Czechoslovakia of the troops belonging to the five
socialist countries represents a big mistake and a serious threat to peace
in Europe and for the destiny of socialism in the world. It is
inconceivable in the present day world – when peoples rise to defend
their national independence and for equal rights – that a socialist state,
that socialist states infringe on the liberty and independence of another
state. There can be no excuse, and there can be no reason to accept, even for
a single moment, the idea of a military intervention in the domestic affairs
of a fraternal socialist state [emphasis added].72
The significance of Ceauşescu’s “balcony speech” of 21 August
1968 is analyzed below in accordance with the three concepts
mentioned above: legitimacy; nation-building; and closure. Thus,
during the period March 1965 – August 1968, regime perceptions
from below improved gradually due to Ceauşescu’s foreign policy of
independence from Moscow and opening towards the West, as well
as due to his domestic policies of relative economic and ideological
Ceauşescu’s speech of 21 August 1968 was published by the Party daily
Scînteia No. 7802 (Thursday, 22 august 1968), 1. The speech was also published
in Ceauşescu, Reports, speeches, articles, January 1968 – March 1969, 415–18.
72
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
285
relaxation. The slight improvement of the standard of living of the
population found an echo in the hearts and minds of a majority of
Romania’s population. Thus, in August 1968 – ten years after the
withdrawal of Soviet troops from Romania – when Ceauşescu gave
his famous “balcony speech” in which he condemned the invasion
of Czechoslovakia by the WTO troops, large segments of the
population supported him without hesitation. The effect of
Ceauşescu’s discourse on Romania’s population was enormous. That
speech represented for many Romanians the “proof” of Ceauşescu’s
charismatic qualifications.73 It may be argued that Ceauşescu’s
“charismatic leadership,” to use Reinhard Bendix’s concept, occurred
in the dramatic conditions of that August 1968.74 At the same time,
this author agrees with David Beetham, who has argued that the use
of the Weberian concept of “charismatic authority” is problematic
in the sense that it “assigns far too exclusive an importance to the
individual, and leads to fruitless, because unresolvable, disputes about
whether particular leaders possess the indefinable quality of ‘charisma’
or not.”75 Therefore, in order to understand the mechanism that
provided the Ceauşescu regime with unprecedented mobilizing
capacity one should consider not only Ceauşescu’s personality and
leadership style, but also the particular circumstances in which
popular mobilization occurred.
With regard to Ceauşescu’s personality and leadership style, one
has to mention that he was by far less flexible in adopting various
policies than his predecessor, Gheorghiu-Dej. As it will be further
According to Max Weber, charisma is: “A certain quality of an individual
personality by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as
endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers
or qualities.” Quoted in Reinhard Bendix, “Reflections on Charismatic Leadership,”
in Reinhard Bendix et. al., eds., State and Society: A Reader in Comparative Sociology
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), 619.
74
Bendix, “Reflections on Charismatic Leadership,” 616–29.
75
David Beetham, The Legitimation of Power (London: Macmillan, 1991), 156.
73
286
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
shown, Ceauşescu was also less imaginative and his ideological
commitment to the main tenets of Marxism-Leninism remained
strong. Nonetheless, he was only 47 when he became secretary general
of the RCP and managed to build a positive image of himself as a
“man of the people” by proceeding consistently to grassroots
consultations. One can easily grasp the extent of the phenomenon
from the large number of domestic mass rallies analyzed above only
for the period January-August 1968. During the period 1965–1968,
Ceauşescu’s domestic visits were carefully staged and in many
instances he also visited the most relevant historic monuments in the
respective area, thus paying respect to the deeds of the ancestors with
an emphasis on the medieval rulers of Romanian principalities. This
was in sharp contrast with the leadership style of his predecessor,
Gheorghiu-Dej, who did not champion such staged domestic visits.
Furthermore, the launch of his belated and short lived de-Stalinization
– which was intended primarily to unmask the wrongdoings of
Gheorghiu-Dej and damage his legacy among the nomenklatura
members – made of Ceauşescu the undisputed leader of the RCP.
Regarding the mobilizing power of Ceauşescu’s actions, it was his
policy of independence from Moscow and opening toward the West
– which was initiated in fact by Gheorghiu-Dej – that contributed
decisively to the mass mobilization that followed his speech of 21
August. In this respect, Ceauşescu benefited largely from the line
inaugurated by Gheorghiu-Dej. Let us examine some recollections
by critical intellectuals, some of whom became after 1977 fierce
political opponents of the supreme leader of the RCP. Writer Paul
Goma, the initiator of the 1977 Goma movement for human rights
and perhaps the most famous Romanian dissident, wrote about the
atmosphere in Bucharest on 21 August 1968. According to Goma,
Ceauşescu’s appeal to the population to take arms and defend their
country had a tremendous mobilizing force.76 Writer Dumitru
Paul Goma, Amnezia la români (Amnezia to Romanians) (Bucharest: Editura
Litera, 1992), 54.
76
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
287
Ţepeneag remembers that Ceauşescu’s discourse had an instantaneous
effect on him: “For some days, I was a convinced Ceauşescuist.”77 A
bitter confession by journalist Neculai Constantin Munteanu, who
became one of the most acerbic critics of Ceauşescu’s dictatorship as
part of the Romanian desk of Radio Free Europe during the 1980s,
deserves further examination. In 1977, Munteanu addressed a letter
to Ceauşescu himself, in which he stated that he had decided to leave
Romania for ever and put forward his main reasons for making such
a decision. In his letter, Munteanu also mentioned that on 21 August
1968, while he was in front of the CC building and listened to
Ceauşescu’s speech, he felt proud of being a Romanian: “The
vehemence of your condemnation of the armed aggression of some
member countries of the WTO against a friendly and allied country
made me feel proud of being a Romanian.”78 There were some simple
themes, such as the struggle for independence and return to
traditional values that found an echo in the minds and hearts of a
majority of the Romanian population. At the same time, there were
some things that people could experience on an everyday basis such
as: a cautious ideological relaxation, a slight improvement of the living
standards and an opening towards the West. In 1968, things seemed
to move in the right direction, and many felt that the RCP leadership
was truly concerned with improving the general situation of the
population. Such a widespread positive perception of the regime
permitted the RCP to achieve a “limited legitimation through
consent.”79 Moreover, the “balcony speech” – which was generally
perceived as a “proof” of Ceauşescu’s charismatic qualifications – was
given at the beginnings of his rule. At the same time, as Max Weber
Dumitru Ţepeneag, Reîntoarcerea fiului la sînul mamei rătăcite (The return
of the son to prodigal mother’s breast) (Iaşi: Institutul European, 1993), 95.
78
See Neculai Constantin Munteanu, Ultimii şapte ani de-acasă: Un ziarist în
dosarele Securităţii (The last seven years from home: A journalist in the files of the
Securitate) (Bucharest: Editura Curtea Veche, 2007), 120.
79
Beetham, The Legitimation of Power, 117.
77
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puts it, if a charismatic leader “is for long unsuccessful, above all if
his leadership fails to benefit his followers, it is likely that his
charismatic authority will disappear.”80 It took, however, more than
ten years for Ceauşescu’s charisma to erode.
Under Ceauşescu’s rule, the RCP engaged in a sustained policy
of reinforcing the ethnic ties among the Romanian majority and
assimilating the historic ethnic minorities. In this respect, 1968 was
also a watershed. As shown above, it was Gheorghiu-Dej who
initiated after 1956 a return to the local traditions and thus to an
ethnic understanding of the nation. However, Ceauşescu’s
predecessor, who applied random terror in order to Sovietize the
country, only managed to engage in a process of “selective
community-building.” Faced with Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization
campaign, the Romanian communist elite discovered that national
identity is a crucial social and political resource and made use of it
in order to ensure their political survival. The Romanian Stalinists,
however, did not master the language of nationalism and it took
them some eight years (1956–1964) to understand fully the
extraordinary force of nationalism as an instrument for preserving
their absolute power. It was only from 1964 onwards that the process
of building selectively a political community was turned gradually
into an all-encompassing nation-building process. In 1964, the
political prisoners were eventually liberated. Since no major segments
of the population were left out anymore, it seemed that the
preconditions for engaging in a comprehensive, “socialist” nationbuilding project were set. But one thing was still missing: the consent
of the ruled. Gheorghiu-Dej tamed the society through random
terror, then distanced himself from Moscow and returned to
traditional values in order to avoid de-Stalinization. As already
discussed, in April 1964 it was issued a “declaration of
independence” and the political prisoners were liberated.
80
Quoted in Bendix, “Reflections on Charismatic Leadership,” 620.
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
289
Nonetheless, the RCP had a legitimacy problem, which was solved
only in August 1968.
After condemning the WTO invasion of Czechoslovakia from the
balcony of the building of the CC of the RCP, Ceauşescu started
what might be termed as the itineraries of national cohesion, meant
to provide popular backing to the independent policies of the RCP.
Since the events unfolded rapidly, a brief event-centered account
would be useful for a better understanding of the context. On 21
August 1968 Ceauşescu delivered his famous “balcony speech,”
condemning the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the WTO troops.
The next day, 22 August 1968, the Romanian Grand National
Assembly – GNA (Marea Adunare Naţională) was convoked for an
extraordinary session. In his speech in the front of the GNA,
Ceauşescu stated: “In our opinion, a big and tragic mistake, with
heavy consequences upon the fate of the unity of the socialist system
and the international communist and workers’ movement,
occurred.”81 Two days later, on 24 August, Ceauşescu paid another
visit to Yugoslavia and held talks with Tito. (Ceauşescu had already
visited Yugoslavia on 27 May-1 June that year).82
Then, on 26 August 1968 Ceauşescu initiated an ample program
of domestic visits. Transylvania was the prime target of regime’s
propagandistic efforts. During a single day, 26 August 1968, he
visited three counties, Braşov, Harghita and Covasna, and took part
to four mass rallies in the towns of Braşov, Sfântu Gheorghe,
The same day, the GNA adopted a document whose importance was equaled
only by that of the “Declaration of April 1964:” Declaraţia Marii Adunări Naţionale
a R.S.R. cu privire la principiile de bază ale politicii externe a României (Declaration
of the Grand National Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Romania regarding
the fundamental principles of Romania’s foreign policy). See Principiile de bază
ale politicii externe a României (The fundamental principles of Romania’s foreign
policy) (Bucharest: Editura Politică, 1968).
82
Florin Constantiniu, O istorie sinceră a poporului român (A sincere history of
the Romanian people) (Bucharest: Editura Univers Enciclopedic, 1997), 509–510.
81
290
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
Miercurea Ciuc and Odorheiul Secuiesc. In two of the counties
visited, the counties of Harghita and Covasna, the majority of the
population is ethnic Hungarian. It seems that, following the lesson
of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, Ceauşescu feared in those days
of August 1968 that the WTO invasion of Czechoslovakia would
stir unrest among the Hungarian-speaking population of Romania.
It should be added that in February 1968 the RCP proceeded to
an administrative re-organization of the country’s territory by
renouncing to the Soviet-type organization into regions (regiuni)
and districts (raioane) and a return to the traditional organization
into counties (judeţe) and communes (comune). More importantly,
through the new administrative organization the existence of the
Hungarian Autonomous Region (Regiunea Autonomă Maghiară)
came to an end.83 It was replaced by three counties, Covasna,
Harghita and Mureş, a situation that angered the ethnic Hungarian
population that perceived the measure as a step towards its
assimilation. Consequently, Ceauşescu had good reasons to fear
that the Hungarian minority in Romania would speculate the
international context and fight for its rights.
It is reasonable to argue that this was the case since at the mass
rallies in the towns of Sfântu Gheorghe, Miercurea Ciuc and
Odorheiul Secuiesc, Ceauşescu ended his speeches by saying a few
words in Hungarian. It must be added that it was the only occasion
The Hungarian Autonomous Region was established through Decree No. 12
of 10 January 1956 and reconfirmed by the Law for the modification of the
Constitution of 27 December 1960. The 1968 administrative organization was
established by the Law concerning the administrative organization of the territory of
the Socialist Republic of Romania of 16 February 1968. For more on this see Ioan
Silviu Nistor, Comuna şi judeţul, factori ai civilizaţiei româneşti unitare: Evoluţia
istorică (The commune and the county, factors of unitary development of the
Romanian civilization: The historical evolution) (Cluj: Editura Dacia, 2000), 131–
37 and Ioniţă Anghel et al., Judeţele României Socialiste (Counties of Socialist
Romania) (Bucharest: Editura Politică, 1969).
83
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
291
when Ceauşescu strove to speak in the Hungarian language.84 With
regard to the revival of historical myths in order to stir popular
support for RCP’s policies, one mass rally was of paramount
importance: the rally held on 30 August 1968 in the Transylvanian
city of Cluj. That day, Ceauşescu delivered a flamboyant speech in
front of a numerous audience. In that speech, Ceauşescu referred for
the first time to the RCP as the direct continuator of the heroic deeds
of the Romanian medieval rulers such as Ştefan cel Mare (Stephen
the Great), Mircea cel Bătrîn (Mircea the Old) and Mihai Viteazul
(Michael the Brave).85 It should be stressed once again that Ceauşescu
made appreciable efforts to lure Romania’s national minorities and
convince them that the RCP policy towards minorities was not aimed
at their assimilation. In this respect, it is telling that a new series of
domestic visits was organized during the period 20–21 September
1968 in another ethnically mixed region of Romania: the Banat.
With that occasion, Ceauşescu visited another three counties, CaraşSeverin, Timiş and Arad, and delivered speeches at the mass rallies
organized in the cities of Reşiţa, Timişoara and Arad.86 Thus, from
See Ceauşescu, “Cuvîntare la mitingul din municipiul Braşov – 26 august
1968” (Speech delivered at the mass rally in the city of Braşov – 26 August 1968);
“Cuvîntare la mitingul din oraşul Sfîntu Gheorghe – 26 august 1968” (Speech
delivered at the mass rally in the town of Sfîntu Gheorghe – 26 August 1968);
“Cuvîntare la mitingul din oraşul Miercurea Ciuc – 26 august 1968” (Speech
delivered at the mass rally in the town of Miercurea Ciuc – 26 August 1968); and
“Cuvîntare la mitingul din municipiul Odorheiul Secuiesc – 26 august 1968”
(Speech delivered at the mass rally in the town of Odorheiul Secuiesc – 26 August
1968), in idem, Reports, speeches, articles: January 1968 – March 1969, 422–30,
431–38, 439–48, and 449–54.
85
Ceauşescu, “Cuvîntare la marea adunare populară din municipiul Cluj – 30
august 1968” (Speech delivered at the mass rally in the city of Cluj – 30 August
1968), in idem, Reports, speeches, articles: January 1968 – March 1969, 478.
86
Ceauşescu, “Cuvîntare la mitingul de la Reşiţa – 20 septembrie 1968” (Speech
delivered at the mass rally in the city of Reşiţa – 20 September 1968); “Cuvîntare
la mitingul de la Timişoara – 20 septembrie 1968” (Speech delivered at the mass
84
292
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
September 1968 onwards the emphasis on independence and unity,
as well as the cult of ancestors and the manipulation of national
symbols became the main ingredients of “Ceauşescuism.”
Another proof of Ceauşescu’s commitment to pursuing
independent policies within the Soviet bloc was his public refusal of
the Brezhnev Doctrine. Ceauşescu made his refusal of the Brezhnev
Doctrine plain on 29 November 1968 in the front of the Romanian
Grand National Assembly gathered in a special session to celebrate
fifty years from the union of Transylvania with Romania on
1 December 1918. In his speech, Ceauşescu resolutely criticized the
concept of “limited sovereignty” applied to the relations between
communist countries:
The thesis that one tries to validate lately, according to which the
common defense of the socialist countries against an imperialistic attack
presupposes the limitation or renunciation to the sovereignty of a state
participating to the [Warsaw] Treaty, does not correspond to the
principles characterizing the relations between socialist states and under
no circumstances may be accepted. The affiliation to the Warsaw Treaty
Organization not only that does not question the sovereignty of the
member states, that does not “limit” in a way or another their state
independence, but, on the contrary, as the Treaty stipulates, is a means
of strengthening the national independence and sovereignty of each
participating state.87
rally in the city of Timişoara – 20 September 1968); and “Cuvîntare la mitingul
de la Arad – 21 septembrie 1968” (Speech delivered at the mass rally in the city of
Arad – 21 September 1968), in idem, Reports, speeches, articles: January 1968 –
March 1969, 506–516; 517–21 and 521–31.
87
Ceauşescu, “Expunere la şedinţa jubiliară a Marii Adunări Naţionale
consacrată sărbătoririi semicentenarului unirii Transilvaniei cu România – 29
noiembrie 1968” (Speech delivered at the special session of the Grand National
Assembly dedicated to the celebration of fifty years since the unification of
Transylvania with Romania – 29 November 1968), in idem, Reports, speeches,
articles: January 1968 – March 1969, 745–746.
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
293
Thus, the Romanian national-communism reached its full
development only in the aftermath of Ceauşescu’s “balcony speech”
of 21 August 1968. This was due to the fact that in those days the
RCP could safely claim that it was the continuator of the political
traditions of the three Romanian principalities and, what is more, it
was perceived as such by large segments of the population.
That August 1968, however, nobody was really thinking that from
the mid-1970s onwards the situation in Romania would decline
rapidly and that in the mid-1980s the standard of living of the
population would rank among the lowest in Sovietized Europe. On
the contrary, at the time many believed that 1968 was only the
beginning of a period of even more economic liberalization and
ideological relaxation. Mobilized by Ceauşescu’s bold condemnation
of the repression of the Prague Spring, there were not many those
who paid attention to the ideological orthodoxy of the secretary
general of the RCP, which was expressed publicly in numerous
instances even before 21 August 1968.
It would be thus interesting to examine some of Ceauşescu’s public
statements that were subsequently transformed into political actions.
One can observe that, apart from the special emphasis put on
independence there were not many signs of reform communism in
the political thought of Ceauşescu. In fact, Ceauşescu consistently
followed the principles put forward in his Report to the Ninth
Congress of the RCP (19 July 1965). A phrase from Ceauşescu’s
discourse epitomizes his political credo: “Free and master of its fate,
following unabatedly its well-versed shepherd, the Party of the
communists, the Romanian people raises its motherland higher and
higher to the peaks of socialism, well-being and happiness.”88 One
can argue that the underlying meaning of Ceauşescu’s statement was
Ceauşescu, Raport la cel de-al IX-lea Congres al Partidului Comunist Român
– 19 iulie 1965 (Report to the Ninth Congress of the RCP – 19 July 1965
(Bucharest: Editura Politică, 1965), 6.
88
294
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
that the RCP should be left to lead the country according to its wish,
without any external interference. Interestingly enough, there was at
least one principle, also enounced by Ceauşescu in his 1965 Report,
to which the secretary general renounced after 1968, i.e., the principle
of “collective leadership and labor.” To this one can add the idea of
“abandoning any tendency of subjectivism in evaluating the cadre,”
emphasized by Ceauşescu in 1965, but to which he also renounced
gradually after 1968, when he started to rely increasingly on his relatives.89
References to Stalinist methods of mass mobilization;
“systemization” of the national territory; return to autochthonous
values in the sphere of culture, were all present in the discourses of
the general secretary of the RCP throughout the year 1968. The same
year, the RCP proceeded to the reorganization of the secret police,
the infamous Securitate, which was ordered to put a stronger emphasis
on the recruitment of intellectuals as informal collaborators. Some
examples would be telling in this respect. For instance, on 10 February
1968, in a speech at the National Meeting of the Union of
Communist Youth (Uniunea Tineretului Comunist – UTC),
Ceauşescu proposed the reviving of the “traditions of voluntary labor”
and the re-opening of the “national youth worksites,” characteristic
of the early Stalinist period, as means of “revolutionary” education
of the young generation.90 On 15 February, the Grand National
Assembly – GNA held an extraordinary session to which Ceauşescu
presented the project of administrative reorganization of the territory
(which was already discussed above).91 Then, on 17 February,
Ceauşescu, Report to the Ninth Congress, 72, 74.
Ceauşescu, Reports, speeches, articles: January 1968 – March 1969, 50–53.
91
Ceauşescu, “Expunere cu privire la îmbunătăţirea organizării administrative
a teritoriului Republicii Socialiste România – 15 februarie 1968“ (Exposé
concerning the betterment of the administrative organization of the territory of
the Socialist Republic of Romania – 15 February 1968), in idem, Reports, speeches,
articles: January 1968 – March 1969, 5–19.
89
90
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
295
Ceauşescu visited the Prahova county, which, according to the new
administrative organization of the territory, was among the largest
ones. With that occasion, Ceauşescu spoke about the necessity of
making use rationally of the arable land and of reducing the
constructed areas of towns and villages: “Leaving aside wasteful
architectonic extravaganzas, let us use our imagination and skill for
economizing the wealth of the people by erecting nice and
inexpensive buildings, and by reducing as much as possible the
constructed areas of towns and villages [emphasis added].”92 Such an
assertion indicates that the RCP supreme leader already had in mind
a plan to “systemize” the territory of the country. As far as the sphere
of culture was concerned, the general secretary of the RCP also had
strong ideas about it. Thus, on 19 April 1968, Ceauşescu spoke at
the National Conference of the Union of Plastic Artists in Romania
and stated: “During the conference it has been stressed that the artist
must be devoted body and soul to serving the interests of their socialist
motherland, that their highest ideal is to create an art of this country,
of this people, an art that responds to the necessities of this glorious
moment that Romania experiences.”93
Last, but by no means least, one should discuss the way the activity
of the communist secret police, the much feared Securitate, was
reorganized after the Plenum of April 1968. As shown above, the
Plenum was carefully staged and represented a frontal attack by the
secretary general of the RCP on the legacy of the previous supreme
leader of the Party. Thus, Ceauşescu accused Gheorghiu-Dej of
wrongdoings with regard to a number of actions taken against Party
Ceauşescu, “Cuvîntare la adunarea activului de partid din judeţul Prahova
– 17 februarie 1968” (Speech delivered at the meeting of the Party cadre from the
Prahova county – 17 February 1968) in idem, Reports, speeches, articles: January
1968 – March 1969, 67.
93
Ceauşescu, “Cuvîntare la Conferinţa pe ţară a Uniunii Artiştilor Plastici –
19 aprilie 1968” (Speech at the National Conference of the Union of the Plastic
Artists), in idem, Reports, speeches, articles: January 1968 – March 1969, 153.
92
296
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
members. In fact, it was about the way Gheorghiu-Dej got rid of his
rivals from within the Party. Of course, being part of the “group from
prisons” Ceauşescu knew perfectly well what was happening at the
time. Another target of the April 1968 Plenum was Alexandru
Drăghici, former head of the Securitate, whom Ceauşescu hated.
Furthermore, as recent research has shown, beginning in 1967 the
Securitate underwent a transformation which culminated with the
appointment of Ion Stănescu – a Party activist quite close to
Ceauşescu – as its head (May 1968 – April 1972). At the same time,
one should note that the reorganization of the Securitate also meant
the promotion of officers with higher education, as well as the
inclusion of a significant number of intellectuals among its informal
collaborators.94 Although the methods of the Securitate shifted from
sheer repression to prevention, its scope never changed. In this respect,
it is worth mentioning the bitter remark of Neculai Constantin
Munteanu: “Back then, in August 1968, in my patriotic euphoria, I
did not pay much attention to the placards with slogans that read:
‘Ceauşescu – RCP,’ ‘Ceauşescu – Romania,’ ‘Ceauşescu and the
people.’ A very few could have imagined at the time that those
placards were only the prelude to a future and violent recrudescence
of the personality cult.”95 Unfortunately, that August 1968 a majority
of the population, including former political prisoners, were misled
by Ceauşescu’s stance.
Ceauşescu’s gesture of defiance not only brought him a broad
popular support, but also permitted him to portray himself as a
“dissenter” within the Soviet bloc, which undermined the domestic
For more on this see Elis Neagoe-Pleşa, “1968 – Anul reformării agenturii
Securităţii” (1968 – The year of reorganizing the Securitate), in Caietele CNSAS
(Bucharest), No. 1 (2008): esp. 19–22. On the political biographies of Alexandru
Drăghici and Ion Stănescu see Dobre et al., eds., Members of the CC of the RCP,
231 and, respectively, 545.
95
Neculai Constantin Munteanu, A journalist in the files of the Securitate, 121.
94
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
297
critical stances towards the regime for many years. In 1968, people
in the street could see and feel that something had changed in
Romania: the country was opening towards the West; a cautious
ideological relaxation was under way together with a slight
improvement of the living standard; and the Party was distancing
from the Kremlin. All in all, people had a rather positive perception
of the regime, which permitted the RCP to achieve a “limited
legitimation through consent.”96 Also, the year 1968 marked the
transition from a process of “selective community-building” to a
comprehensive nation-building project aiming at constructing an
ethnically homogenous Romanian “socialist” nation. Thus,
Romanian national-communism reached full development only in
the aftermath of Ceauşescu’s “balcony speech” of 21 August 1968.
This was due to the fact that in those days the RCP could claim that
it was the continuator of the political traditions of the three historic
Romanian principalities and it was perceived as such by large
segments of the population. In order to convince the population of
its commitment to traditional values, the RCP propaganda machine
made full use of the four fundamental historical myths on which
modern Romania was created in the second half of the 19th century:
ancient roots; continuity; unity; and struggle for independence. At
the same time, the year 1968 marked, in fact, the beginning of the
end of the period of relative economic liberalization and timid
ideological relaxation initiated by Ceauşescu’s predecessor,
Gheorghiu-Dej, in 1964. True, Ceauşescu supported the political
actions of the CPCz. However, his support for the Prague Spring did
not come from his commitment to reform communism. On the
contrary, there was nothing in terms of domestic policies which would
indicate similarities between RCP’s domestic policies and the reform
program of CPCz. Apart from the special emphasis put on
independence and non-interference in the internal affairs of a
96
As defined by Beetham, The Legitimation of Power, 117.
298
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
“fraternal” party, there were not many signs of reform communism
in the political thought of Ceauşescu. As shown above, from January
to August 1968, Ceauşescu constantly referred in his speeches to
Stalinist methods of mass mobilization, “systemization” of the
national territory and the return to autochthonous values in the sphere
of culture. Moreover, the same year 1968, the RCP proceeded to the
reorganization of the secret police, the infamous Securitate, which
was ordered to put a stronger emphasis on the promotion of officers
with higher education and the recruitment of intellectuals as informal
collaborators.
The societal response to Ceauşescu’s speech of 21 August 1968
made clear that nationalism was a most powerful political principle,
able to confer legitimacy on the RCP rule in Romania. As John
Breuilly perceptively points out: “Nationalism is, above and beyond
all else, about politics and … politics is about power. Power, in the
modern world, is principally about control of the state.”97 Thus, from
August 1968 onwards the RCP propaganda machine started to put
a much stronger emphasis on ancestors’ struggle for independence
and their heroic deeds. In this respect, George Schöpflin has aptly
observed: “Mythic and symbolic discourses can … be employed to
assert legitimacy and strengthen authority. They mobilize emotions
and enthusiasm. They are a primary means by which people make
sense of the political process, which is understood in a symbolic
form.”98 In Ceauşescu’s Romania, historians co-opted by the
propaganda machine devised a “national” history centered on the
four fundamental historical myths of the Romanians: (1) ancient
roots; (2) continuity on the present day territory; (3) unity; and (4)
struggle for independence.
John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, 2nd ed. (Chicago: The University
of Chicago Press, 1994), 1.
98
George Schöpflin, Nations, Identity, Power: The New Politics of Europe
(London: Hurst, 2000), 89.
97
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
299
Ancient roots and continuity had to do with the ethnic origins
of the nation and with the disputes with historians from
neighboring Hungary with regard to the contested region of
Transylvania, considered as a cradle of their nation by both
Romanians and Hungarians. Unity and independence, however,
were intrinsically linked to the RCP policies from 1956 onwards.
It was the unity of the Party and its independence from Moscow
that permitted the Stalinist elite in Romania to survive deStalinization. Therefore, a transfer of such a vision to the PartyState level came almost naturally and was very effective as a
propaganda instrument. The medieval rulers of the Romanian
principalities had to defend their independence by fighting against
the Ottomans; the rulers of communist Romania had to oppose
the Soviets in order to preserve the independence of their “socialist”
nation-state.
For his part, Ceauşescu wanted to win a place for himself in the
heroic tradition of the medieval rulers of the three Romanian
Principalities (Wallachia, Moldavia and Transylvania). As already
mentioned, from the very beginnings of his rule Ceauşescu manifested
his appreciation for the heroic deeds of those medieval rulers and his
leadership style was based on a systematic program of domestic visits.99
Moreover, it was under Ceauşescu that the myth of Michael the Brave
(Mihai Viteazul) – the condottiere that realized a short-lived
unification of the three principalities under his scepter in 1600 – was
revived. In 1969, it was started the production of a movie, also
entitled Mihai Viteazul, directed by Sergiu Nicolaescu. Released in
1971, the movie proved to be the most watched historical Romanian
film production of all time, and the third most watched Romanian
For more on this see Cristina Petrescu, “Vizitele de lucru, un ritual al Epocii
de aur” ([Ceauşescu’s] Domestic visits, a ritual of the Golden Epoch), in Lucian
Boia, ed., Miturile comunismului românesc (Myths of Romanian communism)
(Bucharest: Editura Nemira, 1998), 229–38.
99
300
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
movie of all time. In fact, Mihai Viteazul epitomized the historical
myths of unity and independence. It is also worth noting that a
previous movie by Nicolaescu, Dacii (The Dacians), released in 1967,
concentrated on ancient roots and continuity, and alluded to the
Roman conquest of the Dacian kingdom and the formation of the
Romanian people as a Dacian-Roman synthesis. Dacii was
Nicolaescu’s first success and ranks second after Mihai Viteazul in
the hierarchy of the most watched Romanian historical movies and
fourth in the national rankings of the most watched movies of all
time.100 Nonetheless, the issues of ancient roots and continuity of the
Romanians on the present day territory were addressed in an even
more influential feature film released in November 1968. The title
of the movie – Columna (The Column) – is a direct reference to the
famous column, still standing today in Rome, erected by the Roman
emperor Trajan (Marcus Ulpius Traianus) to commemorate the two
Dacian wars, i.e. 101–102 and 105–106 A.D., which led to the
annexation of Dacia to the Roman empire. Directed by Mircea
Drăgan and benefiting from an international cast, the movie illustrates
the thesis of the birth of the Romanian people as a Roman-Dacian
For details regarding the movies Dacii and Mihai Viteazul, see Grid
Modorcea, ed., Dicţionarul filmului românesc de ficţiune (Dictionary of the
Romanian feature film) (Bucharest: Editura Cartea Românescă, 2004), 164–65
and, respectively, 198–99. For a conceptual framework concerning the process of
nation-building in communist Romania, see Dragoş Petrescu, “Communist
Legacies in the ‘New Europe:’ History, Ethnicity, and the Creation of a ‘Socialist’
Nation in Romania, 1945–1989,” in Konrad H. Jarausch and Thomas
Lindenberger, eds., Conflicted Memories: Europeanizing Contemporary Histories
(New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), 37–54. On the rankings devised by the
National Centre of Cinematography regarding the most watched Romanian movies
of all times see “Cele mai vizionate filme româneşti din toate timpurile” (The most
watched Romanian movies of all time) in Cotidianul (Bucharest), 23 August 2005;
Internet; http://cotidianul.ro/cele_mai_vizionate_filme_romanesti_din_toate_
timpurile-2116.html; accessed 29 July 2008. Mihai Viteazul was watched by
13,330,000 persons while Dacii was watched by 13,112,000.
100
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
301
synthesis in the aftermath of the second Dacian war. The script also
contained some memorable lines that proved to be popular with the
younger audiences, such as those of the Dacian nobleman Bastus –
played by Gheorghe Dinică, one of the most gifted Romanian actors
– who eventually betrays king Decebal.101
Ceauşescu’s posture of defiance towards the 1968 Soviet
intervention in Czechoslovakia misled statesmen, politicians and
scholars alike. A keen observer of Romanian politics and society,
Jowitt argued at the time that Ceauşescu’s stance was characteristic
of “romantic (liberal) nationalism:”
Under Ceauşescu, the nationalism of the Romanian regime, at least
through the summer of 1969, has been what Carlton Hayes has termed
romantic (liberal) nationalism. There are a number of indices one can
use to justify this characterization: (a) the presence or absence of a Adam
Smith sort of definition of world harmony; (b) an emphasis on the value
of sovereignty, that is, national independence; (c) identification with
“oppressed” nations; (d) an emphasis on the past which focuses on events
and continuity rather than on a golden age or myth era; and (e) a view
of nations as the natural divisions of humanity.102
In reality, Ceauşescu’s vision of national identity had nothing to
do with romantic nationalism. He was aiming, as far as the Romanian
majority was concerned, at a radical reinforcement of the ethnic ties,
a stance made clear by the launch of the so-called “Theses of July
1971.” The “theses” was a rather brief document structured on
seventeen points, issued on 6 July 1971 and which embodied
Ceauşescu’s rigid attitude towards education and cultural production.
Ceauşescu reiterated the main ideas from the document issued on
July 6 at a meeting of the Party active involved in propaganda and
For more on the movie Columna see Modorcea, ed., Dictionary of the
Romanian feature film, 181–82.
102
Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development, 286.
101
302
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
indoctrination held on 9 July 1971. The “Theses of July 1971”
represented a radical attack against the cosmopolitan and the
“decadent,” pro-Western attitudes in Romanian culture.103 Equally
important, they signaled a return to cultural autochthonism.
Furthermore, after the launch of the 1971 “theses,” the regime began
to place a stronger emphasis on the importance of history writing in
building the “socialist” nation, and the most important step to be
taken was to provide the party guidelines for the writing of a
“national” history.
Three years later, in 1974, it was issued the founding document
of Romanian national-communism: the Romanian Communist Party
Program (RCPP).104 This official document opened with a 38–page
concise history of Romania, which, in fact, became not only the
blueprint for a single, compulsory textbook utilized in every school,
but also the model for every historical writing published in Romania,
based on the four historical myths already discussed: (1) the ancient
roots of the Romanian people; (2) the continuity of the Romanians
on the present day territory from the ancient times until present; (3)
the unity of the Romanian people throughout its history; and (4) the
Nicolae Ceauşescu, Propuneri de măsuri pentru îmbunătăţirea activităţii
politico-ideologice, de educare marxist-leninistă a membrilor de partid, a tuturor
oamenilor muncii – 6 iulie 1971 (Proposals of measures aimed at enhancing the
political-ideological activity, of Marxist-Leninist education of the Party members
and the entire working people – 6 iulie 1971) and Expunere la Consfătuirea de lucru
a activului de partid din domeniul ideologiei şi al activităţii politice şi cultural-educative
– 9 iulie 1971 ( Exposé at the Meeting of the Party aktiv in the field of ideology
and the political and cultural-educational activity – 9 July 1971) (Bucharest: Editura
Politică, 1971).
104
See Programul Partidului Comunist Român de făurire a societăţii socialiste
multilateral dezvoltate şi înaintare a României spre comunism (The Romanian
Communist Party’s Program for establishing a multilaterally developed socialist
society and Romania’s advancement towards communism) (Bucharest: Editura
Politică, 1975). Regarding the teleological approach to the “national” history, see
pp. 27–64.
103
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
303
Romanians’ continuous struggle for independence. Through history
and geography teaching the Party propaganda also managed to
inculcate in the minds of the young generations the idea that it was
continuing the deeds of the ancestors with regard to the preservation
of the national identity and territorial integrity. Nationalism is also
place-bound. Therefore, as far as geography teaching is concerned,
the presence of an identical map of the country, in every classroom
of every grammar school in Romania, contributed decisively to the
process of “imagining” the nation. In this respect, as Cristina Petrescu
has suggested, the generations raised under communism had a
different perception of the national territory than the interwar
generations. For them, Romanian national territory was imagined as
comprising Transylvania, but not including Bessarabia. The mental
map they interiorized was based on the political maps they
continuously saw in the classrooms and consequently Bessarabia
ceased to be perceived, at mass level, as being part of historic
Romania’s territory. Therefore, during the communist period, the
process of imagining the Romanian nation did not include that
territory. At the same time, the RCP elite kept alive the idea that
Bessarabia was part of historical Romania. As far as Bessarabia is
concerned, the process of cultural reproduction created a set of salient
values that undermined RCP’s ability to manipulate national symbols.
Consequently, when Ceauşescu sought to win back popular support
by raising the issue of Bessarabia in the late 1980s, he received very
little popular backing. The precise moment when the issue of
Bessarabia surfaced in the RCP’s discourse is still difficult to establish
with precision. Niculescu-Mizil argues that discussions with the
Soviets were initiated in 1973–74 and were continued in 1978.
Nevertheless, at the Fourteenth Congress of the RCP Ceauşescu asked
for the abrogation of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact.105
105
See Niculescu-Mizil, From Comintern to national-communism, 448–49.
304
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
After the launch of the 1974 Romanian Communist Party’s
Program, the regime devised a national festival, Cîntarea României
(Song of Praise to Romania), which was initiated in 1976 and took
place annually until 1989. A national sport competition – Daciada
– whose name was a clear reference to the Dacian origins of the
Romanians was also launched. Daciada, however, was less influential
in legitimizing the RCP rule as compared with Cîntarea României.106
The national festival Cîntarea României played an important role in
forging allegiance to the Party and its supreme leader because it was
devised as a sort of huge cultural-ideological umbrella for the totality
of cultural activities that took place in Romania after 1976. In other
words, everything that could be identified as a cultural event had to
be part of the national festival and praise, one way or another, the
nation, as well as the Party and its conducător (leader). Furthermore,
the festival gathered not only professional artists, but also large
numbers of amateur artists from all over the country. For the amateur
artists the festival was first and foremost an opportunity to escape
from their boring workplaces and spend some days out of factory
and sometimes out of town.107 The price to be paid was that they
had to praise Partidul, Ceauşescu, România, but many felt that it was
worth doing it. Insidiously, however, through the verses that people
recited and the songs they sang a set of political values and attitudes
were slowly inculcated. The result was that many acquired a subjective
version of national history and came to believe that Party’s
On the first edition (1976/1977) of the national festival Cîntarea României
see Dragoş Petrescu, “Cîntarea României sau stalinismul naţional în festival” (Song
of Praise to Romania or the national-Stalinism in festival), in Lucian Boia, ed.,
Miturile comunismului românesc (Myths of Romanian communism) (Bucharest:
Editura Nemira, 1998), 239–51. For more on the national sport competition
Daciada see Vlad Georgescu, Politics and history, 124–25.
107
Such an assertion is also supported by what the present author has observed
directly, while working as an engineer at the Romlux Tîrgovişte Electric Bulbs
Factory during the period 1987–1989.
106
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
305
achievements were indeed a continuation of the heroic deeds of the
medieval rulers. Let us not forget that the magic of the 1968 “balcony
speech” was still powerful. Also, one should bear in mind that it was
only after 1981 that the economic crisis began to undermine regime’s
efforts of indoctrinating the population.
Such a mixture of professionalism and amateurishness harmed
not only the quality of the cultural products, but also made more
space for those products that served best the communist propaganda
machine. Initially, in terms of glorification of the RCP and its
supreme leader, amateur artists overdid the compliments, as a way
of achieving official recognition. Soon afterwards, professional artists
saw in the festival a means for upward mobility and a possibility to
earn easy money and followed suit. Consequently, many professional
artists produced continuously, until the demise of the regime,
artworks of pretentious bad taste depicting the supreme leader and
his wife. The eighties, especially, proved to be a fertile period for the
production of this kind of kitsch.108 What is important, however, for
the present analysis is that at grassroots level the festival was
One can mention painters such as Constantin Piliuţă and Sabin Bălaşa, or
poets such as Corneliu Vadim Tudor and Adrian Păunescu. The list of those
professional artists (to say nothing of the large numbers of amateur artists) who
produced such kind of “artworks” is, however, much longer. See for instance the
numerous paintings dedicated to the Ceauşescu couple, by both professional and
amateur artists, reproduced in the Luceafărul Almanac 1988 (Bucharest), 1–13,
and the Scînteia Almanac 1987 (Bucharest), 25–31. For figures concerning the
artistic production, see Nicolae Stoian, “Cîntarea României – Un festival-epopee”
(Song of Praise to Romania: A festival-epopee), in Flacăra Almanac 1978
(Bucharest), 32–36 and N. Popescu-Bogdăneşti, “Cîntarea României: O constelaţie
a talentelor poporului” (Song of Praise to Romania: A constellation of people’s
talents), in Scînteia Almanac 1978 (Bucharest), 129–36. As for poetry, a good
introduction to the productions by court poets is Eugen Negrici, Poezia unei religii
politice: Patru decenii de agitaţie şi propagandă (The poetry of a political religion:
Four decades of agitation and propaganda) (Bucharest: Editura Pro, n.d.), esp.
311–49.
108
306
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
instrumental in praising Romanianness and the unity of the PartyState. Thus, through cultural reproduction, the regime succeeded in
enforcing upon the ethnic Romanians a stronger sense of belonging
to the organized solidarity of the Romanian nation.
In addition to the Cîntarea României national festival, another
huge propaganda machine under the guise of a traveling cultural
show served with rather simple means the identity politics enforced
by the regime: the Flacăra (Flame) Cenacle of Revolutionary Youth
led by poet Adrian Păunescu. From 1973 until its demise in June
1985, the Flacăra Cenacle succeeded in confiscating the natural
rebelliousness of the young generation and in transforming or
directing it towards patriotic stances and thus towards allegiance to
the Party-State. The long-term effects of the nationalistic cultural
products propagated by the Flacăra traveling cenacle were disastrous:
by channeling the energy of a generation who did not yet perceive
the system as utterly bad, the Flacăra Cenacle hampered the
development of a counterculture and thus contributed significantly
in hampering the structuring of dissidence in Romania. By mixing
rock music with poetry praising the nation, the Party and its supreme
leader, Păunescu’s cenacle reached a public that Cîntarea României
could not reach: the young and potentially rebellious people. The
message of the Flacăra Cenacle was that communism and a sort of
alternative culture could coexist. Young people were allowed to stay
until small hours on stadiums throughout the country where they
could sing, dance, smoke, consume some alcohol, and make love. In
many respects, the atmosphere on the stadiums where the Flacăra
Cenacle performed was more pleasant than what the system could
offer in terms of leisure opportunities, especially in the early 1980s.
On 15 June 1985, however, the Flacăra Cenacle performed on a
stadium in the city of Ploieşti, some 50 km. north of Bucharest, when
a torrential rain caused a melee. Five people died and many were
injured. As a consequence, the regime banned the Flacăra Cenacle.109
109
On the Ploieşti event see Dinu C. Giurescu, Romania’s history in data, 719.
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
307
Nevertheless, the harm was done. Politicized rock did not appear in
Romania and this was also due to the Păunescu’s cenacle. True, the
rock-and-roll counterculture was also undermined by the economic
crisis and the rationing of power consumption, as a Westerner
ironically observed: “How could you expect rock-and-roll to survive
in a country where there is barely enough electricity to power a light
bulb, let alone drive an electric guitar?”110 However, the role of the
Flacăra Cenacle in “confiscating” a major segment of the alternative
culture to which Cîntarea României was not able to get and
channeling it into patriotic performances in accordance with the
tenets of Ceauşescu’s July 1971 Theses must not be neglected.111
At the power elite level, the rule of Ceauşescu consolidated rapidly
in the aftermath of the Tenth Congress of the RCP, held on 6–12
August 1969. In fact, Ceauşescu was not challenged from within the
RCP during the next decade, i.e. 1969–1979. It is also true that he
did not have to use terror anymore to rule; instead, he made use of
the “rotation of cadres” and relied increasingly on relatives.112 One
can have a pretty accurate image of the scale of the process of “rotation
of cadres” by consulting the lists of the officials who entered the
Romanian governments from 1975 onwards and looking to the
successive positions they occupied until the fall of the regime. From
the mid-1970s to the end of the communist rule in Romania there
were four governments in power, as follows: (1) the Manea Mănescu
government (18 March 1975 – 28 March 1980); (2) the Ilie Verdeţ
government (29 March 1980 – 20 May 1982); (3) the first
Constantin Dăscălescu government (21 May 1982 – 28 March
Quoted in Sabrina P. Ramet, Social Currents in Eastern Europe: The Sources and
Meaning of the Great Transformation (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991), 234.
111
Actually, the Flacăra Cenacle won the first prize for “artistic and culturaleducative activity” at the inaugural (1976–1977) edition of the national festival
Cîntarea României.
112
See the lists of ministers in Neagoe, A history of Romania’s governments,
1859–1995, 205–43.
110
308
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
1985); and (4) the second Constantin Dăscălescu government
(29 March 1985 – 22 December 1989).
In 1979, however, a Party veteran dared to raise his voice against
Ceauşescu. In front of the Twelfth Party Congress held on 19–23
November 1979, Constantin Pârvulescu, an old-timer, protested
resolutely against the rule of Ceauşescu and the personality cult
developed around him. An 84 years old Party veteran and one of the
founders of the RCP, Pârvulescu affirmed in the front of the RCP
Congress that nothing serious was discussed by the delegates to the
event, who shouted incessantly the slogan “Ceauşescu reales la al
doisprezecelea Congres” (Ceauşescu re-elected at the Twelfth
Congress). Therefore, Pârvulescu further stated, he would vote against
the re-election of Nicolae Ceauşescu as Secretary General of the RCP.
Pârvulescu did not receive any support from the nomenklatura
members or other officials in the audience and was evacuated
immediately from the Congress hall.113 No other Party official dared
to criticize the rule of Ceauşescu in a similar manner until the late
1980s. However, an unexpected change took place in Moscow and
which would change fundamentally the relations between the
“Moscow center” and the Sovietized countries in ECE: the coming
to power of Mikhail Gorbachev.
disenchantment and de-legitimation, 1985–1989
When a Romanian high rank party official exclaimed in a discussion
with a foreign diplomat: “Independence is our legitimacy!” he really
meant it.114 In the particular case of Romania, the nationalistic hatred
For a brief account of the event see Dinu C. Giurescu, ed., Romania’s history
in data, 675.
114
Quoted in Mihai Botez, Românii despre ei înşişi (Romanians about
themselves) (Bucharest: Editura Litera, 1992), 33.
113
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
309
for the Soviets acted in favor of the regime until the mid-1980s. At
mass level, one of the lessons taught by the national history was that
nothing good came from the East and the regime was prepared to
nurture and exploit Romanians’ Russophobia, which, as Hugh SetonWatson put it, “is second only to that of Poles.”115 This it did skillfully
until mid-1980s.
It was, however, something that the regime could not foresee, i.e.
the coming to power in Moscow of a younger leader with a broader
vision of politics and a different leadership style. After 1985, in the
conditions of the structural economic and moral crisis of Romanian
communism, the launch of Gorbachev’s domestic perestroika led to
the emergence of a totally different image of Soviet Union and its
leadership. “Gorbimania” started to spread among Romania’s
population, which was exasperated by the economic crisis and
personality cult of the “Genius of the Carpathians.” When Gorbachev
paid an official visit to Romania, between 25 and 27 of May 1987,
many Romanians hoped, in vain, that he would persuade Ceauşescu
to introduce some economic reforms. All in all, the combined result
of the economic and moral crisis of the Ceauşescu regime and the
program of reforms introduced by the new leadership in Moscow
was that the Romanians ceased to perceive the Soviet Union as a real
threat to Romania’s sovereignty. On the contrary, large segments of
the population in Romania began to look towards Moscow in the
hope of setting them free from the domestic tyranny of the Ceauşescu
clan. People were eager to find more about Gorbachev’s reforms.
Pamphlets and brochures published in Romanian in the Soviet Union
by the Novosti Press Agency circulated, especially in Bucharest, as a
sort of dissident writings. During the 1988–1989 period people read
avidly Soviet brochures whose titles contained subversive words and
Cited in Wayne S. Vucinich, “Major Trends in Eastern Europe,” in Stephen
Fischer-Galati, ed., Eastern Europe in the 1980s (Boulder, CO: Westview Press,
1981), 9.
115
310
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
syntagms such as: “restructuring,” “renewal,” “innovative,” and “a
new vision.”116 In terms of nationalist propaganda, therefore, the key
argument of RCP’s legitimating discourse, i.e. independence from
Moscow, vanished after the inception of Gorbachev’s reforms. Thus,
the period 1985–1989 can be defined as one of disenchantment with,
and de-legitimation of, the RCP rule in Romania.
Following Pârvulescu’s open criticism of Ceauşescu in 1979,
another critical voice from within the party elite was heard only in
1987. In the aftermath of the Braşov workers’ uprising of 15
November 1987, Silviu Brucan – a veteran communist militant
that occupied top positions under the rule of Gheorghiu-Dej as
deputy editor of the Party daily newspaper Scînteia between 1944
and 1956, and ambassador to the United States (1956–59) and the
United Nations (1959–62) – decided to speak out. On 29
November 1987, Brucan issued a statement in which he stated that
“a period of crisis has opened up in relations between the Romanian
Communist Party and the workers.”117 Nevertheless, the most
notable protest within the establishment occurred on 14 March
See for instance: Conferinţa a XIX-a a P.C.U.S.: O nouă viziune, hotărîri cu
caracter novator (The 19th conference of the CPSU: A new vision, innovative
decisions) (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency, 1988); Cea de-a XIX-a conferinţă a
P.C.U.S.: Documente şi materiale—Raportul prezentat de Mihail Gorbaciov, secretar
general al C.C. al P.C.U.S. (The 19th conference of the CPSU: Documents and
materials – The report presented by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the
CPSU) (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency, 1988); Congresul deputaţilor poporului
din U.R.S.S.: Raportul prezentat de Mihail Gorbaciov, Moscova, Kremlin, 30 mai
1989 (People’s Deputies Congress: The report presented by Mikhail Gorbachev,
Moscow, Kremlin, 30 May 1989) (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency, 1989); Nikolai
Şmeliov, Restructurarea aşa cum o vede un economist (Restructuring as seen by an
economist) (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency, 1989); and Restructurarea: Probleme,
Studii, Prognoze – Potenţialul spiritual al înnoirii (Restructuring: Problems, Studies,
Prognoses – The spiritual potential of renewal) (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency, 1989).
117
Dennis Deletant, Ceauşescu and the Securitate: Coercion and Dissent in
Romania, 1965–1989 (London: Hurst & Company, 1995), 253.
116
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
311
1989, when the open letter signed by six former high-rank officials
of the party – Gheorghe Apostol, Alexandru Bârlădeanu, Silviu
Brucan, Corneliu Mănescu, Constantin Pârvulescu and Grigore
Răceanu – was broadcast by Radio Free Europe. The letter was
addressed to Ceauşescu and began with an indictment of his
mistaken policies. The six former high rank Party officials concluded
their letter with three demands addressed directly to Ceauşescu: (1)
to declare in categorical and unequivocal terms that he has
renounced to the plan of rural systematization; (2) to reestablish
the constitutional guarantees concerning the citizens’ rights, which
would indicate that Romania has adhered to the decisions of the
Vienna Conference concerning human rights; and (3) to stop the
export of foodstuffs which—the signatories considered—was
threatening the very biological existence of the nation.118 The “letter
of the six” terminated with the following phrase: “Immediately after
these measures will be taken we are ready to participate, in a
constructive manner, in a dialogue with the government on the
ways and means to resolve the current crisis.”119
It must be emphasized that all the signatories of the letter had
been part of Gheorghiu-Dej’s team and some of them, at different
levels, had been part of the confident Romanian communist elite
that emancipated itself from Moscow in the late 1950s. It may be
argued that being a part of the elite that learned high politics by doing
it and emerged as a skilled group of political actors within the
communist bloc the signatories had a broader view of world politics
than Ceauşescu’s men. It was for the first time in communist
Romania that former top Party officials were publicly criticizing
Ceauşescu’s policies. Among the signatories were Brucan and
For the complete text of the “letter of the six,” see Silviu Brucan, Generaţia
irosită: Memorii (The wasted generation: Memoirs) (Bucharest: Editurile Univers
& Calistrat Hogaş, 1992), 190–94.
119
Ibid., 194.
118
312
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
Pârvulescu, who had already criticized the Ceauşescu regime. The
others were communist personalities such as Alexandru Bârlădeanu
and Corneliu Mănescu, who proved themselves in international
politics during the 1960s and 1970s, as well as Gheorghe Apostol,
who had been Gheorghiu-Dej’s oldest collaborator.120 Less known
was Grigore Răceanu, an old-timer purged by Gheorghiu-Dej in
1958.121 The “letter of the six” marked a watershed in the history of
the RCP. On the one hand, the letter of the six represented the first
major split at the level of the RCP elite. For the first time since the
1957 split at the top – the Constantinescu-Chişinevschi episode, the
monolithism of the RCP was broken and a major faction of the
nomenklatura openly protested against Ceauşescu’s lead. On the
other hand, the signatories of the letter were already retired when
RFE broadcast the text and their links with the Party were practically
severed. In this respect, the letter came too late and therefore had an
insignificant impact on RCP’s domestic policies. In other words, the
“mortal sin” of factionalism was committed too late to avoid a bloody
revolution in 1989.
In what concerns the legitimating power of nationalism, the
regime was left with a sole target: the Hungarian minority in
Romania. Thus, on 20 December 1989 Ceauşescu affirmed
that the revolt in Timişoara, which sparked the Romanian
revolution, was the result of the activity of “hooligan elements,
working together with reactionary, imperialistic, irredentist,
chauvinistic circles … aiming at the territorial dismemberment of
In 1948, Apostol was already a member of the Politburo.
Fortunately, three of the signatories, Brucan, Bârlădeanu, and Mănescu have
provided their own accounts on the preparation of the “letter of the six.” See
Brucan, Memoirs, 194–208; Betea, Bârlădeanu on Dej, Ceauşescu, and Iliescu, 216–
25; and Betea, Mănescu: Unfinished conversations, 247–53. Also, Răceanu’s step
son, Mircea Răceanu, has provided some useful details and comments. See Mircea
Răceanu, Infern ’89: Povestea unui condamnat la moarte (Inferno 1989: The story
of a prisoner sentenced to death) (Bucharest: Editura Silex, 2000), 137–54.
120
121
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
313
Romania.”122 To be sure, Ceauşescu was hinting, among others, at
neighboring Hungary and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the new
image of the Soviet Union among Romania’s population deeply
undermined the propagandistic efforts of the regime. In the late
1980s, independence from Moscow ceased to be a major source of
legitimacy for the communist regime in Romania. By 1989, the
Romanian polity was definitely split into us and them.
As for them – the inner circle of power around the Ceauşescu
couple – they displayed a high level of cohesion, the highest among
the six countries that compose the 1989 sequence of collapse, up to
the very end of the regime. This explains in many respects why
Romania occupies the last position, the sixth, in the said sequence.
At the same time, to paraphrase the statement of the Romanian top
communist official quoted in the beginning of this section,
independence ceased to be their legitimacy and this permitted popular
protest to grow and spread across Romania in December 1989. It
was due to the fact that the RCP discourse centered on independence
from Moscow lost its legitimating power in the eyes of a majority of
the population that Romania was eventually able to exit from
communism in 1989.
See the text of Ceauşescu’s televised evening discourse of 20 December 1989
in Aurel Perva and Carol Roman, Misterele revoluţiei române: Revenire după ani
(The mysteries of the Romanian revolution: A come back after years) (Bucharest:
Editura Carro, 1991), 38–39.
122
314
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
the political cultures of resistance
A comprehensive analysis of the political cultures of resistance would
imply a study of the rather numerous subcultures that characterize a
modern society. This, however, would go much beyond the scope of
this book. Nevertheless, in order to examine the major aspects related
to the appearance and development of dissident actions in communist
Romania, this section focuses on the political cultures of resistance
at the elite and respectively mass level. As Jowitt suggests, the concept
of “dissimulation” understood as the posture, response, and strategy
which integrates the public and private spheres is useful for explaining
political attitudes and behavior at the community level under
communist rule. “Dissimulation,” the same author further argues,
“takes the form, not so much of political opposition, as of a strong
anti-political privatism in which family and personal interests are
emphasized at the expense of regime and societal interests.”123 Applied
to a society modernized from above through “cognitive dissonance”
such as the Romanian one, the concept of “anti-political privatism”
is particularly useful when analyzing the lack of dissident networks
under communist rule. Moreover, during the 1980s, in the conditions
of the deep economic crisis communist Romania experienced a
consolidation of the extended family pattern accompanied by the
development of a complicated network of mutual services which led,
as a side-effect, to an increasing “egoism of small groups.”124 However,
in December 1989 the growing “egoism of small groups” was
unexpectedly subverted and a short-lived moment of solidarity
occurred, creating a frail cross-class alliance that brought down the
Jowitt, The Leninist Extinction, 80.
For an analysis of the Polish case see Michal Buchowski, “The shifting
meanings of civil and civic society in Poland,” in Chris Hann and Elizabeth Dunn,
eds., Civil Society: Challenging Western Models (London: Routledge, 1996), 85.
123
124
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
315
communist regime. As a side effect, due to its frailty the said crossclass alliance was not able to offer a viable political alternative to the
second- and third-rank nomenklatura members that filled the power
vacuum after the fall of Ceauşescu. The following section aims at
answering some simple, but nevertheless relevant, questions such as:
What shaped the political cultures of resistance in communist Romania?
What kept alive the spirit of opposition throughout the 1980s? or
What made a majority of the population feel solidary in their protest
against the regime of Nicolae Ceauşescu in December 1989?
Intellectuals and the syndrome of “velvet” dissent
Applied to the Romanian intellectual elite, the above-mentioned
concept of “egoism of small groups” apparently explains the paralysis
of the civil society in communist Romania. Some authors argued that
the failure of the Goma movement for human rights epitomizes the
entire story of Romanian dissent. Speaking about the Romanian
dissidence in the 1970s, a Western specialist in East European affairs
affirmed in the early 1980s that: “Romanian dissent lives in Paris
and his name is Paul Goma.”125 This seems to be true since after
Goma the other radical dissidents of the 1980s, such as Doina
Cornea, Dorin Tudoran, Radu Filipescu, Gabriel Andreescu or Dan
Petrescu, experienced a similar loneliness of radical dissidence.
Therefore, the general perception was that, compared with the
Central European Czechoslovakia, Hungary or Poland, Romania did
not behave under communist rule as an “occident kidnappé,” to use
Milan Kundera’s inspired syntagm. Kundera’s essay “Un occident
kidnappé – oú la tragédie de l’Europe centrale” sparked the most
important debate on the fate of the “rebellious,” anticommunist
Michael Shafir, Romania. Politics, Economics and Society: Political Stagnation
and Simulated Change (London: Frances Pinter Publishers, 1985), 168.
125
316
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
Central Europe which took place in the early 1980s. For Kundera,
Central Europe was “the Eastern border of the West,” a family of
small nations that had its own vision of the world and “by virtue of
its cultural history” was “the West.” Kundera’s Central Europe
comprised those nations that behaved as an “occident kidnappé” by
the Soviet Union: the Hungarians, the Poles and the Czechs. In his
view, the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, the 1968 Prague Spring, and
the birth of Polish Solidarity in 1980 proved that a difference existed
between the countries of Central Europe, i.e. Poland, Hungary and
Czechoslovakia, and those of Eastern Europe i.e. Bulgaria and
Romania. Nevertheless, what Kundera’s approach cannot explain is
why communist regimes in both “rebellious” Central Europe (former
Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland) and the “submissive”
Southeast Europe (Bulgaria and Romania) collapsed the same year
1989.126 In other words, it is a fact that communism collapsed during
the same “miraculous year” 1989 in all countries mentioned above.
Nevertheless, a difference between the “rebellious” and the
“submissive” nations resides in the pace of the democratic
transformation that followed the 1989 revolutions. Thus, a higher
degree of rebelliousness under communism made the difference
between the countries in ECE that experienced a more rapid
transition to democracy, i.e. Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland,
and those where the process was more tortuous and painful, i.e.
Bulgaria and Romania.
Thus, as far as Romania is concerned one should explain not only
why opposition to the regime was so weak among the intellectual
elites in that country, but also what role the few radical dissidents
Milan Kundera, “Un occident kidnappé – ou la tragédie de l’Europe
centrale,” Le Débat (November 1983), 3–22. The version cited in the present
article was published under the title “The Tragedy of Central Europe,” in Gale
Stokes, ed., From Stalinism to Pluralism: A Documentary History of Eastern Europe
Since 1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 217–23.
126
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
317
actually played in the revolution of December 1989. To be sure, the
answer to such a question is by no means simple. The argument put
forward by this chapter is that although dissidence developed only
tortuously in communist Romania and took a more articulate form
only in the late 1980s, dissidents and critical intellectuals played a
major role in transforming the anti-Ceauşescu character of the revolt
into an anticommunist revolution. In other words, there were mainly
the radical dissidents and critical intellectuals that turned the expressing
actions of a majority of the population, i.e. the anti-Ceauşescu protests,
into purposive actions, i.e. a fundamental regime change.
Until writer Paul Goma launched, in 1977, the movement for
human rights that now bears his name, dissidence was almost nonexistent in communist Romania. There were two main reasons for
such a situation. First, it was about the relative success of the overall
political strategy devised by the Gheorghiu-Dej regime after 1956,
which was based on two pivotal issues, i.e. industrialization and
independence. Ceauşescu only adapted the strategy of his predecessor
to the post-1968 context and thus focused on “socialist”
modernization and nation-building. As Cristina Petrescu has
suggested, especially after August 1968, this stance made of Ceauşescu
himself a most prominent “dissident.”127 Also, such a strategy proved
to be particularly successful because it was consistent with the strategy
of economic and political development adopted by the successive
governments and regimes since the inception of the modern
Romanian state (1859), and appealed not only to a majority of
Romania’s intelligentsia, but also to a majority of the population.
Second, the regime had something consistent to offer to cultural, as
well as technical, intelligentsia. After the period of Stalinist terror of
the 1950s, the “tacit deal” offered by the regime led to the co-optation
See Cristina Petrescu, “Ar mai fi ceva de spus: Despre disidenţa din România
lui Ceauşescu” (There is something more to say: On dissidence in Ceauşescu’s
Romania), afterword to Petrescu and Cangeopol, 319.
127
318
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
of the intellectual elites that benefited widely from the period of
relative ideological relaxation. It was only after 1980 that the “new
social contract” became more and more restricted, in the sense that
the regime was increasingly selective in allowing individuals and
groups enter the “tacit deal.” During the 1980s, the “tacit deal” was
not anymore open to all those willing to abide by the rules because
the regime did not need to co-opt the elites anymore. Furthermore,
during the 1980s, in the conditions of the economic crisis described
above, the resources became increasingly scarce and the regime was
less and less able to reward properly the rapidly increasing numbers
of sycophants. At the same time, the regime was able to
instrumentalize nationalism from August 1968 onwards, which
allowed the creation of a relatively enduring focus of identification
with the regime and hampered to some extent the development of
intellectual dissidence in communist Romania.
It was also an earthly argument that nurtured opposition and
dissent. Towards the mid-1980s, many intellectuals started to realize
that, after all, they had something in common with ordinary people:
they also had to feed regularly their families. This, however, did not
apply to prominent public figures. To them, the regime had until its
very end something very precious to offer: the permission to travel
abroad, especially to the West. At the same time, from 1977 onwards,
nobody could pretend that nothing happened in Romania in terms
of opposition towards the regime. Goma offered a chance to all those
willing to protest against the rule of Ceauşescu if they wanted to do so.
Having said this, let us discuss briefly the significance of the Goma
movement. The movement for human rights initiated by writer Paul
Goma was the Romanian response to the Czechoslovak Charter 77
and was inaugurated in January 1977 by a letter of solidarity sent by
Goma to Pavel Kohout, one of the leaders of the Charter 77. In
addition, Goma wrote an appeal to the 1977 Belgrade conference,
i.e. the Helsinki follow-up conference, demanding that the Ceauşescu
regime comply with the provisions of the 1975 Helsinki conference
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
319
concerning the observance of human rights by the signatory
governments. What followed explains to some extent Goma’s
frustration and his post-1989 sharp criticism towards the Romanian
cultural establishment. Apart from writer Ion Negoiţescu and
psychiatrist Ion Vianu, no other prominent intellectuals supported
Goma’s actions. Moreover, among the approximately 200 persons
who eventually signed the appeal, the overwhelming majority actually
wanted just to obtain a passport – the so-called “Goma passport” –
in order to emigrate to the West. The authorities, after trying in vain
to persuade Goma to renounce to his radical stance, imprisoned him
on 1 April 1977. After the news of his arrest reached the West, an
international campaign, in which the Romanian desk of RFE played
a major role, was immediately launched. As a result of the sustained
international campaign, the communist authorities released Goma
from prison on 6 May 1977. Embittered by the lack of support from
the part of his fellow writers, marginalized and frustrated, in
November 1977 Goma left Romania definitively together with his
wife and son, and settled in Paris.128
Nevertheless, one should bear in mind that at the moment when
the Goma movement was launched the overwhelming majority of
the population thought that the communist rule in Romania, as well
as in the rest of the Sovietized ECE, was unlikely to be challenged in
the foreseeable future. The rise and fall of the Goma movement
showed that: (1) it was possible to initiate an opposition movement
in Romania; (2) the Romanian desk of RFE was ready to act swiftly
and efficiently to spread the news and provide some protection to
the protesters by making their names known to international
Goma wrote at length about his dissidence and the subsequent
anticommunist activity in Paris. For a detailed account of the unfolding of events
during the January-April 1977 period see Paul Goma, Culoarea curcubeului ‘77:
Cutremurul oamenilor (The colour of the rainbow ‘77: The earthquake of the
people) (Oradea: Editura Multiprint, 1993).
128
320
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
organizations, such as Amnesty International; and (3) that the elites,
cultural and technical alike, were not prone to join the protest; those
who nevertheless joined the movement, wanted in general to obtain
a passport and leave the country.
In connection to the Goma movement and its strictly limited echo
among fellow intellectuals, there is an issue that deserves a closer look:
the problem of the so-called “resistance through culture.” The main
argument that stays behind the concept of “resistance through
culture” was quite simple. As a majority of the Romanian intellectuals
have claimed, before and after the 1989 revolution, the Ceauşescu
rule in Romania was so harsh, and the secret police, the infamous
Securitate, was so powerful, that any attempt at intellectual dissidence
was doomed to failure in the shortest time. Instead, the proponents
of the “resistance through culture” argue, the most efficient way to
resist the regime was to concentrate on cultural production. As a
consequence, from the early 1970s onwards the most important
intellectual debates were concerned with the latent conflict between
the so-called “protochronists” and the “europeanizers” or
“modernists.” The debate, however, was primarily concerned with
the problem of literary values. “Europeanizers” argued in favor of the
cultural values of the West, which was to some extent a bold stance
after the launch of Ceauşescu’s “theses” of 6 July 1971, as models
for improving native literary works. For their part, the protochronists
argued, as the literary historian and aesthetician Edgar Papu put it,
that a “number of Romanian literary developments chronologically
precede similar achievements in other countries.”129 A majority of
For more on Edgar Papu, seen as the founder of Romanian protochronism,
see Anneli Ute Gabanyi, “Romanian ‘Protochronism’ and the New Cultural
Order,” in idem, The Ceauşescu Cult (Bucharest: The Romanian Cultural
Foundation Publishing House, 2000), 156. For a recent overall assessment of the
phenomenon, see Alexandra Tomiţă, O istorie “glorioasă:” Dosarul protocronismului
românesc (A “glorious” history: The dossier of Romanian protochronism)
(Bucharest: Editura Cartea Românească, 2007).
129
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
321
the protochronists thus advocated the recognition of Romanian
contributions to world culture. In many respects, as Verdery has
perceptively argued, protochronism “was an intensified resuscitation
of interwar indigenist arguments about national essence.”130
In spite of the support provided by the Romanian desk of RFE,
which, as already discussed, was ready to spread immediately the
dissident message, the “europeanizers” did not act as a dissident group:
for instance, they did not criticize publicly the cultural policy enforced
by the regime after July 1971. In a majority of the cases, the debate
was carried out within the limits imposed from above by the
communist regime. As Verdery puts it, those who opposed
protochronism expended “their energies in a joint defense of
intellectual authority rather than in a more substantial critique of
power.”131 Sadly enough, “resistance through culture” proved to be
a strategy that offered the communist regime the opportunity to coopt gifted intellectuals by offering them the illusion of living a normal
professional life and, of course, by giving them the opportunity to
travel to the West. Instead of epitomizing a form of “everyday
resistance,” “resistance through culture” proved to be ultimately a
form of “everyday co-optation.”132 To those who were not asked to
Katherine Verdery, National Ideology Under Socialism: Identity and Cultural
Politics in Ceausescu’s Romania (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991),
168, 179. A brief survey of the debate on “protochronism” is provided in Gabanyi,
The Ceauşescu Cult, 155–62.
131
Verdery, National Ideology Under Socialism, 169.
132
The relevance of the cultural production of the “resisters through culture”
is yet to be assessed. Twenty years after the fall of the communist regime the literary
canon is about to suffer further modifications due to a revived tendency to
concentrate more on the literary value rather than on the ethical, or even dissident,
value of a given work. In a recent analysis on the topic, literay critic Paul Cernat
wrote: “The post-1989 East-ethical revisionism … has been responsible for the
persistent protracting of a deliberate confusion between ethical, aesthetic and
political, which has led not only to a vitiation of numerous value judgements, but
also to a malicious parochialization of our cultural field.” See Paul Cernat, “Iluziile
130
322
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
collaborate with, or still had scruples in serving, the regime, “resistance
through culture” offered a minimal mental comfort in a period when
hardships and widespread malaise disrupted normalcy. Their stance,
however, did not annoy the regime. Furthermore, as dissident writer
Dorin Tudoran put it, one cannot “defend and preserve culture only
by culture.”133 One should also fight for a cause, and up to the spring
of 1989 there were not many literati willing to do so. This also
explains why the “drawer literature” proved to be so scarce after the
fall of the regime.
With regard to the drawer literature, there were nevertheless some
notable exceptions. One of them is a novel finished in 1985, authored
by Ion D. Sîrbu and entitled Adio Europa! (Farewell, Europe!). The
novel – which was published only in 1993, i.e. after the breakdown
of the communist regime – captures perfectly the atmosphere of the
1980s, characteristic of the economic and moral ruin of the Ceauşescu
regime. The main character of the novel is an intellectual who wanted
to live in the civilized West, but has no other choice than to live on
the other side of the Iron Curtain, in Isarlîk, an imaginary town in
southern Romania. Here, the similarity between Sîrbu’s biography
and that of his character is obvious. Raised and educated in the main
cultural center of Transylvania, the city of Cluj, Sîrbu was forced
because of his political biography to settle in the Oltenian city of
Craiova. Even more interesting is the way in which the author depicts
some major aspects of everyday life in Romania during the 1980s.
Thus, Sîrbu’s book is about corruption and cowardliness, nepotism
and bribery, false patriotism and duplicity, urban decay and nostalgia
revizionismului est-etic” (The illusions of the East-ethical revisionism), Observator
Cultural (Bucharest) Nos.: 539 (Part I); 540 (Part II); and 541 (Part III), AugustSeptember 2010; the passage quoted has been published in Part III, Nr. 541 (2010).
For more on “canonization” and cultural memory see Aleida Assmann, “Canon
and Archive,” in Astrid Erll and Ansgar Nünning, eds., Cultural Memory Studies:
An International and Interdisciplinary Handbook (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2008), 99–100.
133
Freedom House, Romania: A Case of “Dynastic” Communism, 75.
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
323
for the bygone days of normality. In other words, it is about everyday
life in late-communist Romania. The masterful depiction of
Ceauşescu’s Romania as an “Ottomanized” Balkan country gives one
the feeling that Isarlîk could have been any town in communist
Romania. Isarlîk, in fact, is the epitome of urban Romania in the
1980s.134
Turning back to the political cultures of resistance, one should
stress that a cross-class alliance did not emerge in Romania until
December 1989, when the overwhelming majority of the population
became united in its protest against the Ceauşescu regime. It is
another question as to why a cross-class alliance on the Polish
Solidarity model did not emerge in communist Romania until
December 1989. In fact, until the 1987 Braşov revolt working-class
protests did not receive support from the part of either critical or
technical intelligentsia. A good opportunity to link intellectual
dissidence with working-class unrest was lost in 1977. Unfortunately,
there was no connection between the two major protests that occurred
in 1977, i.e. the dissident movement led by the writer Paul Goma
(January-April) and the strike organized by miners in the Jiu Valley
basin (August). To some extent, the specifics of teaching of industrial
arts and applied sciences might explain the more conformist mindset
of the technical intelligentsia in Romania. In this respect, the number
of radical dissident stances among the technical intelligentsia was
smaller as compared to the number of similar stances among the
cultural intelligentsia. With regard to the creation of a “caste” of
specialists quite faithful to the communist regime that created it,
Zygmunt Bauman observed:
In most countries, practically all modern specialization came into being
during the period of communist rule and the specialists have no
See Ion D. Sîrbu, Adio, Europa! (Farewell, Europe!) 2 vols. (Bucharest:
Editura Cartea Româneasc, 1993).
134
324
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
collective, institutionalized memory of professional life under any other
conditions. What follows is that everywhere a considerable part of the
educated elite has been made to the measure of the communist regime
from the beginning. Coping with the situation defined by the
communist bureaucracy has been an integral part of their occupational
training and professional upbringing.135
There is some truth in such an assertion. Arguably, the fact that
the communist regime put a strong emphasis on undergraduate
training in engineering hampered the development of a critical mass
of “rebellious” intellectuals able to think in political terms. In
communist Romania, the number of students in industrial arts and
applied sciences grew steadily. For instance, the available data for the
academic year 1980/81 show that the graduates from polytechnic
universities made up 58.5 percent of the total.136 Moreover, among
the most prominent radical dissidents in Romania only Radu
Filipescu was an engineer. It was also due to the latent hostility
between the intellectuals and the working class that cross-class alliance
could not be established in Ceauşescu’s Romania. For instance, Istvan
Hosszu, a Jiu Valley miner who participated to the August 1977
strike, observed in 1989: “My discussions, as a worker in Romania,
with the Romanian intelligentsia were very unpleasant…. The
intelligentsia in Romania, unfortunately, misunderstands, in fact
disdains the working class and, in a way, brutalizes it.”137 There was,
however, a daring attempt at creating a free trade union in Romania
as early as 1979, that is, before the creation of the Polish Solidarity.
The Free Trade Union of the Working People in Romania (Sindicatul
Liber al Oamenilor Muncii din România – SLOMR) existed practically
from January to June 1979. Its leaders – Ionel Cană, Gheorghe
Zygmunt Bauman, “Intellectuals in East-Central Europe: Continuity and
Change,” in Eastern European Politics and Societies, 1–2 (1987), 181.
136
See Table 17 in Shafir, Romania: Politics, Economics and Society, 145.
137
Freedom House, Romania: A Case of “Dynastic” Communism, 86–87.
135
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
325
Braşoveanu and Nicolae Dascălu – were imprisoned immediately
after RFE broadcast the founding declaration of the SLOMR on
4 March 1979. Following the imprisonment of its leaders, the
initiative was suppressed rapidly. SLOMR never became a movement.
It was just a daring and timely initiative that did not receive adequate
support, neither from the part of the workers nor the intelligentsia,
in order to structure itself properly and spread across the country.138
Indeed, it is striking that not one of the opposition activities
evolved into an opposition movement. The mutual mistrust between
technical intelligentsia and the workers contributed to such a
situation. It is also worth mentioning that during the 1989 revolution,
many of the actions that led to the demise of the regime were
conducted “from below.” For instance, this author, who worked for
three years (1987–1989) as an engineer at the Romlux Tîrgovişte
enterprise, witnessed the way in which the factory personnel reacted
to the news that revolutionaries took over the Romanian Radio and
Television on 22 December 1989 at noon. The first to storm the
factory gates in order to march downtown and assault the building
of the RCP County Council were mostly workers. True, they were
accompanied by some engineers and technicians, but the bulk of the
engineers joined the revolution after the working hours.
On the Securitate reports concerning the SLOMR see Mihai Pelin,
Operaţiunile “Meliţa” şi “Eterul:” Istoria Europei Libere prin documente de Securitate
(The “Grinder” and “Aether” operations: History of Radio Free Europe through
documents of the Securitate) (Bucharest: Editura Albatros, 1999), 172–78. A work
that focuses on a prominent case of working-class dissent, that of Vasile Paraschiv,
also provides relevant details on SLOMR. See Oana Ionel and Dragoş Marcu,
”Vasile Paraschiv şi ’Securitatea lui’” (Vasile Paraschiv and ”his Securitate”), in
Vasile Paraschiv, Lupta mea pentru sindicate libere în România: Terorismul politic
organizat de statul comunist (My struggle for free trade unions in Romania: The
political terrorism organized by the communist state) ed. by Oana Ionel and Dragoş
Marcu (Iaşi: Editura Polirom, 2005), 367–71.
138
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natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
In terms of dissidence and public protests by intellectuals, after
the termination of the Goma movement (1977) and the suppression
of the SLOMR (1979), the first major act of dissidence belonged to
Doina Cornea, a lecturer in French at the University of Cluj. In
August 1982, RFE broadcast an open letter by Doina Cornea on the
crisis of the educational system in Romania.139 Over the next seven
years, Doina Cornea represented one of the most powerful dissident
voices in communist Romania. She adamantly criticized the
Ceauşescu regime in spite of the permanent surveillance and
harassment to which the Securitate subjected her. Cornea’s last open
letter before the collapse of the regime was broadcast by RFE in the
autumn of 1989.140 A promising poet from Bucharest, Dorin
Tudoran, decided in 1982 to make public his criticism towards the
establishment. Until 1985, when he decided to emigrate, Tudoran
radicalized his position and evolved from comments strictly limited
to the abuses concerning the literary milieus to the denunciation of
the communist system itself. After emigrating and settling in the
United States, he remained an acerbic critic of the Ceauşescu regime.141
The complete text of Cornea’s open letter is provided in Doina Cornea,
Scrisori deschise şi alte texte (Open letters and other texts) (Bucharest: Editura
Humanitas, 1991), 13–17. For more on her bold dissidence, see Doina Cornea,
Libertate? Convorbiri cu Michel Combes (Freedom? Conversations with Michel
Combes) (Bucharest: Editura Humanitas, 1992) and idem, Jurnal: Ultimele caiete
(Diary: The last notebooks) (Bucharest: Editura Fundaţiei Academia Civică, 2009).
140
Ibid., 126–32.
141
Dorin Tudoran has published a volume of some 600 pages containing a
large selection of relevant documents from his Securitate file covering the period
1982–1985. See Dorin Tudoran, Eu, fiul lor: Dosar de Securitate (I, their son:
Securitate file) (Iaşi: Editura Polirom, 2010). As for his dissident texts, see for
instance “Frig sau frică? Asupra condiţiei intelectualului român de astăzi” (Cold
or fear? On the condition of the contemporary Romanian intellectual) and
“Scrisoare adresată lui Nicolae Ceauşescu” (Letter addressed to Nicolae Ceauşescu),
both dating from 1984 and republished after 1989 in Tudoran, Kakistocracy, 25–
30 and 31–76 respectively. See also OSA/RFE Archives, Romanian Fond,
300/60/3/Box 9, File Dissidents: Dorin Tudoran.
139
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
327
Another significant act of opposition belonged to Radu Filipescu,
a young engineer from Bucharest. During the period January – May
1983, Filipescu produced and disseminated in Bucharest some
thousands anti-Ceauşescu manifestos. Arrested on 7 May, Filipescu
was sentenced on 12 September 1983 to ten years in prison for
“propaganda against the socialist system.” He was eventually released
from prison in 1986 after a sustained international campaign
organized by RFE and Amnesty International.142 Such protests were
not singular. Isolated protests abounded during the 1980s but their
authors did, or could, not make their acts known abroad. Thus, many
courageous acts of opposition simply passed unnoticed in the West
and organizations such as RFE or Amnesty International could not
intervene. Radu Filipescu confessed that, while in prison, he was
astonished to see how many people dared to speak out or disseminate
manifestos against the communist regime in Romania.143 Physicist
Gabriel Andreescu engaged during the period 1984–1987 in dissident
activities related mainly to the monitoring of the numerous violations
of human rights in communist Romania and the transmission of such
information abroad. Towards the late 1980s, he became one of the
Romanian dissidents best known in the West.144 Beginning in 1988,
open dissident stances multiplied.
For an account of Filipescu’s dissident actions see Herma Köpernik-Kennel,
Jogging cu Securitatea: Rezistenţa tînărului Radu Filipescu (Jogging with the
Securitate: The resistance of the young Radu Filipescu) (Bucharest: Editura
Universal Dalsi, 1998) esp. 11–84. A copy of a manifesto authored by Filipescu is
provided at p.273.
143
Ibid., 106–108.
144
For more on Gabriel Andreescu’s dissent, see his works Spre o filozofie a
dizidenţei (Towards a philosophy of dissent) (Bucharest: Editura Litera, 1992),
esp. 155–97, and L-am urît pe Ceauşescu: Ani, oameni, disidenţă (I hated Ceauşescu:
Years, people, dissent) (Iaşi: Editura Polirom, 2009). See also OSA/RFE Archives,
Romanian Fond, 300/60/3/Box 6, File Dissidents: Gabriel Andreescu.
142
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natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
In January 1988, an intellectual from the city of Iaşi, writer Dan
Petrescu, openly protested against the Ceauşescu regime. Dan
Petrescu’s first act of dissidence was an interview he gave in Iaşi,
towards the end of 1987, to the French reporter Jean Stern (pen
name Gilles Schiller). The French left wing newspaper Libération
published the interview on 27 January 1988 under the title
“Ceauşescu nu e singurul vinovat” (Ceauşescu is not the only one to
be blamed). A second essay, “Mic studiu de anatomia răului” (Short
study on the anatomy of evil) was published in Libération on 15
February 1988, and was subsequently broadcast by Radio Free
Europe. Petrescu’s criticism towards the regime was sharp: he stated
clearly that it was the communist system to be blamed for Romania’s
disastrous situation and not solely the person of Nicolae Ceauşescu.145
From that moment on, in the city of Iaşi a nucleus of dissidence
emerged around the person of Dan Petrescu and his wife, Thérèse
Culianu-Petrescu.
Bucharest intellectuals eventually joined the anti-Ceauşescu
opposition. On 17 March 1989, the same French newspaper
Libération published an interview with poet Mircea Dinescu.146 Until
For Dan Petrescu’s own account see Dan Petrescu and Liviu Cangeopol,
Ce-ar mai fi de spus: Convorbiri libere într-o ţară ocupată (What remains to be said:
Free conversations in an occupied country) new and rev. ed. (Bucharest: Editura
Nemira, 2000). The work at the book started in the spring of 1988 and finished
in the autumn of the same year. Subsequently recorded on tape, it was smuggled
abroad around Christmas 1988. Unfortunately, the book was never published in
the West, apart from some excerpts broadcast by the Voice of America. In 1990,
the Minerva Publishing House in Bucharest published a first edition of the book.
The 2000 Nemira edition also comprises Dan Petrescu’s major essays, “Ceauşescu
is not the only one to be blamed” (pp. 231–35) and “Short study on the anatomy
of evil” (pp. 236–43).
146
For the complete text of the interview, see Gilles Schiller [Jean Stern],
“Entretien avec Mircea Dinescu,” in Les Temps Modernes No. 513 (Avril 1989):
17–28.
145
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
329
the publication of the interview, Dinescu had not been a radical
dissident and was rather perceived as belonging to the intellectual
establishment. Nevertheless, Dinescu’s criticism went beyond the
current professional issues related to the literary field and was directed
against the way in which Romania was ruled. He ridiculed regime’s
attempts at creating a “new man” able to “feed on ideology and dress
in the gross rhetoric of propaganda.” Furthermore, Dinescu praised
Gorbachev’s reforms by saying that in Romania the Soviet leader was
perceived as the “Messiah of socialism with human face.”147 What
followed was that Dinescu was placed under house arrest. At the same
time, his protest did not follow the pattern of “solitary dissidence”
that was so characteristic of Romanian dissent. Thus, a number of
seven intellectuals, i.e. Geo Bogza, Ştefan Augustin Doinaş, Dan
Hăulică, Alexandru Paleologu, Andrei Pleşu, Octavian Paler and
Mihai Şora, subsequently joined by other two, Radu Enescu and
Alexandru Călinescu, wrote a letter of solidarity with Dinescu. (It is
worth mentioning that only Alexandru Călinescu lived in Iaşi and
had links with the most prominent dissident in that city, Dan
Petrescu. All the others signatories were from the capital city
Bucharest.148) Although their letter, written on 20 March 1989, was
addressed to the head of Writers’ Union, Dumitru Radu Popescu, it
was a first major gesture of solidarity between regime’s opponents.
It is difficult to say if it was just by chance that the first major
post-Goma intellectual protests occurred in two major cultural centers
of Romania, the cities of Cluj and Iaşi, but not in the capital city
Bucharest. It may be argued that in Bucharest it was more difficult
to carry out an open protest due to the permanent surveillance by
the Securitate. Nevertheless, from the spring of 1989 onwards, the
See “Romanian Poet Mircea Dinescu Criticizes Ceausescu’s Policies and
Appeals for Reforms,” Romanian Fond, Unit No. 300/60/3/7, File Dissidents:
Dinescu Mircea, OSA/RFE Archives, 2–3.
148
See Cristina Petrescu, “On dissidence in Ceauşescu’s Romania,” 337–38.
147
330
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
situation changed significantly. Six former communist officials wrote
a highly critical open letter to Ceauşescu. Nine prominent intellectuals
publicly expressed their solidarity with Dinescu. Slowly, group
protests were replacing the isolated dissident acts by courageous
individuals. In November 1989, dissident Dan Petrescu initiated a
campaign of collecting signatures against the reelection of Ceauşescu
at the Fourteenth Congress of the RCP. Petrescu, who, one should
be reminded, was living in the Moldavian city of Iaşi, contacted
Doina Cornea, who was living in the Transylvanian city of Cluj. It
was for the first time when prominent dissidents were trying to
organize a joint action against the regime. Another story, which is
telling of the efforts and vacillations of the intellectuals who felt that
they should do something to protest against the communist rule, is
that of the “letter of the eighteen.” According to writer Stelian Tănase,
the idea of writing a letter of protest against the cultural policies of
the regime emerged during a discussion he had with Alexandru
Paleologu, an intellectual from an older generation who was
imprisoned on political grounds in the late 1950s.149 It took, however,
until mid-December for the signatures to be collected and the letter
transmitted abroad.150 Nevertheless, the fact that eighteen intellectuals
eventually managed to become solidary in their protest in the autumn
of 1989 indicates that something had changed by that time: a timid
but shared feeling of solidarity was gradually replacing the “egoism
of small groups.”
It was, however, too late for a dissident movement to take shape
and give birth to a political opposition able to fill the power vacuum
The conversations between the two were published after 1989 as Alexandru
Paleologu and Stelian Tănase, Sfidarea memoriei: Convorbiri, aprilie 1988 –
octombrie 1989 (The defiance of memory: Conversations, April 1988 – October
1989) (Bucharest: Editura Du Style, 1996). On Paleologu’s prison experience see
especially pp. 180–223.
150
Tănase, The official wintertime, 138 and 181.
149
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
331
in the afternoon of 22 December 1989. What some intellectuals
managed to do that day was to speak to the large crowds gathered in
the Palace Square in downtown Bucharest and argue forcefully and
convincingly that the monopoly of the RCP was over.151 In other
words, they told the people that it was not about an anti-Ceauşescu
uprising, but about an anti-Communist revolution. Although shortlived, that was an important moment of the 1989 Romanian
revolution. At the same time, in order to have a complete picture of
the mechanism that led to the bloody demise of the communist
regime in Romania, one should also address the issue of the
perceptions and actions “from below.” It is the purpose of the next
section to address this subject.
workers and peasant-workers in a working-class
“paradise”
This section intends to shed some light on the intricate and
ambivalent relationship between the industrial workers and the
communist regime in Romania, and thus explain the way in which
mass protest developed and contributed to the final demise of the
regime in December 1989. What was, actually, the role of the
Romanian working class in the final demise of communism in that
country? The answer to such a simple question is by no means facile
all the more that the class character of the popular uprising in
Timişoara, which sparked the 1989 revolution, is seriously
questionable. Nevertheless, one must bear in mind that the Romanian
revolution of 1989 occurred and ensued almost completely in large
urban areas. Thus, the revolution broke out in the city of Timişoara,
the capital of a highly industrialized region, i.e. the Timiş County,
where workers made up around 60 percent of the total population.
151
Ibid., 191–92.
332
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
Therefore, a discussion of the patterns of working-class co-optation
and protest under communism is relevant in explaining not only why
the Romanian revolution of 1989 was sparked in the city of
Timişoara, but also what made possible the appearance of a broad,
though short-lived, cross-class alliance between workers, professionals,
intellectuals and students in December 1989.
Due to the lack of resources, under communist rule the
urbanization process was not able to keep the pace with the
industrialization process. Consequently, the Romanian working class
underwent an accelerated transformation that led to the gradual
emergence of two major categories of workers: (1) the “genuine”
workers; and (2) the commuting villagers or the peasant-workers.
(Peasant-workers must not be confused with the agricultural workers
employed by state farms; in the terms of the present work, it is about
industrial workers that commuted daily from their villages to their
workplaces located in urban areas.) As one can easily observe, this
categorization differs from the classic one that discerns between skilled
and unskilled workers. The distinction between “genuine” workers
and peasant-workers takes into consideration the development of
distinct subcultures of resistance against the regime due to the
particular situation in which each of these categories of workers found
itself throughout the 1970s and 1980s. “Genuine” workers
represented a category of workers that severed their roots with
countryside, moved to towns where they were employed mostly in
industry, and thus were dependent on the salary they received. By
the end of 1980s, in the conditions of the severe crisis faced by the
Ceauşescu regime, this category of workers was increasingly forced
to think in terms of biological survival and thus was more prone to
engage in open protests. For their part, the peasant-workers
represented a category that was less affected by the economic crisis.
During the period of food shortages, i.e. 1981–1989, such people
were able to obtain the necessary foodstuffs for survival and thus their
potential for protest was lower. The peasant-worker is a good example
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
333
of a strategy of the individual to survive in the conditions of a severe
crisis: a job in industry in the nearby town, and food supplies from
the little farm he or she owned in the village. However, such a strategy
became less successful after the introduction of a strict system of
quotas and increased control by the authorities of the output of the
small individual farms.
To sum up, the category of “genuine” workers was the first and
most affected sector of society in the conditions of economic crisis.
As shown below, beginning in the mid-1970s four large and highly
industrialized areas of communist Romania – the counties of
Constanţa, Braşov, Hunedoara and Timiş – attracted the largest
number of internal migrants in the country, many of whom came
from remote and less developed regions of Moldavia. In these areas,
as the interregional long distance migration figures show, came into
being a relatively numerous class of workers relying only on the salary
they received in industry – a class of “genuine” workers. One should
stress once again that the term “genuine” has to be understood in the
sense of a category of workers almost entirely dependent on the salary
received in industry and not in the sense of worker-father origins. A
complex analysis that takes into account among others: working-class
traditions of protest; trends of long distance internal migration; the
process of urbanization and industrialization; and demographic data
supports such an assertion. Until the late 1970s, the category of
“genuine” workers benefited from the policy of industrialization and
urbanization enforced by the communist regime. Beginning in the
late 1970s, however, the same category of workers proved to be the
most vulnerable in face of the deep economic crisis. Between 1977
and 1989, the most important protests from below occurred in
workplaces where “genuine” workers constituted a majority: in the
Jiu Valley (Hunedoara County) in 1977 and in Braşov (the capital
of the Braşov county) in 1987. As already mentioned, in the late
1980s there were in Romania four highly industrialized urban areas
– the counties of Constanţa, Braşov, Hunedoara, and Timiş – where
334
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
the number of workers coming from other regions of the country
was particularly high. When the structural crisis deepened, the
“genuine” workers in those areas were severely affected by food
shortages, strict rationing, and non-payment of wages, and were thus
forced to think in terms of biological survival. In one of these areas,
i.e. the city of Timişoara, the capital of the Timiş County, the
Romanian revolution of 1989 was sparked.
In order to discuss the patterns of protest and compliance by the
working class under the communist regime, the period between 1948
and 1989 has been divided into three main periods: (1) 1948–1958;
a period in which revolts and strikes occurred in all major traditional
working-class environments: Jiu Valley, Prahova Valley, Bucharest
etc.; (2) 1958–1977; a period characterized by relative quiescence,
in which no major working-class protests occurred; and (3) 1977–
1989; the period of crisis and decline, characterized by the major
working-class protests of Jiu Valley (1977), Motru (1981) and Braşov
(1987), as well as by the uprising in Timişoara that marked the
beginning of the 1989 revolution.
workers in a people’s democracy, 1948–1958
From the late 1940s onwards, the Romanian economy sustained a
high growth rate focusing on steel, petrochemical, and machinebuilding industries. Employment in the secondary sector became
dominant, while employment in primary and tertiary sectors declined.
By 1956, the tertiary sector, which dominated urban employment
in 1930, lost its first position to manufacturing.152 Many of the newly
declared towns were mining and heavy manufacturing centers, where
employment in the secondary sector was dominant. For instance,
in 1956, in the city of Hunedoara and in the mining centers of
152
Ronnås, Urbanization in Romania, 156.
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
335
Jiu Valley as Lupeni, Petrila and Vulcan, the employment in
the secondary sector exceeded 80 percent of the total active
population.153 Throughout the period, the working class grew steadily,
from 23.7 percent of the total population in 1956, to 39.9 percent
in 1966, and 54.3 percent in 1977. In 1960, from a total occupied
population of 9,537,700 persons, of which 3,208,400 were employed
in the state sector, 2,212,500 were workers.154
Accounts regarding the low standard of life of the working class
during the 1950s abound. After nationalization, the Gheorghiu-Dej
regime did not devise a coherent plan of economic development. In
the working-class milieus, the standard of life was extremely poor
and insufficient payment resulted in corruption and thefts from state
enterprises. Basically, the goods stolen were of two types: (1)
materials to be sold or exchanged with other necessary goods or food;
and (2) materials for the improvement of the household. An
electrician who worked between 1951 and 1954 in the Metallurgical
Combine Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej in Hunedoara states that the
workers stole cables, tin plates, or “anything else they could lay their
hands on.”155 The same report also mentions some of the most acute
For instance, 84.4 percent of the total population active in industries was
employed in the secondary sector in the city of Hunedoara, 81.4 percent in Lupeni,
80.5 percent in Petrila and 82.0 percent in Vulcan. For comparison, in 1930, in
the city of Hunedoara 38.8 percent of the population was employed in
manufacturing, mining and construction. In 1956, in the city of Braşov, out of
the total population active in industries, 60.7 percent was employed in the
secondary sector, while 36.2 percent was employed in the tertiary sector. For
comparison, in 1930, 39.1 percent of Braşov’s population was employed in the
secondary sector, while 38.6 percent was employed in the tertiary sector See Table
27, Industrial Structure of Romanian Towns in 1956 – Active Population in
Primary (I), Secondary (II) and Tertiary (III) Employment, in Ronnås,
Urbanization in Romania, 359–62.
154
Tsantis and Pepper, Romania, 542.
155
Romanian Fond, Unit No. 300/60/1/837, Item 11095/54: 3, OSA/RFE Archives.
153
336
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
problems the Hunedoara workers were facing. For instance, on
March 1954, Gheorghe Apostol, the vice-president of the Romanian
Council of Ministers, himself a former railway worker in the interwar
period, visited the combine on the occasion of the inauguration of
a new blast furnace. With that occasion, a delegation of workers
went to meet with vice-president Apostol and submitted a list of
requests of which the most important were: (1) a raise in wages; (2)
the supply of protective equipment by the factory; (3) the timely
supply of firewood in the winter; and (4) the speedy solution of the
housing problems, as the workers stayed in barracks. The answer
they received was that the government would solve their problems,
but no improvements occurred after Apostol’s visit.156 An account
dated December 1955 describes the living conditions of railway
workers in the Griviţa district of Bucharest, considered a communist
“bastion.” According to the said report, railway workers who worked
as locomotive conductors and could travel throughout the country
used to buy foodstuffs such as cheese, eggs, meat, etc. in the province
at lower prices and sold them to relatives and friends in the capital
city Bucharest in order to earn some extra money.157 Alcohol consumption
was another major problem. A report dating from June 1958 refers
to the extensive consumption of alcohol among the workers, who
on paydays used to “rush to bars and restaurants and often return
home without a penny.” Consequently, on paydays many wives
gathered in the front of the factories waiting for their husbands in
order to prevent them from spending all the salary on alcohol.158
Romanian Fond, Unit No. 300/60/1/837, Item 11095/54: 3–4, OSA/RFE
Archives.
157
Romanian Fond, Unit No. 300/60/1/837, Item 4019/56: 4, OSA/RFE
Archives.
158
Romanian Fond, Unit No. 300/60/1/837, Item 4623/58: 2, OSA/RFE
Archives.
156
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
337
Unrest did occur in working-class milieus during the period under
scrutiny. Although scarce, the available information indicates that
between August 1950 and August 1958 at least twenty-one strikes
and revolts occurred in communist Romania.159 From the total, 13
occurred in regions with a strong tradition of working-class protest,
such as the Griviţa Railway Repair Shops in Bucharest, the Jiu Valley,
the Prahova Valley, and the Reşiţa Steel Mills.160 Relatively
important strikes took place at the Galaţi and Brăila shipyards in
June and December 1951, respectively. Interestingly enough, no
major protest took place at the Constanţa shipyard, the most
important shipyard in the country. It is important, however, to stress
that during the period 1948–1958 all major protests occurred in
traditional working-class environments, where traditions of selforganization developed in the interwar period were still present.
Such workplaces were: the coal mines in the Jiu Valley; the Prahova
Valley oil industry refineries; the fluvial ports of Galaţi, Brăila and
Turnu Severin; and some large manufacturing enterprises.161 Another
account provides some details on a spontaneous protest that allegedly
occurred at the Griviţa Railway Repair Shops during the period 1–
3 February 1952. The Griviţa railway shops represented a stronghold
For an annotated list of thirty-six working class protests that occurred in
communist Romania during the period 1950–1989, see Annex 2 to Dragoş
Petrescu, “Workers and Peasant-Workers in a Working-Class’ ‘Paradise:’ Patterns
of Working-Class Protest in Communist Romania,” in Peter Hübner, Christoph
Kleßmann, and Klaus Tenfelde, eds., Arbeiter im Staatssozialismus: Ideologischer
Anspruch und Soziale Wirklichkeit (Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 2005), 136–39.
160
Under the communist regime the official name of the Railway Repair Shops
was Griviţa Roşie (Red Griviţa) Railway Repair Shops, as a reminder of the interwar
workers’ revolt.
161
In this respect, one can mention the Reşiţa Steel Mills, the Ploieşti Oilfield
Equipment Enterprise, the Bucharest enterprises Griviţa, 23 August, and Vulcan,
the Brăila Cement Factory, the Baia-Mare Chemical Combine, the Victoria Arad
Tool Factory and the Braşov Explosives Plant.
159
338
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
of the Romanian working class, where a major strike was organized
in February 1933.162 The strike, on which not much information is
available, broke out after the enforcement of the monetary reform
of 28 January 1952, which practically ruined workers’ savings.
According to the said account, the workers ceased their protest and
returned to work only after Gheorghiu-Dej, the leader of the RWP,
himself a former worker at Griviţa in the interwar period, came to
negotiate with them.163
To conclude this section, it may be argued that during the period
analyzed a majority of the workers still believed that the party leaders
would solve their problems. The examples of the Griviţa workers
returning to work, in February 1952, after the leader of the Romanian
On 17 January 1933, the Al. Vaida-Voevod government applied the socalled “third sacrificial curve,” which meant the reduction of wages by 10 to 12.5
percent. This resulted in demonstrations and strikes in the major industrial areas
of the country. On 2 February 1933, the workers from the Griviţa Railway Repair
Shops in Bucharest went on strike asking for: (1) a wage-increase of 40 percent;
and (2) stoppage of dismissals from among workers and re-employment of the
already fired ones. The management agreed to satisfy some of the workers’
demands and the strike ceased the same day in the evening. During the night of
3 to 4 February, however, the authorities declared a state of siege and operated
massive arrests among the strikers. On 15 February 1933, the workers at the
same Griviţa workshops went on strike demanding the liberation of the workers
arrested after the strike of 2 February and the enforcement of the agreement
signed that day. In response to an occupation strike started on 15 February, the
army stormed the Griviţa workshops on 16 February. The army attack left 3
workers killed and 16 seriously wounded. See Constantiniu, A sincere history of
the Romanian people, 340.
163
Romanian Fond, Unit. No. 300/60/1/837, Item V-1266/S (June 17, 1952):
1–2, OSA/RFE Archives. Gheorghiu-Dej worked as a railway worker at Griviţa
in the early 1930s and took part in the preparation of the Griviţa strike of JanuaryFebruary 1933, for which he was sentenced to 10 years in prison. For more on
Gheorghiu-Dej’s term in prison see Câmpeanu, Ceauşescu, the countdown years,
39–84.
162
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
339
communists promised to solve their problems, or the Hunedoara
workers presenting themselves, in March 1954, with a list of requests
to Gheorghe Apostol, the vice-president of the Romanian Council
of Ministers, indicates that during that period the distinction between
“us” and “them” did not operate among the Romanian workers. This
was due most probably to the proletarian background of many of the
communist leaders of the time and therefore during that period a
majority of the workers did not consider the leaders of the Party as a
“red bourgeoisie.” Moreover, the analysis of the working-class protests
of the period 1948–1958 reveals that the demands put forward by
the workers were strictly related to the living conditions and did not
turn political.
a “new social contract,” 1958–1977
In spite of the many accounts that suggest that workers were
dissatisfied with the wages and working conditions, no major
working-class protests occurred during the period 1958–1977. To
date, no systematic research has been carried out on the topic of
working-class protest in communist Romania and consequently
one can only rely on the scarce and incomplete information
available. Thus, it seems that a sole relevant protest occurred during
the period 1958–1977, i.e. a strike organized by the Jiu Valley
miners in the year 1972, of which not much is known. Therefore,
at the present stage of the research it may only be stated that no
major working-class protests occurred during the mentioned
period, even though small-scale, spontaneous revolts with no
political content certainly occurred. The absence of confirmed
working-class revolts or strikes during the period between 1958
and 1977 needs a detailed explanation. Thus, it is this author’s
opinion that during the said period the Romanian working class
engaged in a “new social contract” as defined by Antonin J.
340
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
Liehm,164 or a “tacit social contract” (“tacit deal”). As defined by
George Schöpflin, such a “tacit deal” meant: “The right ‘not to work
hard,’ together with nearly absolute job security” against granting to
the party the “sole right to involve itself into politics.”165 The
communist regime proved to be quite successful in co-opting a majority
of the working class and this was also due to the policy of sustained
industrialization and urbanization enforced especially after 1956.
A confident and experienced by now political elite, shepherded by
Gheorghiu-Dej,166 with an increased room to maneuver after the July
1958 withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Romania, engaged in an
ambitious strategy of political survival based on economic development
and nation-building. As already discussed, the Ceauşescu regime
followed until the early 1970s the developmental pattern and the policy
“The notion of a new social contract [emphasis mine] in East and East Central
Europe suggests that the population of those areas had ceded to the authorities its
rights to free speech and assembly, its right to organize, and various other basic
democratic rights in exchange for certain implicit guarantees. These include assured
employment that, even if providing only mediocre wages permits a standard of
living above the poverty level. Little real effort, personal involvement, or individual
initiative is required. The contract also implies the state’s provision of important
social services and a degree of social security. As long as the contract is honored by
both parties, it provides both with a set of real or perceived advantages. Social and
political calm prevail, and there is no need for labor camps, revolts, terrorism, or
more than a minimal number of political prisoners.” Antonin J. Liehm, “The New
Social Contract and the Parallel Polity,” in Jane Leftwich Curry, ed., Dissent in
Eastern Europe (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983), 174.
165
George Schöpflin, Politics in Eastern Europe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 150.
166
Corneliu Coposu, the late leader of the Christian-Democratic National
Peasant Party is telling. Coposu has emphasized Dej’s transformation from a
humble worker animated by communist ideas, who seemed rather intimidated by
Ana Pauker and Vasile Luca, to a cynical RCP leader who ordered the assassination
of Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu. See Corneliu Coposu, Dialoguri cu Vartan Arachelian
(Dialogues with Vartan Arachelian) (Bucharest: Editura Anastasia, 1991), 76–77.
See also Corneliu Coposu, Confesiuni: Dialoguri cu Doina Alexandru (Confessions:
Dialogues with Doina Alexandru) (Bucharest: Editura Anastasia, 1996).
164
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
341
of increased short-term consumption established by Gheorghiu-Dej
in the early 1960s. Consequently, between 1964 and 1974 Romania
experienced a “golden period” of some economic achievements,
characterized by an accentuated pro-consumption economic policy.167
As a result of the process of accelerated urbanization, between 1960
and 1977 the percentage of urban population grew from 32.1 percent
to 47.5 percent, while the percentage of rural population declined from
67.9 percent in 1960 to 52.5 percent in 1977. The rapid
industrialization of the country resulted in a growth of the population
involved in industry. Consequently, the labor force employed in
industry grew from 19.2 percent in 1960 to 30.6 percent in 1975,
while the population involved in agriculture (except for forestry)
declined from 56.5 percent in 1960 to 37.8 percent in 1975. In
absolute numbers, the population employed in agriculture decreased
from 6,233,000 persons in 1960 to 3,837,000 persons in 1975, whereas
the total labor force increased from 9,538,000 persons in 1960 to
10,150,000 persons in 1975. Between 1956 and 1977, the Romanian
working class – “blue collar workers,” including foremen – grew from
23.7 percent of total population in 1956 to 39.9 percent in 1966 and
to 54.3 percent in 1977. In absolute numbers, the working class grew
steadily, reaching 2,212,500 persons in 1960; 3,018,700 in 1965;
3,867,800 in 1970 and 4,089,100 in 1972. 168 However, the
urbanization program was not able to keep the pace with the
industrialization program, so that a considerable commuting workforce
came into existence in the early 1970s.169 According to an evaluation
of 1973, in some factories in the Braşov County around 50 percent of
Such a consumption-oriented economic policy led to a rise of population’s
expectations, but, on the long term, conveyed to economic stagnation and debt
accumulation.
168
Tsantis and Pepper, Romania, 542–43.
169
See also Table 28, Industrial Structure of Romanian Towns in 1966 – Active
Population in Primary (I), Secondary (II) and Tertiary (III) Employment, in
Ronnås, Urbanization in Romania, 363–68.
167
342
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
the workforce was composed of commuting villagers.170 Similarly, in
the case of the Piteşti Automobile Enterprise, 57.5 percent of the total
workforce was composed of commuting villagers. Moreover, 8.7
percent of the total workforce of the Piteşti Enterprise was composed
of long-distance intra-county commuters.171 All in all, the commuting
villagers represented a quick-growing class of peasant-workers, whose
backgrounds, habits, and life-styles differed sharply from those of their
urban-born or urban-based fellow workers.
Although the number of commuters grew constantly during the
period analyzed, the transport conditions for the commuting workers
did not improve much. Considering the distances to be covered,
many workers were obliged to go between 20 and 60 kilometers by
train or by trucks provided by their enterprises. In many cases,
commuters had to walk several kilometers from the nearest railway
station to their village. The following example describes a normal
working day for a commuting villager, considering the train as a
means of transport and a commuting distance of 60 kilometers. At
the time, the average speed of local trains in Romania was
approximately 45 kilometers per hour on main lines and 30
kilometers per hour on branch lines, due to the large number of
stations. Consequently, the distance of 60 kilometers was covered in
one hour and a half to two hours per trip, and thus the total
commuting time amounted to some 3 or 4 hours per working day.172
Let us consider the working program at the “Steagul Roşu” (Red
Flag) Truck Factory in Braşov, i.e. 6.30 a.m. to 14.30 p.m. Thus, a
commuter had to wake up at 4.00 a.m. – in the case that the railway
Shafir, Romania: Politics, Economics and Society, 141.
As already mentioned, Nicolae Ceauşescu inaugurated the Piteşti Automobile
Enterprise on 20 August 1968. The next day, 21 August, he would live “his finest
hour” and deliver the famous speech condemning the invasion of Czechoslovakia
by the WTO troops.
172
Tsantis and Pepper, Romania, 323.
170
171
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
343
station was close enough to his or her village – in order to arrive at
the factory at 6.30 a.m. When the working day was over, commuters
could get home at 5 p.m. under the most favorable conditions, but
in many cases, they got home around 6 p.m.
A survey of the workforce at the Piteşti Automobile Enterprise,
dated 31 July 1971, indicated that 42.5 percent of the total spent up
to 30 minutes to arrive to the factory, 48.8 percent spent up to 60
minutes, while 8.7 percent needed around 100 minutes.173 Prior to
1957, the commuting workforce had to walk some 4 km from the
nearest railway station to the factory. In harsh winters, many workers
were forced to stay overnight in the factory, because of the bad roads
and poor transport conditions.174 After 5 or 6 p.m., the vast majority
of the commuters entered the “second shift.” As John W. Cole puts
it, the “second shift” was related to the activity the commuting
workers did in agriculture after a day of work in the factory and refers
to the entire process of production and distribution, which was carried
on through “non-corporate social relations.”175 The indirect costs
posed by the “second shift” activity to the state sector were high since,
due to the difficulties of commuting, workers were often too tired
to do good work, and their sleepiness during working hours caused
numerous accidents.176
The analysis of the period between 1958 and 1977 suggests two
important trends related to the Romanian working class. First, the
traditional working-class environments, with traditions established
in the interwar period, were “diluted” through a massive input of
173
Ştefănescu, Moroşan and Soare, Monografia Uzinei de Autoturisme Piteşti,
88.
Ibid., 20–21, 26.
John W. Cole, “Family, Farm, and Factory: Rural Workers in Contemporary
Romania,” in Daniel Nelson, ed., Romania in the 1980s (Boulder, CO: Westview
Press, 1981), 93.
176
Romanian Fond, Unit No. 300/60/1/390, Item 4623/58: 3, OSA/RFE
Archives.
174
175
344
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
rural-born workers. Such a phenomenon contributed to the
emergence of a working class with a reduced sense of cohesion and
solidarity. Moreover, the existence of a large category of commuting
villagers lowered the potential for protest in such working-class
milieus. For instance, as mentioned in an account dated December
1955, only the older workers at the Griviţa railway shops still
displayed a certain sense of solidarity.177 Secondly, the process of long
distance internal migration resulted in the creation of a category of
“genuine” workers. The term “genuine,” however, has to be
understood in the sense of a category that had to rely almost entirely
on the salary obtained from the “socialist” sector, lacking traditions
and whose sense of solidarity developed only slowly. Nevertheless,
one should not neglect the high potential for protest of this category
of workers in the context of the severe economic crisis of the 1980s.
The “genuine” workers were at the origins of the two most significant
working-class protests that occurred in communist Romania in
August 1977 and November 1987, and they were also instrumental
in the outbreak of the Romanian revolution in the city of Timişoara
in December 1989.
economic decline and working-class unrest, 1977–1989
From the partial information gathered until now results that, between
1977 and 1989, 13 noticeable working-class protests – mainly strikes
– occurred in Ceauşescu’s Romania. Out of the total, three strikes
occurred in the mining industry, two in the petrochemical industry
and seven in the manufacturing industry, especially in the machinebuilding sector. Of all these, however, two protests were by far the
most important: (1) the August 1977 strike organized by the miners
Romanian Fond, Unit No. 300/60/1/837, Item 4019/56: 5, OSA/RFE
Archives.
177
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
345
in the Jiu Valley basin; and (2) the November 1987 revolt of the
Braşov workers.
The Jiu Valley strike of 2–3 August 1977 put an end to the period
of “tacit deal” between the communist regime and the Romanian
working class. The real proportions of the Jiu Valley strike are still
difficult to evaluate. One of the most cited witness accounts has been
that of a participant to the strike, Istvan Hosszu, who gave a six-hour
interview on the events after he left Romania in 1986. Hosszu
affirmed that between 30,000 and 35,000 miners joined the strike,
a figure that, however, exceeds the total number of miners employed
by the ten mines in the Jiu Valley basin.178 To date, the most accurate
analysis of the Jiu Valley strike was carried out by two researchers
from Petroşani, Marian Boboc and Mihai Barbu, who benefited from
their socialization among miners in the Jiu Valley and thus combined
oral history interviews with a thorough examination of the Securitate
files on the matter. Let us have a look at the number of miners
employed in 1977 at each of the ten mines in the Jiu Valley: Lonea
– 2,345; Petrila – 2,772; Dâlja – 1,823; Livezeni – 943; Aninoasa 2,508; Vulcan – 3,599; Paroşeni – 1,726; Lupeni – 4,825; Bărbăteni
– 870; and Uricani – 2,116.179 All in all, the total number of miners
employed at the time of the August 1977 strike at the Jiu Valley
mines amounted to 23,527. It should be mentioned also that the
critical mass of miners that determined the outbreak of the strike was
composed of the third shift that just finished the working day and
the first shift that was preparing for entering the mine.
For a summary of Hosszu’s account see Romanian Fond, Unit
300/60/1/837, Item 1750/86, OSA/RFE Archives (hereafter cited as Item
1750/86). See also Mihai Barbu and Gheorghe Chirvasă, După 20 de ani: Lupeni
’77–Lupeni ’97 (20 years after: Lupeni 1977–Lupeni 1997) (Petroşani: Cotidianul
“Matinal” & Editura Cameleonul, 1997).
179
Marian Boboc and Mihai Barbu, Strict secret: Lupeni 1977 – Filajul continuă!
(Top secret: Lupeni 1977 – Surveillance goes on!) (Craiova: Editura MJM, 2007),
30, 49, 80, 90, 98, 144, 178, 354, 470 and 528.
178
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natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
The strike was sparked by new legislation concerning pensions,
i.e. Legea nr. 3 din 30 iunie 1977 privind pensiile de asigurări sociale
de stat şi asistenţa socială (Law no. 3 of 30 June 1977 concerning state
social pensions and social assistance). The law was adopted by the
Romanian Grand National Assembly on 30 June and was
subsequently published in the Official Bulletin of the Socialist
Republic Romania on 8 July. Miners were particularly concerned
with a series of limitations introduced by the new law as compared
with the old legislation (Law no. 27/1966) such as: the raise of the
retirement age from fifty to fifty-two, and the cancellation or
restriction of various categories of sickness benefits and entitlements
to disability pension (especially with regard to the so-called “thirddegree disability pension”).180 The new legislation came on a backdrop
of growing dissatisfaction among the miners in the Jiu Valley with
the conditions of work and the obligation to work on non-working
days, as well as with the disruptions in the supply with basic
foodstuffs. In addition, a central element of discontent for each and
every miner was the extension of the workday from six to eight hours;
in this respect, it was a general agreement that the workday should
be reduced to six hours. Overall, the Jiu Valley strike represented a
mature working-class protest. The main aspects of the strike can be
summarized as follows: (1) the miners displayed a high level of selforganization; a strike command post was established at Gate No. 2
of the most important mine in the area, the Lupeni mine, which
became the focal point of the strike; (2) the strike was non-violent,
sit-down, and round-the-clock; and (3) the miners prepared a list of
demands and asked to negotiate directly with Ceauşescu, face to face.
For the complete text of the Law no.3/1977, see Ioan Velica and Dragoş
Ştefan Velica, Lupeni ’77: Laboratorul puterii (Lupeni 1977: The laboratory of
power) (Deva: Editura Polidava, 2002), 39–71. For a discussion on the limitations
introduced by Law no. 3/1977 as compared with Law no. 27/1966, see Boboc and
Barbu, Top secret: Lupeni 1977, 12–15.
180
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
347
(Constantin Dobre – a miner from the Paroşeni mine and a key
participant to the strike – states that the final list of demands had 23
points.)181
On 2 August 1977, a delegation of high Party officials, led by Ilie
Verdeţ was sent to negotiate with the miners.182 After the refusal of
the strikers to discuss with the Bucharest delegation, Ceauşescu
arrived at Lupeni on 3 August at noon and, in front of a determined
but not violent crowd, practically agreed with the list of demands.
The fact that Ceauşescu agreed to consider workers demands resulted
in the termination of the strike. At the same time, Ceauşescu did not
use the force to suppress the strike: the repression followed gradually,
during the winter of 1977–1978. In spite of rumors, the strike leaders
were not killed by the Securitate, but they were forced to move to
The list of demands included among others: (1) the reinstatement of a sixhour working day; (2) retirement at age of fifty in the conditions of twenty years
of effective activity; (3) the reinstatement of sickness benefits and entitlements to
disability pensions restricted by the new law of pensions; (4) the improvement of
working conditions, as well as adequate food supplies and medical care in the Jiu
Valley; (5) the establishment of light industry enterprises in the Jiu Valley to provide
work to miners’ wives and daughters; (6) the establishment of workers’ commissions
at the enterprise level, and their empowerment to control managers’ activity; (7)
an agreement to be signed providing that protesting miners would suffer no
reprisals; and (8) the national media to report accurately on the causes and progress
of miners’ strike. For the complete list of demands as provided by Dobre, see Mihai
Barbu and Marian Boboc, Lupeni ’77: Sfânta Varvara versus Tanti Varvara (Lupeni
’77: Saint Varvara versus Tante Varvara) (Cluj: Editura Fundaţiei pentru Studii
Europene, 2005), 215–16.
182
The delegation was composed of Ilie Verdeţ, prime-viceprime minister,
Gheorghe Pană, president of the General Union of Romanian Trade Unions and
Constantin Băbălău, the minister of mining industry. High officers from the
Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Securitate accompanied the Party officials. For
details on the negotiations between the strikers and the Party officials see the witness
account by Dumitru Iordache, a miner from the Lupeni mine, in Barbu and Boboc,
Lupeni ’77: Saint Varvara versus Tante Varvara, 164–76.
181
348
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
other regions where they remained under the supervision of the secret
police. A majority of the demands put forward by the miners were
satisfied for a short period of time, including the improvement of
medical care and food supplies. Some improvements were made
towards creating jobs for the families of those employed in the mining
sector through investments in the light industry of the Jiu Valley. To
conclude, the Jiu Valley strike was the best-conducted working-class
protest in communist Romania. At the same time, the strike did not
turn into an open anti-regime protest. The protesters understood
that Ceauşescu had the power to solve their problems, which does
not mean that they really trusted the supreme leader of the RCP, and
therefore demanded to negotiate directly with him. The existence of
working-class traditions in the area – witnesses to the strike mention
that the protesters shouted “Lupeni 1929!” as a reminder of the
interwar miners’ revolt that took place also in Lupeni – and the
dangerous activity performed created a special sense of cohesion
among miners, which allowed them to conduct a large-scale protest.183
The historic importance of the Braşov workers protest of 15
November 1987 resides in the fact that it turned into a violent antiThe 1929 Lupeni strike occurred after a long period of negotiations for the
signing of the new collective work contract in the mining industry. In order to
sign the new contract, a list of requests was raised by miners’ representatives, among
which the most important were: (1) that it be respected the eight hours working
day program, (2) a wage raise of 20 per cent; (3) the payment of salaries on a regular
basis; (4) the management was required to cease firing workers and to re-employ
the already fired miners; and (5) the abolition of the system of fines applied to
workers. After eight months of negotiations it was decided to call for a general
strike in the Jiu Valley. On 5 August 1929, in the morning, however, only the
Lupeni miners went on strike. On 6 August 1929, in the morning, the authorities
decided to repress the strike. According to the official figures, between 20 and 30
miners were killed and over 100 wounded that day. See Mircea Muşat and Ion
Ardeleanu, România după Marea Unire 1918–1933 (Romania after the Great
Unification 1918–1933) vol. II (Bucharest: Editura Ştiinţifică şi Enciclopedică,
1986), 620.
183
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
349
Ceauşescu revolt. In the conditions of a deep social and economic
crisis, the initial economic requests of the workers turned quickly
into political demands. In the case of the Braşov working-class
uprising, a number of Braşov dwellers also joined the workers in their
protest, which was an indication of the growing dissatisfaction of the
population in general with the Ceauşescu regime. Whereas the Jiu
Valley miners were still convinced in 1977 that Ceauşescu would
solve their problems, the Braşov protesters shouted “Jos Ceauşescu!”
(Down with Ceauşescu!)184 The revolt in Braşov took place in a totally
different context than the 1977 strike, since it occurred in the midst
of an acute economic crisis, during a period characterized by all kinds
of shortages: food, gasoline, natural gas, heating fuel, and electricity
supply.
The Braşov revolt was initiated by a part of the Steagul Roşu (Red
Flag) truck plant workers, in response to the wage cuts imposed by
the management for the non-fulfillment of production targets. In
the context of chronic food shortages and heating restrictions (in a
mountain area), the wage cuts announcement provoked the workers’
revolt. The research carried out so far permits a fair reconstruction
of the Braşov events.185 Everything started during the third (night)
shift at the Steagul Roşu truck plant. Workers stopped working at
6.00 a.m. and around 8.00 a.m. marched off from the plant, in the
direction of the city center. According to an eyewitness account, at
the beginning there were 300–350 protesters. Because on that day
local elections were held in Romania, the police forces were dispersed
Deletant, Ceauşescu and the Securitate, 250.
See Romulus Rusan, ed., O zi de toamnă, cîndva: 15 noiembrie 1987 –
Braşov (One day of autumn, someday: 15 November 1987 – Braşov) (Bucharest:
Editura Fundaţiei Academia Civică, 2004); Marius Oprea and Stejărel Olaru,
eds., Ziua care nu se uită: 15 noiembrie 1987, Braşov (The day one cannot forget:
15 November 1987, Braşov) (Iaşi: Editura Polirom, 2002); and Vasile Gogea,
Fragmente salvate (1975–1989) (Saved fragments: 1975–1989) (Iaşi: Editura
Polirom, 1996), 168–77.
184
185
350
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
to the voting sections, and the remaining forces tried in vain, two
times, to stop the crowd. At 10:30 a.m. the crowd, joined by workers
from the tractor factory Tractorul and citizens of Braşov, all in all
some 3,000–4,000 people, gathered in the front of the Party
headquarters.186 Meeting no resistance, the protesters entered the
building and threw out furniture and equipment, and set them on
fire outside the building. A similar scenario was repeated at the
People’s Council building. Around 12:00 a.m., the special
intervention troops (the riot police) entered the central square of
Braşov. Simultaneously, fire engines and firefighters entered the
square. Around 1:00 p.m. the crowd was dispersed and the protest
ceased. During the night of 15 to 16 of November 1987, some 500
protesters – mainly workers – were arrested and interrogated, of which
61 were eventually deported.187
The analysis of Braşov protest reveals that the spontaneous revolt
of the Steagul Roşu workers was caused by deep economic and social
problems. The protest was sparked the non-payment of wages, but
turned eventually into an anti-Ceauşescu revolt, which was joined
by many citizens of Braşov. Moreover, the crowds protested not only
against the Party officials, but also against the rule of Ceauşescu. In
this respect, the spontaneous, unorganized and violent character of
the Braşov protest reveals the enormous dissatisfaction of the Braşov
population with the communist regime. Also, the protest sparked by
the Steagul Roşu workers spread to the Tractorul enterprise, but not
to other large enterprises in the city. At the same time, it was the
Gogea, Saved fragments: 1975–1989, 173.
Deletant, Ceauşescu and the Securitate, 253. The Association “15 November
1987” of the participants to the revolt confirms the number of 61 workers deported
to other regions of the country. See Comisia Prezidenţială pentru Analiza Dictaturii
Comuniste din România (Presidential Commission for the Analysis of the
Communist Dictatorship in Romania), Raport final (Final report), eds. Vladimir
Tismăneanu, Dorin Dobrincu, and Cristian Vasile (Bucharest: Editura Humanitas,
2007), 709.
186
187
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
351
same unorganized and violent character of the revolt that hampered
the appearance of a much larger protest action, although large
categories of the Braşov population were likely to join the protest.
The fact that the strikers decided to leave the plant and protest in
the front of the Braşov Party headquarters affected workers’ capacity
to defend themselves against the special intervention troops. For
comparison, the Jiu Valley protest of 2–3 August 1977 showed that
a round-the-clock, sit-down strike could have been more effective.
Moreover, the Jiu Valley miners’ proved to be more organized and
conducted a non-violent protest, taking care of not damaging
property and issuing a list of requests. In the case of the Braşov revolt,
the damaging of the mentioned two buildings favored the quick
suppression of the revolt, as the authorities could claim that “hooligan
elements” disturbed the peaceful atmosphere of the local elections.
The two major protests discussed above were not singular. For
instance, prior to the Braşov workers revolt of November 1987,
another violent protest was carried out by the miners in the Motru
basin in October 1981. Thus, angered by the rationing of bread,
miners went on strike on 19 October 1981, marched into the town
of Motru where they attacked the building of the Party committee.
The assault on the building began at around 3 p.m. on 19 October.
The authorities sent the army, Militia and Securitate to suppress the
protest: the intervention lasted from 10 p.m. on 19 October until 3
a.m. the next day, i.e. on 20 October 1981. Finally, nine miners were
put to trial and received sentences ranging from 6 to 8 years in
prison.188 One should be also reminded that during the period under
scrutiny there occurred also numerous small, spontaneous work
conflicts, strikes or revolts that had no political goals, and sometimes
were not even caused by wage cuts or difficult working conditions.
In a majority of the cases, however, the demands put forward by the
Gheorghe Gorun, Rezistenţa la comunism: Motru ‘981 (Resistance to
communism: Motru 1981) (Cluj: Editura Clusium, 2005), 89–93.
188
352
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
strikers were related to food shortages, heating problems and nonpayment of wages. In his diary, writer Stelian Tănase speaks of a
strike that broke out in November 1988 at a major Bucharest heavyindustry plant during which the workers asked for mîncare şi căldură,
i.e. food and heating.189 Actually, as Vladimir Socor has shown, the
scenario of a working-class protest was more or less the following:
Representatives of the party and other authorities, including the police,
rushed to scene of the strikes, acted in a conciliatory manner by
promising full redress of the workers’ grievances, and brought into the
strike-bound factories ample food-supplies, including items that had
not been seen in a long time. Within a few days the concessions induced
the strikers to go back to work. No arrests, prosecutions, or physical
maltreatment were reported. Following the full-scale resumption of
work, however, the police began questioning workers.190
To sum up, one should note that, until the popular revolt of
Timişoara, the strategy described above served well the regime, which
contained almost all the protests from below, with the exception of
the November 1987 Braşov workers’ revolt. One should stress that
the protest of the Braşov workers was in many respects similar with
the one carried out in June 1956 by the Polish workers in Poznan.191
With respect to the “mechanism” of the revolt, the similarity between
the two protests is indeed striking: workers went on strike, marched
into the town where they were joined by many city dwellers in their
protest and finally attacked and damaged heavily the Party
headquarters building. In the Romanian case, the 1987 Braşov
workers’ revolt showed for the first time ever that a high potential
Tănase, The Official Wintertime, 91.
Vladimir Socor, RFE/Situation Report/2, 19.
191
On the 1956 Polish workers’ revolt in Poznan, see R. J. Crampton, Eastern
Europe in the Twentieth Century (London: Routledge, 1994), 285.
189
190
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
353
for revolt existed not only among the workers, but also among the
urban population in general.
The study of the mechanisms of revolt, however, does not explain
why major protests occurred in those areas and only there. To answer
such a question, one should engage in a complex analysis involving
industrialization and urbanization patterns, long distance intercounty
migration trends, and the distribution of developmental resources
between different regions of Romania. Concerning the way in which
the process of industrialization and urbanization led to the
modification of the industrial structure of population, census data
indicate that between 1956 and 1977, in the case of Hunedoara
County (which includes the Jiu Valley region), in the major mining
centers, the employment in the secondary sector was significantly
high.192 Furthermore, in 1977 in the Hunedoara County workers
represented 63.2 percent of the total active population. In 1977, the
Braşov County turned to be one of the most industrialized counties
of Romania, where workers represented 70.5 percent of the total active
population and the employment in the secondary sector was high.193
At the same time, the analysis of workers’ potential of protest has
to take into consideration not only the total number of workers
employed in the secondary sector, but also the percentage of
commuting villagers and the percentage of long distance intercounty
migrants. As shown above, it is important to discuss the emergence
In 1977, the population active in the second sector represented 77.7 percent
of total active population in Lupeni, 74.3 percent in Petrila, 66.5 percent in Uricani,
and 78.6 percent in Vulcan. In the case of the city of Hunedoara, 71.4 percent of
the total active population was employed in the secondary sector.
193
The population active in the secondary sector represented 67.2 percent in
Braşov, 71.3 percent in Codlea, 71.8 percent in Făgăraş, 77.7 percent in Rîşnov,
77.9 percent in Săcele, 73.7 percent in Victoria and 85.6 percent in Zărneşti. See
Table 29, Industrial Structure of Romanian Towns in 1977 – Active Population
in Primary (I), Secondary (II) and Tertiary (III) Employment, in Ronnås,
Urbanization in Romania, 369–73.
192
354
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
of the category of “genuine” workers, obliged to rely almost entirely
on the salary obtained from the socialist sector, in relation with the
working-class revolts under communist rule. These workers were the
most vulnerable in the case of wage cuts in the context of the
structural crisis that became evident in the early 1980s. The most
affected workers were those who severed their ties with their families
– the long distance intercounty migrants – who could not rely on
the products of the small family lot or did not have a relative to stay
in line for hours in order to buy some basic aliments (milk, butter,
sugar, meat, eggs, edible oil, etc.).
The analysis of the long distance intercounty migration is based
on the data provided by the 1977 census. Unfortunately, between
1977 and 1992 no other census was taken in order to complete the
information with data concerning the period between 1977 and 1989.
However, considering the partial information available, it is
reasonable to consider that the general trend was maintained.194 In
order to define the concept of long distance intercounty migration,
the present research considered a maximum commuting time of two
hours per trip, which means a total of four hours per day. As discussed
above, this calculation has been made considering the main
characteristics of the Romanian means of transport, based on railway
and bus schedules from the period; since gasoline was strictly rationed
in the 1980s, commuting by personal automobile was almost
non-existent. Moreover, the information provided by different scholars
has been compared with author’s own experience of commuting.195
In the case of Braşov, the pattern of long distance intercounty migration
was also illustrated in the 1980s by the numerous jokes with Moldavians who
migrated to Transilvania. A very popular joke stated that the city of Braşov was
slowly transforming itself into Iaşov, considering the large number of migrants
from the Moldavian city of Iaşi.
195
In her study on the village of Binţinţi (Hunedoara county), Verdery states
that the average commuting time for the commuting villagers was of two hours.
194
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
355
The result is that in the overwhelming majority of the cases the
commuting range could not exceed the neighboring counties.
Therefore, in order to determine the percentage of the population
unable to commute daily, the population born in the neighboring
counties has been subtracted from the total number of migrants into
the respective county. The analysis is based on the absolute figures
of internal migration for twelve selected counties and the city of
Bucharest.196 One should also mention that the counties selected
correspond to the 1981 administrative reform. The selection was
made considering the areas where working-class protests occurred in
both interwar and communist periods, i.e. the counties of Hunedoara,
Braşov, Cluj, Prahova, Iaşi, Constanţa, and Timişoara. At the same
time, the analysis was extended to the counties considered sources of
internal migration (such as Vaslui, in Moldova) and to those counties
considered representative for the respective region of Romania in
terms of their development under communist rule (such as: Dolj for
Oltenia; Arad for Crişana-Maramureş; and Argeş and Dîmboviţa for
Muntenia).197
In the case of Hunedoara County, the figures related to the
migrants coming from the bordering counties – Alba, Arad, CaraşSeverin, Gorj, Timiş and Vîlcea – have been subtracted from the
total number of interregional migrants. This resulted in a total
number of 131,388 long distance intercounty migrants, representing
25.5 percent of county’s total population. In the case of Braşov
Katherine Verdery, Transylvanian Villagers: Three Centuries of Political, Economic
and Ethnic Change (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 58. See also
the discussion on the commuting workforce of the Piteşti Automobile Enterprise.
196
The calculation is based on the internal migration figures provided by the
official 1977 census. See Direcţia Centrală de Statistică, Republica Socialistă
România: Recensămîntul populaţiei şi al locuinţelor din 5 ianuarie 1977, vol. I,
Populaţie – Structura demografică (Bucharest: n.p., 1980), 696–743.
197
For more details, see Annex 3 to Dragoş Petrescu, “Patterns of WorkingClass Protest in Communist Romania,” 140.
356
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
County, the total number of migrants coming from the bordering
counties – Argeş, Buzău, Covasna, Dîmboviţa, Harghita, Mureş,
Prahova and Sibiu – has been subtracted from the total number of
migrants into the respective country. This resulted in a total number
of 146,696 long distance intercounty migrants, representing 25.2
percent of the county’s total population. Nevertheless, there were
another two counties – Timiş and Constanţa – that received a
relatively high number of long distance intercounty migrants (23.5
percent of the total population and 21.8 percent, respectively).
Moreover, in both cases, the working class was well represented in
absolute numbers as well as in the percentage of the total population.
In the case of Timiş County, workers represented 59.1 percent of
the total county’s population, while in the case of Constanţa County
workers made up 64.0 percent of the total population.198
Furthermore, the investments in the fixed assets of socialist
enterprises created a differentiation between the counties. As Daniel
Nelson has aptly shown, during the period 1970–1983 some major
changes occurred in the regime’s economic policy. In terms of
investments, the “big winners” were the Constanţa, Gorj, Tulcea and
Vîlcea counties, while the “big losers” were the industrialized counties
In the Timiş County, in 1977, the structure of the population involved in
the secondary sector, for the major county’s towns, was the following (for
comparison, the percentage of total active population active in the tertiary sector
is given in parentheses): Timişoara, 60.8 percent of the total active population
(36.8 percent active in the tertiary sector); Lugoj, 57.7 percent (37.5 percent active
in the tertiary sector); Buziaş, 32.5 percent (36.4 percent employed in the tertiary
sector); Deta, 54.1 percent (32.1 percent); Jimbolia, 68.0 percent (20.9 percent)
and Sînnicolau Mare, 46.5 percent (34.9 percent). In the case of the Constanţa
County, the percentages of the population active in the secondary sector, for the
major county’s towns are indicated below (the percentage of the population
involved in the tertiary sector is provided in parentheses): Constanţa, 43.1 percent
(54.1 percent); Eforie, 25.8 percent (70.7 percent); Mangalia, 48.1 percent (45.7
percent); Cernavodă, 51.7 percent (39.8 percent); Medgidia, 59.6 percent (32.3
percent). See Ronnås, Urbanization in Romania, 369–73.
198
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
357
of Hunedoara and Prahova. Moreover, there were no Transylvanian
counties among the “big winners.” The Mureş County, for instance,
was a “big loser,” whereas Cluj County was a “moderate loser.” The
Braşov County was placed among the “small losers,” while Timiş
County experienced almost no change in terms of investments.199 As
for the Hunedoara and Braşov counties, the lack of investments in
industry created major sources of workers’ discontent. Such was the
case in Jiu Valley, where workers demanded the establishment of
light industry factories – to provide jobs for their spouses and
daughters, criticized the bad working conditions – such as the lack
of protective equipment, and asked for a free meal before entering
the shift. In the case of the Steagul Roşu Braşov truck plant, the
obsolete products of the enterprise induced the lose of export markets
and the non-fulfillment of the export plan, which led to wage cuts
and created the premises for the November 1987 revolt.200
It seems that in the cases of Timiş and Constanţa counties, the
possibility of smuggling consumer goods from the former Yugoslavia
and Hungary (in the case of Timiş County) or through the commercial
seaport (in the case of the city of Constanţa) acted somehow as a
“safety valve” and delayed the emergence of social protests in both
regions.201 One should also note that workers’ protests occurred also
in the capital city, Bucharest. However, in Bucharest the situation was
different from the rest of the country for two main reasons. First, since
Bucharest was the center of power, the concentration of repression
forces – army, militia and secret police – was much higher than in the
Daniel Nelson, Romanian Politics in the Ceauşescu Era (New York: Gordon
and Breach, 1988), 164–66.
200
Deletant, Ceauşescu and the Securitate, 252.
201
A detailed analysis of smuggling consumer goods in both Timiş and
Constanţa counties has to be carried out in order to reveal the extent to which the
possibility of buying scarce consumer goods on the black market hindered or
delayed the emergence of social protests in working-class environments.
199
358
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
rest of the country, and protests were contained easily. Second,
conditions of life in Bucharest were a little better than in the province:
for instance, bread was not rationed and gasoline quotas were higher.
The analysis of long-distance migration trends reveals an element
of paramount importance: by the end of the 1980s there were four
regions in Romania in which workers’ potential of protest was
particularly high, i.e. the counties of Constanţa, Braşov, Hunedoara,
and Timiş. When the revolution sparked on 16 December 1989 in
the city of Timişoara, long distance migrants played an important
role in the events. A participant in the events, writer Daniel Vighi,
recalls: “There were many Moldavians, very courageous…. Let us be
fair and unprejudiced to the Moldavians from here [from
Timişoara]… who were in the front rows and got beaten. That is the
truth; they fought with the Militia in the Central Park, in the dark.”202
As for the participation of the workers in Timişoara to the 1989
revolution, it suffices to say that out of the total number of 376
victims in Timişoara during the period 17 – 21 December, 185 were
workers.203
Thus, an analysis of the way in which working-class unrest
contributed to the collapse of the Romanian communism has to
consider both the intricate process of co-optation by the regime
during the 1960s and 1970s and the deep frustration felt by many
industrial workers in the late 1980s. The peasant-workers or the
commuting villagers – estimated at 30–50 percent of the total active
workforce in industry – were less affected by the economic crisis that
lowered Romanians’ standard of living beginning in the late 1970s.
Such a category was favored by the strategy of the “extended family
household” which permitted people, especially during the period of
structural crisis and food shortages of 1981–1989, to obtain the
necessary foodstuffs for survival. The category of “genuine” workers,
202
203
Milin, Timişoara in revolution and after, 28–29.
Pitulescu, ed., The Ministry of Internal Affairs in December 1989, 100.
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
359
who were totally dependent on the salary received in industry,
developed slowly in communist Romania. As discussed above, the
category of “genuine” workers attained a certain degree of selfconsciousness in the late 1970s and early 1980s, depending on the
characteristics of the workplace (large or small enterprise, dangerous
work, location of the enterprise and its relevance at national level).
At the same time, such workers had an increased tendency to develop
spontaneous and violent forms of protest, since they were forced to
think in terms of biological survival.
A thorough analysis of workers’ revolts shows that industrial
workers from large enterprises were more likely to organize defensive,
wage strikes, after long periods of discontent, rather than to engage
in offensive, politically motivated strikes that could have led to the
development of a mass-movement similar to the Polish Solidarity.
Even if the Braşov revolt would have been a round-the-clock, nonviolent sit-down strike on the model of Jiu Valley miners’ strike of
1977 it is unlikely that solidarity strikes in major enterprises
throughout the country would have occurred. Nevertheless, the
Braşov workers revolt revealed that the deep economic crisis in the
late 1980s created a special sense of cohesion and solidarity among
the urban population in general. Furthermore, it indicated that the
potential for protest of Romanian urban population was higher in
the large cities and that spontaneous violent revolts were likely to be
joined by an appreciable number of bystanders. Finally, the analysis
of long distance inter-county migration trends shows that in four
areas of the country the potential for protest by the industrial workers
was particularly high. In four counties, Constanţa, Braşov, Hunedoara
and Timiş, long-distance inter-county migrants made up around 25
percent of the total population, of which over 60 percent were
workers. Such people severed their ties with countryside and could
not rely on their families in a period when “queuing for food” was
crucial for feeding one’s family. It was in one of these areas, namely
the Timiş County, where the 1989 Romanian revolution was sparked.
360
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
the church, the mIlItary and the SecurItate
how theSe InStItutIonS
“thought” under communISm
Church and religion under Communism
Much has been written on the alleged “submissive” character of the
Romanians. Some authors have argued that the dominant religious
culture – the Greek-Orthodox faith, has a major impact on both the
regime and community political cultures, and determined a more
compliant attitude toward the communist regime. Much has also
been written on the role of Catholic Church in establishing a mass
opposition movement under communism, and the most quoted case
is that of the Catholic Church in Poland and its role in the birth of
Solidarity. For instance, Jacques Rupnik wrote in 1988 that in
communist Poland the Church was “the official counter-culture, the
repository of an alternative ideology.”204 Similarly, Eisenstadt
emphasized the importance of the Catholic Church in Poland in
creating “autonomous sectors” under state socialism.205 Compared
with the Polish case, it is no wonder that many authors argued
that the complacent character of the Romanian Orthodox Church
hampered the development of an alternative discourse to that of
the ruling power. Shafir, for instance, stated: “The contrast with
the Catholic Church in Poland could not be greater. Traditional
submission, increased by the treat of sanctions, makes the
dominant church in Romania a tool in the hands of the
Jacques Rupnik, The Other Europe (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989),
209–10.
205
S. N. Eisenstadt, “The Breakdown of Communist Regimes,” in Daedalus
121 (Spring 1992): 21–41.
204
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
361
authorities.”206 It is this author’s opinion that a discussion on the
mechanisms that made the Orthodox Church in Romania more
compliant with the communist authorities has to focus on church
and its institutional needs. A much more complicated discussion is
that on the alleged role of religion, that is, the Orthodox faith, in
inducing a passive attitude towards the regime among a majority of
the population.
The present analysis is organized on two parts. The first part
consists in a historical survey, focusing on the relationship between
the Romanian Orthodox Church (ROC) and the communist state
during the period 1945–1989. The second part discusses the role of
ROC as a religious organization and its strategy to address its
institutional needs; this part also addresses the alleged role of religion
in establishing a passive attitude towards the regime in communist
Romania. The present section concludes that the ROC, due to its
passivity and subservience, contributed little to the collapse of
communism in Romania. At the same time, it argues that, somehow
paradoxically, the more formalistic and ritualistic character of
Orthodoxy led, in the late 1980s, to the development of a silent –
but steady – opposition to the regime.
The imposition of communist rule in Romania was accompanied
by the enforcement of a strict state control over the Church. As
Deletant aptly puts it: “The Romanian Communist Party, while
officially condemning religious worship, nevertheless tolerated it
within certain bounds prescribed by law. In this respect, it was more
lenient than the Soviet regime.”207 The legislative framework was
established in 1948, when the communist regime adopted the Law
of Cults. Under the Articles 6 and 7, the Law stated that the practice
of religion had to observe the Constitution, internal security, public
order and general morality. Furthermore, Article 13 introduced the
206
207
Shafir, Romania: Politics, Economics and Society, 152.
Deletant, Ceauşescu and the Securitate, 10.
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natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
provision that the State had the right to revoke the legal recognition
of a denomination, when considered justified. In addition, Article
32 stated that the clergymen “who express anti-democratic attitudes
may be deprived temporarily or permanently of their salary, which
is provided by the state.”208 All in all, the Law proved to be an effective
instrument in imposing the authority of the communist regime on
the Churches.
After the collapse of the communist regime, a much debated has
been that of the collaboration of the upper hierarchy of the ROC
with the communist regime. With regard to the early Stalinist period,
Czeslaw Milosz addresses the case of Justinian Marina (1901–1977),
the Patriarch of ROC, who allegedly proclaimed: “Christ is a new
man. The new man is the Soviet man. Therefore Christ is a Soviet
man!”209 Patriarch Justinian’s statement, if true, best characterizes
the ambiguous relationship between ROC and the communist regime
in the aftermath of the communist take-over. Justinian, who became
Patriarch in 1948, had a close relationship with Gheorghiu-Dej. It
was said that after evading from the Tîrgu-Jiu prison camp, in the
second week of August 1944, few days before the coup d’état of 23
August 1944, Gheorghiu-Dej was hid by Justinian, a humble village
priest at the time. In one of Gheorghiu-Dej’s official biographies, the
paragraph related to his escape reads as follows: “Thus, after 11 years
of imprisonment, in one of the nights at the end of the first half of
August [1944], comrade Gheorghe Gheorghiu-De evades from the
Tîrgu-Jiu prison camp.”210 Ion Gheorghe Maurer, who organized the
escape, recalls that the event took place two or three weeks before 23
August 1944.211 Official information on Gheorghiu-Dej’s escape was
Quoted in Deletant, Ceauşescu and the Securitate, 10.
Czeslav Milosz, The Captive Mind (London: Penguin Books, 1985), 208.
210
Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej (Bucharest: Editura Partidului Muncitoresc Român,
1951), 42.
211
For Maurer’s statement, see Betea, Maurer and the Yesterday World, 48.
208
209
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
363
provided in an article published in the Party’s daily newspaper Scînteia
on 24 August 1946. The author, Ştefan Voicu, maintains that
Gheorghiu-Dej evaded from the Tîrgu-Jiu prison camp two weeks
before the coup of 23 August 1944.212 In any case, Maurer recalls
that after the escape a village priest hid Gheorghiu-Dej and himself
some 30 kilometers east of Craiova, but did not identify that
Orthodox priest as the future Patriarch Justinian. In spite of these
ambiguities, the close relationship between Gheorghiu-Dej and
Patriarch Justinian is confirmed by witness accounts. For instance,
Paul Sfetcu, Gheorghiu-Dej’s secretary for thirteen years, recalls that
the supreme leader of RWP knew Justinian from the period of
illegality. Sfetcu also recalls an episode related to the construction
works carried out to the new Congress Hall (Sala Palatului) in
Bucharest. The Kreţulescu (Orthodox) Church was initially believed
to obstruct the project and therefore Gheorghiu-Dej asked, during a
conversation over the phone, for Justinian permission to demolish
the church. Patriarch Justinian, Sfetcu remembers, gave on the spot
his consent to the demolition, but the project was carried out without
demolishing that particular church.213
Patriarch Justinian died in 1977, after twenty-nine years in office
and left an ambiguous legacy. Some said that he succeeded to reconcile
the obligation of the Orthodox Church to serve the regime with its
transcendental mission. Until his death in 1977, Justinian managed to
ensure the survival of the Orthodox Church during the period of
Stalinist terror of the early 1950s – when atheism was widely propagated
– and to maintain the continuity of monastic life. However, his role in
the suppression of the Uniate (Greek-Catholic) Church and its
subsequent absorption into ROC in 1948 is still to be discussed.
Furthermore, in spite of its compromise with the State, ROC could not
Scînteia, no. 608 (24 August 1946). Quoted in Betea, Maurer and the
Yesterday World, 51.
213
Sfetcu, Thirteen Years in Dej’s Antechamber, 74–76.
212
364
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
avoid the consequences of the second period of terror launched by
Gheorghiu-Dej’s regime, which followed the 1958 withdrawal of the
Soviet troops from Romania. According to some authors, between 1958
and 1963 the regime arrested around 2,500 priests, monks and nuns,
and closed more than half of the monasteries existing in the country.214
During the period 1977–1989, the ROC played a most
controversial role that deserves further examination. As already
mentioned, Patriarch Justinian died in 1977 and was succeeded by
Justin Moisescu (1977–1986). Although Patriarch Justinian was
accused of being a “red priest,” some said that Patriarch Justin was
even closer to the communist power than his predecessor.215 In 1986,
Teoctist Arăpaşu succeeded Patriarch Justin and followed a similar
line of compliance with the communist regime. After the collapse of
the communist regime, in January 1990, Patriarch Teoctist, who was
fiercely denounced for his collaboration with the Ceauşescu regime,
resigned. Two months after, in spite of the protests coming from
different sectors of the Romanian society, he was reinstated as the
Patriarch of the ROC.
The period between 1977 and 1989 was characterized by the most
troublesome compromises between the Orthodox Church and the
regime. During the period 1977–1989, the role of ROC as a social
institution was neglected and its duty as spiritual body was
compromised. Apart from the quiescence of the ROC hierarchy with
regard to the human rights abuses of the Ceauşescu regime, one of
the most debated issues is that of the almost complete lack of protest
from the part of the Orthodox clergy against the demolition of
numerous churches in Bucharest. One should be reminded that,
between 1984 and 1989, because of Ceauşescu’s plan of systemization
of Romania’s capital city, as many as eighteen Orthodox churches
were razed to the ground. As historian Dinu C. Giurescu remembers,
214
215
Deletant, Ceauşescu and the Securitate, 216.
Shafir, Romania: Politics, Economics and Society, 151.
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
365
in December 1985 Patriarch Justin argued that the regime destroyed
only some small, insignificant churches and this could not be
interpreted as a manifestation of regime’s hostility towards the
Church.216 If the head of the ROC had such an image of the ongoing
demolition of Orthodox churches in Bucharest, it is no wonder then
that the small clergy was equally silent. Writer Stelian Tănase recalls
that in 1988 he asked a Bucharest parish priest about Romanian
Patriarchy’s stance toward to the destruction of churches. The answer
he received was perplexing: the demolition of churches did not
depend on the Romanian Patriarchy’s approval and after all the
people, not the Patriarchy, had to protest since churches belong to
the people and not to the Patriarchy.217 Patriarch Teoctist, who
succeeded Patriarch Justin in 1986, followed the same line of
compliance with the regime. As Deletant rightly puts it, Teoctist’s
telegram of support for the Ceauşescu regime – published on 20
December 1989, when the population of Timişoara was already
protesting for three days against the regime – proved that the
hierarchy of the ROC was overtly supporting the regime.218
As stated in the beginning of this section, in discussing such
intricate issues as the subservience of ROC under communism or
the influence of Orthodox faith on Romanians’ alleged passive, nonrebellious character one should make the distinction between church
and religion. Churches, in general, strive to adopt policies that
correspond to their institutional needs. In this respect, Pedro Ramet
identifies four factors that determine the institutional needs of a
religious organization: (1) size; (2) dispersion; (3) symbolic resources;
and (4) operational ideology.219 An analysis based on the application
Quoted in Dinu C. Giurescu, Distrugerea trecutului României (The Razing
of Romania’s Past) (Bucharest: Editura Museion, 1994), 87.
217
Tănase, The Official Wintertime, 105.
218
Deletant, Ceauşescu and the Securitate, 233–34.
219
Pedro Ramet, Cross and Commissar: The Politics of Religion in Eastern Europe
and the USSR (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), 193.
216
366
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
of the above-mentioned four factors in the case of ROC contributes
to a better understanding of the local context and the way in which
the hierarchy of the ROC was forced to accommodate with the regime.
At the same time, such an analysis reveals the limitations of the
unwritten pact of “peaceful coexistence” between the regime and ROC.
The first element that influences the relationship between a
religious organization and the secular authority is its size: the larger
the religious organization, the greatest its need to come to terms with
the secular authority. In this respect, ROC was, and still is, the largest
denomination in the country with a number of worshipers ranging
between 15,5 and 16 million in a population of 23 million.220
Therefore, because of its size the ROC was compelled to devise a
strategy to accommodate to the policies of the communist regime.
Similarly, in the case of Poland, some authors argue, the size of the
Catholic Church determined the ambiguous attitude of its upper
hierarchy towards the regime until the mid-1970s. Andrzej
Korbonski, for instance, notices that “from the mid-1950s to the
mid-1970s, the policy of the [Polish Catholic] Church was focused
primarily on safeguarding its own position vis-à-vis the government.”
In Korbonski’s opinion, the involvement of the Catholic Church in
political dissent after 1976 was due to the increased political activism
among the younger clergy.221
A second element in the analysis of the needs of a religious
organization is its dispersion: the greater the interaction of the religious
organization with external organizations, the greater its ability to
escape regime’s capacity of controlling it. The most obvious case is
that of Catholics, but also, to some extent, of the Muslims or the
V. C. Chrypinski, “Romania” in Stuart Mews, ed., Religion in Politics: A
World Guide (Harlow, Essex: Longman, 1989), 228. See also Shafir, Romania:
Politics, Economics and Society, 151.
221
Andrzej Korbonski, “Dissent in Poland, 1956–1976,” in Jane Leftwich
Curry, ed., Dissent in Eastern Europe (New York: Praeger, 1983), 32.
220
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
367
neo-Protestants in Eastern Europe. Therefore, as far as the dispersion
factor is concerned, the autocephalous Orthodox Church was more
vulnerable to pressure by the communist regime in comparison with
the Catholic Church. In the case of the Polish Catholic Church, for
instance, its affiliation with an external ecclesiastical center, i.e. the
Vatican, led to increasing difficulties for the regime to control its
activity.222 Furthermore, one should not forget that an external
conjunctural factor, i.e. the unexpected election of Cardinal Karol
Wojtyla of Poland as the first non-Italian pope since 1522,
contributed immensely to the consolidation of the authority of the
Polish Catholic Church.
The symbolic resources of a religious organization contribute to its
capacity to resist in face of an authoritarian regime, if that
organization decides to do so. Moreover, when an organized religion
decides to confront the secular authorities, an increase in the symbolic
resources of the respective denomination usually leads to an increase
in its defiance towards the regime. Therefore, the election of Cardinal
Wojtyla to the papacy in 1978 – he assumed the papal throne as John
Paul II, as well as the tragic fate of the pro-Solidarity priest Jerzy
Popieluszko – who was assassinated by the Polish secret police in
1984, increased tremendously the symbolic resources of the Polish
Catholic Church. In the case of the ROC, its symbolic capital was
subject to continuous erosion during the communist period in spite of
the fact that, traditionally, ROC was perceived at both elite and
community levels as a repository of the most profound “national” values.
Nevertheless, due to its size, dispersion and operational ideology
ROC was forced to become subservient to the communist regime.
Such an institutional strategy ensured the survival of the ROC during
the years of Stalinist terror, but its subservient attitude towards the
powers that be during the 1980s did not contribute to preserving,
not to speak of increasing, its symbolic capital. Again, the most
222
Ramet, Cross and Commissar, 193–94.
368
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
difficult thing is to explain Orthodox Church’s attitude towards the
demolition of churches in Bucharest. As mentioned above, there were
actually no protests from the top of Church’s hierarchy during the
1980s, when eighteen churches were demolished in Bucharest as part
of Ceauşescu’s systematization plan. Apart from Father Gheorghe
Calciu, who protested against the demolitions in a series of sermons
delivered at the Radu Vodă Church in Bucharest, few other clergymen
protested against regime’s policy towards the ROC.223 In fact, during
the 1980s, ROC did not engage in any action that could hamper the
erosion of its symbolic resources. This led not so much to a decrease
in ROC’s capacity to resist the involvement of the regime in its affairs,
a situation that ROC could not avoid anyway, but to a profound
alienation of many believers of Orthodox faith.
Finally, another element of major importance for the present
analysis is the operational ideology of a given religious organization. In
terms of operational ideology, the Orthodox Church, similar to other
traditional denominations, is less oriented towards proselytization. As
a consequence, during the 1980s, in the conditions of deep economic
crisis and increased moral, as well as spiritual, confusion, the neoProtestant cults (especially the Baptists) – whose operational ideology
focuses on proselytization – experienced a rapid growth in numbers.
According to a 1986 estimate, there were approximately 200,000
Baptists, 200,000 Pentecostals and 45,000 Plymouth Brethren in
Romania. For all these neo-Protestant denominations, the estimated
growth rate was about 20,000 new converts a year, with most converts
coming from the Orthodox Church.224
Father Calciu (b. 1927) was arrested on 10 May 1979 and sentenced to ten
years in prison. Due to international pressures, he was released from prison in 1984
and immigrated to the United States in 1985. Deletant, Ceauşescu and the Securitate,
231–32. For Father Calciu’s sermons see Preot Gheorghe Calciu, Şapte cuvinte
către tineri (Seven words to the young people) (Bucharest: Editura Anastasia, 1996),
21–80.
224
Ramet, Cross and Commissar, 160–61.
223
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
369
To sum up, due to its significant size, ROC was compelled to
devise a strategy of survival under the communist regime. Since ROC
is autocephalous, that is, does not depend on an external center of
ecclesiastical power, its very existence depends on the Romanian state.
Such a situation led, during the communist years, to a close
collaboration between ROC and the communist regime, which in
the first instance permitted the survival of the ROC during the years
of terror that accompanied the communist takeover. At the same
time, in the conditions of the profound economic, social and moral
crisis of the 1980s, the collaboration of the ROC with the communist
regime led to a rapid erosion of its symbolic capital and to an increased
alienation of numerous Orthodox believers. Since the operational
ideology of the ROC is not oriented towards proselytization, neoprotestant denominations spread rapidly during the 1980s. Many of
the new converts, the available statistics suggest, were mostly former
believers of Orthodox faith. Many of those who left ROC did this
in their quest for spiritual guidance, others because membership in
such denominations proved to ease the immigration to the United
States. Nevertheless, the sad conclusion is that ROC and its hierarchy
contributed little to the final demise of the Romanian communism.
A comprehensive discussion on the alleged influence of the
Orthodox faith on the submissive character of the Orthodox believers,
which has to concentrate on religion, would go much beyond the
scope of this chapter. It should be mentioned, however, that many
Western authors have pointed out, often shallowly, to the Orthodox
faith as being responsible for the lack of public protest against the
Ceauşescu regime. True, the Orthodox Church often preached
submission to the secular authority. At the same time, one should
not neglect the profound transformations the Romanian society
underwent under communism. Until the early 1980s, as shown
above, the regime had something to offer to the Romanian society
at large: a modest improvement of the living standards. Religion, as
Trond Gilberg puts it, “teaches the rules of interaction among
individuals and the collectivities they form and ultimately establishes
370
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
behavior towards authority, both secular and spiritual.”225
Consequently, as long as large segments of the Romanian society still
credited the regime for the post-1964 social and economic
achievements, ROC’s strategy to accommodate with the regime was
not perceived as wrong or immoral.
Things, however, changed drastically in the conditions of the deep
crisis of the 1980s. Due to electric power shortages and erratic raw
materials supply, numerous state enterprises had to work on Sundays
or traditional feasts. This also alienated a majority of the workers, of
which, many were in fact commuting villagers sticking to the
tradition. As a consequence, a syndrome, identified by Verdery as
“etatization of time,” affected large segments of Romania’s
population. “Etatization of time” refers to the “ways in which the
Romanian State seized time by compelling people’s bodies into
particular activities.”226 Verdery’s argument is important for the
present analysis especially because it is related to the formalistic and
ritualistic character of Orthodoxy. Simply put, “etatization of time”
contributed, somehow obliquely, to the final demise of the regime.
Traditional Orthodoxy, Verdery argues, is characterized by rhythms
of worship and by the observance of saints’ days. By striving to create
the new “socialist” man, however, the communist state altered the
traditional religious rhythms. “In contrast with the religious rhythms
just mentioned – Verdery states – the identity of the new socialist
man was to be marked by non-observance of a fixed holy day, his
day(s) of leisure distributed at random across the week.”227 Thus,
work on Sundays – which also affected Easter, on Orthodox saints’
days or on Christmas day was largely opposed by workers, peasant225
Trond Gilberg, Nationalism and Communism in Romania: The Rise and Fall
of Ceausescu’s Personal Dictatorship (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), 3.
226
Katherine Verdery, What Was Socialism, and What Comes Next? (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1996), 40.
227
Verdery, What Was Socialism, and What Comes Next? 53–54.
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
371
workers and peasants alike. Very often, and especially among peasants
and peasant-workers, the main argument was that work performed
on such days would bring misfortune and calamities.228
It was an additional element that originated in the 1980s, which, as
far as the Orthodox faith is concerned, contributed to the final demise
of the Romanian communism. As part of Ceauşescu’s systematization
plan, many Orthodox churches were torn down in Bucharest. For many
believers, this was a sign of Ceauşescu’s insanity. However, the lack of
protest from the part of the ROC against the demolition, as well as
against the relocation of major churches – which were moved from their
central and highly symbolic locations to insignificant positions behind
high-rise blocks of flats – angered a majority of the Orthodox believers.
Furthermore, of the eighteen churches razed to the ground in Bucharest,
many were much more than small parish churches. Due to the more
formalistic and ritualistic character of the Orthodoxy, churches are seen
as repositories of faith and identity and therefore they are key elements
in preserving the memory of the nation. A witness account that speaks
of the 1987 demolition of the Sfânta Vineri Church – a major church
in downtown Bucharest – is telling in this respect:
The place was filled with people, the way I haven’t seen either before
or after, on any occasion…. It was a silent crowd, nobody talked, nobody
moved, but people kept coming, appearing as if from thin air…. There
were lots of people with candles in their hand; they must have brought
them from home. They were whispering that a soldiers’ unit had been
brought, but they refused to pull down and shoot when they had been
ordered to take the firing position, because the parish priest holding the
Cross in his hand had come out in front of the church with some
students from the faculty of Theology.229
Ibid., 54.
Martor, 51–52. For more on the importance of the Sf. Vineri Church as a
historic monument (it was built in 1644–1645 and rebuilt in 1839) see Gheorghe
Leahu, Bucureştiul dispărut (Vanished Bucharest) (Bucharest: Editura Arta Grafică,
1995), 85.
228
229
372
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
Since ritual is a key element of Orthodoxy, destruction of churches
was perceived by a large majority of the population as an attack on
the Orthodox faith itself. At that point, the submissive attitude of
the Orthodox Church towards the regime alienated a large majority
of the Orthodox believers who kept their faith but felt betrayed by
the ROC, which was seen as a tool in the hands of the regime. The
silent majority of the Orthodox believers, often sticking uncritically
to the ritual and paying sometimes more attention to the feasts
traditionally associated with religious celebrations than to the main
tenets of the Orthodox faith, developed a quiet and anti-political
form of opposition to the regime. Such a quiet, but nonetheless
powerful, form of opposition contributed massively to the emergence
of the short-lived sentiment of solidarity among the revolted masses
in December 1989 that determined the collapse of the communist
regime in Romania.
the military under the Ceauşescu regime
Systematically, the post-1989 opinion polls have indicated that
Romania’s population has confidence in two institutions: the Church
and the Army. While the Romanian Orthodox Church was criticized
for its subservience to the RCP, the army was blamed for the way in
which it carried out the repression of the revolutionaries in Timişoara
(17/18 December) and Bucharest (21/22 December). At the same
time, a majority of the authors who focused on the 1989 Revolution
in Romania agree that the moment when the army fraternized with
the revolutionary was a key, perhaps the key, moment of the
revolution. On 22 December 1989, the withdrawal of the army from
the Palace Square in Bucharest signaled that the Ceauşescu regime
was over. Consequently, this section addresses the issue of the
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
373
relationship between the RCP and the army in order to provide an
explanation for the way in which this particular institution and its
leadership reacted to the events of December 1989. Nevertheless, a
brief historical overview of the organization and activity of the military
under the communist rule would help one understand better how
this institution “thought” during the 1989 revolution and especially
during the period 16–22 December 1989. The events unfolded
rapidly from the moment when protests sparked in the city of
Timişoara on 16 December to the moment when Ceauşescu’s
helicopter left the upper platform of the CC building, at 1208 hours
on 22 December 1989. The actors – soldiers and officers alike –
changed their behavior over a short time span. As already noted, the
violent nature of the 1989 revolution has to do with the main features
of the regime political culture, i.e. monolithism and emancipation.
Thus, the army was ordered to shoot to kill and the confusion,
misinformation and indoctrination that characterized the military in
general made them obey the order. Consequently, during the period
16–22 December 1989 protesters were arrested, injured and many
of them killed. It is the purpose of this chapter to explain, at least
partially, why.
romania
a “dissident voice” within the warsaw treaty organization?
Romania was a founding member of the Warsaw Treaty Organization
(WTO), the communist military alliance established on 14 May
1955.230 Three years later, the Soviets decided to withdraw their
troops stationed in Romania. The event was truly important, since
For the complete text of the treaty see Constantin Olteanu, România – O
voce distinctă în Tratatul de la Varşovia: Memorii, 1980–1985 (Romania – A distinct
voice within the Warsaw Treaty Organization: Memoirs, 1980–1985 (Bucharest:
Editura Aldo, 1999), 225–27.
230
374
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
it opened the way towards the “national line” of the Romanian
communists, a fact fully acknowledged at the time by GheorghiuDej and his men. Consequently, they saluted the event with humble
and reassuring speeches. The Presidium of the Romanian Grand
National Assembly issued a decree by which numerous Soviet officers
were awarded Romanian decorations. Moreover, the entire effective
of the Soviet troops stationed in Romania was awarded the
“Liberation from the Fascist Yoke” medal. Throughout the country,
official banquets celebrated the Romanian – Soviet friendship while
crowds were summoned to the railway stations to present flowers
and greet the departing Soviet troops.231 The population was content
to see the departure of the Soviets. The RWP leadership, however,
had all the reasons to be happy: the withdrawal of the Soviet troops
certified the victory of Gheorghiu-Dej’s anti-de-Stalinization
strategy.232 The inner circle of power established in interwar
Romania’s prisons, led by Gheorghiu-Dej himself, had managed to
stay in power in spite of Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization campaign.
The withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Romania in July 1958 was
also reflected by the changes that occurred within the military
profession. The “national line” of the RCP led to a de-Sovietization
Ioan Scurtu, “Introductory Study” to idem, România: Retragerea trupelor
sovietice, 1958 (Romania: The withdrawal of the Soviet troops, 1958) (Bucharest:
Editura didactică şi pedagogică, 1996), 49.
232
See Scrisoarea lui N. S. Hruşciov, prim-secretar al C.C. al P.C.U.S., adresată
C.C. al P.M.R. cu privire la retragerea trupelor sovietice de pe teritoriul României, 17
aprilie 1958 (Letter of N. S. Khrushchev, First-Secretary of the CC of the CPSU,
addressed to the CC of the RWP concerning the withdrawal of the Soviet troops
from Romania’s territory, 17 April 1958) and Scrisoarea de răspuns a lui Gheorghe
Gheorghiu-Dej, prim-secretar al C.C. al P.M.R. adresată C.C. al P.C.U.S., prin care
se exprimă adeziunea la propunerea Uniunii Sovietice de a-şi retrage trupele din
România (Letter of reply of Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, First-Secretary of the CC
of the RWP, addressed to the CC of the CPSU, by which is expressed adhesion to
the Soviet Union’s proposal to withdraw its troops from Romania), in Ioan Scurtu,
ed., The withdrawal of the Soviet troops, 1958, 273–74 and 274–75 respectively.
231
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
375
of the army, which was called to support the independent path chosen
by communist Romania. It is interesting that in his memoirs
Khrushchev blames Maurer for Romania’s change of attitude towards
the Soviet Union:
After Gheorghiu-Dej’s death [March 1965] we preserved the outward
appearance of the same comradely politeness in our relations, but it
began to feel artificial. I think Comrade Maurer was to blame for that.
Romania wanted to have autonomy for its armed forces. It wanted to
be independent from the other Warsaw Pact countries. We realized this
for the first time when Romania refused to buy arms from
Czechoslovakia in accordance with the pact’s procurement plans.233
Nevertheless, it was only after the Soviet-led WTO intervention
in Czechoslovakia, during the night of 20/21 August 1968, that
Romania changed significantly its attitude towards the WTO.
According to military historians, it was Ceauşescu’s coming to power
that consolidated the military potential of Romania. The following
measures taken by the Ceauşescu regime are seen as particularly
important: (1) the adoption of a new military doctrine based on the
principle of defending the country through the participation of the
entire population: the entire people’s war; (2) the creation of the
Patriotic Guards to serve such a doctrine; (3) the revitalization of the
national military industry; and (4) the gradual detachment from
WTO’s plans of “military integration.”234
Ceauşescu capitalized enormously from the August 1968 “balcony
scene:” it was Ceauşescu’s “charismatic moment” and the army
reacted similarly to the rest of the population by supporting the
supreme leader of the RCP. In the aftermath of the 1968 invasion
of Czechoslovakia, Romania’s relations with the WTO changed.
Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes (Boston:
Little, Brown and Company, 1990), 112–13.
234
Codrescu, ed., The Romanian army in the 1989 Revolution, 36.
233
376
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
Although it continued to be part of the WTO, beginning in 1968
Romania put an end to its participation with troops to the military
maneuvers organized on the territory of other WTO member states.
At the same time, beginning in the same year 1968 Romania ceased
to organize on its territory military maneuvers that incurred the
presence of WTO troops. In addition, from 1968 onwards Romania
denied the WTO troops and aircraft the transit of its territory and,
respectively, airspace.235 Nevertheless, Constantin Olteanu, a former
Minister of National Defense under Ceauşescu (March 1980 –
December 1985) and a staunch supporter of RCP’s independent line,
has criticized the fact that Romania was not allowed to take part in
the WTO joint military exercises. In Olteanu’s opinion, such exercises
would have contributed to a better preparation of the Romanian
army, which was in his opinion denied the opportunity to take part
in complex maneuvers.236
Ceauşescu’s independent policies also envisaged an increasingly
independent stance towards the Soviet Union in terms of
acquisition of military equipment. (A similar policy determined the
acquisition of the Canadian CANDU-type nuclear power plant
instead of a Soviet model.) Consequently, sustained efforts were
made to produce in Romania a large part of the necessary military
equipment. Such a decision, however, incurred huge costs: new
research institutes were established and the specialized enterprises
were enlarged and equipped with relative updated machinery. A
post-1989 evaluation indicates that the infantry equipment was
overwhelmingly produced in Romania. This kind of equipment
included: handguns, sub-machineguns, machineguns, semiautomatic rifles and the respective ammunition. As for artillery,
there were produced cannons and field guns (caliber 76 to 152
mm), launchers of unguided missiles with 21 and 40 tubes, antitank
235
236
Olteanu, Romania: A distinct voice within the Warsaw Treaty Organization, 36.
Ibid.
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
377
missiles, as well certain types of antiaircraft weapons: machineguns,
pieces of artillery, and missiles.237
A major problem was to supply the army with the necessary means
of transport, that is, light vehicles and trucks, as well as armored
transporters and tanks. General Tiberiu Urdăreanu argues that a first
phase in the modernization of the Romanian army was initiated in
1953. At the time, however, the military equipment was
overwhelmingly imported from the USSR. Slowly, the domestic
production of automobiles and trucks that could be used by the
military was started. The production of a light four-wheel drive
vehicle – the IMS 57 –began in the small town of Cîmpulung Muscel.
The first 4 tons domestically produced truck – the SR 101 – left the
production line at the Steagul Roşu (Red Flag) truck factory in
Braşov. Nevertheless, Urdăreanu argues, the lack of all-wheel drive
trucks seriously hampered the proper development of the army
transport units.238 After 1968, a relative competitive amphibious
armored transporter, available in three versions, was fabricated at the
Moreni mechanical enterprise but the project took 10–12 years to
develop.239 In addition, light vehicles and heavy trucks, as well as two
types of tractors on continuous chain treads for military use were
eventually produced. Sustained efforts were made to design and
produce a Romanian tank able to replace the outdated Soviet tank
T-34 the Romanian army was equipped with. In this respect, until
1989 a medium-size tank, TR-100, was produced and a functional
model of a more advanced version, TR-125, was devised.240
Communist Romania also produced military helicopters under a
French license and a project to build a military subsonic fighter,
Olteanu, Romania: A distinct voice within the Warsaw Treaty Organization, 46.
Tiberiu Urdăreanu, 1989 – Martor şi participant (1989 – Witness and
participant) (Bucharest: Editura Militară, 1996), 20.
239
Ibid.
240
Olteanu, Romania: A distinct voice within the Warsaw Treaty Organization, 46.
237
238
378
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
IAR-93, in collaboration with Yugoslavia was well under way in
1989. 241 More complex pieces of equipment such as ships,
radiolocation instruments, as well as certain types of helicopters
and aircraft (fighters and bombers), were imported from the
USSR.
Although Romania produced a wide range of military equipment,
the reliability of that equipment was seriously questionable.
Obviously, Romania did not possess the economic means to support
the domestic production of such a variety of weapons. The task of
developing new types of weapons became even more strenuous during
the 1980s. During the interval 1982–1989, the budget share allotted
to defense was reduced from 4.92 percent to 2.77 percent, which in
terms of the share of the GDP dedicated to defense meant a reduction
from 1.79 percent in 1982 to 1.23 percent in 1989.242 Furthermore,
the structure of the imports of components and spare parts was
restrictive: 98 percent of the imports had to be contracted with
communist countries and only 2 percent of the imports were allowed
to be made from the West.243
Nevertheless, it was not the unreliable, domestically produced
equipment and the lack of complex maneuvers, jointly organized
with the WTO member states that frustrated deeply the military
Romania produced a light helicopter IAR-316–B (Alouette III) and a
medium-size helicopter IAR-330 Puma (adaptable to military purposes) whose
fabrication was initiated in 1975. As for the IAR-93 project, in 1972 it was
established the Craiova Aircraft Enterprise as part of the Yugoslav-Romanian
YUROM joint project. The first test flight of an IAR-93 fighter equipped with
a Viper-632–41 engine took place on 31 October 1974. After 1989, the YUROM
project was abandoned. For more on the development of the Romanian aviation
industry after 1968 see Nicolae Balotescu et al., Istoria aviaţiei române (History
of Romanian aviation) (Bucharest: Editura Ştiinţifică şi Enciclopedică, 1984),
407–65.
242
Codrescu, ed., The Romanian army in the 1989 Revolution, 38.
243
Urdăreanu, 1989 – Witness and participant, 22.
241
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
379
during the 1980s. True, such issues contributed to the general
sentiment of frustration. Nevertheless, the causes were much deeper:
from 1980 on the army entered a process of de-professionalization
incurred by the growing involvement of the troops in the economic
activities. Traditionally, the army was used as a source of cheap
workforce under the communist rule in Romania. For instance,
military transport units worked at the “V. I. Lenin” – Bicaz
hydroelectric power plant beginning in 1957. Furthermore, work in
agriculture was a constant obligation of the army. During the 1986–
1990 Five-Year Plan, out of the total irrigation works, the share of
the army amounted to 1.5 million hectares. Nevertheless, during the
1980s, the army was increasingly involved on the gigantic worksites
imagined by Ceauşescu: the Danube – Black Sea Canal and the
systematization of the capital city Bucharest. For instance, at the
Danube – Black Sea Canal, the transport units of the army hauled
around 140,000,000 tons of excavated soil and construction materials,
that is, about 18,000,000 tons per year. In terms of personnel, during
the period 1986–1989, an average of 100,000 troops were involved
in construction works only, apart from those involved in
agriculture.244 Another gigantic worksite was the so-called House of
the People in Bucharest, one of Ceauşescu’s follies.245 A participant
to the construction works, the then lieutenant Ioan Popa,
succeeded in recreating the atmosphere of the gigantic worksite
that was the House of the People in the 1980s in a splendid postIbid., 24, 26.
Architect Camil Roguski (b. 1925), the former director of the specialized
design and construction unit whose mission was to decorate Ceauşescu’s palaces,
affirms that there were architects Cezar Lăzărescu and Anca Petrescu who had the
idea to propose the project of a huge building to serve as a Palace of the Republic.
Ceauşescu liked the idea and developed it. For Roguski’s opinion, see Mirela Petcu
and Camil Roguski, Ceauşescu: Adevăruri din umbră – Convorbiri (Ceauşescu:
Hidden truths – Conversations) (Bucharest: Editura Evenimentul Românesc,
2001), 169–71.
244
245
380
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
1989 novel.246 The House of the People became one of the most
cherished dreams of the supreme leader of the RCP. The worksite
was visited on an almost daily basis and the pace imposed for the
construction work was unbearable. Working under such a pressure
was difficult to bear and many soldiers and officers were involved in
accidents at work. As Popa recalls, some of his fellows died in terrible
accidents or, unable to support the psychological pressure at work,
committed suicide.247 The army’s rapidly growing involvement in
economic activities during the 1980s had serious implications with
regard to the level of training of the military. Therefore, deprofessionalization and the declining prestige of the military
profession were important sources of frustration, especially among
the young officers. At the same time, the deep economic crisis
generated by Ceauşescu’s mistaken economic policies affected also
the military.
In the conditions of an acute economic crisis and a growing
frustration of the army officers with the regime, two high rank officers
– generals Ion Ioniţă and Nicolae Militaru – planned in October
1984 a military coup against the Ceauşescu regime. Again, the
information on the dissident nucleus within the military and their
conspiracy to overthrow Ceauşescu is scarce and contradictory.
Nevertheless, some declarations by Ion Iliescu, Silviu Brucan, and
General Nicolae Militaru shed some light on the issue. According to
Brucan, a first dissident nucleus emerged within the army around
generals Ion Ioniţă (Minister of National Defense between 1966 and
Popa’s book is remarkable for the way in which it reconstructs the
atmosphere around the House of the People and describes the inhuman pace of
the construction works. Also, the accurate analysis of the relationships between
the officers and their soldiers, as well as the description of the humiliation and the
deep frustration felt by the young army officers, are worth mentioning. See Ioan
Popa, Robi pe Uranus (Slaves on Uranus) (Bucharest: Editura Humanitas, 1992).
247
Popa, Slaves on Uranus, 10.
246
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
381
1976), Nicolae Militaru and Ştefan Kostyal. General Militaru
declared that a first plan to overthrow Ceauşescu was devised in the
mid-1970s by generals Ion Ioniţă and Ion Gheorghe.248 However,
Militaru argues, the conditions were not proper for a coup initiated
by the army because the societal response to such a coup was difficult
to estimate. In other words, the conspirators were not sure if the
population would revolt against the regime.
In the 1980s, the situation was totally different. The economic crisis
affected large segments of the population: people suffered from cold
and electric power cuts, while foodstuffs were increasingly difficult to
find on the market. In such conditions, a military coup against
Ceauşescu had more chances of being supported by the population.
Some details on the scenario of the military coup planned for October
1984 were published in a collective work.249 According to the mentioned
source, generals Ioniţă and Militaru planned to topple the regime during
Ceauşescu’s official visit to the Federal Republic of Germany.250 The
conspirators planned to arrest first Ceauşescu’s closest collaborators,
i.e. Emil Bobu, Ion Dincă, Tudor Postelnicu, Ion Coman and Ilie
Ceauşescu. According to the plan, the next step was to capture the
national radio and television with the support of the military
commanders of the Bucharest Military Garrison and launch an appeal
to the population to revolt against the rule of Ceauşescu. A division
of mechanized infantry, led by the general Dumitru Pletos, and an
armored division, led by the general Paul Keller, were supposed to
provide support for the new regime. In addition, the conspirators
would have been given access to an ammunition depot in the city of
Quoted in Perva and Roman, The mysteries of the Romanian revolution, 93.
Dinu C. Giurescu, ed., Romania’s history in data, 715–16.
250
Ceauşescu’s official visit to the FRG took place on 15–17 October 1984; he
was received by President Richard von Weizsacker and Chancellor Helmuth Kohl.
See Cristina Păiuşan, Narcis Dorin Ion, and Mihai Retegan, Regimul comunist din
România: O cronologie politică, 1945–1989 (The communist regime in Romania: A
political chronology, 1945–1989) (Bucharest: Editura Tritonic, 2002), 303.
248
249
382
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
Tîrgovişte guarded by the troops of lieutenant-colonel Ion Suceavă.
The complot, however, was discovered due the betrayal of two
generals who knew about a part of the plan. As for the conspirators,
they did not share the same fate. General Ioniţă died suspiciously of
cancer three years after (1987). General Kostyal was arrested and
forcibly moved to the small city of Curtea de Argeş. General Militaru
was also marginalized. Ion Iliescu has confirmed that a dissident
nucleus existed within the military. Iliescu conceded that he held
some secret meetings with members of that group and mentioned
the names of the generals Ioniţă and Militaru, as well as the name of
Virgil Măgureanu. At the same time, Iliescu has argued that Militaru’s
plan to overthrow the regime during Ceauşescu’s absence from
Romania seemed unrealistic to him.251 After 1989, both Militaru and
Măgureanu held important positions in the state apparatus: Militaru
as Minister of Defense and Măgureanu as head of the Romanian
Intelligence Service.252 To conclude, this episode of dissent, although
did not bear fruit in the sense of overthrowing or at least weakening
the regime, showed that frustration with the Ceauşescu regime was
growing within the military.
the army and the revolution
From repression to switch of arms
The year 1989 contributed even more to the growing frustration
within the military. On 23 August 1989, with the occasion of the
celebration of Romania’s national day, 2,152 officers were supposed
to be promoted in rank. Such a measure could be taken once a year
and only by the president of the Republic or by the Prime Minister.
Iliescu, The lived revolution, 33–37.
The Petre Roman government, 26 December 1989 – 27 June 1990. See
Neagoe, A history of Romania’s governments, 1859–1995, 247.
251
252
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
383
Since promotions in rank had not been made for some time, the
respective officers were waiting with anxiety the promised promotion
of 23 August.253 In the end, the promotion did not take place and
thus a large number of officers felt deprived, which added to the
overall frustration felt by numerous officers of the Romanian army.254
To sum up, in December 1989, the general perception within the
military profession was that the army was increasingly deprofessionalized due to the increasing involvement in economic
activities, especially in agriculture and construction works. Many felt
that their profession was despised and its importance minimized.
Furthermore, the economic crisis did not spare those wearing a
military uniform. In general, army officers had some possibilities to
buy foodstuffs at small stores located within their units, but the supply
was erratic and the quantities insufficient. On top of this, the fact
that over two thousands officers were denied the promotion in rank
added heavily to both the relative and absolute frustration felt by the
military. In this respect, the relative frustration originated by the
comparison with the troops belonging to the Ministry of Internal
Affairs, which in general were not obliged to work in agriculture or
constructions.255 As for absolute frustration, it was related to the
impossibility to provide for one’s family. Thus, in early December 1989,
a majority of the population, including the military, was deeply frustrated
with the regime and hoped for a change. Against this background,
the revolution sparked in Timişoara on 16 December 1989.
Moreover, as historian Florin Constantiniu has stated in a discussion with
the present author, some of the officers were told that their promotion was sure so
that they borrowed money and made preparations for celebrating the event with
their family, friends and colleagues.
254
Codrescu, ed., The Romanian army in the 1989 Revolution, 39 and
Urdăreanu, 1989 – Witness and participant, 33–34.
255
Urdăreanu, 1989 – Witness and participant, 33.
253
384
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
As shown above, the troops belonging to the Ministry of Internal
Affairs attempted initially at suppressing the revolt. The troops were
overwhelmed and therefore, at 2045 hours on 16 December 1989,
Radu Bălan, the first secretary of the Timiş County, asked the
lieutenant-colonel Constantin Zeca to provide military troops and
armored vehicles to patrol the city and re-establish order. At 2130
hours, the Ministry of National Defense, General Vasile Milea,
ordered Zeca to send into the city five patrols of ten soldiers each, in
total 50 troops. Subsequently, there were sent other ten patrols,
comprising 100 soldiers. An antiaircraft unit led by Colonel
Constantin Rotaru was ordered to provide another nine patrols (90
soldiers). The military patrols went into Timişoara’s downtown and
operated arrests. According to military sources, the patrols were
withdrawn on 17 December around 0400 hours.256
Meanwhile, in Bucharest, the Party leadership organized an
extraordinary meeting of the Executive Political Committee of the
RCP chaired by Ceauşescu himself. After the meeting, a delegation
composed of generals from the Ministry of National Defense and
the Ministry of Internal Affairs was ordered to fly to Timişoara. From
the part of the military, the delegation was composed of: (1) Generalmajor Ştefan Guşă; (2) General-lieutenant Victor Atanasie
Stănculescu; (3) General-lieutenant Mihai Chiţac; (4) General-major
Florea Cârneanu; and (5) Colonel Gheorghe Radu.257
The protests in Timişoara radicalized during the day of 17
December 1989. As a consequence, the involvement of the military
increased. In many respects, the moment when the army was asked
to patrol the streets, first to maintain order and then to repress the
revolted crowds in Timişoara and subsequently in Bucharest was the
moment when the regime was doomed. An army of conscripts, deprofessionalized and humiliated had little chances to identify itself
256
257
Codrescu, ed., The Romanian army in the 1989 Revolution, 56.
Codrescu, ed., The Romanian army in the 1989 Revolution, 50.
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
385
with the regime. Nevertheless, one should not forget that beginning
with the moment when the partial alarm – password “Radu cel
Frumos” – was ordered on 17 December 1989 at 1800 hours, the
army, officers and soldiers alike, was practically cut off from the
outside world. From that moment on, the information the
commanders of military units received came only through official
channels. Consequently, the first impression of many officers was
that Romania was indeed faced with a foreign military intervention,
supported by terrorist activities from within, aimed at provoking the
secession of the province of Transylvania from Romania.258 Therefore,
when analyzing the reaction of the troops in the face of revolted
crowds and isolated, violent small groups, one should also consider
that many officers and soldiers feared the worst.
The shooting in Timişoara started during the night of 17/18
December 1989. In general, sources from the military and the
Ministry of Internal Affairs indicate – rather obliquely – to groups
of violent young people who spoke Romanian with difficulty as
being at the origin of violence. In this respect, references abound.
Such affirmations point towards a conspiracy meant to nurture
unrest and provoke a popular revolt. At the same time, this kind of
information is almost impossible to verify since not a single person
involved in those events was brought to justice. Furthermore,
according to the sources cited above, a similar scenario, that is, small,
determined, violent and well-trained groups of young people,
suspiciously synchronized in their actions was repeated in all the
cities and towns where protests occurred before 22 December 1989.
The identity of those who were part of those groups remains a
mystery. It is striking that none of the most comprehensive works
on the involvement of the army and the Ministry of Internal Affairs
in the events of 1989 provides any precise information about the
258
Ibid., 31.
386
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
individuals who allegedly engaged in diversions in the initial phase
of the revolution.259
At the same time, when assessing the ability of many
demonstrators to fight against the intervention troops with
improvised means one should consider that many segments of the
population had been exposed to a certain degree of military training.
This was the result of the military doctrine devised under the
Ceauşescu regime, which was based on the principle of a “war fought
by the entire people.” According to such a doctrine, all localities,
cities, towns, communes, villages, as well as industrial units such as
factories and enterprises were supposed to become “citadels of work,
struggle and defense.” A consequence of Ceauşescu’s military doctrine
was that a majority of the population was exposed to military training
and was familiar with the handling of a usual Kalashnikov-type submachine gun. Many witness accounts speak not only of
demonstrators’ knowledge in handling military equipment, but also
of their ability to prepare Molotov cocktails and to immobilize
armored vehicles and tanks. In this respect, one hypothesis is
conspicuously absent: the fact that in communist Romania a majority
of the young men and, to a lesser extent, women underwent a sort
of military service. One should also notice that in communist
Romania the military service was compulsory. This author, for
instance, after taking the admission exam at the polytechnic institute
in Bucharest, served for nine months in the army and only after began
his university studies. It was also a possibility to serve only six months,
but after the completion of university studies. Those who did not
pursue university studies were obliged to serve in the army for sixteen
months. No matter how long one served in the army it was obvious
For the time being, the most minute analyses of the participation of the
army and the troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs are Codrescu, ed., The
Romanian army in the 1989 Revolution and, respectively, Pitulescu, ed., The Ministry
of Internal Affairs in December 1989.
259
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
387
that they would acquire a certain familiarity with the military
equipment. Thus, those who served in tank or mechanized infantry
units were more or less familiar with the armored vehicles and the
ways to immobilize them with rather simple means. This author, for
instance, who served in an antiaircraft artillery battalion, is familiar
with the antiaircraft cannon caliber 57 mm. Colleagues who served
in tank units do know more about the tanks that were used by the
military in the late 1980s. Similarly, many of those who served in
mechanized infantry units are able to find and exploit the weak points
of a TAB, that is, the Armored Auto Transporter (Transportor Auto
Blindat) which was used to disperse the revolutionaries in Timişoara
and Bucharest. For instance, a participant to the revolution in
Timişoara, Traian Orban, a veterinary by profession, describes the
way he participated to the immobilization of a tank in Timişoara,
on 17 December:
For a while, a tank stopped nearby a tram stop and was immediately
surrounded by young people who were trying to block it. A few
youngsters wanted to introduce a metal bar and other objects between
the caterpillar tracks. I helped them by introducing the tank’s pull rope
between its caterpillar tracks. The tank was blocked, but its turret rotated
threateningly in all directions. A boy was riding the tank’s barrel. I told
the youngsters to stuff the exhaust pipe with pieces of cloth, what they
did. The tank’s engine stopped and crowd cheered on.260
It seems that in their attempt to decipher the “mysteries” of the
1989 revolution many authors simply failed to notice the fact that
among the protesters there were numerous those who had some basic
information about the military equipment. At the same time, the
army recruits sent to suppress the popular revolt experienced the
events differently. Under psychological pressure, faced with violent
actions and unprepared for street fighting, the recruits were in a totally
260
Account by Traian Orban. See Mioc, The revolution in Timişoara, 44–46.
388
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
new, frightening situation. As historian Alin Ciupală – a then recruit
in Timişoara placed at the frontline – told the present author, the
situation on the streets was terribly tense and the recruits truly feared
the worst in face of the angered crowds of protesters. In such
moments, the young recruits became scared and it was up to each of
them to decide what to do: some did not shoot at all, some shot in
the air, others shot low while others, scared to death, shot to kill.
The then Corporal Nicu Marian, on duty during the night of 17/18
December 1989, recalls:
A group of 3–4 manifestants walked toward us. The four of us shouted
the warnings: “Freeze!” then “Freeze where you are!” and “Freeze or I
fire!” The three young men who were walking toward us did not obey
our orders and said that we did not possess real ammunition but only
exercise ammunition. After the warning ‘Freeze or I fire!’ all the four of
us shot a warning fire in the air. At that moment, other youngsters left
the column of protesters and advanced toward us. When the three young
men approached at ten meters, we shot low, at their legs.261
Army officers did the same. A witness account of the events of 17
December in Timişoara reads: “I saw an army officer getting out of
the garrison building, reaching under the mantle, producing a pistol
and starting shooting at the crowd. He also injured two soldiers.”262
Another witness, Elena Aparaschivei, confesses: “When the group of
soldiers arrived in the front of the block of flats, one of them, older
and wearing a moustache, projected the beam of an electric torch
toward us and then fired some shots at us. My husband was shot in
the breast and fell on his back.”263
In many respects, the situation repeated itself in Bucharest during
the night of 21–22 December 1989. In Bucharest, however, it took
Ibid., 78.
Iordan Florea’s account on the death of his son Iordan Silviu Sebastian.
Mioc, The revolution in Timişoara, 127.
263
Ibid., 85.
261
262
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
389
just one night for the protest to generalize. Furthermore, the suicide
of General Vasile Milea on 22 December in the morning precipitated
the decision of many military commanders to switch sides. (Until new
information becomes available one is compelled to stick to the official
version provided by the military, which is also the most documented
for the moment.) A detailed event-centered account of the events in
Bucharest is provided above. However, one should note that at the
moment when the crowds entered the Palace Square in Bucharest not
a single fire was shot at the revolutionaries. According to military
experts, the firepower of a Kalashnikov sub-machine gun, within a 300
meters range, is devastating. As a former Securitate officer told the
present author, only someone who did not serve in the army could
underestimate the effect a single platoon equipped with usual
Kalashnikovs and defensive grenades would have had on a square
packed with people. Such an assertion is supported by one of
Ceauşescu’s architects, Camil Roguski, who recalls a discussion with
an army colonel in charge with guarding the building of the CC of the
RCP. The respective colonel told Roguski that around 180 officers –
each of them equipped with two submachine guns and 10,000 rounds
of ammunition – guarded the CC building. “In five minutes – the
colonel affirmed – we could terminate the persons in the [Palace] Square
and we would still have ammunition for another two squares.”264
To sum up, the process of fraternization between the army and
protesters was not as smooth as the official sources indicate. A great
deal of confusion, lack of training, fear, frustration, and occasionally
sheer stupidity made such a process difficult. Some officers and
soldiers joined a revolution, which at the time not many believed
that it would succeed.265 Such people really took a major risk and
Petcu and Roguski, Ceauşescu: Hidden truths, 191.
In this respect, the account of Gabriel Mitroi, an officer on duty on the
military airfield Giarmata (nearby Timişoara) in December 1989 is extremely
telling. See Timişoara 16–22 Decembrie 1989, 179–222.
264
265
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natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
their moral choice should be praised. Others, although did not join
the revolution, preferred to wait and see. Their stance also favored
the collapse of the regime, because their passivity contributed in
avoiding a massacre in Timişoara, Bucharest and many other cities
in Romania. Ultimately, it was due to the humiliation and deprofessionalization experienced by many members of the military
during the 1980s that the fraternization of the army with the
protesters became possible in December 1989.
the securitate
The Securitate epitomized the systematic infringement of the basic
human rights perpetrated by the communist regime in Romania.
Although the research on the Securitate has gained momentum in
Romania especially during the period 2005–2010, numerous
questions related to the involvement of the Securitate in the
December 1989 events have remained unanswered to this day. One
should not forget that the Securitate was officially dismantled
immediately after the regime change through the Decree-law no. 4
of 26 December 1989 issued by the Council of the National Salvation
Front (Consiliul Frontului Salvării Naţionale – CFSN).266 It took
See “Decret privind trecerea în componenţa Ministerului Apărării Naţionale
a Departamentului Securităţii Statului şi a altor organe din subordinea Ministerului
de Interne” (Decree regarding the transfer to the Minstry of National Defense of
the Department for State Security and other organs of the Minstry of Internal
Affairs) no. 4 of 26 December 1989; published in the Monitorul Oficial al
României (Official Bulletin of Romania) No. 0005 of 27 December 1989;
http://www.monitoruloficial.ro/mofnou/index.php?page=acts&action
=search&term=& nr =&date=&date_end=&pg=9753; accessed 14 November
2010.
266
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
391
however some ten years for the post-communist regime in Romania
to establish an official agency – the National Council for the Study
of the Securitate Archives (Consiliul Naţional pentru Studierea
Arhivelor Securităţii – CNSAS) in charge with administration of the
Securitate files. Nevertheless, in spite of the growing corpus of works
on the structure, methods and wrongdoings of the former Securitate,
not much has been brought to light with regard to the involvement
of the Securitate in the regime change of December 1989. This
section provides a brief account on the ongoing systematic research
of the Securitate archives and puts forward a series of issues related
to the implication of the Securitate in the 1989 regime change that
require further exploration.
Debates on the moral obligation of dealing with the wrongdoings
of the communist secret police – the infamous Securitate – gained
momentum after the first shift in power that occurred in postcommunist Romania in 1996. The former political prisoners played
a paramount role in pushing for a complex solution in dealing with
the crimes and abuses of the defunct communist regime, all the more
that they were prominent in all three “historical” parties mentioned
above, i.e. the National Peasant Party, National Liberal Party and the
Romanian Social-Democratic Party. In addition, the former political
prisoners organized themselves from the very days of the 1989 revolution
in an association of the survivors of the Romanian Gulag. The
Association of the Former Political Prisoners in Romania (Asociaţia
Foştilor Deţinuţi Politici din România – AFDPR) worked in close
association with the “historical” parties, especially with the National
Peasant Party, and other civil society organizations. At the same time,
the AFDPR promoted a specific agenda related to restitution for all
those who had been politically persecuted under communism.267 To
AFDPR was established on 2 January 1990, and, by the end of the year, it
enrolled 98,700 members. AFDPR was an exemplary case of self-organization of
interests, being the first group that succeeded in legalizing its existence and publicly
267
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the former political prisoners the process of communism meant not
only bringing the perpetrators to justice, but also restituting to the
victims their proper place in society by acknowledging the injustice
made to them by the communist regime.
From a legal point of view, one of greatest victories of the AFDPR
was the passing of the Law 187/1999 or the “Law regarding the access
to the personal file and the disclosure of the Securitate as political
police” by the Romanian Parliament in December 1999. Known to
everyone as the “Ticu Law” after its main proponent, former senator
of the National Peasant Party and president of AFDPR, the late
Constantin Ticu Dumitrescu (1928–2008), it was voted only after
years of heated debates and repeated modifications. From its very
title, one can see that the law is granting to Romanian citizens as well
as to present day foreign citizens that had been citizens of Romania
after 1945 the right to access their Securitate files. Furthermore, Law
187/1999 has created for the first time a legal framework for the
study of the Securitate archives by any citizen interested in assessing
“the political police activities of the former secret police in order to
offer to society as correct as possible a picture of the communist
period.”
In order to achieve such an ambitious goal, a new institution was
established, the National Council for the Study of the Securitate
Archives, which has been destined to take over the files of the former
secret police. The institution is led by a Collegium composed of
eleven persons. Of them, nine are nominated by the political parties
– in accordance with their representation in the Parliament, one is
advocating the interests of its members. The Decree-Law No. 118 of 1990 granted
special rights to former political prisoners, including medical care, and local
transport free of charge, subventions for medicines, limited free railroad transport,
etc. For the Decree-Law No. 118 regarding the rights of the persons politically
persecuted by the dictatorship established on 6 March 1945, see Monitorul Oficial
al României (Official Bulletin of Romania), No. 118, 18 April 1998, 5–7.
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
393
nominated by the President, and one by the Prime Minister.268 The
major function of CNSAS is to provide evidence for unmasking the
former employees (agents) and informal collaborators of the secret
police, and thus enabling lustration. In this respect, the Collegium
was empowered to check holders of, and candidates for, public offices
and assess if they were involved in the activities of “the Securitate as
political police.” The concept of “political police” (poliţie politică)
was defined by Law 187/1999 in order to apply lustration –
understood as conditioning the access to public offices on certificates
of morality based on the archives of the former secret police.
Romanian Parliament decided that the pivotal idea at the basis of
Law 187 has to be that of individual responsibility and by no means
that of collective guilt – based on a simple association with the
Securitate. Thus, the Romanian law focuses on individual deeds and
on proof “beyond any reasonable doubt” similar to the German
legislation, and not on the position the respective people occupied.
The Romanian law stipulated that political police included “all
those structures of the secret police created in order to establish and
maintain the communist totalitarian power, and to suppress and
restrict the fundamental human rights and liberties.” In short, this
law has been conceived to be as consistent as possible to the rule-oflaw principles. According to Article 3 of Law 187/1999, people
seeking, or occupying, public office must fill in a special form in
which they have to state if they were on not agents or collaborators
of the former communist secret police. Disqualification of persons
proven by CNSAS to have been agents or collaborators of the
Securitate occurs only if they did not acknowledge their position
within, or their collaboration with, the Securitate apparatus when
completing the above mentioned form. If collaboration is proven
The Law No. 187 of 7 December 1999 was published in Monitorul Oficial
al României (Official Bulletin of Romania), No. 603, 9 December 1999, 1–5. For
more on this institution, visit its website at www.cnsas.ro.
268
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and has not been acknowledged, the respective person is to be charged
with false statements provided in a public document. Nonetheless,
up to the year 2006, the application of Law 187/1999 proved to be
very difficult, and it may be argued that a major hindrance in this
respect was the lack of political will by the Constantinescu (1996–
2000) and the second Iliescu (2000–2004) regimes to push for the
transfer of the Securitate archives to the CNSAS. Moreover, the
verification of individuals based on what they did represents a difficult
operation that requires the work of many people over a very long
period of time. As compared to the Federal Agency for the
Administration of the Stasi Files (BStU), which employed some 3,300
people over the first fifteen years of its existence or the Polish Institute
of National Remembrance (IPN), which employs some 2,145 people,
the Romanian CNSAS has 300 posts provided in its structure of
personnel, of which only 245 are actually occupied.269
One can identify three stages in the ten-year long history of the
CNSAS. During the first stage, i.e. 2000–2005, CNSAS has been
confronted with major problems related to the transfer of the archives
of the former Securitate – hosted mainly by the Romanian
Intelligence Service (Serviciul Român de Informaţii – SRI); the Foreign
Intelligence Service (Serviciul de Informaţii Externe – SIE) and the
Ministry of National Defense (Ministerul Apărării Naţionale –
MapN) – to its archive. In fact, since its establishment in the year
2000, CNSAS has constantly struggled with the above mentioned
institutions over the custody of the documents produced by the
former Securitate. Over the period 2000–2005, such documents were
For more on the mission and structure of the official institutions in charge
with the files of the former communist secret police agencies in Bulgaria, Czech
Republic, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia see The
“European Network of Official Authorities in Charge of the Secret-Police Files:” A
Reader on their Legal Foundations, Structures and Activities, compiled, edited and
published by BStU (Berlin, 2009).
269
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
395
transferred to CNSAS very selectively. Nevertheless, after the general
elections of 2004, things changed tremendously.
The second stage of CNSAS activity was inaugurated in midDecember 2005, when SRI donated over 1 million files to CNSAS,
which had to inaugurate a new building for their preservation. A
Government Ordinance (No. 149 of 10 November 2005, extended
the application of the law for another six years under a new Collegium.
Also, the functioning of the CNSAS has been improved by
Government’s Ordinance No. 16 of 27 February 2006 and
Government’s Decision No. 731 of 7 June 2006.270 Furthermore,
over the period April-August 2006 a number of four decisions of
Romania’s Supreme Council of National Defense (Consiliul Suprem
de Apărare a Ţării – CSAT) have made possible the transfer to the
CNSAS archive of 1.555.905 files comprising 1.894.076 volumes,
which amount to some 24 km of archive. As a result, the activity of
the CNSAS has gained momentum. For instance, according to the
CNSAS Annual Activity Report 2006, during the year 2006 only the
institution has unmasked 270 informal collaborators of the Securitate,
which represents more than the number of informers unmasked during
the entire period 2000–2005. It may be thus argued that the activity
of CNSAS has taken momentum from early 2006 onwards and
consequently more and more public figures – from politicians to the
higher clergy and from all fields of activity, ranging from the judiciary
to the academia – were gradually disclosed as former collaborators.
At the same time, the insufficient personnel could not do wonders
with a huge archive that had to be simultaneously investigated and
put in order. Time and again, the media raised questions about the
destruction of relevant files after 1989. Indeed, the collaboration of
prominent politicians was revealed not by their personal files, which
Law 187/1999 underwent some modifications. In this respect, see Monitorul
Oficial al României (Official Bulletin of Romania), No. 182, 27 February 2006,
1–8. For the extension of the activity of CNSAS, see Monitorul Oficial al României
(Official Bulletin of Romania), No. 1008, 14 November 2005, 7–8.
270
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natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
were not preserved in many cases, but by the files of their victims, in
which evidence of collaboration (usually copies of informative notes)
was found. In other words, even though some files of former
collaborators are now missing, their informative notes can still be
found in the files of those on whom the respective individuals provided
information, so that the process of unmasking the acts of collaboration
is neither totally irrelevant nor useless.
The third stage in the activity of the CNSAS was inaugurated in
January 2008, when the Romanian Constitutional Court (Curtea
Constituţională a României – CCR) decided on several grounds that
the Law 187/1999 was in fact unconstitutional. The decision was highly
contested and commented as another attempt of the neo-communist
camp to stop a process that finally started to look promising.271 The
sole genuine problem though was the simultaneous function of
prosecutor and judge performed by the CNSAS Collegium, which was
empowered by the law of 1999 not only to search for proofs of
collaboration with the Securitate as “political police,” but also to
formulate a first judgment on the collaboration of the persons under
verification. Consequently, CNSAS functioned on a governmental
ordinance until November 2008, when a new law was passed.272 The
For an insightful analysis of the CCR decision see Corneliu-Liviu Popescu,
“Uzurparea de putere comisă de Curtea Constituţională în cazul cenzurii
dispoziţiilor legale privind deconspirarea poliţiei politice comuniste” (The
usurpation of authority by the Constitutional Court in the case of censoring the
legal dispositions regarding the unmasking of the communist political police), in
Noua Revistă de Drepturile Omului, Vol. 4, 1 (2008), 3–14.
272
Both the decision of the Constitutional Court regarding the nonconstitutionality of Law 187/1999 and the Governmental Ordinance of February
2008 that provided a legal basis for prolonging the activity of CNSAS were
published together in Monitorul Oficial al României (Official Bulletin of Romania),
No. 95, 6 February 2008, 2–8 and 9–10. A subsequent Governmental Ordinance
of March 2008 ensured the functioning of CNSAS until a new law was passed.
See Monitorul Oficial al României (Official Bulletin of Romania), No. 182, 10
March 2008, 2–10.
271
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
397
new legislation is though more restrictive than the previous one with
regard to disqualification, but it ultimately allows more transparency
in the process of unmasking former collaborators. As mentioned
above, the initial law was based on the concept of “political police,”
according to which an act of collaboration meant any denunciation
that implied an infringement of the rights guaranteed by the
communist Constitution. The new law defines the collaboration with
the Securitate as those acts that not only violated fundamental rights
of individuals, but also “denounced activities or attitudes adverse to
the communist state.”273 This principle of simultaneity – infringement
of fundamental rights and denunciation of anti-regime attitudes and
activities – obviously reduces the number of cases that can be brought
in front of the administrative court of justice on the grounds of
collaboration with the Securitate. In spite of the initial reservations
and criticism coming especially from civil society organizations, the
new legislation has unleashed a multifaceted process of unmasking
and exposing the repressive actions of the Securitate. For instance,
under the new legislation the number of informers whose real names
were communicated to the persons that accessed their personal files
increased from 610 in 2008 to 739 in 2009. Furthermore, the
number of cases brought in front of the administrative court of justice
in order to assess officially collaboration with the former communist
secret police by individuals has increased from 292 in 2008 to 560
in 2009.274 Furthermore, the public exposure of the agents (officers)
and informal collaborators of the Securitate has enhanced
For the text of the law that sanctioned the Governmental Ordinance of
March 2008 and which constitutes the current legal basis for the functioning of
the CNSAS see Monitorul Oficial al României (Official Bulletin of Romania),
No. 800, 28 November 2008, 1–4.
274
Data provided in the CNSAS Annual Report 2009. Details on the activity
of the CNSAS – related legislation, annual activity reports, research projects,
publications etc. – can be found on its institutional website at www.cnsas.ro.
273
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natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
tremendously the knowledge on the structure, methods and
wrongdoings of the communist secret police.275
The ongoing systematic research on the Securitate files, however,
has told us little about the involvement of the former communist secret
police in the December 1989 events. There are at least two reasons for
such a situation. First, information on the involvement of the Securitate
in the 1989 events might have been contained by some of the so-called
operative files related to the cases the Securitate operatives were working
on in December 1989. Such files were not closed and classified in the
Securitate archives and were among the first to be destroyed during
the days of the revolution by the Securitate personnel. Second, it is
very likely that important orders given to the Securitate operatives in
those days in December 1989 were verbal and not written, and thus
might never be found in written form in a Securitate file. In light of
the above, there is no wonder that numerous questions remained
unanswered to this day. There are at least three major issues that deserve
further examination that concern the implication of the Securitate in
the violent regime change in Romania in December 1989: (1) the
conspiracy scenario; (2) the bloody repression (17/18 December in
Timişoara and 21/22 December 1989 in Bucharest); and (3) the
mystery the so-called terrorists (22–25 December 1989).
See for instance: Securitatea: Structuri/Cadre. Obiective şi metode (The
Securitate: Structures/Cadres. Objectives and methods) vol. I (1948–1967); vol.
II (1967–1989), ed. by Florica Dobre with Florian Banu, Theodor Bărbulescu,
Camelia Duică, Liviu Ţăranu, Elis Neagoe-Pleşa, and Liviu Pleşa (Bucharest:
Editura Enciclopedică & CNSAS, 2006); Trupele de Securitate, 1949–1989 (The
Securitate troops, 1949–1989) ed. by Florica Dobre with Florian Banu, Camelia
Duică, Silviu B. Moldovan, and Liviu Ţăranu. Bucharest: Editura Nemira &
CNSAS, 2004); Arhivele Securităţii (Archives of the Securitate) Vol. 1 (Bucharest:
Editura Pro-Historia, 2002); Arhivele Securităţii (Archives of the Securitate) Vol. 2
(Bucharest: Editura Nemira, 2004); Arhivele Securităţii (Archives of the Securitate)
Vol. 3 (Bucharest: Editura Nemira, 2006); and Arhivele Securităţii (Archives of
the Securitate) Vol. 4 (Bucharest: Editura Enciclopedică, 2009).
275
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
399
The conspiracy scenario. As discussed above in Chapter 2 of this
book, many of those who reflected upon the 1989 regime change in
Romania have explained those violent events as the result of a
conspiracy. Such an interpretation was favored especially by former
Securitate officers that could thus justify the repressive measures taken
at the time by the Securitate against the protesters by arguing that
the secret police was simply defending the country against a
conspiracy involving major foreign secret services.276 For instance,
Filip Teodorescu, a former deputy of the head of the
counterintelligence section of the Securitate asserted in his book of
memoirs that the violent events of December 1989 were stirred from
outside the country, following an agreement between “West and
East,” i.e. between the United States and the Soviet Union.277 Niculae
Mavru, the former head of the Surveillance and Investigation Section
of the Timişoara branch of the Securitate, supports a similar version
insisting on the Soviet involvement.278 Alex Mihai Stoenescu features
prominently among the authors who consistently supported the thesis
of an international conspiracy that provoked the demise of the
Ceauşescu regime in 1989. In the book length interview realized by
Stoenescu with Virgil Măgureanu – the first director of the postcommunist Romanian Intelligence Service, Măgureanu and Stoenescu
agree upon the idea of an implication of foreign secret services in the
initiation of the mass protest in Bucharest on 21 December 1989.279
Former president Emil Constantinescu (1996–2000) has stated
For a brief survey of such conspiracy theories see Perva and Roman, The
mysteries of the Romanian revolution.
277
Teodorescu, Timişoara, December 1989, 43–51.
278
Mavru, Memoirs of the former head of the Timişoara Surveillance and
Investigation section, 60–64.
279
Virgil Măgureanu with Alex Mihai Stoenescu, De la regimul comunist la
regimul Iliescu: Virgil Măgureanu în dialog cu Alex Mihai Stoenescu (From the
communist regime to the Iliescu regime: Virgil Măgureanu in dialogue with Alex
Mihai Stoenescu) (Bucharest: Editura Rao, 2008), 116–22.
276
400
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
bluntly that in December 1989 Romania witnessed a coup d’état
organized by a group of high-ranking pro-Soviet army and Securitate
officers with Soviet support. According to Constantinescu, the
Romanian revolution was violent because Ceauşescu did not accept
to resign at Soviet pressure and “the authors of the coup d’état of 22
December were nomenklatura and Securitate members that needed to
legitimate themselves in the eyes of the people [emphasis added].”280
The repression. Testimonies by former Securitate operatives
engaged in surveillance missions in December 1989 affirm that a
high degree of provocation by foreign citizens existed during the
events in Timişoara and Bucharest.281 Direct participants to the events
have talked about groups of committed young people that engaged
in violent actions. Such groups operated in Timişoara and witness
accounts often converge when describe them: groups of three to five
young males who broke the shop windows with metal bars and other
objects, but did not steal anything. A revolutionary remembers: “We
[the protesters] told them not to do such a thing, because this was not
what we wanted. But they carried on, accomplishing their mission.”282
Radu Cheptenariu recalls the events he witnessed on 17 December:
“The crowd was shouting: ‘Down with Ceauşescu!’ ‘Freedom!’
‘Romanians, join us!’ Three men came out of the crowd and broke
the windows of the food store, took some beverage bottles and threw
them to the shelves and the remaining windows. Then, they went in
the back of the store. Afterwards, other people started to ransack.”283
Emil Constantinescu, Adevărul despre România (The truth about Romania)
(Bucharest: Editura Universalia, 2004), 113–181; the phrase quoted is at p. 181.
281
Mavru, Memoirs of the former head of the Timişoara Surveillance and
Investigation section, 101.
282
Testimony of Orban; another participant, Anton Suharu, also speaks of
such groups of young males. See Mioc, The revolution in Timişoara, 44 and 107–
108, respectively.
283
Ibid., 105.
280
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
401
However, the direct implication of the Securitate agents in the
bloody repression of the demonstrators in Timişoara and Bucharest,
as well in other urban centers throughout the country, is not easy to
demonstrate. In this respect, the role of the Securitate was more
intricate because in December 1989 on the frontline there were the
army and the Militia and not the Securitate operatives. The
revolutionaries saw the army and the Militia firing at the protesters.
Although some witness accounts referred to civilians who shot to kill
from behind the regular troops or from the terraces of the nearby
buildings, the evidence is scarce and few former agents have been
willing to talk about their missions in December 1989. Rumors and
hearsay abound and evidence is difficult to gather. Yet, one should
also consider that the Securitate operatives were among the best
informed about the real situation in the country as well as at the level
of the Soviet bloc. Thus, although the Securitate never opposed the
regime up to its very end, at the individual or group level attitudes
of wait and see did emerge as well.
The “terrorists.” What happened after 1208 hours on 22 December
1989 represents an equally intriguing and intricate story. The period
22–25 December 1989, i.e. the period inaugurated by the flight of
the Ceauşescu couple from the upper platform of the building of the
CC of the RCP and concluded by their hasten execution, requires a
minute reconstruction that goes beyond the scope of this book.
Nevertheless, it is a fact that more people were killed after 22
December 1989 than before. Thus, while 162 persons were killed
and 1,107 were wounded before 22 December, as many as 942 people
were killed and 2,245 were wounded after that date.284 However, not
a single “terrorist” was brought in to trial in Romania. Those who
poured into the streets in December 1989 have the right to ask about
the identity of the so-called “terrorists” whom the army fought fiercely
until 25 December. In the Romanian case, the “Rashomon effect”
284
Constantinescu, The truth about Romania, 113.
402
natIon-SpecIFIc FactorS
discussed in Chapter 2 was born of the protracted inquiry on the
1989 events carried out by the Romanian authorities over the last
twenty years. Institutions such as the CNSAS or history research
institutes have limited means of inquiry with regard to the
involvement of the Securitate operatives in the bloody events of
December 1989. The judiciary must pronounce a court verdict in
this respect. Individuals and civic organization have constantly asked
for the resolving of the massive file of the Revolution of 1989. Twenty
years after the events, the judiciary still deliberates on the case.
Exasperated by the situation, Teodor Mărieş – the leader of the most
active association of the 1989 revolutionaries, the 21 December 1989
Association – was on hunger strike for 78 days, beginning on 11
January 2010.285 Among others, Mărieş asked for the declassifying
of the multivolume file of the Romanian revolution of 1989. With
the declassifying of the 1989 Revolution file, it seems that Romania
has entered a new phase of the process of coming to terms with the
traumatic events of December 1989.
For details, visit the site of the association at http://www.asociatia21
decembrie.ro/wp-content/uploads/ 2010 /01/gr-foamei-2–e1263738719135.jpg;
accessed 16 November 2010.
285
ConCludIng remarks
the revolutIon explaIned
This book puts forward a frame of analysis for explaining the 1989
events in East-Central Europe (ECE) and applies it systematically to
the case of Romania. When examining those particular events, one
faces difficult problems of definition. Consequently, the discussion
opens with a comparative analysis of the most significant similarities
and differences between the 1989 events and the great, “classic”
revolutions of the modern age. This analysis concludes that the 1989
events in ECE can be termed as revolutions. They were, however,
revolutions of a particular kind because they were non-utopian, nonviolent (with the exception of Romania), and were not carried out
in the name of a particular class. Timing, sequence of events and
nature – negotiated or non-negotiated, violent or non-violent, are
crucial issues that one has to address when examining the 1989
revolutions. The present work proposes an explanatory model
applicable to all the revolutions of 1989 that combines a culturalist
approach with structural analysis, and takes into consideration the
issue of contingency. This book is therefore based on the key concepts
of culture, structure and contingency, and contends that the collapse
of the communist rule in ECE was provoked by an interplay of
nation-specific, structural, and conjunctural factors, which ultimately
determined the timing, sequence, and nature of those events.
404
concludIng remarkS: the revolutIon explaIned
Following S. N. Eisenstadt, this author proposes the generic term
“postmodern” revolutions when referring to the 1989 revolutions in
ECE and introduces the 1989 sequence of collapse of communist
dictatorships in ECE. The argument is that in 1989 six communist
dictatorships in ECE collapsed in the following order: Poland,
Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania.
At the same time, this author contends that the 1989 sequence of
collapse, i.e. Poland – Hungary – East Germany – Czechoslovakia –
Bulgaria – Romania, consisted in fact of the demise of three types of
communist dictatorships: “national-accommodative” (Poland and
Hungary); “welfare” (East Germany and Czechoslovakia); and
modernizing-nationalizing (Bulgaria and Romania). Kitschelt,
Mansfeldova, Markowski, and Tóka have coined the term “nationalaccommodative” employed for the communist dictatorships in
Poland and Hungary. Following Jarausch, the term utilized to
describe the communist dictatorships in East Germany and
Czechoslovakia is that of “welfare dictatorships.” Finally, with regard
to Romania and Bulgaria this author proposes the term modernizingnationalizing communist dictatorships. The emphasis on the
“dynamic political stance” is essential since the communist power
elites in both countries perceived their party-states in the making as
not completely modern and national, and therefore devised policies
aimed at spurring industrial development and creating ethnically
homogenous “socialist” nations.
As already noted, this book puts forward a theoretical model that
enables one to explain the inception, unfolding, and outcome of the
1989 revolutions in ECE. This model is based on the three categories
mentioned above, i.e. structure, culture, and contingency. The main
assumption is that the 1989 revolutions were determined by a
complicated and sometimes perplexing aggregation of structural,
nation-specific and conjunctural factors. These factors operated and
interacted in various ways in each of the countries analyzed, but they
were nevertheless present in each case. Such a model is able to
concludIng remarkS: the revolutIon explaIned
405
accommodate issues of path-dependency, patterns of compliance and
contestation under communist rule and questions of interdependence
at both international and Soviet Bloc level. The particular way in
which the above-mentioned factors aggregated determined eventually
the nature of the revolution in each of the cases discussed, i.e.
negotiated or non-negotiated, peaceful or violent, as well as the order
in which the six communist dictatorships were overthrown. Nørgaard
and Sampson, who have explained the birth of the Polish Solidarity
as an outcome of social and cultural factors, have inspired this kind
of model.
With regard to the case of Romania, one can formulate three
fundamental questions related to the Romanian revolution, starting
from three concepts, as follows. Timing: Why Romania occupies the
last position within the 1989 sequence of collapse? Nature: Why the
Romanian revolution was the only non-negotiated and violent of the
1989 revolutions in ECE? Outcome: Why the bloody revolution in
Romania brought the second- and third-rank nomenklatura members
to power and thus delayed the process of democratic consolidation?
Given the peculiarities of the Romanian case, before applying the
model presented above to the Romanian case, this work discusses the
conflicting representations of the Romanian revolution in postcommunism and the importance of a thorough event-centered
reconstruction of the December 1989 events. The discussion on the
conflicting representations of the revolution stresses the highly
controversial legacy of the Romanian revolution, which led to the
appearance of an enduring “Rashomon effect” with regard to the
1989 events. The concise event-centered historical reconstruction of
the December 1989 events in Timişoara and Bucharest, based
primarily on the recollections of the participants to those events,
illustrates the fact that people in the street perceived the 1989 events
as revolutionary.
Turning to the explanatory model presented above, the first factors
analyzed have been the “structural” factors, i.e. those factors
406
concludIng remarkS: the revolutIon explaIned
characteristic to all Soviet-type societies: economic decline and
ideological decay. In terms of economic decline, this work has addressed
the economic performance of the communist regime in Romania
over the period 1945–1989 in order to illustrate the relationship
between the severe economic crisis in the 1980s and the growing
potential for social protest. Although Romania faced the most severe
crisis among the six countries that experienced a regime change in
1989, it was the last to exit from communism that year. One can
explain such a paradoxical situation by considering the mechanism
of rising expectations and setbacks that characterized the Ceauşescu
period. Apart from the industrialization process initiated by the
regime, a civilizing process did take place under state socialism in
Romania, which resulted in some improvements with regard to
urbanization and housing, spread of education and sanitation,
transportation and increased mobility by the population during the
1960s and 1970s. The severe crisis of the 1980s paved in many
respects the way for the bloody revolution of 1989. Due to the
miseries of everyday life, the potential for protest of a majority of the
population was particularly high in the late 1980s. Major policy
decisions regarding the economic development and implicitly the
“socialist modernization” of the country under communist rule were
made in accordance with the external constrains and the political
goals of the local power elite. Thus, the period 1945–1989 has been
divided into four distinct periods that represent different stages in
the complicated relationship between politics and economics under
communist rule in Romania. These four periods are defined as
follows: (1) humble imitation of the Soviet model, 1945–1956; (2)
development and emancipation, 1956–1964; (3) closely-watched
relaxation, 1964–1977; and (4) crisis and decline, 1977–1989.
The period 1977–1989 illustrate the close relationship between
the economic decline and the violent breakdown of the communist
rule in Romania. The severe economic crisis of the period 1981–
1989, especially the food shortages and the power cuts of the 1980s
concludIng remarkS: the revolutIon explaIned
407
were by no means the only causes of the bloody revolution in
Romania. However, the everyday miseries were among the causes of
the popular revolt that sparked the 1989 revolution in this country.
During the 1980s, the developmental pattern imposed by the
Ceauşescu regime continued to favor primary and secondary sectors
with a strong emphasis on coal mining as well as on steel, heavy
machinery and petrochemical industries. While these sectors were
unable to produce competitive goods for export, especially for the
Western markets, their functioning required a high level of energy
consumption that led to an endemic energy crisis in industry.
Throughout the 1980s, instead of introducing economic reforms the
regime imposed harsh rationing measures that affected primarily the
population. These measures concentrated on the rationing of energy
consumption (e.g. power supply for household use, gasoline for
private cars etc.), of food supplies (food rationing was introduced in
the early 1980s), and of basic consumer goods (e.g. soap, toothpaste,
detergents etc.). Thus, by the late 1980s the mistaken economic policy
of the Ceauşescu regime forced a large majority of the population to
think in terms of sheer biological survival. Such an economic strategy
led to both absolute and relative deprivation, which affected a great
majority of the population and contributed significantly to the final
demise of the Romanian communist regime.
Ideological decay or the erosion of ideology was a phenomenon
that other communist regimes in ECE experienced after Nikita
Khrushchev presented his “secret report” to the Twentieth Congress
of the CPSU on the night of 24–25 February 1956. Although
Marxism-Leninism never truly appealed to the Romanian society,
the regime was able to make use of nationalism as an ideological
substitute, which, especially from 1968 onwards, served as ideological
“cement” for the Romanian ethnic majority and legitimized the RCP
rule. Ceauşescu turned Gheorghiu-Dej’s incipient nationalism into
a comprehensive nation-building process aimed at creating an
ethnically homogenous “socialist nation” in Romania. In August
408
concludIng remarkS: the revolutIon explaIned
1968, Ceauşescu publicly condemned the crushing of the Prague
Spring by the Soviet led troops of the WTO and thus, the RCP
gained widespread popular support almost overnight. Afterwards,
Ceauşescu’s nationalism acted as ideological “cement” on the
background of an obvious popular distrust for Marxism-Leninism.
It was only in the conditions of the deep economic crisis of the 1980s
and, even more importantly, in the conditions of the radical change
of policy in Moscow after the coming to power of Mikhail Gorbachev
that “Ceauşescuism,” as an ideological substitute for MarxismLeninism, entered in a terminal crisis. After 1985, when large
segments of the Romanian society began to look to Moscow in the
hope of persuading the Ceauşescu regime to improve their living
standards, independence from Moscow – the cornerstone of the RCP
legitimacy in the post-1968 period – ceased to appeal to a majority
of the people. After the launch of Gorbachev’s program of reforms,
emancipation from the Soviet Union lost its relevance for the
Romanian population. Moscow became suddenly synonymous with
restructuring and openness, while the independent Romania was
heading towards disaster. In this sense ideological decay, understood
as the demise of Ceauşescu’s national-communism as an ersatz
ideology, contributed significantly to the collapse of the communist
rule in Romania.
Contingency played an important role in the final demise of the
communist dictatorships in ECE. The present analysis has
concentrated on two kinds of conjunctural factors, i.e. external and
internal. Given the nature of the power relations between Moscow
and its European satellites, an external factor – which might be called
the “Kremlin factor” – always influenced the decisions made by the
power elites in Sovietized Europe. Until the mid-1980s, the “Kremlin
factor” was synonymous with the involvement of Moscow in the
domestic affairs of the “fraternal” countries in ECE. However, once
Mikhail Gorbachev came to power and engaged in a bold program
concludIng remarkS: the revolutIon explaIned
409
of the reforms, the “Kremlin factor” evolved into the “Gorbachev
factor” and became synonymous with restructuring and openness.
The communist dictatorships in ECE proved to be particularly
vulnerable to external conjunctural factors. Nevertheless, one has to
assess the influence of such factors on the six countries that
experienced a regime change in 1989 on a case-by-case basis. For
instance, the Polish “negotiated revolution” initiated the “snowball
effect” that had a considerable influence on the final demise of the
communist regimes in Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia,
Bulgaria, and Romania. Thus, the Polish case poses difficult problems
of interpretation with regard to the set of external conjunctural factors
that contributed to the demise of the communist regime exactly
because a most powerful one, i.e. “the snowball effect,” was not
present. As for the case of Romania, this work contends that two
external conjunctural factors were of paramount importance in the
collapse of communism in this country: (1) the “Gorbachev factor;”
and (2) the “snowball effect.” Considering the reaction by the
overwhelming majority of the population in December 1989, the
present analysis has examined the role played by the international
media in keeping alive, or even developing, a spirit of opposition
towards the regime in communist Romania. Domestic conjuncture
also influenced the demise of Romanian communism. The internal
conjunctural factors, however, contributed to a lesser extent to the
breakdown of the Ceauşescu regime. Nonetheless, a significant
internal conjunctural factor was the coming of age of the 1967–1969
generation that originated in the policy of forced natality launched
by Ceauşescu after his coming to power in 1965.
Nation-specific factors are responsible for the position each country
occupied within the sequence of collapse as well as for the nature of
the 1989 revolutions in the respective countries. The examination
of this set of factors entails a discussion on political cultures at both
regime and community level. As for Romania, these factors were
responsible for the last position Romania occupied within the 1989
410
concludIng remarkS: the revolutIon explaIned
sequence of collapse as well as for the violent nature of the revolution.
The analysis has addressed the attitudinal and behavioral patterns
that characterize the relationship between regime and society, which
emerged as result of the successive transformations of the Stalinist
model imposed on the Romanian society in the immediate aftermath
of World War II. These transformations took place under certain
constraints imposed by the Soviet policy towards the “fraternal”
countries in ECE in the general Cold War context, of which the
Brezhnev Doctrine was perhaps the most significant for the purpose
of this analysis. One can identify five main periods that characterize
the relationship between the communist regime and the Romanian
society in general over the period 1945–1989: (1) “revolution from
above,” 1945–1956; (2) “community-building,” 1956–1964; (3)
transition from “community-building” to nation-building, 1964–
1968; (4) fully-fledged nation-building, 1968–1985; and (5)
disenchantment and de-legitimation, 1985–1989. Throughout these
five periods, two processes interacted permanently. On the one hand,
the regime applied consistent policies meant to tame and subsequently
co-opt the population. On the other hand, the population reacted
to these policies in various ways ranging from collaboration to open
conflict with the regime. The attitudinal and behavioral patterns that
resulted from the complex interaction of these processes determined
ultimately both the nature and timing of the Romanian revolution
of 1989.
The Stalinist mindset of the Romanian power elite went gradually
through a series of transformations beginning in 1956. Once
Khrushchev inaugurated his de-Stalinization campaign, Romanian
communists had to look elsewhere for legitimacy and initiated a
process of “selective community-building.” Thus, they engaged in a
process of creating new political meanings, shared by the communist
ruling elite and the population, concerning the relationship between
the Party and the society. The 1956 political developments at the
Soviet bloc level imposed the devising of a new political strategy by
concludIng remarkS: the revolutIon explaIned
411
the power elite in Bucharest. One should stress once again the
selective nature of the community building process launched in the
aftermath of the 1956 events. Not all the segments of Romanian
society were allowed to take part in the process. Up to the year 1964,
numerous Romanian citizens were imprisoned on political grounds
while their offspring were denied basic civil rights. Obviously, they
were considered “enemies of the people” and the community building
process was not aimed at them. De-Stalinization was a threat to
Gheorghiu-Dej and his men, and a return to the people as the
ultimate source of legitimacy was the only solution at hand. This is
how a worldview developed within the ranks of the illegal RCP during
the interwar years and subsequently in Greater Romania’s prisons
was subsequently extended to the Party-State level. Gheorghiu-Dej’s
recourse to Party-State building in the guise of “selective community
building” created the basis for Ceauşescu’s program of Party-State
building in the form of an all-embracing nation-building project.
Monolithism of the Party and emancipation from Moscow, as key
features of the regime political culture, are largely responsible for the
violent nature of the Romanian revolution of 1989. The most notable
protest within the nomenklatura occurred very late, i.e. only on 14
March 1989, when the open letter signed by six former high-rank
officials of the Party – Gheorghe Apostol, Alexandru Bârlădeanu,
Silviu Brucan, Corneliu Mănescu, Constantin Pârvulescu and Grigore
Răceanu – was broadcast by Radio Free Europe. The letter, addressed
to Ceauşescu, began with an indictment of his mistaken policies. It
was for the first time in communist Romania that former top Party
officials were publicly criticizing Ceauşescu’s policies. The “letter of
the six” marked a watershed in the history of the RCP because it
represented the first major split at the level of the RCP elite. For the
first time since the 1957 split at the top – the ConstantinescuChişinevschi episode, the monolithism of the RCP was broken and
a major faction of the nomenklatura openly protested against
Ceauşescu’s lead. At the same time, the signatories of the letter were
412
concludIng remarkS: the revolutIon explaIned
already retired when RFE broadcast the text and their links with the
Party were practically severed. In this respect, the letter came too late
and therefore had an insignificant impact on RCP’s domestic policies.
In other words, the “mortal sin” of factionalism was committed too
late to avoid a bloody revolution in 1989.
With regard to the legitimating power of nationalism, after the
coming to power of Gorbachev in 1985 the Ceauşescu regime was
left with a sole target: the Hungarian minority in Romania. Thus,
on 20 December 1989 Ceauşescu affirmed that the revolt in
Timişoara, which sparked the Romanian revolution, was the result
of the activity of “hooligan elements, working together with
reactionary, imperialistic, irredentist, chauvinistic circles … aiming
at the territorial dismemberment of Romania.” Ceauşescu was
hinting, among others, at neighboring Hungary and the Soviet
Union. Nevertheless, the new image of the Soviet Union among
Romania’s population deeply undermined the propagandistic efforts
of the regime. In the late 1980s, independence from Moscow ceased
to be a major source of legitimacy for the communist regime in
Romania. By 1989, the Romanian polity was definitely split into us
and them. As for them – the inner circle of power around the
Ceauşescu couple – they displayed a high level of cohesion, the highest
among the six countries that compose the 1989 sequence of collapse,
up to the very end of the regime. This explains in many respects why
Romania occupies the last position, the sixth, in the said sequence.
At the same time, to paraphrase the statement of a Romanian top
communist official, independence ceased to be their legitimacy and
this permitted popular protest to grow and spread across Romania
in December 1989. It was because the RCP discourse centered on
independence from Moscow lost its legitimating power in the eyes
of a majority of the population that Romania was eventually able to
exit from communism in 1989.
As for the community political culture, which has been termed
as the political culture(s) of resistance, some authors argued that the
concludIng remarkS: the revolutIon explaIned
413
failure of the Goma movement for human rights epitomizes the entire
story of Romanian dissent. Speaking about the Romanian dissidence
in the 1970s, a Western specialist in East European affairs affirmed
in the early 1980s that: “Romanian dissent lives in Paris and his name
is Paul Goma.” This seems to be true since after Goma the other
radical dissidents of the 1980s, such as Doina Cornea, Dorin
Tudoran, Radu Filipescu, Gabriel Andreescu or Dan Petrescu,
experienced a similar loneliness of radical dissidence. Group protests
developed only slowly towards the end of the 1980s and replaced
timidly the isolated dissident acts by courageous individuals. In
November 1989, dissident Dan Petrescu initiated a campaign of
collecting signatures against the reelection of Ceauşescu at the
Fourteenth Congress of the RCP. Petrescu, who was living in the
Moldavian city of Iaşi, contacted Doina Cornea, who was living in
the Transylvanian city of Cluj. It was for the first time when
prominent dissidents were trying to organize a joint action against
the regime. Another story, which is telling of the efforts and
vacillations of the intellectuals who felt that they should do something
to protest against the communist rule, is that of the “letter of the
eighteen.” It took a rather long time, i.e. until mid-December 1989,
to collect the signatures and send the letter abroad. Nevertheless, the
fact that eighteen intellectuals eventually managed to become solidary
in their protest in the autumn of 1989 indicates that something had
changed by that time: a timid but shared feeling of solidarity was
gradually replacing the “egoism of small groups.” Nevertheless, it was
too late for a dissident movement to take shape and give birth to a
political opposition able to fill the power vacuum in the afternoon
of 22 December 1989. What some intellectuals managed to do that
day was to speak to the large crowds gathered in the Palace Square
in downtown Bucharest and argue forcefully and convincingly that
the monopoly of the RCP was over. In other words, they told the
people that it was not about an anti-Ceauşescu uprising, but about
414
concludIng remarkS: the revolutIon explaIned
an anti-Communist revolution. Although short-lived, that was an
important moment of the 1989 Romanian revolution.
A key issue concerning the political cultures of resistance refers to
the working-class revolts and the process of establishing a cross-class
alliance against the communist regime. This work distinguishes
between “genuine” workers and peasant-workers and argues that
distinct subcultures of resistance against the regime developed among
these categories of workers throughout the 1970s and 1980s.
“Genuine” workers represented a category of workers that severed
their roots with countryside: they moved to towns seeking for a betterpaid job in industry and thus were dependent on the salary they
received. By the end of 1980s, in the conditions of the severe crisis
faced by the Ceauşescu regime, this category of workers was
compelled to think in terms of biological survival and thus was more
prone to engage in open protests. The economic crisis affected to a
lesser extent the peasant-workers. During the period of food shortages,
i.e. 1981–1989, such people were able to obtain the necessary
foodstuffs for survival and thus their potential for protest was lower.
The peasant-worker is a good example of a strategy of the individual
to survive in the conditions of a severe crisis: a job in industry in the
nearby town, and food supplies from the little farm he or she owned
in the village.
“Genuine” workers represented the first and most affected segment
of society in the conditions of economic crisis. Beginning in the mid1970s four large and highly industrialized areas of communist
Romania – the counties of Constanţa, Braşov, Hunedoara, and Timiş
– attracted the largest number of internal migrants in the country,
many of whom came from remote and less developed regions of
Moldavia. In these areas, as the interregional long distance migration
figures show, came into being a relatively numerous class of workers
relying only on the salary they received in industry – a class of
“genuine” workers. Between 1977 and 1989, the most important
protests from below occurred in workplaces where “genuine” workers
concludIng remarkS: the revolutIon explaIned
415
constituted a majority: in the Jiu Valley (Hunedoara County) in 1977
and in Braşov (the capital of the Braşov County) in 1987. In the late
1980s there were in Romania four highly industrialized urban areas
– the counties of Constanţa, Braşov, Hunedoara, and Timiş – where
the number of workers coming from other regions of the country
was particularly high. When the structural crisis deepened, it affected
primarily the category of “genuine” workers in those areas, who
suffered from food shortages, strict rationing, and non-payment of
wages. It was in one of these areas, i.e. the city of Timişoara, the
capital of the Timiş County, that the Romanian revolution of 1989
was sparked.
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________ . Intelectualii din Europa de Est (Intellectuals of Eastern Europe).
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________ . Surge to Freedom: The End of Communist Rule in Eastern Europe.
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422
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Buzilă, Boris. În prezenţa stăpînilor: Treizeci de ani de jurnal secret la România
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Câmpeanu, Pavel. România – Coada pentru hrană: Un mod de viaţă (Romania
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________ . Ceauşescu, anii numărătorii inverse (Ceauşescu, the countdown
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________ . Propuneri de măsuri pentru îmbunătăţirea activităţii politicoideologice, de educare marxist-leninistă a membrilor de partid, a tuturor
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________ . România pe drumul făuririi societăţii socialiste multilateral dezvoltate:
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Selected bIblIography
423
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________ . România pe drumul făuririi societăţii socialiste multilateral dezvoltate:
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________ . Cuvîntare la Consfătuirea pe ţară a unităţilor de control al oamenilor
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________ . România pe drumul făuririi societăţii socialiste multilateral dezvoltate:
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Chelcea, Liviu, and Puiu Lăţea. România profundă în comunism: Dileme
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424
Selected bIblIography
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Conferinţa Naţională a Partidului Comunist Român: 19-21 iulie 1972 (National
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Congresul al IX-lea al Partidului Comunist Român, 19-24 iulie 1965 (The Ninth
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Congresul al X-lea al Partidului Comunist Român, 6-12 august 1969 (The Tenth
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Congresul al XI-lea al Partidului Comunist Român, 25-28 noiembrie 1974 (The
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Congresul al XII-lea al Partidului Comunist Român, 19-23 noiembrie 1979 (The
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Congresul al XIII-lea al Partidului Comunist Român, 19-22 noiembrie 1984
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426
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________ . 40 de ani de luptă sub steagul biruitor al marxism-leninismului (40
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446
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Index
A
Aladar, Imre 274
Aldcroft, Derek H. 52
Almond, Gabriel 246
Almond, Gabriel A. 63, 65
Andreescu, Gabriel 24, 315, 327, 413
Andropov, Yurii V. 224
Antonescu, Ion 179
Antonesei, Liviu 243
Aparaschivei, Elena 388
Apostol, Gheorghe 22, 132, 142, 254,
255, 264, 311, 312, 336, 339, 411
Arachelian, Vartan 82
Arbore, Ecaterina 274
Arendt, Hannah 29, 30
Ash, Timothy Garton 11, 33–35, 47,
62, 73, 77
Aurelian, Petre S. 118
B
Barbu, Mihai 345
Bauer, Peter 147
Bauman, Zygmunt 323
Bădilescu, Nicolae 96
Bălan, Radu 384
Bârlădeanu, Alexandru 22, 139, 142,
144, 254, 311, 312, 411
Beetham, David 285
Bendix, Reinhard 285
Berlin Wall 38, 57, 210
Bernard, Noel 235, 239, 240
Bîgu, Vasile 184
Boboc, Marian 345
Bobu, Emil 202, 212, 381
Bodnăraş, Emil 255
Bogza, Geo 329
Borilă, Petre 259
Botez, Mihai 18, 170, 187
Bozóki, András 61, 200
Braşoveanu, Gheorghe 325
Breuilly, John 298
Brezhnev Doctrine 20, 60, 61, 195–
200, 208, 244, 248, 276, 292, 410
Brezhnev, Leonid Ilyich 195, 197,
198
British Broadcasting Corporation
(BBC) 220, 233
Brown, Archie 60, 64, 65, 195
Brown, J. F. 14, 33, 74
Brucan, Silviu 22, 80, 241, 310, 311,
380, 411
Brus, Włodzimierz 161
Bucharest 14, 21, 25, 58, 74–76, 79–
82, 85, 87, 97, 98, 100–107, 122,
123, 132, 134, 136, 139, 141, 151,
158, 161–168, 183, 188, 189, 196,
199, 201, 203–205, 207–213, 216,
448
Index
217, 230, 232, 234, 241–244, 260,
264, 278, 279, 286, 306, 309, 326–
329, 331, 334, 336, 337, 347, 352,
355, 357, 358, 363–365, 368, 371,
372, 379, 381, 384, 386–390, 398–
401, 405, 411, 413
Bujor, Mihail Gheorghiu 177
Burghelea, Victor 89
C
Calciu, Gheorghe, Father 368
Cană, Ionel 324
Carol II, King 179
Călinescu, Alexandru 329
Câmpeanu, Pavel 169, 172, 214, 255–
257, 266
Cârneanu, Florea 384
Ceauşescu, Elena 212
Ceauşescu, Ilie 381
Ceauşescu, Nicolae 10, 15–18, 20, 22–25,
52, 57, 58, 75–78, 80–84, 89–94,
97–105, 108–113, 135, 141, 143–
145, 147, 148, 157, 158, 162, 164,
165, 169, 171–173, 178, 180, 184,
185, 187, 189, 192, 194, 196, 198–
202, 207–214, 216, 217, 219, 226–
228, 231, 235, 237–245, 249, 252,
253, 255, 263, 266, 267, 269–273,
275–283, 289–291, 293–299, 301,
303, 308, 310, 311, 317, 318, 320,
323, 326, 328, 330, 331, 340, 344,
346, 347, 349, 350, 365, 375, 376,
379–382, 384, 400, 407, 409, 411,
413, 414
Cheptenariu, Radu 400
Chirot, Daniel 54, 157
Chişinevschi, Iosif 23, 254, 255, 259,
268, 269, 312, 411
Chiţac, Mihai 384
Cismărescu, Mihai 239
Ciupală, Alin 388
Cole, John W. 343
Coman, Ion 381
community-building 21, 188, 248,
249, 253, 258, 265, 270, 276,
288, 297, 410
Constantinescu, Emil 399, 400
Constantinescu, Miron 254, 255,
259, 260, 269, 274
Contici, Adrian 104
Cornea, Doina 24, 315, 326, 330,
413
Coţoveanu, Iacob 184
Craiu, Ion 274
Cristescu, Gheorghe 179, 255
Culianu-Petrescu, Thérèse 328
Curticeanu, Silviu 211, 213
D
Darnton, Robert 30
Dascălu, Nicolae 325
Dăscălescu, Constatin 97, 307, 308
de-legitimation 21, 248, 249, 308,
310, 410
Deheleanu, Ion 212
Deletant, Dennis 361, 365
Demeter, Ioan 274
Deutsche Welle (DW) 220, 233
Diamandescu, Tudor 274
Diamond, Larry 64
Dic-Dicescu, I. 274
Dincă, Ion 381
Dinescu, Mircea 328–330
Dobre, Constantin 347
Dobrescu, Miu 203
Dobrogeanu-Gherea, Alexandru 274
Dobrogeanu-Gherea, Constantin 175
Doinaş, Ştefan Augustin 329
Index
Doncea, Constantin 184, 274
Drancă, Ion 184
Drăgan, Mircea 300
Drăghici, Alexandru 275, 296
Dub•ek, Alexander 277, 278
Dumitraşcu, Dumitru 100
Dumitrescu, Constantin Ticu 392
E
Easton, David 214
Eisenstadt, S. N. 11, 30, 32, 41–43, 404
Elias, Norbert 113
Enescu, George 238
Enescu, Radu 329
Enyedi, Gyorgy 116
F
Fazekás, János 260, 269
Filipescu, Radu 24, 315, 324, 327,
413
Filipovici, Elena 178, 179, 274
Finkelstein, David Fabian 274
Foriş, Ştefan 179, 255, 258, 274
Fortuna, Ioan Lorin 96
Furet, François 31
G
Gaulle, Charles de 152, 278
Genad, Eugen 184
Genad, Heinrich 184
Georgescu, Emil 235, 240, 241
Georgescu, Vlad 119, 171, 235, 239,
241, 264
Gerasimov, Gennady 61, 200
Gerő, András 228
Gheorghe, Ion 143, 271, 362, 381
Gheorghiu-Dej, Gheorghe 16, 18, 21, 22,
111, 125, 128–144, 147, 157, 172,
173, 178, 180, 181, 183, 184, 188–
449
192, 200, 224, 239, 249–274, 276,
285, 286, 288, 295–297, 310–312,
317, 335, 338, 340, 341, 362–364,
374, 375, 407, 411
Ghica, Ion 118
Gilberg, Trond 175, 369
Giosan, Nicolae 203
Giurescu, Dinu C. 181, 364
Goma, Paul 16, 24, 111, 234, 236, 237,
240, 286, 315, 317–320, 323, 326,
329, 413
Gomułka, Władysław 221–223, 280
Gorbachev factor 19, 20, 59, 193,
194, 200, 244, 245, 409
Gorbachev, S. Mikhail 18–20, 23, 59–
61, 192–195, 199–202, 219, 241,
244, 245, 308–310, 329, 408, 409,
412
Gorun, Radu 239
Gothár, Péter 227
Grofu, Dumitru 274
Grósz, Károly 204, 205
Guină, Nicolae 274
Guşă, Ştefan 384
H
Habermas, Jürgen 31
Haşeganu, Mihail 257
Hăulică, Dan 329
Holmes, Leslie 39, 44
Holostenko, Vitali 179, 255
Hoxha, Enver 257
Huntington, Samuel P. 44
I
Ierunca, Virgil 235
Iliescu, Ion 77, 80, 83, 85, 97, 241,
380, 382
Ionescu, Ghita 127
450
Index
Ioniţă, Ion 380–382
Iordănescu, Ştefan 90
J
Janos, Andrew C. 60, 118
Jarausch, Konrad H. 12, 47
Jaruzelski, Wojciech 194
John Paul II (Wojtyla, Karol) 367
Jowitt, Kenneth 43, 66, 67, 247, 250,
256, 266, 273, 301, 314
K
Kádár, János 224, 228, 262, 280
Kaminski, Bartłomiej 53
Kautsky, Karl 175
Kecskemeti, Paul 40
Keller, Paul 381
Khrushchev, Nikita 17, 21, 56, 133,
134, 139, 140, 174, 182, 183, 188,
189, 222, 254, 258, 259, 264, 265,
269, 288, 374, 375, 407, 410
Király, Béla K. 36
Kis, János 36
Kitschelt, Herbert 12, 37, 47
Köblos, Elek 179, 255, 274
Kocka, Jürgen 40
Kohout, Pavel 237, 318
Kołakowski, Leszek 17, 59, 174
Konitz, Jacques 274
Korbonski, Andrzej 366
Kornai, János 53
Kostyal, Ştefan 381
Kovalev, S. 196
Kremlin factor 19, 193, 408, 409
Kumar, Krishan 29, 30
Kundera, Milan 315, 316
L
Leahu, Gheorghe 162
Lendvai, Paul 222
Leon, Nica 102
Leonin, Marcel 274
Levente, Mihai 274
Levy, Robert 182
Lichtblau, Leon 274
Liehm, Antonin J. 339
Linz, Juan J. 39, 71
Lovinescu, Monica 235, 240, 241
M
Mansfeldova, Zdenka 12, 47
Marcou, Lilly 60, 199
Marian, Nicu 388
Marin, Timotei 274
Marina, Justinian 362
Markowski, Radoslaw 12, 47
Marx, Karl 189, 190, 252, 266, 267
Maurer, Ion Gheorghe 143, 271, 362,
363, 375
Mavru, Niculae 84, 399
Mazilu, Dumitru 82
Măgureanu, Virgil 84, 85, 382, 399
Mălnăşan, Aurel 261
Mănescu, Corneliu 22, 97, 200, 311,
312, 411
Mănescu, Manea 156, 271, 307
Mărieş, Teodor 402
Michael I, King 126
Michnik, Adam 35
Mihuţ, Aurelian David 89, 94
Milea, Vasile 103, 107, 108, 202,
213, 384, 389
Militaru, Nicolae 380–382
Milosz, Czeslaw 362
Mioc, Marius 81
Mladenov, Petar 45
Modoran, Vasile 274
Moflic, Constantin 184
Moisescu, Justin 364
Montias, John Michael 146
Morewood, Steven 52
Index
Moscovici (Ghiţă Moscu), Gelber 274
Munteanu, Neculai Constantin 235,
287, 296
Murgescu, Costin 145, 147
N
Nagy, Imre 205, 206, 222, 223
nation-building 18, 21, 22, 46, 109,
114, 189, 191, 192, 248, 249,
266, 269, 270, 275, 276, 284,
288, 297, 317, 340, 407, 410, 411
Natorf, W. 207
Negoiţă, Vasile 184
Negoiţescu, Ion 319
negotiated revolution 9, 19, 36, 61,
62, 194, 409
Nelson, Daniel 356
Németh, Miklós 203
Nicolaescu, Sergiu 80, 299
Nicolau, Alexandru 274
Niculescu-Mizil, Paul 303
Nørgaard, Ole 13, 49, 50, 405
O
Olteanu, Constantin 376
Opp, Karl-Dieter 37, 44
Opriş, Dan Ştefan 89, 243
Orban, Traian 93, 387
P
Pacepa, Ion Mihai 239
Paleologu, Alexandru 24, 329, 330
Paler, Octavian 329
Papp, Bishop 87
Papu, Edgar 320
Patilineţ, Vasile 274
Pauker, Ana 258
Pauker, Marcel 274
Pătrăşcanu, Lucreţiu 258, 274
Păunescu, Adrian 306
451
Pârvulescu, Constantin 22, 185, 308,
310, 311, 411
Pető, Iván 228
Petrescu, Barbu 100
Petrescu, Cristina 303, 317
Petrescu, Dan 24, 237, 315, 328–330,
413
Petrescu, Dumitru 274
Pleşu, Andrei 329
Pletos, Dumitru 381
Polish Solidarity 13, 49, 221, 316,
323, 324, 359, 405
Pollack, Detlef 71
Pop, Traian 204
Popescu, Dumitru 101, 278
Popescu, Dumitru Radu 329
Popescu-Puţuri, Ion 274
Popieluszko, Jerzy 367
Popovici, Vasile 92
Porumboiu, Corneliu 14, 74
Postelnicu, Tudor 103, 108, 381
Powell Jr., Bingham 64
Pozsgay, Imre 205
Prague Spring 18, 57, 196, 221, 276,
284, 293, 297, 316, 408
R
Radio Budapest 225
Radio Free Europe (RFE) 22, 58, 218–
221, 226, 230, 233–236, 238, 241–
243, 245, 287, 311, 328, 411
Radio Liberty (RL) 220
Radio Vatican 220
Radu, Gheorghe 384
Raiha, Valentin 84
Rákosi, Mátyás 262, 268
Rakovski, Cristian 177
Rashomon effect 13, 14, 73, 74, 401,
405
452
Index
Răceanu, Grigore 22, 184, 311, 312,
411
Răceanu, Ileana 185
Rădulescu, Speranţa 186
Reagan, Ronald 19, 59, 193
revolution from above 21, 56, 69, 115,
248, 249, 410
Roberts, Henry L. 122
Roguski, Camil 389
Roman, Petre 80
Roman, Valter 262
Ronnås, Per 117, 120
Rosamond, Ben 64
Ross, Marc Howard 63
Rotaru, Constantin 384
Rozvan, Eugen 274
Rupnik, Jacques 360
Rutkowski, Jan 51
S
Sampson, Steven L. 13, 49, 50, 405
Schöpflin, George 298, 340
Scruton, Roger 41
Seton-Watson, Hugh 309
Sfetcu, Paul 259, 363
Shafir, Michael 175, 360
Sik, Ota 142
Sinatra Doctrine 61, 200, 244
Sinatra, Frank 61, 200
Sîrbu, Ion D. 322
Smith, Anthony D. 268
snowball effect 19, 20, 53, 59, 61, 62,
193, 194, 200, 203, 213, 244,
245, 409
Socor, Vladimir 352
Soltan, Karol 39
Stalin, Iosif Vissarionovici 17, 21, 51,
124, 133, 174, 181, 182, 188, 221–
223, 250, 252, 257, 258, 262
Stănculescu, Atanasie Victor 107, 384
Stănescu, Ion 296
Stefanov, Boris 179, 255
Stefanski, Aleksandr Danieluk 179,
255
Stepan, Alfred 39, 71
Stere, Constantin 175
Stern, Jean 328
Stoenescu, Alex Mihai 84, 85, 399
Stoian, Ion 202
Stoica, Chivu 198, 255
Stoica, Gheorghe 274
Stokes, Gale 30
Stolojan, Sanda 152
strategic compromise 69
Suceavă, Ion 382
Sztompka, Piotr 115
Ş
Şandru, Ovidiu 184
Şora, Mihai 329
Ştefan, Pavel 184
Ştirbulescu, Hermina 102, 217
Şuţu, Nicolae 118
T
Tamás, G. M. 85, 86
Tănase, Stelian 24, 81, 82, 106, 241,
330, 352, 365
Teoctist Arăpaşu 364
Teodorescu, Filip 83, 211, 399
Teşu, Ion 203, 206, 207
Theda Skocpol 31
Tilly, Charles 32, 63
Timişoara 9, 14, 23, 26, 58, 74, 79–82,
84, 87, 88, 90, 92–94, 97–102,
104, 105, 121, 122, 134, 161, 212,
213, 215, 216, 224, 225, 242, 243,
291, 312, 331, 332, 334, 344, 352,
355, 358, 365, 372, 373, 383–385,
Index
387, 388, 390, 398–401, 405, 412,
415
Tismăneanu, Vladimir 252
Tito, Josip Broz 56, 141, 278, 289
Tóka, Gábor 12, 47
Tökés, László 35, 36, 87–90, 216
Tökés, Rudolf L. 35
Totu, Ioan 202
triangle of Romanian dissidence 234,
236
Tucker, Robert C. 56, 181, 249
Tudor, Corneliu Vadim 85
Tudoran, Dorin 24, 315, 322, 326, 413
Ţ
Ţepeneag, Dumitru 287
Ţugui, Pavel 190, 267
Ţura, Dan 75, 76
U
Urban, George R. 220, 226, 239
Urdăreanu, Tiberiu 377
V
Valev, E. B. 141
Vasile, Constantin 84
Vasile, Paul 96
453
Verba, Sidney 63
Verdery, Katherine 158, 172, 230,
321, 370
Verdeţ, Ilie 307, 347
Vianu, Ion 319
Vighi, Daniel 243, 358
Vijoli, Aurel 275
Vlad, Iulian 103, 108, 202, 213
Voice of America (VOA) 220, 233,
242
W
Wałęsa, Lech 203
Walicki, Andrzej 56, 183
Weber, Max 287
Wielgohs, Jan 71
Wolfe, Bertram 115, 182, 188
Y
Yakovlev, Aleksandr 60, 199
Z
Zalic, Alter 274
Zeca, Constantin 384
Zhelev, Zhelyu 45
Zhivkov, Todor 45, 57, 210
Zissu, Petre 274
This book puts forward an explanatory model for the collapse of the communist
regimes in East-Central Europe, applies it consistently to the case of Romania, and
answers some crucial questions concerning the causes, nature and outcome of the
1989 events in this country: m a t happened in December 1989 in Romania? Was it
a revolution or a coup d'dtat? If it was a true revolution, inasmuch as the 1989 events
in East-Central Europe can be characterized as revolutions, why it started in
Tirni~oaraand why precisely in December 1989? Why violence and bloodshed
instead of a "negotiated revolution"? Simply put, the present analysis highlights the
specificity of the Romanian revolution and identifies the causes of the sudden demise
of the Ceau~escuregime on 22 December 1989 at noon.
Drag05 Pctrescu is Lecturer in Comparative Politics in the Department of Political
Science, University of Bucharest and Chairman of the Board (the Collegium) of the
National Council for the Study of the Securitate Archives.
(:over illustrdtion: VI>L (viziti dr lucru) - 1983 by Mihai SrInescu
(Ikproduccd with kind pcrrnission of rhc artist).